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some remedy, if any practicable and expedient rem- to all the complicated transactions of modern business edy exists. The lawyer in au important case does not and society, with a view wholly to supersede the refeel that he has discharged his full duty if he has not ports. made a thorough examination of the multitudinous The comprehensive scheme above outlined seems to mass of decisions and put the result upon his brief. have been Bentham's idea of a code. What is more visThe community which is conclusively supposed to ionary than the legal millennium he pictured to his kuow the law aud required to obey it, does not at- fancy? “Every man his own lawyer. Behold in this," tempt to acquire or affect to possess such knowledge. he exclaimed, “the point to aim at." Bentham never Tennyson's well-known picture borrows nothing from argued or tried a cause. His iudependent and vigorous poetic coloring, but is severely drawn with the sober intellect lacked the true legal wisdom that can only pencil of a judge.

come from living contact with the law at the bar or The lawless science of our law,

on the bench. The codeless myriad of precedent,

He had all the elements of a reformer-enthusiastic, That wilderness of single instances

fierce, destructive. He is an unique, statuesque, ecThrough which a few by wit or fortune led

centric figure in the English law. His sensitive nature May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame." personally unfitted him for the practice of his profesOur condition is worse than the condition in Eng

But as we read his bitter, bold, sweeping denun. laud, since we have thirty-eight State courts of last

ciations of the evils in government and law as he saw resort, and no superior tribunal to harmonize conflict- them, we seem to behold in him an ancient prophet ing decisions except in the comparatively small num- with flowing robe and beard, coming with a new mesber of cases in volving Federal law.

sage to an unheeding world. His assaults were not Still the inquiry comes back, What is the remedy?

wholly without effect, and they brought about at “If there no balm in Gilead? Is there no physician

length some useful emendations in the law. "Nobody there?" Still the question presses, Where or in what has been so much plundered as Bentham," said some is all this to end?

one to Talleyrand, who replied: “True, but how rich When we consider how purblind are the wisest and he still is.” The world is yet troubled over his ideas most sagacious in dealing with the future, I venture a as to the rational and true purpose of that to which he forecast and the reasons therefor with unaffected dis- gave the name of codification, and it is not impossible trust.

that a more remote age may accept as sound in 1. Our laws will, I believe, even if codification be not principle what to most of us still seem to be his exadopted, become relatively more and more embodied travagant notions on this subject. in legislative form.

He believed it was possible to extract from the The greater certainty and convenience of a carefully reports all that was valuable in them; nay, that this considered enactment over the chaotic and upmethod.

ought to be done, and done speedily, and embodied in ized condition of the law wben it has to be sought

a code, whereupon he would have been willing, I through volumes of reports and a variety of statutes,

fancy, to have burued the law reports, and himself to will constantly operate with no inconsiderable force in have applied the torcb. Unfortunately there is no alexpanding the scope of legislative action; and this, chemy by which the value of the law reports can all be although codification in the sense usually attached to extracted and transmuted into statutory coin. the term, be not undertaken. This tendency is especially

There are, I think, few advocates of codification who observable in modern English legislation, and one can

share in Bentham's extreme views; but there are not fail to perceive in the recent English reports how

many who believe, myself amongst them, that a far much greater than formerly is the proportion of causes

less radical scheme-one more suited to human nathat turn upon statutory enactments. Iu this silent, ture's daily food-is not only feasible, but desirable, unperceived way the English bar and people are being

viz. : a thorough revision and systematic statement, educated up to and gradually prepared for codification

not of the whole law, but as far as it can be expein some practicable,expedient form. Every statute care

diently done, of the law on the great subjects wbich fully thought out and fully covering an important sub

relate to the ordinary business and life of the people; ject is in one sense codification; at all events it is pro deducing and stating what is clear; removing what is tanto a remedy for the unsatisfactory condition of the

archaic and obsolete; settling what is doubtful or oblaw ou that subject existing when the statute was en.

scure; filling in the gaps and interstices by legislative acted.

additions, never losing sight of the old land-marks, But ought the legislative action to be so expanded sailing ever close to the shore, using whenever they as to embrace codification within its remedial endeav

will answer the purpose old conceptions, language and ors? Well, what is codification? The term is used in

methods of classification, and making no changes in such a variety of senses that it must be defined before substantive law, except where it is demonstrably clear the question, " Whether codification is an expedient

that change is improvement. remedy," can be answered.

