The boundary of the State of New York, as between New York and New Jersey, is at the low water mark, at the New Jersey shore of the Hudson river. The jurisdiction of New York extends to said boundary and is plenary both in civil and criminal matters. This jurisdiction enabled the courts of New York, for preservation and protection of the harbor and river, in the bay of New York, to restrain persons, by injunction, from filling in and forming land in the said river and harbor, at the New Jersey shore.2 In Contracts of affreightment or carriage to be performed by a corporate common carrier, partly in crossing a common boundary river of two States, but mainly to be performed within the State wherein the carrier is incorporated, are to be construed as to the obligation of performance by the laws of the latter State.3 the case here cited the contract was made at the wharf on the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware river, for transportation of baggage over the defendant's railroad, from thence across the Delaware and through New Jersey to Atlantic City. The supreme court of Pennsylvania, SHARSWOOD, J., say: "As the contract relied on in this case, as the ground of the liability of the defendants, was to be performed in the State of New Jersey, we must look to the law of that State to determine the extent of that liability. It is no answer to say that part of the undertaking was to carry the plaintiff and his baggage across the Delaware to Camden, and so in part within the limits of Pennsylvania. That river is conterminous between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the inhabitants of both have equal rights of navigation and passage. * It was by virtue of their franchise as a corporation, derived from the State of New Jersey, that the defendants made the contract. Nor would it make any difference if it appeared that the trunk was stolen or lost at the wharf in Philadelphia, of which there is no evidence." * 1 People v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 48 Barb. 478. 2 Ibid. 3 Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. * Co., 83 Penn. St. 316; S. C., 15 Am. 4 Ibid. 583 Penn. St. 316; S. C., 15 Am. Ry. Reps. 421, 424. CHAPTER XXXV. POWER OF THE STATES TO LICENSE INTER-STATE FERRIES. I. THE POWER TO LICENSE IS A POLICE POWER. II. THE EXTENT THEREOF AND EFFECT OF ITS EXERCISE. I. POWER TO LICENSE IS A POLICE POWER. Nice questions arise in regard to the grant of ferry privileges across rivers and other waters which are a common boundary between two States. First. As to how far this species of intercourse comes within the jurisdiction of Congress and the Federal courts. The Power is in the State. It is well settled that the granting of a franchise or license to keep a ferry, whether across waters wholly within a State or across waters which are a boundary between two States, is of the police powers of the States which has never been parted with or surrendered to the National government, but has always been exercised by the several States; and that the exercise thereof, in reference to mere matter of ferriage from shore to shore, does not come within or infringe upon the constitutional grant to Congress of power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes," nor does it infringe the provisions of the ordinance of 1787 in regard to the free navigation of the Mississippi river and its navigable waters. The authority of the several States over this subject is but part and parcel of that municipal and police power of the several States of making inspection laws, health laws and quarantine regulations, and laws for the regulations of local matters and of commerce wholly internal of the State; "all of which," in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Gibbons v. Ogden, " can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves." 19 Wheat. 1; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603, 633, 635; Fanning v. Gre goire, 16 How. 524; Chilvers v. The People, 11 Mich. 43; Chiapella v. But its Exercise may not Interfere with Commerce. Should a State, in the exercise of any of these powers, encroach upon the commercial powers of the national government, it would become the duty of the United States supreme court to control or annul such encroachment. But the possibility of abuse in its exercise is no argument against the existence of that power, which being first openly asserted in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, has not, as was said by Justice SWAYNE in Conway v. Taylor's Executors, since been questioned in any adjudicated case, but is repeatedly affirmed by both State and United States courts. It being thus settled, not only by the highest national court but by a general concurrence of opinion of the State courts, that this power of ferries and ferry franchises is one of a local and police nature appertaining to the several States within their own proper jurisdictional limits, the extent of its legitimate exercise becomes now the next subject of inquiry. II. THE EXTENT THEREOF AND EFFECT OF ITS EXERCISE. When the stream, the shores thereof, and the locality upon which this power of the States is brought to bear are situated wholly within the territorial limits of a State, then there can be no question as to the power in the State to grant such franchises and regulate the same by law. But when the water to be ferried over is the boundary line between two States, by reason whereof the opposite shores thereof are within the territorial jurisdiction of different States, then, although the power still exists in each of said States, yet the question arises as to the extent of that power, and in what manner it may be exercised. This we will now consider. Laws have no Extra-Territorial Force. It is well settled that the laws of a State have no extra-territorial force, and it therefore results therefrom that grant of a franchise by a State law, or in virtue of a State law, cannot of its own mere force confer extra-territorial privileges, or extend the legal existence of such franchise into the limits of another State or territorial jurisdition.3 Brown, 14 La. Ann. 189; Marshall v. Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 519; Conway v. 2 Conway v.Taylor, 1 Black, 603, 634. 3 Weld . Chapman, 2 Iowa, 524; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1. The Grant is Local. It follows, from these principles, that a grant of a ferry franchise by a State over a river which is a common boundary between such State and another State confers only the right to transport persons and things from the shore of the State making the grant to the shore and landing of such other State; but it need not confer the right to there land, for that right exists without, as to all public landings;1 and not the right to there take persons and passengers aboard and transport them back across such water course.2 It is a Right to Carry, and not to Land. The Latter Exists without the Grant. "A ferry is in respect to the landing place, and not of the water. The water may be to one, and the ferry to another."3 The franchise is local. "An estate in such a franchise, and an estate in land rest upon the same principle."4 Being thus local, if the right conferred be in reference to a water which is a boundary between two States, then the only right that passes is to take passengers or property from the shore in the State where the grant is made. The grant is from that shore or landing place, and not to the landing in the opposite State. And so if a ferry franchise be granted in the opposite State, it is a grant from the shore or landing in such State, and not a grant of the right also of landing in the other State. The right of landing in public places appertains to all water crafts, independent of special authority or privileges." The enrollment or licensing of a boat under the United States. laws, for the coasting trade, does not alter the case, as above stated, in regard to a right to ferry. It confers no such right." As we have seen, a ferry license or franchise has reference to the land of the river shore in the State where the license is obtained, and to the particular place of the shore designated in the grant. 1 Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603, 632, 634. Conway . Taylor, 1 Black, 603; Weld v. Chapman, 2 Iowa, 524; Ross v. Page, 6 Ham. (Ohio,) 166; Somerville. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. 205, 230; Memphis v. Overton, 3 Yerg. 387. 313 Viner's Ab. 208a; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603, 630; People v. Babcock, 11 Wend. 587; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Freeholders It neither confers nor restricts any right of passing over the water. It is not a grant of the water, or of the use thereof; and though restricted to a particular locality of the river shore, there is no restriction as to how far up or down the stream the craft may go, or as to the route to be pursued, after leaving the landing place of the grant, or in approaching the same; nor does the validity of the franchise depend on the privilege of landing at the shore in the opposite State. It is a complete right when granted by the authorities of one State, and has reference merely to the right of taking and landing at the point of land therein designated in the license. Hence it is, that in law the owner of the soil of the landing place is deemed to have the preference for such a grant. It is so, because, as herein before stated, "a ferry is in respect of the landing place, and not of the water."2 To create such a franchise, the concurrent action of the two States is not necessary, but each may make such from its own shore, a violation of which is restrainable by injunction.3 So, in New York, the courts there hold that power exists in that State to establish and license ferries, by law, across the Niagara river, from the shore in that State, and that to run a ferry there without a license is a violation of the statute law of New York in relation to ferries. It is held to be none the less so, that the State authority and jurisdictions extends only to the middle of the river. The power conferred is to ferry from the American shore. As to the right of landing on the Canada side, the State of New York has nothing to do with that. It was objected that such exercise of authority by the State conflicted with the authority of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign States; but the court held that it was a domestic right in the State, always conceded by the national to the State governments." The Power is a Municipal One. The grant of ferry franchises, as a means of intercommunication over streams between States, is not vested in the United States by the Constitution, but is municipal in its character, and is under State control, both as to |