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I. SUMMARY.

This bulletin presents a detailed survey of the present executive organization of Illinois. This survey divides the executive organization into three groups: (1) The constitutional state officers. (2) The departments under the civil administrative code. (3) Offices, boards and commissions which are neither created by the constitution nor provided for by the civil administrative code. Following the detailed statement regarding the present executive organization, will be found an analysis of the present functions and duties of the present constitutional state officers.

The constitutional convention will have to do pimarily with the state executive offices now provided for by the constitution, but special attention should be called to the fact that almost none of the duties of these offices are prescribed by the constitution. It is therefore necessary to resort to the statutes in order to describe the duties of these constitutional officers. These duties may, by statute, be withdrawn from the constitutional officers upon whom they are now imposed, and be transferred to purely statutory officers.

The departments under the Civil Administrative Code, and numerous miscellaneous offices and boards owe their existence entirely to statutes. The parts of the executive department which are based entirely upon statute have numerous duties which overlap and conflict with duties imposed by statute upon the constitutional state officers. This overlapping of functions as between the constitutional and the statutory officers may to a great extent now be dealt with and remedied by statute, although any thoroughgoing reorganization of functions as between the constitutional and the statutory officers is interfered with because of the difference in status of these

two types of officers. As a matter of fact the political position of the constitutional state officers makes it practically impossible to transfer functions from these officers by statute, against the will of the persons holding such offices. The constitutional status of certain officers which are popularly elective therefore constitutes a very definite barrier to the readjustment of functions, unless such readjustment be made by the transfer of new functions to the constitutional officers.

This bulletin is devoted primarily to a detailed analysis of statutory provisions regarding the executive organization. Such an analysis is necessary in order to present a full view of the present executive organization. It is not assumed It is not assumed that the constitutional convention will seek to place in the constitution detailed provisions regarding the present executive organization. The executive department is one whose organization must expand with the increase in duties to be performed by the state. During the past fifty years an enormous increase has taken place in the duties performed by state

governments, and it is probable that this increase in state functions will continue. A detailed executive organization such as that proposed in the New York rejected constitution of 1915 or such as that authorized by a Massachusetts constitutional amendment of 1917 is likely to make great trouble in the future. Here, as elsewhere in the constitution, much is to be gained by omitting details from the constitution, leaving the executive organization to be built up by statutory

enactments.

In the bulletin on the short ballot will be found some discussion of the application of the short ballot principle to state executive organization. The subject of the executive veto power is dealt with in only an incidental way in this bulletin, but will be found fully discussed in the bulletin dealing with the legislative department. The relationship of the governor to appropriations is fully discussed in a bulletin dealing with state and local finance. So far as they have 'to do with the legislative and judicial departments, the problems of appointment and removal of officers will be found discussed in bulletins upon the legislative and judicial departments. It has been thought desirable, however, to present in this bulletin a rather full review of the present constitutional provisions bearing upon appointment and removal, inasmuch as these matters primarily concern the executive department.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

Constitutional Development. The constitution of 1818 gave little power to the executive department. It provided that the executive power of the State should be vested in a Governor, but his powers were curtailed by granting extensive appointive powers. to the General Assembly, and by placing the veto power in the hands of a council of revision composed of the Governor and the judges of the Supreme Court. The General Assembly was empowered to appoint judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts, and "an auditor of public accounts, an attorney general, and such other officers for the State as may be necessary The Governor appointed the secretary of state with the advice and consent of the Senate.

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The power of the General Assembly to appoint certain officers proved unsatisfactory and the framers of the constitution of 1848 took steps to change this method of appointment. The first constitution contained the provision that the governor should appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate all officers whose offices were established by the constitution or by law and whose appointment was not therein otherwise provided for. The constitution of 1848 added the provision, "And no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the General Assembly." The intention to strengthen. the executive was further demonstrated by the abolition of the Council of Revision and the substitution of a qualified veto power exercised by the governor alone. A majority vote of both houses, however, was all that was necessary to pass a measure over the Governor's veto and this was the same vote as had been necessary to enact a measure after its disapproval by the Council of Revision. The Constitution of 1870 again strengthened the power of the executive at the expense of the General Assembly by making a two-thirds. vote necessary to override the veto of the Governor. Fourteen years after the adoption of the constitution (in 1884) the people ratified the only amendment to the executive article of the constitution of 1870 that has been adopted. This amendment further strengthened the governor's power by empowering him to veto items and sections in appropriation bills. This was an important step toward giving the executive a position of definite responsibility in regard to state appropriations and expenditures.

