mittee on arrangement and phraseology. The proposal when reported upon by this committee, was put upon its second reading and after second reading was voted upon. If adopted, it was again referred to the committee on arrangement and phraseology, which, after all proposed amendments had been considered, reported the complete revision as agreed upon, the convention taking a twelve-day recess in order to give time for this work. This revision was then considered by sections in the committee of the whole, was reported to the convention and was then put upon the third reading and voted upon by articles. and as a whole. This procedure gave four different opportunities for the discussion and amendment of every proposal. But more important, it gave the committee on arrangement and phraseology great influence by allowing it an opportunity to revise the language of each proposal after it was agreed to in committee of the whole and before it was definitely adopted; proposals so revised came again to this committee to be consolidated into a complete constitution. As a result of this care the Michigan constitution of 1908 is the best drafted of recent state constitutions.

A somewhat similar use of its committee on phraseology and style was made by the Ohio convention of 1912. The consideration upon second reading was primarily upon the substance, and thereafter the proposal went to a committee on arrangement and phraseology and after the report of this committee it was presented for final action. The Ohio committee presented its reports in such a manner that each member of the convention had before him the original form of proposal adopted by the convention, the changes recommended by the committee, and the proposal as it would read if such recommendations were adopted.

In the Illinois convention of 1869-70 the committee on revision and adjustment was largely limited to detailed changes in language. The New York convention of 1915 and the Massachusetts convention of 1917-19 are of interest as presenting a fairly effective use of a similar committee. Of recent conventions those of Michigan (1907-08), Ohio (1912), and New York (1915), had the most satisfactory rules.

The rules of the New York convention of 1894 were based too much upon partisan considerations. The rules of the Massachusetts convention of 1917-19 are open to objection in that they allow absolute freedom of debate in committee of the whole, and tend to permit too great a degree of debate upon the measures first presented to the convention,

V. GENERAL OUTLINE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1776.

In this and other states there are two methods of constitutional change. One is through the assembling of a convention and the other is through the proposal of specific amendments. The proposal of specific amendments may be made in a number of states not only by the legislative bodies but also by initiative petition. New Hampshire is the only state which does not provide for the proposal of amendments through legislative action. In New Hampshire the only method of constitutional change is that by a constitutional convention and in that state the question of holding a constitutional convention is submitted to the voters once each seven years.

With increasing detail in the state constitutions, the constitutional convention and the processes of specific constitutional amendment have become important legislative processes, not only for matters of fundamental importance but also for matters not properly fundamental in character. The increasing bulk of state constitutions and the consequent necessity for frequent alteration, have brought with. them easier processes of constitutional change, and in a number of states at the present time the process of constitutional change is not more difficult than that of statutory change.

In this discussion an effort will be made to sum up first of all the general lines of state constitutional development in this country since 1776 and then to outline more in detail the specific changes which have taken place since 1900. The main lines of constitutional development from 1776 to the present time may be summed up under the following headings:

Development of the departments of government. In the first state constitutions the legislatures occupied a predominant position. The struggles of the colonial period between a popularly elected assembly on the one hand, and the governor (who controlled the council as an upper legislative body and the courts) on the other hand, naturally led the framers of new constitutions for independent states, to distrust the executive branch of the government and to concentrate almost complete powers in the hands of the legislative bodies. The first sixty years of constitutional development (1776-1836) were largely a period during which there was a readjustment of the equilibrium as among the three departments of government.

In most of the earlier state constitutions provision was made for the election of the governor by the legislature, and executive councils

dominated by the legislatures further restricted the executive power in a number of the states. The governor possessed little power of appointment, for most important offices were filled by the legislature, and under the first state constitutions his control over legislation was slight.

But a distrust of the legislature soon arose, in part because of the large powers which it had, and in part because it exercised these powers unwisely. The New York constitution of 1777 made the governor a popularly elected officer, as did the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, and the New Hampshire constitution of 1784, and practically all state constitutions after this period adopted the policy of popular election, the Virginia constitution of 1830 being a notable exception to this statement. A lengthening term of office at the same time gave the governor greater opportunity to council. exercise his powers, as did also the discarding by most states of With the cumbersome and ineffective executive respect to the important executive offices of the state the power of the governor in most cases was not greatly increased but the power of the legislatures and their control over the executive was reduced by making such officers elective directly by the people-a movement whose influence may be traced by a comparison of the Michigan constitutions of 1835 and 1850. By the New York constitution of 1777 the executive appointing power was large but was confined largely to a council of appointment whose members were during much of the time out of harmony with the governor. This council of appointment disappeared in New York in 1821, and the governor's appointing power has gradually tended to increase throughout the United States -by virtue of the fact that the state governments have steadily become more complex and assumed new functions, thus increasing the number of appointive officers.

