ordinary legislation. In addition to this there has been a fairly definite tendency to make the process of constitutional amendment easier, although an exception may be suggested with respect to the New Mexico constitution of 1911. Colorado (1900), Oregon (1906), Ohio (1912), and North Dakota (1918) have simplified the process of constitutional change, and the same may be said of the amending provisions in the Alabama constitution of 1901. Another movement which may be said to be directly in the line of making easier popular participation in government is that with respect to the short ballot. With the increasing complexity of government, it may properly be said that oftentimes a means of increasing popular control over government will result from reducing the number of persons for whom each elector is expected to cast his ballot. When a certain point is reached in the election of officials, the addition, of other elective offices tends to complicate the issue before the people and to remove attention from important offices, which can be otherwise held to a responsibility for the conduct of public affairs. During the period under review little has as yet been done by constitutional change toward the reduction of elective officers. By an Ohio constitutional amendment in 1912 provision was made for the appointment of a superintendent of public instruction, and one officer previously elective under statutory provisions in Ohio was thus removed from the ballot. By statute also in Ohio, a public works commissioner and a dairy and food commissioner have been removed from the ballot. Indiana in 1919 by statute removed the state geologist and the state statistician from the ballot, and proposed constitutional amendments in Indiana will if adopted provide for the appointment rather than the election of the superintendent of public instruction and of the clerks of the Supreme and Appellate Courts. California in 1911 by constitutional amendment removed the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the railroad commissioners from the ballot and California has also discontinued the election of its public. printer. Iowa in 1913 by legislation removed the Supreme Court Clerk and Reporter from the ballot. However, two proposed amendments in Ohio in 1913 for the reduction of elective state and local officers were rejected by the people. In Tennessee, the state treasurer and controller are still chosen by the vote of the two houses. The people of that state in 1904 rejected a proposed constitutional amendment making these officers popularly elective. Some important developments The executive department. have taken place since 1900 with respect to the powers and organization of the departments of the state government. The tendency to increase the governor's powers has continued. The veto power has A constitutional amendment in Ohio in 1903 vested been extended. an extensive veto power in the governor which could be overcome by a two-thirds vote of the two houses of the legislature, but an amendment of 1912 reduced to three-fifths the legislative majority required to overcome a veto. Rhode Island for the first time conferred a veto power upon her governor in 1909. Vermont in 1913 adopted a constitutional amendment requiring a two-thirds vote of the two houses to overcome the governor's veto. Before this time the veto in Vermont could have been overcome by a mere majority vote. Virginia (1902), Ohio (1903), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Kansas (1904), Arizona (1911), New Mexico (1911), Oregon (1916), and Massachusetts (1918), granted to the governor the power to veto items of appropriation bills. California in 1908 and Wisconsin in the same year extended the period within which the governor was required to exercise his veto power. With respect to control over appropriations, attention should also be called here to the increased executive power conferred by the budget amendments of Maryland (1916), Massachusetts (1918), and West Virginia (1918). Ohio by constitutional amendment in 1903 conferred upon its governor power to veto any section or sections of a bill presented to him, and to approve other portions of the bill so presented, following in this respect the Washington constitution of 1889, and the South Carolina constitution of 1895. However, this power to veto sections of any bill was withdrawn in Ohio by constitutional amendment of 1912. The Alabama constitution of 1901 permits the governor to propose an amendment to remedy any feature of a bill which he does not approve, and if his proposed amendment is not adopted by the two houses, the bill in order to become a law must be passed over the executive veto. The Virginia constitution of 1902 also gives the governor power to recommend the amendment of a bill if he approves its general purpose but disapproves any part thereof, and in this state the bill if amended by the two houses or if they fail to amend it in accordance with the governor's recommendation, is again returned to the governor for his approval or disapproval. A Massachusetts constitutional amendment adopted in 1918 provides: "The governor, within five days after any bill or resolve shall have been laid before him, shall have the right to return it to the branch of the general court in which it originated