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raised here for the use of Russia, upon which I gave your lordship reason to expect further details, I have nothing very satisfactory to state to you. The information sent to M. Nicolay with a view to the accomplishment of this object is very insufficient, at least he professes to have received nothing more than the mere copy of the note sent to me by Mr. Stuart.-It must be obvious that this paper could not furnish that minister with the authority which was necessary in so complicated and difficult a business. In fact M. Nicolay has met with so many difficulties in his communications with the monied interest in the city, that he has found no other resource than that of applying for the guarantee of this government, without which it is stated that no loan can be raised for the use of Russia, except upon terms extremely disadvantageous to that country.-To this proposition, which is not even hinted at in the Russian note, your lordship will at once see the obvious and insurmountable objections. It is impossible that his majesty's government should make itself responsible for so large a sum as six millions, the annual taxation for the interest of which, combined with any adequate sinking fund, if it should ultimately fall on this country, would amount to little less than 500,0007. sterling. The examples of the Austrian loans are too recent to allow any one to doubt that a loan thus secured, must in effect be considered as a subsidy; and would be so regarded by parliament were such a proposition brought forward there. -It may indeed be said that the resources of Russia are greater than those of Austria, and her credit, from the punctuality with which former loans have been discharged, better established. But here we must remark the difference between a loan nego-wished, this is an evil which must be subtiated with individuals, and one borrowed, (for such would be the effect of the proposed guarantee) from another state. In the one case the hope of raising future suplies in the same way must depend on the faith which is observed in the engagements entered into respecting them. Where the debt is to fall on another power, in the event of any interruption of friendship between the two governments, and still more in the possibility, (I trust very improbable case) of an actual rupture between them, the desire of distressing an enemy may be felt more strongly than the obligations of good faith; at the same time that the violation of that principle is not so certainly pro

ductive of future disadvantage.—An individual who has no object but pecuniary profit will not again trust to promises which have been broken; but it may not unreasonably be presumed that as a government does not contract engagements of this nature, without having some political interest of its own involved in them, the recurrence of a similar interest may induce it to overlook the failure of former engagements. In addition to all this, on a general principle of national policy, it would not be wise, whatever may be our reliance on the honour, the good faith, and the steady friendship of Russia, to implicate ourselves in an arrangement, which if our present good understanding should at any time cease, might enable that power in a moment of great difficulty to throw upon us the additional burthen of so large an annual taxation, as that which I have already stated. │—I have dwelt so much at length on the reasons which must operate conclusively against a compliance with this request, in order that your lordship may be fully apprized of the propriety of the determination which has been adopted, and of the necessity of its been steadily adhered to. Every facility that can be given to any use Russia can make of her own credit, in this the only remaining money market in Europe, will be afforded. In the negociation of the loan formerly raised by that power in Holland, similar difficulties were experienced, and they are understood to have been obviated by obtaining the security, for which a large price was paid, of merchants of well established credit, such as Alexander Hope and Co. of Amsterdam, and others. There seems to be no reason why a similar expedient should not be resorted to now, and if the terms should be worse than is to be

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mitted to; nor is it reasonable tlrat, in order to avoid this difficulty, the finances of this country should, after fourteen years of unparalleled exertion, be subjected to so great an additional burthen.--The pecuniary embarrassments of the moment, are the unavoidable result of the present unfortunate state of public affars, and even this country itself, great as its credit and its resources are, is not altogether exempt from them.-In the course of the discussions which have taken place on this subject, it has been suggested that an additional facility might be afforded by some arrangement for better securing to the creditors the receipt of the interest in England; and

become a principal in the war, and his maj. will be ready to afford her all the succour, which in that chaarcter, she can justly claim, and which the common interests may require.--But in looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes, and above all the inveterate enmity of the French government, must oblige this country to provide, his majesty fells it incumbent on him to preserve as much as possible, the resources to be derived from the tried affections of his people. HOWICK.

