der this plan it is proposed, besides fundamental changes in legislative organization, to abandon the direct election of executive officers, except the governor and auditor. The governor would appoint the principal department heads, and also a State Business Manager. Parts of this plan have been submitted to popular vote, by initiative petition, at several elections; but as yet it has not been adopted.

A constitutional commission appointed in New York in 1872 recommended an amendment for the appointment of the Secretary of State, Attorney General and State Engineer in that State. In the proposd revised constitution for the state of New York, submitted by the constitutional convention in 1915, provision was made for` consolidating the state administration into 17 civil departments, the heads of which were to be appointed by the governor, except the Attorney General and Comptroller. This would have shortened the ballot in that state by eliminating the elective offices of Secretary of State, Treasurer and State Engineer. This plan was approved in the Convention by a vote of 125 to 30 (Republicans 97 to 15, Democrats 28 to 15). But the new constitution as a whole was not ratified by popular vote.

A survey of state and local government in Delaware, presented to the legislature by Governor Townsend in 1919, reports plans for short ballot state and county governments.

In Illinois the short ballot principle has received a broad popular indorsement in the vote on a public policy question presented in 1912, asking for the appointment of a commission to present definite plans for establishing the short ballot in this state. This question received an affirmative vote of 508,780 to 165,270 against.

Arguments against the Short Ballot. In the New York Constitutional Convention of 1915, the short ballot proposal was supported among others by Elihu Root, President of the Convention; F. C. Tanner, Chairman of the Republican State Committee; H. L. Stimson, former Secretary of War; Seth Low, former Mayor of New York City; G. W. Wickersham, former Attorney General of the United States; R. F. Wagner, Democratic leader; and A. E. Smith, now Governor of New York State. The leading opponents. were W. S. Ostrander, L. E. Quigg, State Senator E. T. Brackett and Excise Commissioner George E. Green.

From the addresses in the New York Convention, the arguments against the short ballot may be summarized as follows: To reduce the number of elective offices will be undemocratic and deprive the people of self government; to add to the appointive power of the governor will mean a dangerous increase of political patronage and control over the government; and this movement is a revival of the old system of autocratic rule and a step toward absolute government. It was urged that the general criticisms of the long ballot were due to the introduction of the direct primary and the recently established

"office group" ballot, and that the party column ballot with the single mark for a party ticket provided a short ballot for those who wished it. It was further said that the phrase "short ballot" was misunderstood; that many people supposed it meant merely the physical size of the ballot paper, and that when it was explained that it meant reducing the number of elective offices the people were opposed to it.

In reply to these arguments, those in favor of the proposals before the convention presented the criticisms previously noted of the long ballot system, and the need for a more systematic and responsible government. During this debate, Mr. Root in support of the proposed provisions made his now well known address on "Invisible Government", from which the following quotations may be made:

"What is the government of this State? What has it been during the forty years of my acquaintance with it? The government of the constitution? Oh, no; not half the time, or half way. When I asked what did the people find wrong in our state government, my mind goes back to those periodic fits of public rage in which the people rouse up and tear down the political leader, first of one party and then of the other party. It goes on to the public feeling of resentment against the control of party organizations, of both parties and of all parties. Now, I treat this subject in my own mind not as a personal question to any man. I am talking about the system.

* * *

"They call the system-I don't coin the phrase, I adopt it because it carries its own meaning-the system they call "invisible government. * * *

"The ruler of the State during the greater part of the forty years of my acquaintance with the State government has not been any man authorized by the Constitution or by the law, and, sir, there is throughout the length and width of this State a deep and sullen and long-continued resentment at being governed thus by men not of the people's choosing. The party leader is elected by no one, accountable to no one, bound by no oath of office, removable by no one. Ah! My friends here have talked about this bill's creating an autocracy. The word points with admirable facility the very opposite reason for the bill. It is to destroy autocracy and restore power so far as may be to the men elected by the people, accountable to the people, removable by the people. * *

*

"How is it accomplished? How is it done? Mr. Chairman, it is done by the use of patronage, and the patronage that my friends on the other side of this question have been arguing and pleading for in this Convention is the power to continue that invisible government against that authorized by the people.

*

*

*

"Mr. Chairman, that system finds its opportunity in the division of powers, in a six-headed executive, in which, by the natural workings of human nature there shall be opposition and discord and the playing of one force against the other, and so, when we refuse to make one governor elected by the people the real chief executive, we make inevitable the setting up of a chief executive not selected by

the people, not acting for the people's interest, but for the selfish interest of the few who control the party, whichever party it may be. * * *

"I assert that this perversion of democracy, this robbing democracy of its virility, can be changed as truly as the system under which Walpole governed the commons of England, by bribery, as truly as the atmosphere which made the credit mobilier scandal possible in the Congress of the United States and has been blown away by the force of public opinion. We can not change it in a moment, but we can do our share. We can take this one step towards, not robbing the people of their part in government, but toward robbing an irresponsible autocracy of its indefensible and unjust and undemocratic control of government, and restoring it to the people to be exercised by the men of their choice and their control."18

Results Attained. In several states changes have recently been adopted which shorten the ballot at elections. In Pennsylvania, at each quadrennial state election each elector may vote for governor, lieutenant governor and three other state officers, for a United States senator and a representative in Congress, and for a state senator and representative in the general assembly-a total of nine. Two years later are elections for presidential electors, and members of Congress and state legislature. By amendment to the state constitution. adopted in 1909, county and municipal officers and district judges are elected in November of the odd-numbered years, and these elections are thus separated from the state and congressional elections.