Codification within these conservative limits bas By one class of code advocates it is insisted that the many advocates in England and in this country among essential idea of a code is a complete statement of the

lawyers and judges of ability and wide experience. whole law of the land, including both statute law and

of the opponents of codification of the unwritten case law. In their view the principles of true codifica. law in any form, some deny its practicability and some tion must assume that the law in its leading depart- its expediency. Its practicability proceeds in part ments bas practically attained its growth; that its upon the truth so clearly expressed by Lord Mansfield principles are settled; that these can be and ought to

that “the law does not consist of particular cases, but be expressed in precise and logical form, without any

of general principles, which are illustrated and exnecessary references to old language and conceptions plained by those cases. Rex v. Bembridge, 3 Dougl. or titles; that it is feasible to do this so as to cover the

332. whole field of general law, to the end of superseding

The number of the cases is legion, but the principles the prior statutes and the law reports; and that any they establish are comparatively few, capable of course lesser attempt argues an inadequate appreciation of of being thoroughly mastered, and capable also of dithe mischief and of the needful remedy. To me it has

rect and intelligible statement. The objection to the always seemed, I will not say chimerical, but inexpe- expediency of such a performance, assuming the work dient, to attempt a scheme so ambitious as the em

to be thoroughly done by the ablest and fittest men in bodying into a code or statutory form rules applicable

the profession, is that the freedom of growth of the unwritten law will thereby be arrested, and the inelas- character for learning and ability of many of the ticity and imperativeness of the codified rule will work benches of shifting judges is not such as to invest injustice, since the courts will be required to apply it their judgments and decisions with special value, the in cases in which the facts and circumstances would combined result will be a tendency more and more to take it out of the rule if the rule had not been cast in diminish the importance of the “case lawyer," and to an inflexible statutory mould.

make felt the importance of a knowledge of the great, There is some plausibility, but on the assumption living, fundan ental principles of our law and equity that the work of codification is done in the spirit and systems, and to argue and decide causes with greater manner I have indicated, there is little real force in reliance upon these principles. We have at length the objections. In my view, the codifier ought not to happily reached, in law as in literature, the salutary generalize any principle, so that it could fairly apply stage when, in the language of Dr. Johuson, “no preto any other than the class of cases specially defined, cedents can justify absurdity.” Life of Milton. and for which it was intended, to the end that the As therefore we must expect that adjudged cases codified rule shall, unless purposely changed, be sim- will continue to be reported, and continue as heretoply co-extensive with the settled uncodified rule, fore to be used as authority, and to serve as sources or which the courts have no more power to cbange or to evidence of legal principles, we are deeply concerned refuse to apply in the uncodified than in the codified in whatever favorably or injuriously affects the value state. It cases shall arise not within the rule, and not of the reports. expressly provided for, they will be determined in the The character of many recent reports has deteriosame manner as if no code existed. If mistakes shall rated from several causes. To two of these I will now be made they can be speedily remedied by the Legisla- | allude, because they arise from mistaken views and ture, which meets annually or bi-annually in all the practices of the judges themselves, and are therefore States; and by a standing provision for frequent leg- readily remediable. islative revision. A rule could also be enacted that Most of our appellate courts are crowded with the code should be construed as a code of the common causes, and the effect of this upon the judges is that law of the State, and not strictly, like statutes, in de- they too often feel it to be an ever-pressing, pararogation of the common law.

mount, all-absorbing duty “to clear the docket." This A more extended and radical scheme of codification mistakenly becomes the chief object to be attainedthan the one I have outlined is, I admit, theoretical, the primary instead of a quite subordinate considerapossible, and perhaps desirable, whenever the work tion. In the accomplishment of this end, the judges can be thoroughly done. Codification in some form are as impatient of delay as was the wedding guest in will, I feel sure, be accomplished at no very distant the Rime of the Ancient Mariner. Added to this, a maday in Great Britain, and then, if not before, our jority of the Appellate judges generally reside elseStates will undoubtedly adopt the result with neces- where than at the capital or place where the courts are sary changes.

