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nor prejudicial to the defendants. Lachman v. Barnett. at maturity, and no previous statement of intention Opinion by Leonard, J.

not to pay at maturity, or other arraugement between [Decided Feb. 26, 1884.]

the maker and holder, cau excuse the non-presentation, so far as the indorsers are concerned, whatever effect it may have as to the maker. This question has

been settled by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts CRIMINAL LAW.

in Lee Bank v. Spencer, 6 Metc. 309. That was a suit

against indorsers of a promissory note made payable INTOXICATING

at the bank. It was not presented to the bank for LIQUORS IRREGULAR SALE. Where druggist who has

payment at maturity, because the promisor had for

permit from the probate judge of his county to sell intoxicating would be useless to present the note at the bank, as he

mally called on the holders and informed them that it liquors for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes, is prosecuted upon information in the District

could not pay it. But said Shaw, C. J., “however (ourt for selling intoxicating liquors for other than

this might affect the rights of the promisor, we think

it did not alter the conditional obligation of the inmedical, scientific or mecbanical purposes, and no other offense is charged against him, he cannot be con

dorsers, and make them responsible without any previcted for the offense of selling intoxicating liquors for

sentment whatever.” So in Pierce v. Whitney, 29 Me. medical, scientific and mechanical purposes in an ir

188, it was held that the fact that the maker of a note

had addressed a letter to the holder informing him regular manner. Sup. Ct. Kans., Jan., 1884. State v. White. Opinion by Valentine, J. (31 Kans. 342.)

that he would not be able to pay it at maturity, and

requesting an extension, would be no excuse for nonAPPEAL-A FUGITIVE NOT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD. presentation of the note at its maturity to the maker. -(1) Where the offense charged is a felony, and the Sup. Ct., Cal., Jan., 1884. Appelgarth v. Aybott. Opindefendant remains a fugitive from justice, he has no ion by McKee, J. (2 Pac. R. 43.) right to be heard upon any appeal in his behalf in this court. (2) Moreover the orders of the lower court forfeiting the bail money on the non-appearance of the defendant (though his counsel was present and wished

CORRESPONDENCE. to demur to the indictment), and refusing to hear a motion to discharge the forfeiture, the defendant still beiug at large, are not appealable, and can only be re

MR. THROOP TO MR. STERNE. viewed on an appeal from a final judgment. Sup. Ct. Utah, Feb., 1884. People v. Tremayne. Opinion by Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Emerson, d. (3 Pao Rep. 85.) [See 17 Am. Rep. 315; In the article by Simon Sterne, Esq., published in 3 T. & C. 734, 739; 115 Mass. 133; 10 Bush, 526; 15 La. the last number of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, entiAun. 495; 20 Gratt. 716, 722.-ED.)

tled, “On the Prevention of Defective and Slipsbod BASTARDY-EVIDENCE-NON-ACCESS-PRESUMPTION.

Legislation," I find the following statement relating -The law is well settled that the wife, on the question

to the Code of Civil Procedure: of legitimacy of her children, is incompetent to give then discorered that the repealing clause threatened a

"At last the first seven chapters were passed. It was evidence of the non-access of her husband during the time in which they must have been begotten. This general jail delivery, and that section had to be rule is founded on the very highest grounds of public amended subsequently before the Code could be per

mitted to take effect." policy, decency, and morality. The presumption of the law is in such a case that the husband had access

Gentlemen who are criticisivg others for “defective to the wife, and this presumption must be overcome

and slipshod legislation " should be very careful not by the clearest evidence that it was impossible for him,

to make “defective and slipshod" statements of fact.

as Mr. Sterne has done in this instance. The installby reason of impotency or imbecility, or entire absence froin the place where the wife was during such time,

ment of the Code of Civil Procedure which passed in

1876 contained the first thirteen chapters. No attempt to have had access to the wife, or to be the father of the child. Testimony of the wife even tending to

was ever made to pass the first seven chapters sepashow such fact, or of any fact from which such non

rately; nor were they ever separately reported to the access could be inferred, or of any collateral fact con

