They are not for that reason special or private acts." In this country the disposition has been on the whole to enlarge the limits of this class of public acts, and to bring within it all enactments of a general character, or which in any way affect the community at large. Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me., 54; New Portland v. New Vineyard, 16 id., 69; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 id., 58; Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass., 266; Commonwealth v. McCurdy, id., 324; Commonwealth v. Springfield, 7 id., 9; Bac. Abr., Statute F. On these, and many other authorities which might be cited, we think that the act by which the issue of the bonds sued on was authorized is a public act, of which the courts are bound to take judicial notice, and that it need not be specially pleaded.

But independently of authority there is a conclusive answer to this claim of the plaintiff in error.

The act of Feb. 24, 1854, to which the act of March 27, 1869, is supplementary and amendatory, is declared in express terms by its fifth section to be a public act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the act which supplements and amends it, and thereby becomes a part of it, is a private act. If one is public, both must be. The plaintiff in error next claims that the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company and the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company were consolidated; that the effect of the consolidation was to destroy the old corporations and create a new one, and therefore, when the act of March 27, 1869, was passed, entitled an act supplementary to and amending an act entitled "An Act to amend the act entitled an act to incorporate the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company, approved Feb. 8, 1853," and authorizing certain townships to subscribe to the capital stock of the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company, the charter of the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company had been surrendered; that the company had ceased to exist, and that, there being no corporation to which it could apply, the act of March 27, 1869, was, therefore, of no effect.

This seems to be an attempt to overturn by argument and inference a deliberate enactment of the legislature, and erase it bodily from the statute book.

Let it be conceded that the effect of the consolidation of the two companies was to create a new corporation under the name of the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company. It was perfectly competent for the legislature to authorize townships to subscribe to the stock of the new company, and issue their bonds in payment thereof. This was what the act under consideration did. The act which it purported to amend, after reciting in its preamble the fact of the consolidation of the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company with the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company, conferred on the latter company, "as existing under the consolidation, all the property, rights, franchises, and powers held,

enjoyed, and possessed by either of said original corporations prior to their said consolidation."

The act under consideration authorized certain townships to subscribe stock to this corporation thus formed, and to issue their bonds in payment therefor. It might fairly be entitled an act to amend an act, by authority of which the company existed.

The new company, existing by recognition of the act of Feb. 20, 1854, had the capacity to accept, and did accept, this amendment, for it received and put in circulation the bonds issued under its authority.

There is no ground for the theory that the act of March 27, 1869, is inoperative. We are bound, if possible, to give it effect, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. So far from its binding force being a matter of doubt, we see no difficulty, based on the reasons advanced by the plaintiff in error, in the way of giving it full and complete effect.

It is next said by the plaintiff in error that the act is unconstitutional, and, therefore, void and of no force.

The ground of its unconstitutionality is alleged to be that it does not conform to sec. 23 of art. 3, of the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, which provides that "no private or local law which may be passed by the General Assembly shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

Assuming the act in question to be a local law, is it open to the objection urged against it? It legalizes two elections held by the people of Macon County; the first to decide whether the county should issue its bonds to the amount of $60,000 to aid in building the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway, and the second to decide whether the county should subscribe $40,000 to the stock of said railway company and issue its bonds for that amount in payment thereof, and declares valid and binding any bonds of the county issued or to be issued in pursuance of said elections, and it authorized certain townships on conditions prescribed to subscribe to the stock of said railway company, and issue their bonds in payment thereof.

This act is entitled "An Act supplementary to and amending the act conferring corporate powers on the Indiana and Illinois Central Railroad Company."

The question whether such an act is obnoxious to the provision of the Illinois Constitution in relation to the subject and title of local acts, has been substantially decided in the negative by this court in the case of San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S., 312.

The Constitution of Texas declares that "every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The act of the legislature of Texas, said to be in violation of this provision, was entitled "An Act to incorporate the San Antonio Railway Company." Among other provisions,

it authorized the city of San Antonio to take stock in that company, and issue bonds to pay for the same. The act was decided

to have but one object, and that was expressed in the title.

The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of The Belleville, etc., Building Company v. Gregory, 15 Ill., 20, has decided that an act whose title was "An Act to incorporate the Belleville and Illinois Railroad Company," and which contained a section which authorized the city of Belleville and the County of St. Clair to subscribe for stock in the company, was not in violation of the section of the State Constitution under consideration. Firemen's Benevolent Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill., 511; Supervisors of Schuyler County v. People, 25 id., 181; O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 id., 534; Erlinger v, Boneau, 51 id., 94; People v. Brislin, 80 id., 423; Binz v. Weber, 81 id., 288. The act cannot, therefore, be held to be open to the constitutional objection under consideration.

But it is insisted that the second election ratified by the act under consideration, not only had reference to subscriptions of stock and the issue of bonds in aid of the Indiana and Illinois Railway Company, but also of three other railroad companies, and the act, therefore, contained more than one subject, and the latter subject was not expressed in the title.