beld, and the desire is constantly felt to bring a laboIn the law of procedure we have heretofore led the rious session to an end as speedily as possible, in order way, under an able and eminent lawyer of this State that they may rejoin their families and do their work (Mr. David Dudley Field) in a great reform, which in the fatigue dress of their libraries rather than under spread not only over our own land, but has crossed the the necessary restraints of the term. As a result, two two oceans, and lies at the basis of the recent and ex- practices have grown up too generally throughout the isting Judicature Act of Great Britain.*

country, which have, as I think, done more to impair It ought to gratify a laudable national and profes- the value of judicial judgments and opinions than persional pride if we could in like manner lead the way to haps all other causes combined. a reform equally needed, and within the limits indi- The first is that the submission of causes upon cated, equally practicable, in the substantative law printed briefs is favored, and oral arguments at the common to both nations. I recall here Mr. Webster's | bar are discouraged, and the time allowed therefor is remarks in his finished eulogy on Mr. Justice Story: usually inadequate. ** There is no purer pride of country thay that in which On this subject I hold very strong opinions, but also, we may indulge when we see America paying back hold that no opinion can be too strong. As a means the great debt of civilization, learning and science to of enabling the court to understand the exact case Europe; and in the august reckoning and accounting brought thither for its judgment;{as a means of eliobetween nations, returning light for light and mind iting the very truth of the matter, both of law and for mind. Acknowledging, as we all acknowledge, fact, there is no substitute for oral argument. None! our obligations to the original sources of English law, I distrust the soundness of the decisiou of any court, as well as of civil liberty, we have seen in our genera- of any case, either novel or complex, which has been tion copious and salutary streams turning and running submitted wholly upon briefs. Speaking, if I may be backward, replenishing their original fountains, and allowed, from my own experience, I always felt a reagiving a fresher and brighter grace to the fields of sonable assurance in my own judgment, when I had English jurisprudence."

patiently heard all that opposing counsel could say to 2. In course of time each State will have, as the aid me, and a very diminished faith in any judgment result of permanent statutes and the lengthened line given in a cause not orally argued. Mistakes, errors, of its own judicial decisions, a jurisprudence of its fallacies and flaws elude us in spite of ourselves, unless own, so ample that the necessity for going beyond it the case is pounded and hammered at the bar. This will arise only in the novel and exceptional cases, mischievous substitute of printer's ink for face-to-face which will justify and reward the labor. -> argument impoverishes our case law at its very source,

3. As the common law happily underlies our juris- since it tends to prevent the growth of able lawyers, prudence, thereby giving it a general uniformity of who are developed only in the conflicts of the bar, and character, and as the labor of examining the multitude of great judges, who can become great only by the aid of reports becomes more and more onerous to the busy of the bar that surrounds them. It was not thus until practitioner or the equally busy judge; and as the a quite recent period. Nor are these views at all novel

* Fortunate man! To hate had his days graciously Lord Coke refers to the benefits of oral arguments in prolonged so much beyond the common span, that he language the most solemn and impressive. In cases of might witness this ecumenical triumph of the ideas of

difficulty he says: “No man alone, with all his utterhis earlier, but not more enthusiastic, days.

most labors, nor all the actors in them, themselves by themselves, out of a court of justice, can attain unto a right decision; nor in court without solemn argu- ciples of law which apply to this precise state of ment, where I am persuaded Almighty God openeth facts, each of which operations requires the disciplined and enlargeth the understanding of those desirous of exercise of intellectual qualities of a high order; when justice and right.”

the bench shall be constituted of the flower of the bar, Formerly whenever a new or difficult question arose and appellate judgments shall not be given without a the judges of England invited argument and rear previous conference of the judges, at which the grounds ment always in open court; and in the earlier days of of the judgment shall be agreed upon before the recthe law the matter was not only debated at the bar by ord is assigned for the opinion to be written; when the counsel for the parties, but was afterward dis- opinions shall be rigidly restricted, without unnecescussed by the judges openly at a time prefixed in the sary disquisition and essay writing, to the precise presence of the barristers and apprentices. "A rever- points needful to the decision, we will have an abler end and honorable proceeding in law, a grateful satis- bar, better judgments, and an improved jurisprudence faction to the parties, and a great instruction to the in which erroneous and conflicting decisions will be studious hearers.''*

few and reduced in the minimum. If, gentlemen, our case law is not to go on deterior- And here I must close. My purpose has been to ating, we must revive the former appreciation of the show that our system of jurisprudence is consonant value of oral arguments. It is these that must be fa- with the genius of our people and with our civil and vored, and it is the submission wholly on briefs that political ivstitutions; that it is an outgrowth of them, ought to be discouraged.

