pendent of her husband; but in either case she has full power CHAPTER XX. of disposition whilst she is single (ƒ). Where an estate for separate use or separate use with restriction against anticipation is given generally, subsequent words which appear to point to a present or future coverture only, are treated as superfluous, and the separate use applies to all covertures (g). use. Where an estate for life (h) or in fee (i) is limited to a married Effect of trust for separate woman for her separate use, she has a complete right of disposition thereof, by deed or will; and, accordingly, she can alienate that estate, independently of the Fines and Recoveries Act (k), without the concurrence of her husband, and without any acknowledgment. An instrument disposing of a wife's separate estate, real or personal, and executed by her, effectually conveys her equitable interest, and operates as a direction. to the trustees to convey or hold the estate according to the new trust which is created by such direction, and the trustees are bound to convey accordingly (1); and when the trust thus created is clothed by the trustees with the legal estate, the alienation is complete both at law and in equity (m). If the legal estate is vested in the wife, it can only be effectually conveyed by the wife with her husband's concurrence by deed acknowledged. The Married Women's Property Act, 1882(n), does not alter the powers of a married woman over her separate estate, not being her separate property, by virtue of the Act (0). A married woman may create a valid charge upon her separate property without expressly charging it in terms (p), but the mere fact of her being a party to a deed by which her husband alone assigns property limited to her separate use, but without any disposition by her, or any recital or covenant on her part indicating an intention to charge her interest will not bind such interest (g). (f) Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377. (g) Steedman v. Poole, 6 Ha. 193; Re Gaffee, 1 Mac. & G. 541; Hawkes v. Hubback, L. R. 11 Eq. 5; Re Molyneur's Estate, Ir. R. 6 Eq. 411. (h) Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 209; Acton v. White, 1 S. & St. 429; Glyn v. Baxter, 1 Y. & J. 329. (i) Taylor v. Meads, 4 De G. J. & S. 597; Atchison v. Le Mann, 23 L. T. 302, L. JJ.; Hall v. Waterhouse, 11 Jur. N. S. 361; Blatchford v. Woolley, 2 Dr. & S. 204, 206; Pride CHAPTER XX. interests. A married woman, unless restrained from anticipation, can Reversionary generally dispose of a reversionary interest settled to her separate use in realty (r), or personalty (s); but it seems doubtful whether she can do so if the reversionary interest is contingent (t), or an interest which cannot by any possibility arise during the coverture (u). So, also, the trust for separate use may be so framed as not to attach to the interest of a married woman till the happening of a future event, in which case she cannot dispose of such interest until the event happen (~). Savings by married women. Bar of estate tail. Covenant to settle after Savings, during coverture, from separate estate, and investments thereof in stock or furniture, are separate estate (y), although the stock were purchased by the husband (≈), but not savings during discoverture (a). Shares in a company purchased by a wife out of savings, are separate estate, and the husband is not a contributory (b). Since the Judicature Act (c), the decisions at common law, in respect of savings, and property purchased with them (d), will no longer apply. The rule in equity must be followed, as it was before the Act upon an interpleader rule (e). Where an estate tail is limited to the separate use of a married woman, she may bar the entail, and dispose of the estate, free from any curtesy of her husband, but his consent is required by the Fines and Recoveries Act (f), under which alone she can bar the entail, and is necessary, notwithstanding that the estate is limited to her separate use; and even if there is a clause against anticipation covering the entail, she may still bar the entail, although she cannot dispose of the estate, or its income (g). Separate property of a married woman has been held not to be subject to a covenant by the husband alone for the settle Cr. 377. See also Callow v. Howle, 1 (r) Major v. Lansley, 2 R. & My. (s) Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190. (x) King v. Lucas, 23 Ch. D. 712, (y) Newlands v. Paynter, 4 My. & Cr. 408; Brooks v. Brooks, 25 Beav. 342; Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254, 255; Haddon v. Fladgate, 27 L. J. P. D. & A. 21; Barrack v. McCullock, 3 K. & J. 110; Darkin v. Darkin, 17 Beav. 578; Humphrey v. Richards, 2 Jur. N. S. 432; Haselinton v. Gill, 3 ment of the wife's future property (), nor is an estate tail(i); CHAPTER XX. but if a covenant to settle after-acquired property is entered into acquired both by the intending husband and the intending wife, it will property. bind her so as to compel her to settle it (); and a declaration in a will that the property shall not be settled is disregarded (7). By the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (m), in case of judicial separation or desertion, all property which the wife may acquire Effect of or which may come to or devolve upon the wife belongs to her, judicial sepaas a feme sole (n), although there is a clause against anticipation (0); and although the property, which had been vested before, had not been reduced into possession until after the desertion (p), and the property of which she has so become possessed as a feme sole becomes, on resumption of cohabitation, her separate property (q). In case of desertion, and an order for protection of the earnings and property of the wife, her property, in remainder or reversion, at the date of the desertion, or decree for judicial separation, is included therein (). The wife is entitled to reversionary personalty, which she and her husband had mortgaged, as soon as it falls into possession (s). Under a protection order, property of which the wife is