Legislature; but when a draft of them was completed nected with this main fact, is to be most scrupulously printed copies thereof were sent by the commissioners kept out of the case; and such non-access and illegiti.

to members of the bar for their suggestions; and after macy must be clearly proved by other testimony. The receiving such suggestions the commissioners revised, King v. Inhabitants, etc., 5 Ad. & Ell. 180; Dennison

amended and reprinted those chapters with the other v. Page, 29 Penn. St. 420; People v. Overseers of the

six, and reported the thirteen chapters to the LegislaPoor, 15 Barb. 286; Com. v. Shepard, 6 Bin. 283; State

ture, nearly two years after the drafts of them had v. Pattaway, 3 Hawks (N. C.), 625; Cope v. Cope, 1

been thus sent out. Nor did the Code of Civil ProceMoody & R. 269. Sup. Ct. Wis., May 15, 1884. Mink v.

dure contain any “repealing clause " whatever, either State. Opinion by Orton, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 445.) in the installment enacted in 1876 or in the installment [See 22 Eng. Rep. 286; 30 id. 562; 31 Minn. 319.

enacted in 1880. Nor did the General Repealing Act ED.)

of 1877 (L. 1877, ch. 417)—if Mr. Sterne means that act by his expression “repealing clause"-contain any thing which “threatened," or was thought by any body

(as far as I ever heard) to threaten, or could possibly FINANCIAL LAW.

be thought by any sensible person to threaten “a gen

eral jail delivery;" nor was it, nor were the thirteen NOTARY-PROTEST OF--EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT- chapters of the Code amended with the expectation or NO PRESENTATION INDORS ES DISCHARGE.--(1) The for the purpose of preventing any "jail delivery," gen. protest of a notary is only prima facie evidence of the eral, special, particular or partial. facts contained in it, and evidence to contradict and

Respectfully yours, overcome its recitals is admissible. (2) To bind the

MONTGOMERY H. THROOP. indorsers on a note, it must be presented to the maker ALPANY, September 22, 1884.

The Albany Law Journal.

can and English law. In the particular case of the Chatterbox' series the result is certainly some

thing similar in effect to what would follow if a ALBANY, OCTOBER 11, 1884. system of international copyright prevailed.

Though any American may reprint the books, probCURRENT TOPICS.

ably he would find no market for them except as

the Chatterbox'series, and thus the series may THE anomalous condition of the law which does incidentally be protected from reproduction in

America, except by the assignee of the English not recognize international copyright, but does

publisher." And the Athenæum says: “If this recognize the doctrine of trade-mark as to aliens, judgment is good law it is only one more anomaly has recently been illustrated in a suit, of which we

in a very anomalous state of affairs — that the find the following account in the Solicitors' Journal:

American law should thus defend the reputations of “The English publisher of a set of juvenile books called the Chatterbox' series has succeeded in a

our books while it will not reserve to us the profits

on their sale." suit against a Boston firm who reproduced the series. The suit was in fact brought by the person Whatever doubts the judges of Canada have about in America to whom the English publisher had as- the propriety of beating drums in the streets, the signed the exclusive right to use the name of the magistrates of Truro, England, have none about 'Chatterbox ’ series in America, but the question concertinas when complained of. The offending upon which the case turned was whether the En- musicians were members of the Salvation Army, glish publisher could prevent the use of the name and it was in evidence that they had on previous in America. It was quite clear, of course, that any

