X. Exceffive bail fhall not be required; nor exceffive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. XI. The enumeration, in the Conftitution, of certain rights,, fhall not be conftrued to deny or disparage others, retained by the people. XII. The powers, not delegated to the United States by the Conftitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are referved to the States refpectively, or to the people, it N. B. By the returns made into the Secretary of State's Office, appears that the First Article of the above amendments is agreed to by only feven States-the fecond by only four-and therefore thefe are not obligatory. All the remainder having been ratified by nine States, are of equal obligation with the Constitution itself. The defects of this Conftitution will be beft explained by fubfequent events. It is, however, neceffary to obferve here, that the great defect was the leaving of too much power in the hands of the Governments of the different States; but this evil was not to be avoided. It was the obvious intereft of a certain clafs of men in every State, to refift all changes which might hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and confequence of the offices they held under the State establishments; and the ambition of another class of men led them to hope to aggrandize themfelves by the convulfions of their country, or to flatter themselves with fairer profpects of elevation, from the fubdivifion of its territory into feveral partial confederacies, than from its union under one government. The former clafs were pacified by those provifions which left them in poffeffion of their emoJument and confequence; the latter have, ever fince the establishment of the new Conftitution, been endeavouring to fubvert it. The plan of a Conftitution, which Mr. HAMILTON, who was one of the Deputies from the State of NewYork, propofed to the Convention, has fince been published by his enemies, with a view of destroying his popularity and influence. If the people were not blind, they would perceive that fuch a Government as that which Mr. Hamilton proposed to form, would would have prevented all the evils which they have experienced for feveral years paft. The propofition of Mr. Hamilton was as follows: I. The fupreme legislative power of the United States of America to be vefted in two different bodies of men: the one to be called the Affembly; the other, the Senate; who together fhall form the Legiflature of the United States, with power to pass all laws whatfoever, fubject to the negative hereafter mentioned. II. The Affembly to confift of perfons elected by the people, to ferve for three years. III. The Senate to confift of perfons elected to ferve during good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chofen for that purpose by the people: in order to this, the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal, or refignation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of the district from which he came. IV. The fupreme executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governor, to be elected during good behaviour; the election to be made by electors chofen by the people in the election diftricts aforefaid; the authorities and functions to be as follows; to have a negative upon all laws about to be paffed, and the execution of all laws paffed; to have the direction of war, when authorized or begun; to have, with the advice and confent of the Senate, the power of making all treaties; to have the fole appointment of the heads or chief officers of finance and foreign affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers, ambaffadors to foreign nations included, fubject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have power of pardoning all offences, except treafon, which he fhall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate. V. On the death, refignation, or removal of the Governor, his authorities to be exercised by the Prefident of the Senate, till a fucceffor be appointed. VI. The Senate to have the fole power of declaring war, the power of advifing and approving all treaties, the power of approv ing and rejecting all appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs of the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs. VII. The fupreme judicial authority of the United States to be vefted in Judges, to hold their office during good behaviour, with adequate and permanent falaries; the court to have original jurifdiction in all caufes of capture, and an appellate jurisdiction in all caufes on which the revenues of the General Government, or the citizens of foreign nations, are concerned. VIII. The Legiflature of the United States to have power to institute courts in each State, for the determination of all matters of general concern. IX. The Governors, Scnators, and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachment for mal and corrupt conduct; and, and upon conviction to be removed from office, and difqualified for holding any place of truft and profit. And all impeachments to be tried by a court to confift of the Chief Juftice, or Judge of the fuperior court of law of each State, provided fuch Judge hold his place during good behaviour and have a permanent falary. X. All laws of the particular States, contrary to the Conftitution or laws of the United States, to be utterly void; and the better to prevent fuch laws being paffed, the Governor or President of each State fhall be appointed by the General Government, and fhall have a negative upon the laws about to be paffed in the State of which he is Governor or Prefident. XI. No State to have any force, land or naval; and the militia to be under the fole and exclufive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commiffioned by them. It was faid, that a Government formed on this plan, would have been "a monarchy in every thing but the name." This is very true, and America wanted precifely fuch a Government. The many of all countries ftand in need of a monarch, at once to keep them in obedience to itself, and to protect them from the tyranny and rapacity of the afpiring, rich, and avaricious few. The people of America wanted fuch a protector, but the delufion of the times. would not have permitted him to be called a mo.narch. Pursuant to an ordinance for that purpose, the two Houses of the first Federal Congrefs, met at NewYork, in March, 1789. Having formed a quorum on the 6th of April, they proceeded to examine the returns of the elections which had been held in the autumn of 1788, for the choofing of the PRESIDENT and