and powerfully supports and sustains them. It is, in The other practice among some, I fear many, of our its ground work, the system that prevails whererer, in appellate courts which injuriously affects our case law, either continent, the English language is spoken. In is the practice of assigning the record of causes sub- our law libraries we find the learning and labors of mitted on printed arguments to one of the judges to judges administering this system in law reports from look into and write an opinion, without a previous ex- India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, the amination of the record and arguments by the judges

Sandwich Islands and the West Indies. All this is the in concert.

heritage, by a species of tenancy in common, of the This practice ought to be forbidden; peremptorily English and American lawyer, who wherever, within forbidden, by statute. What is the most difficult func

this wide horizon, he finds his language spoken, finds tion of an appellate court? It is, after the record is

also individual and civil liberty, popular institutions, fully opened and the arguments understood, to deter

legislative assemblies, the graud and petit jury, Magna mine precisely upon what point or points the judgment Charta, Habeas Corpus, the same sacred regard for iudiof the case ought to turn and rest. This most delicate vidual rights, the same reverential affection for, and and important of all judicial duties ought always to be instinctive obedience to law. What incalculable adperformed by the judges in full conference before the vantages! We have the same legal literature. We hare record is delivered to one of their number to write the

the same legal firmament, in which we behold Hale opinion of the court, which, when written, should be

and Mansfield, Hardwicke and Story, Blackstone and confined to the precise grounds thus predetermined. Kent, Erskine and Webster. We partake mutually of But in respect to oral arguments and prior confer

the benefits of each other's labors. Whoever achieres ences, it gives me sincere pleasure to add that the Su- any thing for the advancement of the law, achieves it preme Court of the United States is a model for every not for his own country alone, but for all Englishappellate tribunal in the country.

speaking and English-governed peoples. When the ideal of legal education shall be the master My further purpose has been to show that although of principles, so that the first impulse of the lawyer this system is not without serious defects, rather howwill be to find the “principle" and not the case

ever of form than of substance, the remedy is not to that governs the matter in hand; when arguments at substitute the principles of some alieu system, but to the bar shall be mainly directed, first, to an ascertain- engraft the needed amendments and changes on this ment of the peculiar aud controlling facts of the case hardy, native stock. under consideration, and then to pointing out the prin- The special duty of the American lawyer is of course

to improve and promote the jurisprudence of his own *"Whereunto (in those cases that be tortuosi and of country. That we recognize this duty, the existence great difficulty, adjudged upon demurrer or resolved of this association, of which this is the chief end, and in open court) no one man alone with all his true and

your presence fully attests. What great and complex uttermost labors, nor all the actors in them, themselves problems confront the American lawyer, growing out by themselves, out of a court of justice, nor in court of our vast territorial extent, and our District, Federal without solemu argument, where (I am persuaded Al- and State systems of government and jurisprudence; mighty God openeth and enlargeth the understanding out of the changes wrought by iron, steam and elecof the desirous of justice and right) could ever bave at- tricity in business, and all the modes of communicatained unto. For it is one amongst others of the great tion and transportation; out of the combinations of honors of the common laws that cases of great diffi- capital almost without limit, in corporate form, affectculty are never adjudged or resolved in tenebris or sub iug interests vital to individuals and to society. The silentio suppressio rationibus; but in open court, and law has to be adapted to these new situations and cirthere upon solemn and elaborate arguments, first at cumstances. What a weighty work! Truly it demands the bar by the counsel learned of either party (and if the most attentive study, the most penetrating obserthe case depend in the Court of Common Pleas, then vation, the most sedate consideration, the ripest judgby sergeants at law only); and after by the bench by meut. Here will be found work enough for us all. the judges, where they argue (the puisve judge begin- We have laid, as I have attempted to show, the foundning and so ascending) seriatim upon certain days ations of a noble jurisprudence, and during the two openly and purposely prefixed, declaring at large the centuries of our colonial and national life the structauthorities, reasons and causes of their judgments and ure has been carried along so as to meet contemporary resolutions, in every such particular case (habet enim wants and needs. The work must however go forward nescio quid energiae viva vox) a reverend and honora- with the national progress. What more generous amble proceeding in law, a grateful satisfaction to the bition can inspire; what higher duty can engage the parties, and a great instruction and direction to the American lawyer than to assist in his day in advancattentive and studious hearers." Sir Edward Coke's ing this structure, and adapting it, by alteration and Preface to 9th Coke's Reports, page XIV.