In such a case the provisions of the law touching the subject, which is expressed in the title, must stand. Those relating to the other subjects, not expressed in the title, alone fall. By such a construction the purpose of the constitutional provision is fully accomplished.

All the provisions of the law under consideration which have reference to the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company constitute but one subject; this, as we have seen, is expressed in the title; the other matters constituting other subjects not expressed in the title are so entirely disconnected with that which is expressed, that they can be eliminated and leave the remainder of the act in full force. Packet Company v. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80.

We are of opinion, therefore, that so much of the act of March 27, 1869, as authorizes the issue of the bonds sued on, is fairly expressed in the title, and is constitutional and valid.

It is next alleged by the plaintiff in error that the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company was incorporated under the general law of Illinois" to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations," and not under the special act to incorporate the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad, of Feb. 8, 1853. And it is insisted that the act of March 27, 1869, under authority of which the bonds. in suit were issued, was an attempt by special act to add to the powers conferred upon the company by a general law.

Conceding the premises, we do not think the conclusion follows. There is nothing in the constitution of Illinois or the unwritten restraints upon legislative power which forbids such an enactment.

We can see no reason, either in the Constitution of the State or in public policy, to restrain the legislature from declaring that certain townships may subscribe to the stock of a particular railroad company, organized under a general law, and issue their bonds to pay for the same.

But the premises which we have conceded are not true. The Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company was organized under the special authority of the act to incorporate that company upon compliance with the requirements of the general law.

The Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company, in whose behalf the act of March 27, 1869 was passed derived its corporate existence and power from a consolidation between a company of that name and the Decatur and Indianapolis Railroad Company, made by authority of the law under which the latter company was organized, and of the act of Feb. 20, 1854, which recognized the consolidation and confirmed to the new company "all the property, rights, franchises, and powers held and enjoyed by either of said original corporations.

The Indiana and Illinois Central Railroad Company derived its existence from special laws and not from the act to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations. There is, therefore, no ground for the objection under consideration to stand on.

The case is a clear one, and it is unnecessary to devote further space to its discussion. There was in existence, by virtue of the legislation of the State of Illinois, a corporation known as the Indiana and Illinois Central Railway Company. By a perfectly valid and constitutional act certain townships, among them the plaintiff in error, were authorized, upon a vote of a majority of their legal voters, to subscribe stock in the railway company mentioned and issue their bonds to pay for it. The election was held under this law in the township of Unity. A majority of its legal voters at that election decided in favor of subscribing to the stock of the railroad company, and issuing the bonds of the township in payment thereof. The stock was accordingly subscribed, and the bonds were issued by authority of law and sold. The railroad has been built and is in full use as one of the post-roads of the United States. The holders of the bonds are entitled to their money, and there is no legal obstacle in the way of a judgment therefor in their favor.

Judgment affirmed.

MENASHA V. HAZARD.

(102 U. S. Reports, 81. October Term, 1880.)

A town in Wisconsin, being thereunto authorized by law, subscribed for stock in a railroad company, and issued its bonds in payment therefor, each reciting that it "shall be valid only when it is thereon duly certified that the conditions upon which it was voted, issued, and deposited by said town have been performed." Suit was brought on the bonds by a party who in good faith purchased them before they matured. Held, that the certificate on the bonds (infra), is in proper form, estopping the town from denying their validity, and placing them in a condition to be put on the market as commercial paper.

Where, before the subscription and bonds were voted, the company was authorized to consolidate with other companies constructing connecting lines, and such consolidation was effected. Held, that the issue of the bonds to the consolidated company was lawful.

County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U. S., 682, and Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 id., 499, approved.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

This was an action by Rowland G. Hazard against the town of Menasha, and the city of Menasha, upon interest-coupons detached from bonds of the town of Menasha, payable to the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company or bearer. On the trial of the issues it appeared:

I. That the Portage, Winnebago, and Superior Railroad Company made to said town the following proposition:

"The Portage, Winnebago, and Superior Railroad Company of the State of Wisconsin, a corporation of said State authorized to construct and operate a railroad with one or more tracks, from Doty's Island, situated in the towns of Neenah and Menasha, in the County of Winnebago, northwesterly, via the towns of Weyauwega, Waupaca, Amherst, and Stevens Point, to Bayfield, and thence to Superior, on Lake Superior, and requiring the aid of the said towns of Menasha and Neenah, each in the sum of $50,000, in the construction of that portion of road which lies between said Doty's Island and the Wolf River, and being thereto authorized by Chapter 126 of the General Laws of 1869, entitled 'An Act to authorize certain counties, towns, cities, and villages to aid in the construction of the land-grant railroad from Portage City and from Doty's Island to Lake Superior, submits to the said town of Menasha the following proposition, to wit:

"First, That in consideration of the construction by said company of a single-track railroad from block 3 in Jones's Plat in the said town of Neenah, Doty's Island, to Wolf River, and of five hundred full paid shares of the capital stock of said company of $100 each, the said town of Menasha shall pay to said company or