occasions marched through the streets playing body in America could reprint the matter of the musical instruments, tambourines and triangles, and series; the point was whether the Boston house did had been complained of. The proceeding was not represent their goods to be those of the English under a local ordinance, which appears in the folpublisher. The judge held, on the evidence, that lowing remarks of Stepheu, J., in delivering the by calling their reprint 'the Chatterbox series,' opinion of the Queen's Bench Division on affirming they were holding out to the world that their work the conviction: “Now, if we look at this by-law, was his. The English publisher had the exclusive the part I am now considering, and which is all we right to put his own work as his own upon the have to deal with, is: “Every person who shall market of the world. Not the right to prevent the sound or play upon any musical instrument, or sing copying and putting the work upon the markets, or make any noise whatsoever, in any street or near but the right to be free from untrue representa- any house within the said borough, after having tions that this other work was his when put upon been required by any householder resident in such the markets.' This principle is very familiar to street or house, or by any police constable, to desist English lawyers in cases with regard to trade- from making such sounds or noises, either on acnames; and in this country, as in America, there is count of the illness of any inmate of such house, nothing to prevent an alien friend from asserting or for any reasonable cause. Now what is there his right. It has been urged in America that the unreasonable in that? I have not the words of the decision in question gives the English inventor of London Act before me, but it is exactly like a wellthe 'Chatterbox' series what amounts to a copy- known provision in some of the metropolitan acts, right in the form of the books, and that the case is which in substance enables any householder who an illustration of the injustice to which the absence does not like barrel organs to order them to go of international copyright leads. (The laws of the away out of his hearing. We have heard about United States, it is said, 'which patriotically fos- the common law of England, and the liberty of the ter the pillage of Tennyson, or Macaulay, or Dick- subject, which are always suspected words. It is ens, can yet protect the inventor of a 'Chatterbox' like talking Latin. When one talks of the liberty series. With the spirit of this remark English au- of the subject and the common law of England, thors and publishers will doubtless agree. But the one always suspects it cannot be true. The liberty case does not really touch the question of copy- of the subject always consists in doing something right. The evidence showed that the Boston pub- a man is not forbidden to do, and why it is unrealishers, by using the name 'Chatterbox,' were rep- sonable and void that he should be forbidden to resenting their wares as those of the English play a musical instrument in the public streets of maker, and an American trader has no right to do Truro, I cannot see. It is a thing which nobody that in the case of books any more than in that of would visit with severity; but on the other hand it other kinds of goods. An American may make is an extreme annoyance to have a man playing unand sell reprints of Murray's handbooks, or imita- der your window with a concertina for a couple of tions of Holloway's pills, but he must not represent hours, and having a number of people to listen to that they are the articles made by Murray or Hollo- | it and to sing. That may be a great nuisance. It way. The ground upon which the principle is put is for the magistrates to say whether it is or not. If is that there is no right to deceive the public into a I saw, or if there was the least reason to think, that belief that the goods sold by one man are those of that by-law was strained unjustly, and distorted another. The principle is common to both Ameri- I from its natural meaning; if I thought that merely

VOL. 30 - No. 15.

because these people did not like the Salvation The case of the yacht Mignonette raises the quesArmy and their meetings, they tried to strain that tion whether one of two survivors of a shipwreck by-law to prevent their doing what they prima may lawfully kill and eat the other in order to save facie have a right to do, my view of the case would himself from starvation. The Law Journal rebe altogether different; but as far as I can judge, marks: “The story of the yacht Mignonette raises it appears from the whole of the proceedings there no legal question about which there can be any real was fair reason to think that the playing of this doubt. English law does not recognize necessity musical instrument in this place was an annoyance as an excuse for crime. Hunger is no dcfense to a to some of the persons who heard them, and the charge of larceny, still less is it a defense to a charge man who was summoned and fined was fined for of murder. There is authority in the books for saying that reason. On the one hand he has every right that if two drowning men grasp a plank which will to be protected in conducting religious worship in only support one, it is not homicide for one to push whatever harmless way he thinks fit; but on the the other off. This is looked upon as a sort of act of other hand he must obey the law, and if the law of self-defense, and is as far as the law goes in admita particular borough is that he is not to play a musi- ting the plea of necessity. Ordinarily, necessity in cal instrument in the streets if people object, English law means compulsion by threats of life or then he must not play it there, or he must play it limb." And the Solicitors' Journal observes: where people will not object, and I daresay there Blackstone says: “There is one species of homiare many places where he could play it without cide se defendendo where the party is equally innogetting into trouble.” What a luxury it must be cent as he who occasions the death, and yet this to live in a place where a householder can induce homicide is equally excusable from the great unian organ-grinder to “move on” without paying versal principle of self-preservation which prompts tribute!

every man to save his own life preferable to that of But the magistrates of Rugby were not so cer

another, where one of them must inevitably perish. tain whether mushrooms are "cultivated plants,"