There has also been a steady increase in the governor's power over legislation. Of the earlier state constitutions, that of South Carolina (1776) vested an absolute veto in the president of the state, but this power was only once sought to be exercised and was withdrawn by the constitution of 1778. The New York constitution of 1777 provided a council of revision of which the governor was a member, which should have a suspensory veto, and a plan somewhat similar to that of New York existed in Illinois from 1818 to 1848. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 was the first to give the governor acting alone a suspensory veto over legislation which might be overcome by action of an extraordinary majority (3) in the legislative houses. The New Hampshire constitution of 1784 was largely copied from that of Massachusetts, but the provisions for an executive veto of legislation was rejected by New Hampshire. The provision of the federal constitution of 1787 with respect to the presidential veto has been followed in principle by most of the subsequent state constitutions. Georgia (1789), New Hampshire (1792) and Kentucky (1792) followed the federal precedent by giving their governors a veto power New York abolished its council of revision in 1821 and conferred As the states adopted new this power upon its governor acting alone

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constitutions it became usual for the veto power to be conferred, and although several states have only recently conferred upon their governors a negative over legislation, North Carolina today is the only state whose governor has no veto power.

The governor's veto power over legislative action has been so extended that in more than two-thirds of the states he now also has power to veto separate items in appropriation bills; the constitutions of Washington and South Carolina in addition confer upon the governor power to veto any section or sections of a bill presented to him, and to approve other portions of the bill so presented.

The executive department has thus in its organization and powers become stronger, and its gain in power has been largely at the expense of the legislature. Somewhat the same development has taken place with respect to the judicial department. In most of the first constitutions the judges were chosen by the legislative bodies, although in several states there was executive appointment, subject to confirmation by the executive council or upper branch of the legislature. The power of appointment was in most cases gradually taken from the legislature; this power in some states was at first conferred upon the governor, but the movement for popular election, which gained force from 1830 to 1850, has extended popular choice to judicial as well as executive officers. The legislative power of impeachment has continued in many states, and to it has been added in a number of cases an executive power of removal upon address by the legislative bodies.

But the most important power acquired by the judicial departent in this country has been that of declaring invalid laws which in the opinion of the judges conflict with the constitution. The exercise of this power was not contemplated by the earlier state constitutions, but the courts which in our earlier state governments really occupied a subordinate position, were able to assume such power, largely because of the early developed distrust of the legislatures and of the feeling that some check upon legislative power was needed. The judicial power over legislation, once established, has steadily grown, in part by the assumption by the courts on their own motion of more extensive and detailed supervision over legislation, and in part also because the state constitutions have steadily added an increasing number of limitations upon legislative action, such limitations being subject to judicial enforcement, under the theory of judicial control as to the constitutionality of legislation.

Limitation upon legislative power. Reference has already been. made to the fact that constitutional legislation has steadily increased in the states at the expense of ordinary legislation-that through revision or amendment much matter properly of a statutory character has been introduced into the state constitutions, thus limiting the power of the regular legislative bodies. In addition legislative power is strictly limited by a series of specific prohibitions which have from time to time been introduced into the constitutions.

The first series of important limitations may be said to have resulted from the state internal improvement movement which gained force after 1830. The people of many states were carried away by a wild frenzy for internal improvements to be constructed at state expense, and plans often immature and impracticable were forced upon state legislatures; failure was almost sure to result. As a result of unwise plans adopted by the states during the period from 1830 to 1850 practically all of our constitutions now have strict limitations upon state indebtedness. "As the people had driven their representatives to enter upon internal improvements without caution, so when taxes began to press, they censured them without justice and disowned the policy."

The states having excluded themselves from the field of internal improvements, their place was taken by private corporations. These private corporations in their turn appealed for financial aid to the minor civil divisions of the state, upon whom no constitutional limitatations had yet been placed, and which might aid railroads and other enterprises either under their general powers or under powers conferred for that purpose by the legislatures. The legislatures here again yielding to popular pressure permitted the civil divisions of their states to loan their credit heavily to projected railways and other similar enterprises. Here, too, unwise management brought financial disaster, and as a result constitutional limitations were adopted by which municipalities and other local divisions of the states are forbidden to loan their credit in aid of such enterprises or to incur indebtedness beyond certain fixed limits.

In a somewhat similar manner the early banking experiences of the states and especially the abuses arising out of state participation in banking and out of legislative grant of bank charters-produced a series of constitutional limitations upon the passage of state banking laws. In the case just referred to the legislatures acted unwisely, but they acted under pressure of the people, and cannot be held entirely responsible for the abuses which resulted. The people insisted upon legislative policies which resulted in disaster and then after the injury had been done they imposed strict limitations upon their legislatures.

In many matters, limitations have been imposed upon legislatures as a result not so much of legislative incompetence or corruption as of actions resulting from popular pressure. But other classes of limitations have been the direct result of abuses for which the legislatures alone were primarily responsible-as with respect to favoritism in granting charters to private companies, the passage of local and special And on account of abuse of power by legislative legislation, etc. bodies we now have a series of strict limitations upon local and special legislation and upon the methods of legislative action.

These limitations, which have been steadily growing in number, have decreased the power and influence of legislative bodies. And the popular distrust of legislatures, fostered in part by measures enforced by popular sentiment, and in part also by the incompetence of the legislatures themselves, has caused the adoption of constitu