au idea has occurred, that by a suppression, sire to contribute to the utmost of his power of the customs on British merchandize im- to the support of an ally, with whom, ported into Russia, and the imposition of an whether in peace or war, the king finds his equivalent export duty here, this might be own interest so closely connected; but it is effected; a separate account being kept of not to be supposed that so great and powerthe duties so raised, and their strict appli- ful an empire as Russia can fail to find in cation carefully provided for, by paying its own resources, abundant means for over the whole of them as fast as they are its own defence. Should an inability to do collected, into the hands of commissioners this be avowed, it would leave little hope of or trustees, who might be compelled by success in a war, the whole burthen of law faithfully to apply the whole to those which must then rest upon England.-His purposes only, to which it would be so ap- maj. has at no time shewn a backwardness propriated. Though it does not seem pro- to second the efforts of the continental bable that the present plan of raising a loan powers; but the case is not now of an will be pursued much farther, it may be useful auxiliary force which this government is to make some enquiry upon this subject, with endeavouring to draw out for purposes of a view to any future demands of the same offence, and the expences of which are to nature, and to throw out the idea to M. be defrayed at a great distance from the Budberg, as one which has been suggested resources of the power which furnishes it. by an extreme desire to find some mode-Russia, attacked on her own frontiers, is of facilitating the object which is in view, without subjecting this country to sacrifices which cannot, in justice, be expected from ber. Your lordship will therefore endeavour to obtain the most accurate information of the amount and sources of the Russian revenue, of the mode of its collection, of the amount of public debt to which it is pledged, and on what branches of the revenue the payment of such debt and the interest is secured, and particularly of the possibility of any such transfer of duties as that which I have above suggested.-The arrangement which I announced to your lordship in my last dispatch for the immediate transmission of 500,000l. in specie, on account of the late subsidy, has been completed. The necessary declarations were this morning exchanged between M. de Nicolay and me; and the money will be immediately shipped for Gottenburg, on board the Quebec frigate. It is to be expected that Russia may make some complaints of what may perhaps be considered as an unwillingness on the part of this government to come to her assistance. M. de Nicolay indeed, in a conversation this morning with lord Grenville and myself, thew out some hints to this effect, and even asked if it was no longer the intention of this country to make common cause with Russia? To this the answer is obvious and easy. A refusal to comply with a request unreasonable in itself and injurious to this country, ought not to give rise to any such suspicion.-Your Idp. will find no difficulty in producing abundant proofs from the king's past conduct; and you will repeat, in the strongest manner, fresh assurances of his majesty's earnest de

No. 14.-Extract of a Dispatch from C.
Stuart, esq. to visc. Howick, dated St.
Petersburgh, Jan. 14th, 1807.-Re-
ceived Feb. 27.

I must not conceal from your lordship that the apparent silence of his majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favourable effect on the opinion either of the ministers or the public of this country. No. 15.-Extract of a Dispatch from the

marq. of Douglas, to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Jan. 26th 1807. Before I conclude, I must inform your lordship that baron Budberg complained of the situation in which Russia was now placed, being left to combat alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other.

No. 16.-Extract of a dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howick,

dated St. Petersburgb, Feb. 4th, 1807. During this interview general Budberg seized every occasion of complaining of the Russians being left without military assistance on the part of Great Britain. An attack on any part of the coast of France,

or even the alarm of an attack promulgated with confidence, would tend to relieve Russia from the concentrated forces of the French army. Was any measure of this kind to be adopted I am persuaded I should no longer hear any arguments against the ulterior guarantee; not that I omitted to remind the general that after what had been done in Italy, and what was ready to be done at Constantinople, Great Britain could never be considered as a negative co-adjutor whether in reference to the common cause or in reference to her immediate friends and allies.

No. 17.-Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howiek, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 8th, 1807. His excellency said, that the court of Petersburgh being now abandoned to her own resources, was entitled to expect some efforts which may divert the attention of the French government, before they consent to enter into any engagement which is likely to create future differences with that power upon a subject not immediately interesting to Russia.

No. 18.-Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas to visc. Howick, dated St. Petersburgh, Feb. 15th, 1807.-Received March 8th.

I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by G. Britain to divert the general concentration of the French troops from the banks of the Vistula.

No. 19.-Extract of a Note from gen. Budberg to the marq. of Douglas, dated Feb. 1st, 1807.-Transmitted by the marq. of Douglas and received March 8th.

The undersigned has already had occasion to observe to the ambassador the marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale, that partial and separate expeditions cannot influence the general operations in an impressive manner, and that a vague assurance, such as,

"We shall soon see what England will do," cannot be sufficiently satisfactory in circumstances so imminently critical as the present. The emperor is therefore desirous that the British government should make known to him with the greatest possible detail, the plans which it may have in view, in order to effect a powerful diversion upon one or any of the points of the coasts subject to the enemy; and that in general it should communicate to his ministry, such views and projects, the execution of which

it may judge capable of contributing to the success of the common cause. His imperial majesty thinks himself the more justified in expressing this wish, as at all times he has prescribed it as a duty to his cabinet to communicate to that of his majesty the king of Great Britain, every thing that might interest it upon this subject, and as, in point of fact, the British government has been regularly informed of all the measures which, in the course of events, have been adopted by Russia, and has been acquainted with the forces which she has em ployed on such points where their presence has been judged useful to the interests of the allied courts.