with a recommendation that any amendment or amendments specified by him be made therein. Such bill or resolve shall thereupon be before the general court and subject to amendment and re-enactment. If such bill or resolve is re-enacted in any form it shall again be laid before the governor for his action, but he shall have no right to return the same a second time with a recommendation to amend." As a part of the proposed New York constitution of 1915 an claborate re-organization of the executive department was provided for. The proposed New York constitution was rejected. A Massachusetts constitutional amendment adopted in 1918 provides for a re-organization and consolidation of executive offices in that state. Little has yet been accomplished through constitutional change with respect to the consolidation and simplification of the state executive organization. However, in this field a great deal has been accomplished by statute. Rather thoroughgoing consolidations in the field of state executive organization have been accomplished by statu tory provisions in the state of New Jersey. However, perhaps the most important single change was that made by legislation in the state of Illinois in 1917, and the Illinois plan has been to a large extent copied by legislation in 1919 in Idaho and Nebraska. While a good deal needs to be done by constitutional change in the field of state executive organization, attention should be called to the fact that the detail of executive organization should not be placed in a constitution. The New York plan with respect to this matter was a bad one, and it would be highly unwise to place in a new constitution of Illinois. the details of the executive organization as worked out in the civil administrative code enacted in 1917.1 The power of the governor has also been increased in other respects. The Virginia constitution of 1902 authorizes the governor to suspend executive officers of the state during the recess of the general assembly, the general assembly itself to decide at its next meeting whether the suspended officer shall be restored or removed. The governor of Oklahoma is given power to require information in writing under oath from all officers and commissioners of the state and from all officers of state institutions. By the Alabama constitution of 1901 and by the Michigan constitution of 1908 the governors are given increased power to require information in writing from the By statute in executive and administrative officers of these states. Minnesota in 1917 the governor is granted power to remove statutory officers. By legislation in Illinois in 1905 the governor is under certain conditions authorized to remove sheriffs, and in Oregon in 1917 by legislation the governor was authorized to remove county clerks. In Maine in 1917 by constitutional amendment the governor was vested with power to remove sheriffs. The power of the governor has been to a large extent increased by developments in the states with respect to the budget. These developments have to a large extent been statutory, but a number of important constitutional proposals have been made and adopted. Budget amendments vesting a large power in the governor to submit estimates to the legislatures, and depriving legislatures of the power to make increases in estimates so submitted have been adopted in Maryland (1916), Massachusetts (1918) and West Virginia (1918). A similar constitutional amendment is pending in Indiana. Virginia in 1918 by statute adopted budget proposals similar to those existing in Maryland by constitutional amendment. A proposed budget amendment, which was unsatisfactory and which would have reduced the nower of the governor, was rejected by popular vote in California Budget proposals, similar to those adopted in Maryland. Massachusetts and West Virginia. constituted a part of the proposed constitution reiected in New York in 1915. Illinois in 1917 adopted plans for a budget by statute, and statutory plans for a budget have within recent years been adopted in substantially three fourths of the states.1 1 See Moley. Raymond. The State Movement for Efficiency and Economy. 1 Buck. A. E The legislative department. With respect to the organization and procedure of the legislative department little has been accomplished since 1900. To some extent the tendency to reduce the frequency of legislative sessions has continued. Iowa (1904) has established biennial sessions as a substitute for the previous plan of annual sessions. In 1906 the voters of South Carolina voted in favor of biennial sessions, but the legislature did not approve the proposed amendment after the popular vote in its favor. However, Mississippi (1910) returned from quadrennial to biennial sessions. The plan of departing from the quadrennial plan and re-adopting biennial sessions was rejected in Alabama in 1916. There has in recent years been a good deal of agitation for a single-chambered legislature and plans for a single chamber have been submitted in Oregon (1912, 1914), Oklahoma (1914), and Arizona (1916). In all of these states the proposal for a single chamber was rejected. In 1908 the voters of Oregon adopted an amendment authorizing the establishment of proportional representation by law, but nothing has been done under this amendment, and an