scheme concerted between Montezuma and his subjects. He coolly replied, he had already begun to prepare for returning to his own country; but as the vessels in which he came were destroyed, some time was requisite for building other ships.

This appearing reasonable, a number of Mexicans were sent to Vera Cruz, to cut down timber; and some Spanish carpenters were appointed to superintend the work. Cortes flattered himself that during this interval, he should receive such reinforcements, as would enable him to despise every danger.

Nine months had now elapsed since Porto-carrero and Montigo had sailed with his dispatches to Spain; he daily expected their return with a confirmation of his authority from the king: without this, his condition was insecure, and precarious.

While he remained in this suspense, uncertain with respect to the future, and by the late declaration of Montezuma, oppressed with a new addition of cares, a Mexican courier arrived informing him of some ships having appeared on the coast. Cortes elated with this intelligence imagined they were reinforcements arrived to strengthen and forward his conquests; and that the completion of all his wishes and hopes was at hand: he imparted the glad tidings to his companions, who received them with transports of mutual congratulation. Their joy was short; a message from Sandoval, whom Cortes had made gover nor of Vera Cruz in the room of Escalante brought certain intelligence that the armament was fitted out by Velasquez, governor of Cuba, and threatened them with immediate destruction.

The armament consisted of eighteen ships, which had on board fourscore horsemen, eight hundred foot soldiers, of which eighty were musqueteers, and a hundred and twenty cross-bow-men, together with a train of twelve pieces of cannon. This force was commanded by Pamphilo de Narvaez, with instructions to sieze Cortes, and his principal officers, and send them prisoners to Cuba, and then to compleat the conquest of the country in his

name.

Narvaez had landed his men without opposition, near/ St. Juan de Ullua. Three soldiers whom Cortes had sent to search for mines, deserted and joined Narvaez;

by them he was informed of the progress and situation of Cortes; and as they had learned the Mexican language, were the more acceptable, as they would serve as interpreters. Narvaez having sent a summons to the governor of Vera Cruz to surrender, Guavara a priest, whom he employed in that service, made the demand with such insolence, that Sandoval an officer of high spirit, and zealously attached to Cortes, instead of complying with his terms, seized him, and his officers, and sent them prisoners in chains to Mexico. Cortes received them not as enemies, but as friends, condemning the severity of Sandoval, set them immediately at liberty.

By this well-timed clemency, seconded by caresses and presents, he gained their confidence, and drew from them such particulars concerning the force and intentions of Narvaez, as gave a view of the impending danger, in its full extent.

He had now to take the field against an army in courage and martial discipline equal to his own; in number far superior, commanded by an officer of known bravery.

Narvaez more solicitous to gratify the resentment of Velasquez, than attentive to the honour and interest of his country, had represented Cortes and his followers to the natives, as fugitives and rebels, who had unjustly invaded the Mexican empire; and that his sole object was to punish the Spaniards, and rescue them from their oppression. The same unfavourable representations had been conveyed to Montezuma.

Animated with the prospect of being set free from subjection to strangers, the provinces began openly to revolt from Cortes; and regarded Narvaez as their deliverer. Montezuma kept up a secret intercourse with the new commander, and courted his favour.

Such were the dangers and difficulties which presented themselves to the view of Cortes. No situation could be more trying. If he should abandon the capital, and set the captive monarch at liberty, and march out to meet the enemy, he must at once give up all the fruits of his toils and victory, and relinquish advantages which could not be recovered without infinite danger. The natural haughtiness of Narvaez precluded all hopes of succeeding by conciliatory measures.

After revolving every scheme with deep attention, Cortes fixed that which was the most hazardous, but if successful, would be most honourable and beneficial to himself and his country. With decisive intrepidity, he, in this desperate situation, determined to make one bold effort for victory under every disadvantage, rather than sacrifice his own conquests, and the Spanish interest in Mexico. But as it would have been indecent and impolitic to advance in arms against his countrymen, without first attempting to adjust matters by an amicable negociation: he employed Olmedo, his chaplain, to whose character the function was well suited, and who was possessed with such prudence and address as qualified him for secret intrigues, in which Cortes placed his chief confidence.