No. 20.-Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas,

dated Downing Street, Feb. 20th 1807. With respect to military diversions, your exc. must at once have been prepared to state to the Russian government the extreme difficulty of any maritime operations at the present season. The difficulty and danger indeed at all seasons of landing in a country such as France, where the means exist of collecting, in a short time, a much larger force than any that can be sent from this country, and from whence there can be no secure retreat, must be sufficiently apparent. All that can at present be said therefore on this head is, that if a favourable opportunity should arise, his majesty will be desirous of exerting his utmost efforts to distress the enemy upon any point which may present an advantageous opening to assist the general operations of the war.

No. 21.-Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated, Downing Street, March 7th 1807.

I have nothing to add to my former dispatches (to which I beg leave to refer your excellency) with respect to the renewal of the commercial treaty, the proposal of military diversions by this country, and the suggestion of further pecuniary assistance. No. 22.- Extract of a Dispatch from

visc. Howick to the marq. of Douglas, dated Downing Street, March 10th 1807...

The messenger Vick, with your excellency's dispatches, arrived on Sunday last, and I have it in command from the king to lose no time in expressing to your excellency the lively satisfaction with which his majesty has received the account of the battle of the 8th ultimo. Your excellency will take the earliest opportunity of offer

respect to measures with which it is wholly unconnected, and which must depend upon considerations of a totally different nature. --I have already explained to your excellency the difficulties which have hitherto prevented any attempt at military diversions. A more favourable season is now approaching; and you may assure the Russian minister, that this government is sedulously employed in preparing the means of still more active co-operation.— I hope soon to be able to communicate to your excellency something more specific on this subject; but the Russian government must be aware how much the force of which his majesty can dispose for continential operations is necessarily limited, both by the extent of his naval exertions and the necessary support.of his distant colouies; and how much the difficulty of employing it advantageously is increased by the present situation of the north of Germany, where his majesty can neither look to the junction of his army with that of any ally, to any established magazines to enable to advance, nor to the possession of any considerable fortress to secure its retreat.

ing to the emperor, the king's congratula- | either as an inducement or a threat, with tions on an event so glorious to the Rus sian arms, and so advantageous to the cause in which the two sovereigns are engaged.It is painful to me to pass from this to a less pleasing topic; but I am under the necessity of expressing to your excellency the increased disappointment and regret which his majesty has experienced in learning that so many unforeseen objections are still urged against the renewal of the commercial treaty. The proposed extension of this treaty for two years, upon the conditions annexed to this proposal, is by no means satisfactory; nor does there seem to be any good reason for not. coming to a definitive arrangement, which his majesty is willing to conclude without any alteration in the terms of the present treaty. Had any new proposal been made on the part of his majesty, there might have been some pretence for delay; but in a case where the interests of the two countries are so well understood, and in which experience has proved the advantage to both, of the treaty which is now about to expire, his majesty feels himself entitled, upon all the grounds of mutual interest and friendship, to renew his instances with his august ally, for an immediate compliance with so equi- No. 23.-Dispatch from visc. Howick to table a proposal. Though your excellency Alex. Straton, esq. his majesty's envoy will urge this in the strongest terms, you extraordinary and minister plenipotenwill however consent to the offered exten- tiary at the court of Sweden, dated sion for two years, it being understood Downing Street, March 10th, 1807. that the advantages at present enjoyed by Sir; Your dispatches have been received the British commerce are to suffer no dimi- and laid before the king.-Though the nution, rather than allow the treaty to ex- king of Sweden does not appear to have pire. I cannot, however, dismiss this sub- renewed with you the question of an adject without some remark upon the man- ditional subsidy, that subject has beeu ner in which this concession, as it is termed, pressed upon me in repeated conversations on the part of Russia, is made to depend by M. Rehausen.-From the communicaupon an immediate assurance of a power- tion which that minister has made to me ful military diversion being made by this of the instructions he has received from his country. The insinuation conveyed in this court, a good deal of dissatisfaction appears part of the baron de Budberg's note, is so to be felt there at our supposed backwardlittle justified by the former conduct of ness in assisting the exertions which the this government, that it cannot be passed king of Sweden is willing to make.--There over without notice. It is unnecessary to certainly is no ground for such an imputastate the obvious tendency of such language tion. In the instructions of your predeto produce mutual discontent, and excite cessor you will find that he was uniformly adverse pretensions, destructive of the har-directed to state the importance which his mony and confidence which ought to prevail between the two governments. In renewing your representations, therefore,upon the necessity of a speedy conclusion of this treaty, which your excellency will remark is no less advantageous to Russia than to England, you will protest against any attempt to make use of it in this manner,