amendment proposed in 1914 for the establishment of proportional representation in the election of members of the lower house of the legislature was rejected by popular vote. Substantially the only other proposed change with respect to the organization of the legislature was that in Ohio in 1913 when it was proposed to reduce very materially the size of the two houses of the legislature. This proposal was rejected by popular vote. With respect to fundamental changes in legislative organization, it may perhaps be said that a vigorous movement has been under way, but that this movement is still in its infancy and has not yet been strong enough to make itself felt in constitutional provisions. With respect to matters of procedure there have been a number of proposals. Michigan in 1904, California in 1908 and Colorado in 1918 adopted amendments having to do with restrictions upon the time of introducing bills. California in 1911 provided for a thirtyday recess of the legislature and for the introduction of bills prior to such recess unless the consent of three-fourths of the members could be obtained. Massachusetts (1918) adopted an amendment authorizing the general court of that state to take a recess similar to that required by the constitutional amendment of California in 1911. The voters of Arkansas in 1912 adopted an amendment limiting legislative sessions to sixty days, but this amendment was declared invalid by the supreme court of that state. The voters of Connecticut in 1912 adopted a limitation upon the length of legislative sessions. In Wyoming in 1914 the voters rejected a proposal extending the legislative session from forty to sixty days. In 1912 Ohio adopted a constitutional amendment with respect to special sessions, and by this amendment no business may be transacted at a special session other than that named in the proclamation calling the session or in a subsequent proclamation by the governor during the session. The subject of legislative apportionment is one which has given rise to a good many proposals of amendment during the period here under review, but on the whole the amendments adopted seem not to have accomplished a great deal. Connecticut and Maryland in 1901 adopted amendments which to some extent give a more equitable apportionment of representatives. Proposed amendments in Rhode Island in 1902 and 1905 and in New Hampshire in 1903 and 1912 for a more adequate representation of larger communities failed of adoption. However, in Rhode Island (1909) a constitutional amendment was adopted which betters to some extent the representative system of that state. Wisconsin in 1910 adopted a provision for decennial apportionments. Idaho (1912), Mississippi (1914), Maine (1917), and Arizona (1918) adopted constitutional provisions with respect to apportionment. Kansas in 1906 and Michigan in 1908 adopted constitutional provisions vesting in the courts the power to determine when special laws should be passed. The constitutions of Alabama (1901), Virginia (1902), and Oklahoma (1907) impose strict limitations upon local and special legislation, and a North Carolina amendment of 1916 The Michigan constitution of 1908 imposes similar restrictions. definitely limits special legislation but does not enumerate in detail the subjects upon which special laws may not be passed. The Michigan constitution provides that the legislature shall pass no local or special act where a general act can be made applicable, and the question. whether a general act could have been applicable is made a question not for the legislative determination but for the decision of the court. By the Michigan provision also local and special acts do not take effect. until after they have been approved by a majority of the electors. voting thereon in the district to be affected by such acts. The Michigan plan is proving perhaps the most effective one for the reduction of local and special legislation.1 The most important single development with respect to legislatures during the period under review is one which has led to an increase in legislative power. Constitutional limitations upon the powers of the legislature have usually been imposed when some power has been exercised unwisely, and it is perhaps not too much to say that in most such cases the power which has been exercised unwisely has been so exercised under popular pressure. Limitations so imposed come at some later time to interfere with powers which the people desire to have the legislature exercise. and a development then begins of precisely the reverse order. That is, the people begin by constitutional change to confer upon their legislatures powers which have previously been withdrawn by constitutional changes. Perhaps the most important types of constitutional limitations upon the legislature in this country are those which relate to debt limits and to the prohibition of undertaking other than governmental functions by the states. In recent years there has been a distinct tendency away from these limitations. California (1902), Michigan (1905 and 1919). New York (1905), Kentucky (1909), Maine and Ohio (1912), North Dakota Some aspects of judicial control over special and 1 See Merrills, F. E. local legislation. American Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 351 (1913). |