As among others, in the case mentioned by Lord when salt has been sown with them to encourage

Bacon, where two persons being shipwrecked and their growth. At common law larceny does not lie getting on the same plank, but finding it not able for taking things savoring of the realty, but the

to save them both, one of them thrust the other Criminal Law Consolidation Act makes it a sum

from it, whereby he is drowned. He who thus premary offense to “destroy or damage with intent to

serves his own life at the expense of another man's

is excusable through unavoidable necessity and the

, pleasure-ground, nursery-ground, hothonse, green principle of self-defense, since both remaining on house or conservatory," and also to “destroy or

the same plank is a mutual, though an innocent damage with intent to steal any cultivated root or

attempt upon, and endangering each other's life.' plant used for the food of man or beast, and grow

The analogy between the case of two drowning in any land." The defendant was complained of

men struggling for the support of a small plank, for taking mushrooms from a field. The London

and that of two or more men in a boat in no immeLaw Journal says: “The case clearly did not come

diate peril otherwise than from starvation, is somewithin the first offense, because the mushrooms

what imperfect, since the survival of either of them were growing in a field and not in a garden; but

could scarcely be described as even 'an innocent atthe question was whether mushrooms growing in

tempt upon and endangering each other's life.' the field, and cultivated to the extent of salt being

We think the difference between the two thrown down for their benefit are 'cultivated

cases is very narrow, almost imperceptible. It is plants' within the meaning of the section. The plain that in a struggle to get possession of the magistrates decided that they were not, and it plank either would be justified in beating the other would be hard to say that they are wrong. Mush

off, even at the expense of life; but when two are rooms are clearly not cultivated plants' as a class,

once on a plank that can support only one, one has as and merely throwing a little salt or a little manure

much right to it as the other, and if one thrusts the on a field will not alter their character in the eye

other off to save his own life, how does that differ of the criminal law. If this were so, it might be

from his killing and eating him to save his own criminal to pick blackberries, because the owner

life? Strictly speaking, are not both murder! took care of the bramble bushes in clipping the

Should they not wait for the "survival of the fithedge. The mode of cultivating mushrooms from

test?” We concede that “hunger is no defense to spat is well known, and makes them apparent to

a charge of murder," but we do not see that danger the eye as cultivated plants, and in this form alone

to one's own life is any defense to a charge of takwould mushrooms in the fields seem to come within ing the life of another. But where is the jury that the statute. The case, which is reserved for the

would convict on such a charge? Men are not opinion of the High Court, may however throw morally responsible in such circumstances — they some light on the nature and properties of a

are unreasoning brutes, maniacs, reduced to a state somewhat mysterious growth." The case will

of nature, and absolved from the obligations of eventually be worthy of embalmment in our “Com- society. At least, so it will seem to the average mon Words and Phrases."

twelve men.

*

*

NOTES OF CASES.

C. B. 544; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 id. 583; Od

gers on Libel and Slander, by Bigelow, 202, 218, IN Rae , Mayor, etc., 51. Mich. 526

, it was hela N Rae v. Mayor, etc., 51 Mich. 526, it was held | 225; Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 433. The communi

cation had its origin in the confidential relation excommon council to take measures for the preserva-isting between the parties, and emanated from one tion of the public health, a nurse employed by the whom the defendant, under the circumstances, had council to take care of small-pox patients is entitled the right to believe. Privileged communications to compensation from the city, although the pa- comprehend all statements made bona fide in the tient himself is of sufficient ability to pay for the performance of a duty, or with a fair and reasonaservice, and a statute makes the cost of services so ble purpose of protecting the interest of the person rendered an individual liability. The court said: making them. The communication made by the “The duty to guard the public health and prevent defendant comes within the protection of this rule. the spread of contagion was imperative, and the

What the defendant said was in performance of a power of the common council was- commensurate duty he owed, not only to the guest, but to the with the duty. Neither the power nor the obliga- good reputation and management of the hotel untion could be lessened by the failure to designate a

der his charge. Numerous illustrations of the rule sub-agency."