VICE-PRESIDENT; when it appeared that the former office had fallen to the lot of GENERAL WASHINGTON, and the latter to JOHN ADAMS. On the 30th of April the PRESIDENT met the two Houfes, and addreffed them in the following fpeech. Fellow-citizens of the Senate, and of the Houfe of Reprefentatives, Among the viciffitudes incident to life, no event could have filled me with greater anxieties than that of which the notification was tranfmitted by your order, and received on the 14th day of the prefent month; on the one hand, I was fummoned by my country, country, whofe voice I can never hear but with veneration and love, from a retreat which I had chofen with the fondeft predilec tion, and, in my flattering hopes, with an immutable decifion, as the afylum of my declining years: a retreat which was rendered every day more neceflary, as well as more dear to me, by the ad. dition of habit to inclination, and of frequent interruptions in health, to the gradual waste committed on it by time. On the other hand, the magnitude and difficulty of the truft to which the voice of my country called me, being fufficient to awaken in the wifeft and most experienced of her citizens, a diftruftful scrutiny into his qualifications, could not but overwhelm with defpondence one who, inheriting inferior endowments from nature, and unpractifed in the duties of civil adminiftration, ought to be pecufiarly confcious of his own deficiencies. In this conflict of emotions, all I dare aver is, that it has been my faithful study to collect my duty from a just appreciation of every circumstance by which it might be affected. All I dare hope is, that if, in executing this talk, I have been too much swayed by a grateful remem brance of former inftances, or by an affectionate fenfibility to this tranfcendant proof of the confidence of my fellow-citizens-and have thence too little confulted my incapacity as well as difinclination for the weighty and untried cares before me-my error will be palliated by the motives which mifled me, and its confequences be judged by my country with some share of the partiality in which they originated. Such being the impreffions under which I have, in obedience to the public fummons, repaired to the prefent station, it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this firft official act, my fervent fupplicaations to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who prefides in the councils of nations, and whofe providential aids can fupply every human defect, that his benediction may confecrate to the liberties and happiness of the people of the United States, a government inftituted by themselves for thefe effential purposes; and may enable every inftrument employed in its administration, to execute with fuccefs the functions allotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the great Author of every public and pri vate good, I affure myself that it expreffes your fentiments not lets than my own, nor thofe of my fellow-citizens at large, less than either. No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invifible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than the people of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation, feems to have been distinguithed by fome token of providential agency. And in the important revolution jutt accomplished in the fyftem of their United Government, the tranquil deliberations and voluntary confent of fo many distinct communities, from which the event has refulted, cannot be compared with the means by which moft Governments have been established, without fome return of pious gratitude, along along with an humble anticipation of the future bleffings which the past seem to prefage. These reflections, arifing out of the prefent crifis, have forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be fuppreffed. You will join with me, I truft, in thinking that there are none under the influence of which the proceedings of a new and free Government can more aufpicioufly commence. By the article establishing the Executive Department, it is made the duty of the Prefident to recommend to your confideration fuch measures as he fhall judge neceffary and expedient. The circumftances under which I now meet you, will acquit me from entering into that fubject farther than to refer to the great conftitu tional charter under which you are affembled; and which, in defining your powers, defignates the objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more confiftent with thofe circumstances, and far more congenial with the feelings which actuate me, to subftitute, in place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due to the talents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters felected to devife and adopt them. In thefe honourable qualifications, I behold the fureft pledges, that as, on one fide, no local prejudices or attachments, no feparate views, nor party animofities, will mifdirect the comprehenfive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great affemblage of communities and interefts; fo on another, that the foundations of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality; and the pre-eminence of free government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens, and command the refpect of the world. I dwell on this profpect with every fatisfaction which an ardent love for my country can infpire: fince there is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there exifts in the economy and course of nature, an indiffoluble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy, and the folid rewards of public profperity and felicity: fince we ought to be no lefs perfuaded, that the propitious fmiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that difregards the eternal rules of order and right, which Heaven itself has ordained; and fince the prefervation of the facred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican model of government, are justly confidered as deeply, perhaps as finally ftaked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people. Befides the ordinary objects fubmitted to your care, it will remain with your judgment to decide, how far an exercife of the occafional power delegated by the fifth article of the Conftitution is rendered expedient at the prefent juncture, by the nature of objections which have been urged against the fyftem, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them. Inftead of undertaking particular recommendations on this fubject, in which I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I fhall |