enlargement, to the changed and changing conditions

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Charles H. Drew, for complainant.
C. J. Hunt, for defendant.

LOWELL, J. This bill is brought upon two patents, and the demurrer of the city of New Bedford raises sereral objections, all but one of which, it is agreed, can be and may be removed by amendment. A question which cannot be thus disposed of, and which has been argued with earnestness, and is pending in at least one other Circuit, is whether the complainant's title to an undivided part of one of the patents is sufficient. It seems that this title comes through an administrator of the patentee, and the defendant contends that the grant of a patent, by Rev. Stat., § 4884, is to the patentee, “his heirs and assigns," and that by force of these words a patent descends directly to the heirs, without the intervention of the administrator. This is a new and somewhat surprising proposition. It has never been doubted before that a patent' is personal property, which follows the ordinary course, and goes to the executor or administrator in trust for the next of kin. The cases take this for granted, and when any question has been mooted, it has had reference to the due qualification of the executor or administrator, or something of that sort, as ir Rubber Co. v.Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788. The text-writers treat of patent-rights as personal property which goes to the executor. Norm. Pat. 145; Schouler Exrs., $ 200. The defendant argues that the statute of 1870 changed the rule by omitting the words “ executors and administrators" from what is now section 4884, intending to make a sort of real estate of this incorporeal right. He has not argued that the widow can be endowed of it, but I suppose that will follow. A grant of personal property to a man and his beirs, without further qualification, means to him and his next of kin, according to the statute of distributions. 4 Kent Comm. (5th ed.) 537, note d, and cases; Vau. v. Henderson, 1 J. & W. 33811. ; Gittings v. McDermott, 2 Mylne & K. 69; Re Newton's Trusts, L. R., 4 Eq. 171; Re Gryll's Trusts, L. R., 6 Eq. 689; Re Steeven's Trusts, L. R., 15 Eq. 110, Re Thompson's Trusts, 9 Ch. Div. 607; Houghton v. Kendall, 7 Allen, 72; Sweet v. Dutton, 109 Mass. 589. Such a grant is simply a limitation of an estate of inheritance, having po reference one way or the other to the administrator. He takes in trust for the next of kin, because the estate is more than a life estate. The acts of Congrees have not been drawn with technical accuracy in this particular respect. Down to 1836 the word "executors was omitted, and patents were issued to the patentee, his “heirs, administrators, or assigns' (St. April 10, 1790, $1; 1 St. 110; St. Feb. 21, 1793, $ 1; 18t., $ 321); but no one ever doubted but executors would take the title. In 1836 executors were added,

and the grant was to the patentee, his “heirs, administrators, executors or assigns." St. July 4, 1836, $ 5; 5 St. 119. In 1870 administrators aud executors were left out. This omission is not significant. The law was not changed by it, the proof of which is that executors and administrators are mentioned as taking title in five of the sections of the Revised Statutes which reenact the law of 1870. Thus, by section 4896, if an inventor dies before a patent is granted, the right to obtain it devolves on his executor or administrator, in trust for his heirs at law (that is, his next of kin, as we have seen), or to his devisees, as the case may be, which techuically should be legatees. By section 4898 every patent shall be assignable, and the patentee and his assigns, or legal representatives," may in like manner grant, etc. Now legal representatives usually means executors or administrators (Price v. Strange, 6 Madd. 159; Re Gryll's Trusts, L. R., 6 Eq. 589), and it has that meaning in this statute, for by section 4896, above mentioned, by which the executors or administrators are authorized to apply for a patent, it is provided that wheu the application is made “by such legal representatives," the oath shall be varied to meet their situation. By section 4900 it is made the duty of all patentees and their assigns and “legal representatives" to do certain acts by way of informing the public that the article they make or sell is patented. By section 4922, when a patentee has innocently claimed more than his invention, he, his executors, administrators and assigns may maintain a suit on the patent, notwithstanding the mistake. By section 4916 if a patentee is dead, without having assigned the patent, and there is occasion for a reissue, it shall be made to his executors or administrators. From a comparison of these sections it is made clear that a patent-right, like any other personal property, is understood by Congress to vest in the executors and administrators of the patentee, if he has died without having assigned it. It is really of no consequence whether they hold in trust for heirs or for next of kin, so long as they take the legal title.