Ohio has recently removed from the list of elective state officials the Public Works Commissioner, the Dairy and Food Commissioner, and the State Commissioner of Common Schools, replacing the latter by a Superintendent of Public Instruction appointed by the Governor. A proposed constitutional amendment, submitted in 1913, for the appointment of the Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer and Attorney General, was defeated. Iowa has ceased to-elect the clerk of its Supreme Court. In California the Railroad Commissioners, the State Printer and the clerk of the Supreme Court have been removed from the ballot.

In 1917 the ballot of Nebraska was shortened by eliminating the names of presidential electors. After the election in presidential years the governor is in this state authorized to appoint eight electors of the party that carried the state.

Indiana, in 1919, abolished the elective offices of State geologist and State statistician; and constitutional amendments have been proposed for the appointment of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the clerks of the Supreme and Appellate Courts.

18 Elihu Root, in New York Constitutional Convention, 1915.

VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

While the general principles of the short ballot have been widely indorsed, there is more difficulty in reaching an agreement as to the application of these principles to the government of the state and local districts. If the general policy is approved by the Illinois Constitutional Convention, the discussion and decision as to methods of working out the policy will be one of the most important and serious tasks before the convention. Without attempting to solve these problems, it seems desirable to set forth some of the specific questions which have arisen, and to indicate some of the factors to be considered and solutions which have been suggested.

The application of short ballot principles affects a good many different organs of government, which will be considered in various other . pamphlets prepared for the Illinois Constitutional Convention. What will be presented here will be merely a brief summary of the problems connected with these several organs which are directly related to the question of the short ballot.

State Executive Officers. With reference to the executive and administrative officers for the state at large, the governor may be made the only elective state officer, as is the case in Maine, New Hampshire and New Jersey, by providing for the appointment of other state executive officers. In this way the ballot for state officers would be reduced to a minimum of one.

The first exception which inevitably presents itself for consideration is as to the lieutenant governor. It may be assumed that if this office is retained, it will be continued as an elective office. But it may be noted that several states do not have this office; and the question has been raised as to the need for an officer whose main function is to fill a vacancy in another position. It has been pointed out that Vice Presidents of the United States and Lieutenant Governors of the States have usually represented a somewhat different element or point of view from the President and the Governors; and that a change of policy is more likely to arise when the chief executive is succeeded by such an official than if he were succeeded by an officer appointed by himself. The problem to be decided in this matter is as to the need for the separate office of lieutenant governor.

A second exception commonly advocated is as to the State Auditor, or Comptroller as he is called in some states. It is urged that the duties of this officer are primarily to act as a check on the expenditures of the executive officials; and that for this reason it is essential

that he should be independent of the chief executive. In reply it has been pointed out that in the United States National Government the Comptroller of the Treasury and the Auditors are appointed by the President of the United States; and a similar arrangement is provided in some cities, as in Chicago. The accounting and auditing work in the national government and in these cities appears to be as efficiently performed as in states and cities with elective auditors.

A method of securing the independence of the Auditor from the Governor without direct election is that followed in New Jersey and Tennessee, where this officer is not electd by popular vote, but is chosen by the legislature. This arrangement is based on the view. that his primary function is to act as agent of the legislature to insure that expenditures by the executive are kept within the provisions of the appropriations. But it may be questioned whether this now represents the most important duties of this office.

If the auditor is to remain a popularly elected officer, the suggestion may be made that, in order to insure his independence of the governor, he be not elected at the same time as the governor, but perhaps at the intervening biennial election. If the auditing function is to be a check on the executive departments, it will probably also be suggested that the auditor have no other function than that of exercising such a check. Under the present system in Illinois the auditor is responsible for the audit of his own expenses with respect to the supervision of banks.

It may further be noted that in most American governments one result of placing the control over disbursements in the hands of an official theoretically independent of the executive has been that there is in fact no real independent examination of the accounts and financial reports. The State Auditor is supposed to be both accountant and auditor. The experience of European governments indicates that the accounting system and the detailed control over disbursements may well be carried on by a branch of the executive administration, provided there is a subsequent audit of the accounts by an independent agency. In Great Britain, this current check on disbursements is performed by the Treasury; while the work of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to make a critical study of the completed financial accounts, methods and reports at the end of the fiscal year. In Illinois, the main control over disbursements of officers appointed by the Governor was for many years exercised by the Governor's auditor, and is now vested in the department of finance, established by the civil administrative code in 1917.

In New York the question of the election or appointment of the Attorney-General has been given special attention. This question was discussed in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1867; and a provision for the appointment of the Attorney General was barely defeated by a vote of 54 to 56. The New York constitutional commission of 1872 recommended the appointment of the Attorney General.19

19 Lincoln: Constitutional History of New York, Vol. II.