Part of the appointive power which the General Assembly possessed under the first constitution was in 1818 given to the Governor, and part of it was given to the people by providing for

more elective state officers. Under the Constitution of 1848, the secretary of state, auditor, and treasurer were elective, in addition to the Governor and the lieutenant governor, who were the only popularly elective state officers under the Constitution of 1818. The growing tendency to increase the number of state officers was manifest in the proposed constitution of 1862. Its enumeration of elective state officers, like many of its other provisions concerning the executive department, was a few years later embodied in the constitution of 1870. It proposed to have the same seven elective state officers we have today: Governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction and attorney general. These officers were only to be elected for a two-year term, which seems to indicate some dissatisfaction with popularly elected state officials. However, the terms of all popularly elected state officers, except treasurer, were fixed at four years by the Constitution of 1870, and the restriction that the Governor could only serve four years in any term of eight years was omitted.

Statutory development. In the preceding paragraphs we have traced the constitutional development of the executive department. There still remains to be considered the statutory development. The General Assembly has all powers not granted to the federal government nor forbidden the states by the Constitution of the United States, and all powers not forbidden it by the state constitution. Under these broad powers the General Assembly has enacted many statutes dealing with the executive department. The statutes, in fact, cover the greater part of this bulletin, and consideration of them is necessary in order to present the constitutional problems at issue.

The creation of separate offices, departments, boards and institutions, many of them with extensive powers, has been a gradual development. These statutory agencies were not a very important consideration for the framers of our earlier constitutions, for the executive department was not nearly as complex as it is today. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1848, the constitutional state officers, and three state institutions embraced the entire executive department. When the Constitutional Convention of 1862 met, two institutions, a normal school, and two officers had been added. Between 1862 and 1870, six institutions, a normal school, the university and seven boards and offices were added, so that when the framers of the Constitution of 1870 met they were dealing with an executive department consisting of five state officers and about twenty-five independent offices, boards and institutions, which is less than one-fourth of the number that existed in 1917.

Each succeeding session of the General Assembly has led to the establishment of new authorities, often with little reference to previously existing authorities, either as to form of organization or the scope of their powers. Most of them were substantially independent

of each other, and subject to no control except the nominal supervision of the Governor. The assumption by the state of each new function, as a rule, involved the creation of a state administrative board, commission or officer, to which was entrusted the direct exercise of the function. These independent agencies tended toward the decentralization of the executive power, for the increase in the number of appointive offices did not bring about a corresponding increase in the administrative importance of the Governor.

A state board of equalizaton had been created in 1867 and its administration of state revenues seems to have caused the first tangible dissatisfaction with these independent agencies. Its members were elected, one from each congressional district, and it grew to be and long remained an important factor in state politics. A legislative commission appointed to investigate the revenue system of the state recommended its abolition as early as 1886, and a tax commission made the same recommendation in 1910.

Consolidation. Naturally, this irresponsible system of independent state boards was particularly bad for the state institutions, and because of their large number, geographical distribution, and the fact that they were spending the bulk of the appropriations, the conditions eventually became known to the people. In response to insistent demands because of some specific abuses, Speaker Edward D. Shurtleff appointed a special investigating committee January 14, 1908, in accordance with a resolution passed by the House of Representatives. This committee published an exhaustive report of over a thousand pages. It found the institutions in an unsatisfactory condition and recommended the creation of a central state board of control for their administration. Accordingly, a board of administration was created the following year (1909), to which was given the management and control of all the state charitable institutions.

The same session of the General Assembly that provided for the investigation of state institutions also passed a resolution directing the Governor to appoint an educational commission to investigate the common school system of the state. This commission published a comprehensive report on this subject and drafted a bill providing for the creation of a state board of education to strengthen our common school system. This board was to consist of the superintendent of public insruction, as chairman, and representatives of various school interests selected by the Governor with the approval of the Senate.

In 1913, the work of the fish commission and the game commissioner was consolidated, and a game and fish conservation commission was created to perform their functions.

In his inaugural address, in 1913, Governor Edward F. Dunne recommended the abolition of the state board of equalization, the consolidation of the park boards of the city of Chicago, and an examination into the affairs of the public institutions of the state

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