trustee is not included (t). Nor does the statute apply so as to include property to which a married woman had become entitled previously to the separation or desertion. Thus, where a married woman, entitled to an equitable life interest in realty for her separate use without power of anticipation, was deserted by her husband and obtained a protection order; she subsequently mortgaged her life interest; it was held that as regarded the property in question, not being property acquired by her or which had come to or devolved upon her after the desertion, the restraint on anticipation prevailed notwithstanding the order (u). (0) Cooke v. Fuller, 26 Beav. 99; Munt v. Glynes, 41 L. J. Ch. 639. (p) Re Coward and Adams' Purchase, (a) Re Emery's Trusts, 32 W. R. 357. (s) Re Insole, L. R. 1 Eq. 470. See (t) Kingsman v. Kingsman, 6 Q. B. D. 122, C. A. (u) Hill v. Cooper, (1893) 2 Q. B. 85, C. A. ration, &c. CHAPTER XX. Married woman may exercise power of appointment over realty by deed acknowledged. Copyholds. Legal estate. Misrepresentation as to power. Appointments of personalty. Payment of interest on void mortgage. Release of powers by married woman as regards land. vii.-Appointments under Powers.-A married woman can, independently of any statutory enactments, exercise a power of appointment whether relating to land or simply collateral (y); her husband's concurrence is not necessary for this purpose (≈), unless required by the terms of the power (a); and inasmuch as sect. 78 of the Fines and Recoveries Act (b) expressly provides that the powers of disposition given to married women by that Act shall not interfere with any other powers which they had before the Act, it is obvious that the instrument whereby the power is exercised does not require acknowledgment. This rule applies to copyholds as well as freeholds (c). The exercise by a married woman of a power of appointment over land in favour of a mortgagee or purchaser will pass the legal estate unless outstanding (d). Where a married woman joined her husband in a mortgage of an estate by deed, which represented her to have a power of appointing the fee, though, in fact, the estate was settled to her separate use for life with remainder to the husband for life with remainder over, it was held that the mortgagee was not debarred from enforcing his security against her life estate (e). A married woman may also exercise a power of appointment over personalty whether in possession or reversionary (ƒ), and an appointment of a future or reversionary interest will not require acknowledgment under Malins' Act (g). Where a mortgage is void by reason of the defective exercise of a power by a married woman, payment by her of interest for many years will not render the mortgage binding on her (h). A married woman might formerly have extinguished a power affecting land by fine or recovery (i); and by sect. 77 of the Fines and Recoveries Act (j) a married woman is empowered to release, surrender, or extinguish any power which may be vested in, limited, or reserved to her in regard to lands of any tenure, or any money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands, (y) Lady Travel's Case, cit. 3 Atk. 711; Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. Sen. 191. See Sug. Powers, 8th ed. p. 153. (z) Doe d. Blomfield v. Eyre, 5 C. B. 713. (a) Antrim v. Buckingham, 1 Ch. Ca. 17. (b) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74. (c) Driver v. Thompson, 4 Taunt. 294. (d) Wright v. Lord Cadogan, 2 Ed. 239, 252. See Field v. Moore, 7 De G. provided her husband concur in the deed and that the deed be CHAPTER XX. duly acknowledged. By sect. 1 () of Malins' Act, a married woman is empowered Release of in like manner to release or extinguish any power over a future power over personalty. or reversionary interest in personalty, unless she is restrained from alienating the same. release must By sect. 52 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, Whether 1881 (7), a person to whom a power, created either before or after be acknowthe Act, whether coupled with an interest or not, is given, may ledged. by deed release or contract not to exercise the power. But this section has been said to be merely declaratory (m), and though a married woman is no doubt a "person," yet it would seem hardly safe to assume that she could release her power over land or reversionary personalty except with her husband's concurrence and by deed acknowledged (»). Sect. 6 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882 (o), enables a person to whom a power, created before the Act, is given, whether coupled with an interest or not, by deed to disclaim such power, and the above remarks seem also to apply to this enactment. The Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (p), does not seem to affect the question whether a release or disclaimer by a married woman under these sections must be by deed acknowledged, as, though it enables a married woman freely to dispose of property, it nowhere expressly enables her to release or disclaim a power as if she were a feme sole (q). viii.—Mortgages under the Married Women's Property Act 1870. Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (r), the power of a married woman to mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, property was extended. By it the following property, acquired by a woman after the Act, whenever married, was declared to be her separate property, viz. :— 1. Earnings in her separate trade or employment (s. 1). (k) See section set out, ante, p. 323. (7) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41. (m) Per North in Re Radcliffe, Radcliffe v. Bewes, (1891) 2 Ch. 662, at p. 670. (n) See Wolst. Conv. and S. L. Acts (7th ed.), p. 108; Mr. Farwell thinks differently, see Powers (2nd ed.), p. 117. (0) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 39. (p) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, post, p. 335. (9) See Re Davenport, Turner v. King, (1895) 1 Ch. 361; and as to the (r) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93. This Act is |