It was argued that Congress may have intended to express by the word “beirs" that a patent should not be assets for the payment of debts. But they have not only not exempted patent-rights from being taken for the debts of the owners, but have required that they should be so taken by assignees in bankruptcy (Rev. Stat., $ 5046); and the Supreme Court have failed to discover such an intent, for they hold that by due process in chaucery a patent-right may be applied to such payment. Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126. Indeed section 4898 is decisive of this question, for it expressly provides that the legal representatives of the patentee may assign. Eveu if this were a mere statutory power, the authority would be sufficient; but it is of course a recognition of a fact, and not a new grant of power.

Demurrer overruled.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-STATE LAWS.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF INDIANA.

FEBRUARY 26, 1884.*

a

HULL V. DILIA. A bill of complaint having been filed by a vard against his

guardian in the United States Circuit Court for Indiana, it was contended by the defense, that according to the laws of Indiana, in matters of probate, relief could be granted only by the courts in which the proceedings were had, and that these could not be made subject to any collateral proceedings. Held, that the equity courts of the United States are not affected by the restrictions laid by the several States upon their own equity courts.

* 19 Fed. Rep. 957.

*S. C., 19 Federal Reporter, 753.

demurrer to bill. ON

366; Jones & C. Pr. 270, $6; Rorer Jud. Sales, 125, $317;

2 Story Eq., $ 1339. Sullivan & Jones, W. L. Penfield, and E. Callahan,

Whatever may be the rule in and in respect to the for complainant.

State courts, the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, in

such cases, if the parties be citizens of different States, Combs, Bell & Morris, for defendant.

seems to have been distinctly declared and upheld.

In Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, a case wherein the Woods, J. The bill, stated generally, charges that

bill sought “to open the settlements with the Probate the defendant was appointed guardian of the com

Court as fraudulent, and to cancel the receipt and plainaut by the Probate Court of De Kalb county, In

transfer from the complainant to the administrator diana, and that as such guardian, he wrongfully and

because obtained by false representations," the propofraudulently sold real estate of the complainant for

sition was advanced “that a Federal court of cbanless than its value, and afterward, in like mauner, pro

cery sitting in Missouri will not enforce demands oured an order of the court for the investment of the

against an administrator or executor, the State court, proceeds of the sale in other lands, owned by the de

having general chancery powers, could not enforce fendant, at and for a sum greatly exceeding the value

similar demands.” In response to this, the Supreme of the land, and thereupon conveyed the land to the

Court, by Davis, J., says: “If this position could be plaintiff, and procured the approval of the court to the

maintained, an important part of the jurisdiction conveyance, by concealing from the court the fact that

couferred on the Federal courts by the Constitution the land belonged to the guardian himself; that the

and laws of Congress would be abrogated. But this guardian had made false and fraudulent reports, and

objection to the jurisdiction of the Federal tribunals had been guilty of other official delinquencies specified

has been heretofore presented to this court and over(but which need not be particularized here); and that

ruled.” in October, 1878, the defendant filed with the court his

“We have repeatedly held 'that the jurisdiction resignation as guardian, coucerning which the entry

of the courts of the United States cannot be impaired of record made at the time is of the tenor following,

by the laws of the States which prescribe the modes of to wit: “Which resignation is accepted."

redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribu

That plaintiff became of lawful age in December, 1882, and

tion of their judicial power.' If legal remedies are on the next day after attaining his majority executed

sometimes modified to suit the cbanges in the laws of and tendered to the defendant a reconveyance by

the States, and the practice of their courts, it is not so

with equitable. The equity jurisdiction conferred on quitclaim deed of said land, and demanded an ac

the Federal courts is the same that the high court of counting of said guardianship, all of which the defendant refused. The prayer of the bill is “to have

chancery in Eugland possesses; is subject to neither the said record and proceedings examined in this

limitation nor restraint by State legislation; and is court and corrected or revised; annulled, canceled,

uniform throughout the different States of the Union. and set aside;" that the order authorizing such sale

Hgde v. Stone, 20 How. 175; Union Bank v. Jolly's may be reviewed and wholly reversed; and that the

Admrs., 18 id. 503; Suydam v. Broadnat, 14 Pet. 67.

See also Fiske v. Hills, 11 Biss. 294; S.C., 12 Fed. Rep. plaintiff be restored to his rights as if the sale had not been made; and if this cannot be done, “that an ac

372; Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 249. count may be taken of the

This bill shows that the complainant is a citizen and

matters and things charged," eto., and for general relief.

resident of Illinois, and the respondent of Indiana, The objections made to the bill is that it shows a

and except in the respect already considered, its sufcase wherein relief should be sought, and can be ficiency has not been questioned. The demurrer is

therefore overruled. granted only in the Circuit Court of De Kalb county, Indiava, the court which is clothed with probate powers, and in which the proceedings complained of

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABwere bad.

STRACT. In support of this view, counsel for the defendant insist, and the fact cannot be denied, that the Supreme

STOCK-PLEDGEE-NO LIABILITY AS STOCKHOLDER. Court of Indiana has repeatedly decided that the

-It is well settled that one who allows himself to aporders of the Probate Courts, whether final or inter

pear on the books of a National bank as an owner of locutory, are binding until set aside; that they cannot

its stock is liable to creditors as a shareholder, whether be attacked collaterally; and that they can be set

he be the absolute owner or a pledgee only, and that aside or corrected only in the particular court which

if a registered owner, acting in bad faith, trausfers his made them; that a bill in equity is a collateral attack, stock in a failing bank to an irresponsible person, for and cannot be maintaived in any other court. Among

the purpose of escaping liability, or if his transfer is the cases cited are Spaulding v. Baldwin, 31 Ind. 376;

colorable only, the transaction is yoid as to creditors. Barnes v. Bartlett, 47 id. 98; Holland v. State ex rel., 48

National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 6:28; Bowden v. Johnid. 391; Sanders v. Loy, 61 id. 298; Parsons v. Milford,

Bon, 107 id. 251. It is also undoubtedly true, that 67 id. 489; Briscoe v. Johnson, 73 id. 573; Candy v.

the beneficial owner of stock registered in the name of Hanmore, 76 id. 125; Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. 1;

an irresponsible person may, under some circumstanPaine v. Slone, 10 id. 75; Negley v. Gard, 20 Ohio, 310;

ces, be liable to creditors as the real shareholder, but Goodrich v. Thompson, 4 Day, 215; State v. Rolland, 23

it has never, to our knowledge, been held that a mere Mo. 95; Short v. Johnson, 25 Ill. 489; Iverson v. Loberg,

pledgee of stock is chargeable where he is not regis26 id. 180; Freem. Judg., $S 319a, 608.

tered as owner. Anderson v. Warehouse Co. Opinion Counsel for the complainant, on the contrary, con

by Waite, C. J. (See 24 Eng. Rep. 6:24.-ED.) tend, that notwithstanding the statutes which confer

[Decided April 21, 1884.] probate jurisdiction upon particular courts, courts of equity continue to have jurisdiction in such cases, and

EVIDENCE-TREASURY BOOKS -- TRANSCRIPT.- This consequently that an original bill of review may be suit involved the accounts of the navy department. maintained in any court of general equity powers,

The fourth auditor is charged by law with the duty of State or National, which can obtain jurisdiction of examining all accounts accruing in that department. the parties; and cite Bond v. Lockwood, 33 Ill. 212; Rev. Stat., & 277 subdivision fifth. He has certified Wickizer v, Cook, 85 id. 68; Fogarty v. Ream, 100 id. under his hand that the paper offered in evidence " is

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