“In providing that what is will be found in the authorities above cited, and done shall be at the charge of individuals, it is not the recent case of Billings v. Fairbanks (Sup. Ct. of intended to exempt the public from immediate lia- Mass., Dec., 1883) shows that it controls the dispobility. It would be impossible under such a regu- sition of this case. The communication being lation to effectuate the general object. Individu- privileged, the legal inference of malice is repelled, als would not be willing to provide necessaries, and and the onus of proving its existence, beyond the serve as nurses and assistants at the instance of the mere falsity of the charge, was in consequence public if compelled to collect their pay of the pa- thrown upon the plaintiff. Lewis v. Chapman, 16 tients or their relatives. The public is first and

N. Y. 373. There being no affirmative proof of acimmediately responsible, and the intent of the stat- tual malice it follows that the complaint must be ute is to enable the public to obtain reimbursement

dismissed." from those who ought to sustain the expense. The plaintiff hired herself to the city.

In Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, the accused, a

She trusted the city and no one else. The occasion was a public

physician, while examining the person of a female one. It was an emergency to which the duty and patient believed to be suffering from a disease of authority of the common council attached under

the womb, had carnal connection with her. There the power of police, and the right and duty to act

was no evidence of consent upon her part, obtained depended in no manner on the pecuniary ability of by fraud or otherwise. Held that the accused was the persons who were sick or infected. The great tends to show that the appellant, as a physician, in

guilty of rape. The court said: “The evidence object was to stay the contagion, and the proper formed Rebecca and her mother that the former and humane care of the individuals was a righteous incident. The question is not affected by any of

was suffering from a terrible womb disease, and was

If the jury believed, as they the other provisions. We are satisfied that the

losing her mind. council was fully authorized to employ the plaint- might well have done under the evidence, that the iff, and that the city is liable." To the same effect,

appellant, as a physician, obtained possession and Labrie v. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120; S. C., 47 Am.

control of Rebecca's person, under her mother's Rep. 179; 29 ALB. Law JOUR. 43.

command, for the purpose of making a further examination of her alleged disease of the womb, and

not for the purpose of sexual intercourse, and that In Keane v. Sprague, New York City Court, the she never in fact gave her consent, through fraud court, by McAdam, J., held as follows: “The de- or otherwise, to the sexual connection, then, it fendant, the manager of the St. James Hotel, was seems to us, that the case in hand falls fairly within informed by a guest that the plaintiff, a domestic the doctrine declared in Queen v. Flatery, 2 Q. B. employed in the hotel, had stolen a diamond pin D. 410, decided in 1877, and that the appellant from his room, whereupon the defendant sent for was lawfully convicted of the crime of rape. In the plaintiff and told her what the guest had said, the case cited, as in this, the defendant professed and in the presence of the chambermaid charged to give medical and surgical advice for money. the plaintiff with the offense. For this the plaint-The prosecutrix, a girl of nineteen, like the proseiff sues the defendant, and the question arises cutrix in this case, was 'subject to fits,' and she whether, under the circumstances stated, the com- and her mother consulted the defendant in regard munication, apparently slanderous per se, was privi- to her case, and informed him of her condition. leged. I hold that it was. The relation of master The defendant, as in this case, made an examinaand servant existed, in legal effect, between the tion of the person of the prosecutrix, and advised parties, and the occasion, in law, repels all idea of that a surgical operation be performed, and under malice, and justified the defendant in repeating the the pretense of performing it, had carnal conneccharge which his guest made. See Townshend on tion with her. It was held by the court that the Libel and Slander, $$ 209, 244; Manly v. Witt, 18 prisoner was guilty of rape. Kelly, C. B., said: It is plain that the girl only submitted to the de. error, because it did not recognize force as an esfendant's touching her person in consequence of sential element. See note, 12 Am. Rep. 290. See the fraud and false pretenses of the prisoner, and also Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276; S. C., 38 Am. that the only thing that she consented to was the Rep. 366; Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 518; S. C., performance of the surgical operation. Up to the 36 Am. Rep. 856, and note, 860. time when she and the prisoner went into the room alone, it is clearly found on the case that the only thing contemplated, either by the girl or her

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHARLES

JAMES FOLGER. mother, was the operation which had been advised; sexual connection was never thought of by either of them. And after she was in the room alone