majesty attached to the undertaking of offensive operations on the side of Pomerania, and that he was even authorized to give assurances of pecuniary assistance from the momcut the Swedish troops should have passed their own frontier: But it was added, that before any thing could be conclusively arranged, it was necessary that his


thousand men.-From M. de Rehausen's statements to me, it appears that the chief deficiency of the Swedish army is in cavalry. This is certainly the description of force which his majesty could best spare from his own army. If a brigade of dragoons would enable his Swedish majesty to bring into the field a force of the amount above stated, you may state that this proportion of cavalry might probably be furnished from hence.-With regard to the last point, viz. that of subsidy, you will state that his majesty will be disposed to contribute to the support of the proposed operation, by a subsidy regulated according to the proportion of that which was given to Austria in 1805; but that this proportion cannot be exceeded, except as to a sum usually furnished as a première mise en campagne," which, as soon as the measures in contemplation shall be conclusively agreed upon, may be advanced to the amount of two, or at most three, months subsidy.Having communicated these proposals to the king of Sweden, you will request his majesty to authorise his ministers to enter upon the immediate discussion of them; and to prevent the loss of time, you will suggest the expediency of sending to this country some confidential military officer, fully' instructed upon all the points above-mentioned, who might assist Mr. de Rehausen in giving the necessary explanations, aud in bringing this business to a prompt termination. I know it is unnecessary for me to recommend to you the utmost diligence in the execution of these instructions, and in obtaining and transmitting to me the most accurate information respecting the present state and disposition of the Swedish government, and the condition and numHOWICK.

Swedish majesty should communicate ge-
nerally to this government his plan of ope-
rations, and more particularly the amount
of force which it might be in his power to
employ.-M. de Rehausen has urged the
impossibility of stating in detail all the mea-
sures which it may be necessary to arrange
with a view to a future campaign. No
such thing however was required. The in
formation asked for, was only what was
necessary to enable his majesty to judge of
the general expediency of the measures
proposed, with respect to which it is evi-
dent that no satisfactory opinion could be
formed without a knowledge of the force
destined to execute them, and of the time
when it would be ready to act. Even fur-
ther details, when they could be conve-
niently communicated, his majesty, con-
sidering how largely he is expected to
contribute his support, would have a right
to expect; and such communication would
be obviously necessary to enable his ma-
jesty to direct any efforts, which on his side
he might have an opportunity of making,
to the advancement of the common objects
of the two powers.—In order to come to a
right understanding upon this point, you
will, with as little delay as possible after
the receipt of this dispatch, request an au-
dience of his Swedish majesty. You will
state the sincere pleasure with which
his majesty has seen the king of Sweden's
steady resistance to the common enemy.
You will repeat the opinion already ex-
pressed on the part of this government,
that a diversion by a Swedish force on the
side of Pomerania, would be at the pre-
sent moment of the utmost importance,
and with a view to bringing the dis-
cussion to a point, you will request par-
ticular information on the three follow-bers of its army.
ing heads. What is the amount of
force which the king of Sweden could
employ, exclusive of the garrison of Stral-
sund? In addition to which information, it
is desirable to know, where it is now sta-
tioned, and how soon it could be ready to
act? 2. Whether any, and what addition of
British troops would be required? 3. What
amount of subsidy the king of Sweden
would demand in proportion to the num-
ber of troops employed ?-Should the
Swedish government be willing to enter in-
to this discussion, you will state upon the
two first points, that it does not appear to
his majesty that any effectual operation
could be undertaken without a force
amounting at the very least to twenty-five

No. 24.-Extract of a Dispatch from lord Hutchinson addressed to visc. Howick, dated Memel, March 9th, 1807.-Received April 18th, by Mr. Secretary Canning.

I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian government, with whom the Russians have also co-operated, to write to your lordship on the subject of a diversion to be made by the British troops, which might occupy the French essentially, and force them to withdraw a part of their troops from this quarter. M. de Zastrow made me yesterday a formal proposition. -Marshal Mortier now blockades Stralsund with about twenty thousand men; it is therefore proposed that the British and

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