All terms of accommodation were rejected with scorn by Narvaez, who, by a public proclamation, denounced Cortes and his companions rebels and enemies to their country. The intrigues of Olmedo were more successful, he had letters to deliver from Cortes and his officers, their ancient friends and companions; these were accompanied with presents of rings and chains of gold, which inspired those needy adventurers with high ideas of the wealth that he had acquired, and envy of the good fortune of those who were engaged in his service. They declared for an immediate accommodation with Cortes; but Narvaez upon discovering the inclination of the army towards an accommodation, irritated his violent temper almost to madness. In a transport of rage, he set a price upon the head of Cortes, and his principal officers, and having learned that he was now advanced within a league of Zempoalla with his small body of men, he considered this such an insult, as merited immediate chastisement, and marched out with all his troops to offer him battle.

Cortes was a leader of greater abilities and experience than to fight an enemy so far superior in number on equal ground. Having stationed his army on the opposite bank of the river de Canoas, where he was safe from any attack, he beheld the approach of the enemy without concern, and disregarded this vain bravado. The wet season had set in, and the rain had poured down during a great part of the day, with a violence peculiar to the torrid Zone.

The followers of Narvaez, unaccustomed to the severity of a military life, murmured at being thus fruitlessly exposed: this, together with the contempt he had of his enemy, induced him to permit them to retire to Zempoalla. The very circumstance that made them quit the field, encouraged Cortes to form a scheme by which he hoped at once to terminate the war. His hardy veterans, though standing under the torrents, without a single tent, or any shelter to cover them, were so far from repining at hardships which were become familiar to them, that they were still fresh and alert for service. He knew that the enemy would give themselves up to repose after their fatigue, and deem themselves perfectly secure at a season so unfit for action. He resolved therefore to surprize them by an unexpected attack in the night. His soldiers, knowing that there was no resource but in some desperate effort of courage, approved of the measure with such warmth, that Cortes in an oration which he delivered to them was more careful to temper, than to inflame, their ardour.

He divided them into three parties: Sandoval commanded the first; this gallant officer was entrusted with the most dangerous and important service, that of seizing the enemy's artillery, which was planted before the principal towers of the temple, where Narvaez had fixed his head quarters. Christoval de Olid commanded the second, with orders to assault the tower and lay hold on the general. Cortes himself conducted the last and smallest division, which was to act as a body of reserve, and to support the other two as there should be occasion.

Having passed the river di Canoas, which was so swelled with the rains, that the water reached their chins, they advanced in profound silence, each man armed with his sword, his dagger, and his Chinantlan spear. Narvaez, remiss in proportion to his security, had posted only two centinels to watch the motions of an enemy, whom he had such good cause to dread. One of these was seized by the advance guard of Cortes's troops, the other made his escape, and, hurrying to the town, spread the alarm of the enemy's approach, so that there was full time to prepare for their reception. But through the arrogance and infatuation of Narvaez, the important interval was lost. He charged the centinel with cowardice, and treated with de

rision the idea of being attacked by forces so unequal to his own. The shouts of Cortes's soldiers, however, convinced him at last of his mistake.

The rapidity with which they advanced was such, that they fired but one cannon, before Sandoval's party closed with them, and drove them from their guns, and had begun to force their way up the steps of the tower. Narvaez, as brave in action as presumptuous in conduct, armed himself in haste, and by his voice and example endeavoured to animate his men to the combat. Olid advanced to sustain his companions; and Cortes himself, rushing to the front, conducted and added new vigour to the attack. The compact order of this small body, and the impenetrable front they presented with their long spears, bore down all opposition.

They had now reached the gate, and as they were endeavouring to force it open, a soldier set fire to the reeds with which the tower was covered, and forced Narvaez to sally out. In the first encounter he was wounded in the eye, with a spear, and falling to the ground, he was in a moment clapped in fetters.

The shout of victory resounded among the troops of Cortes. Those who had sallied out with their leader, feebly maintained the conflict, or began to surrender. Terror and confusion prevailed. Their own artillery was pointed against them; wherever they turned their eyes, they beheld with astonishment, lights gleaming through the obscurity of the night; which, although proceeding from what is now well known by the name of the fire-fly, which abounds in sultry climates, their affrighted imaginations represented as numerous bands of musqueteers, advancing with lighted matches to the attack. After a short resistance, the soldiers compelled their officers to capitulate; and before morning all had laid down their arms, and quietly submitted to their conquerors.

This compleat victory was the more acceptable, as it was gained with little bloodshed; only two of the soldiers of Cortes being slain; as were also two officers and fifteen privates of the adverse party. Cortes treated the vanquished as friends offered to send them immediately back to Cuba, or take them into his service, as partners of his fortune, and on the same terms as his own soldiers. They eagerly embraced the latter proposal, and vied with each