N looking over my letters from Judge Folger it with the prisoner, what the case expressly states is that the girl made but feeble resistance, believing be of great interest to the legal profession and to that she was being treated medically, and that

the public, as illustrative of his mental characteriswhat was taking place was a surgical operation.

tics and habits, and his opinions, and would display In other words, she submitted to a surgical opera

him in a familiar and pleasant light to those who tion, and nothing else. It is said however, that

did not intimately know him. For example, I having regard to the age of the prosecutrix, she

know it is generally supposed that he died of must have known the nature of sexual connection.

political disappointment. This is a natural inferI know of no ground in law for such a proposition.

ence, perhaps, but it is a mistaken one, I believe. And even if she had such knowledge she might

He was too strong for that, and he was a very sick suppose that penetration was being effected with man long before he went to Washington. How he the hand or with an instrument. The case is there

really felt about his defeat in 1882 is shown in the fore not within the authority of those cases which

following, of November 15, 1882, in answer to have been decided, decisions which I regret, that

mine remarking that election day had proved a where a man by fraud induces a woman to submit “cold day for the Republican party:" "You seem to sexual connection, it is not rape.' In the same

to think that Mr. Cleveland's election is one of the case, Mellor, J., also said: “It is said that submis- 'frozen facts' that we have heard of lately. Sevsion is equivalent to consent, and that here there eral of the anonymous letters I received during the was submission. But submission to what? Not to canvass promised to make it hot' for me. Whence carnal connection. The case is exactly within the

this inconsistency? For I fancy the writers hug words of Wilde, C. J., in Reg. v. Case, 1 Den. C. C.,

themselves with the notion that they kept their at page 582: "She consented to one thing, he did promise. Considering the tone and action of the another materially different, on which she had been Republicans, lukewarm 'might be the better word. prevented by his fraud, from exercising her judg. But cold, or hot, or tepid, it has passed, and I am ment.' In People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, after

content if the people are.” The next day he wrote: citing some decisions both in England and in this “Your having forsworn politics may have saved country, to the effect that if the woman's consent you from some evil things; it ought not to debar is obtained by fraud the crime of rape is not com- you from some good things; so I send you this. I mitted, Cooley, J., said: “But there are some cases have a note by mail, anonymous, as follows: 'Acin this country to the contrary, and they seem to cept the best wishes and appreciation, in this day us to stand upon much the better reason, and to be of your defeat, from a political opponent. more in accordance with the general rules of

•Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit, criminal law. People v. Medcalf, 1 Whart. C. C.

Nulli flebilior quam mihi.' 378, and note 381; State v. Shepherd, 7 Conn. 54.

'Consulque non unius anni

Sed quoties bonus atque idus.' And in England where a medical practitioner had knowledge of the person or a weak-minded pa

The first couplet is from the ode of Horace, adtient, on pretense of medical treatment, the offense

dressed to Virgil on the death of Quinctilius Varus was held to be rape. Reg. v. Stanton, 1 C. & K. 415.

(Lib. 1, ode xxiv). My friend has substituted mihi The outrage upon the woman, and the injury to for tibi, and omitted Virgili. He (perhaps you will society, is just as great in these cases as if actual

think) would have been as apt in quotation if he force had been employed, and we have been unable

had written to me the last two lines of the ode: to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said to be

'Durum, sed levius fit patientia any less against the will of the woman, when her

Quicquid corrigere est nefas!' consent is obtained by fraud, than when it is ex- (It is hard; but borne with patience, even that torted by threats or force.' But in Don Moran v. which cannot be remedied, becomes more toleraPeople, 25 Mich. 356; S. C., 12 Am. Rep. 283, the ble.) Where my Democratic mourner gets his jury having been instructed that they might con- other couplet, I have not yet found.” I am invict if they found that the defendant procured the clined to believe that he was more annoyed at his woman to have connection with him by fraudulent inability to ascertain the authorship of that couplet representations, which she believed, that it was a | than by his defeat. necessary part of his medical treatment of her, and He did not love politics, and he heartily despised to save the necessity of a dangerous operation, held, the insincerity and faithlessness of politicians, I

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