ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS—
An administrator acting in good faith is not responsible for loss incurred
by the failure of a bank of good credit, wherein he had deposited the
funds of the estate, to the credit of the estate, and did not mingle
them with his own. Ramsey v. McGregor et al. 327.
See CONTRACT, 4; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 6; RECOUPMENT, 2.
ADMIRALTY. See JURISDICTION.
AGENCY. See BAILMENT, 3, 4; CONTRACT, 8; COVERTURE, 2; Insur-
ANCE, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1; STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, 2.
ANTENUPTUAL AGREEMENT. See DoWER.
ASSENT. See PARTNERSHIP, 4.
ASSESSMENT. See AUDITOR OF COUNTY; BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 2;
DEDICATION, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3, 4.
ASSIGNMENT. See PRACTICE, 13.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. See PRACTICE, 19.
ATTACHMENT. See DOMICILE; PRACTICE, 9, 13.
AUDITOR OF COUNTY-
When a tract of land was listed and assessed, and the taxes paid, and
afterward an error in the number of acres in the tract was discovered,
which the owner reported immediately to the auditor, that officer is
not authorized by section 70 (2 S. & C. 1463) of the tax act to assess
and levy, himself, upon said tract the back taxes for the excess dis-
covered. Ludlow v. Willich, 315.
See BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 2.
1. A common carrier having given a bill of lading for goods can not re-
lieve himself from liability, on the ground that the goods were never
received by him, except by the clearest proof of that fact. L. M. C.
& X. R. R. Co. v. Dodds et al. 47.
2. A stock and gold broker in Cincinnati received from a customer $4,000,
on account of margin on $40,000 of gold to be purchased, together
Bill of Exceptions-Board of City Improvements.
with an order as follows: "Buy for my account and risk $40,000
gold, limit 44 to-day, upon which I agree to keep ten per cent.
margin in cash. If the said margin is not kept good, you are author-
ized to buy or sell the same at your discretion." The broker pur-
chased the gold through an agent in New York, where it was kept
on deposit in bank, and the customer failing to keep up the ten per
cent. margin, the broker, upon sufficient notice, sold the gold at a
loss. Held, that the customer could not recover back the money
deposited as a margin on the ground that the broker had failed to
comply with his contract, although he kept the gold, when pur-
chased, in a bank in New York, in his own name and not in the
name of the customer,nor in a separate parcel, but subject to his
order, in accordance with the well-known usage in that kind of
business. Patterson v. Keys et al. 94.
3. The defendants were stock brokers, and had money belonging to the
plaintiff, to the amount of $1,600, on deposit as a margin on pur-
chases and sales of stock made and to be made, under a contract be-
tween the defendants and plaintiff. The plaintiff gave an order to
the defendants to sell his Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Rail-
road Company stock, and two hundred shares of Erie stock, which
was one hundred more than he then had on hand. This order was
not obeyed, but a larger amount of Erie stock was purchased, con-
trary to the plaintiff's order. If the order of the plaintiff had been
obeyed, the amount on deposit would have been increased to $2,100,
while the course taken resulted in a loss. The plaintiff called for his
money, and was told by the defendants that if he would let it remain
they would work the account, and would repay him all his money,
viz: the $2,100, acknowledging their obligation to refund it. The de-
fendants continued to speculate on the fund, and lost it all and more.
Held, that the defendants worked the account at their own risk, and
were bound to refund to the plaintiff the $1,600 which he had when
he gave the order which was disobeyed, and the additional $500
which he would have had if his order had been obeyed. Hollings-
head v. Green et al. 305.
4. Suit brought on receipt given by V. to G. for money to be invested in
stocks, and "to manage the same as my own," with V.'s knowledge.
G. invested the money, with an equal amount of his own, in a "pool,”
where nearly the whole was lost, and, on a settlement with their
brokers, an equal dividend was paid to each, accepted, and no ex-
ception taken by V. at the time. Held, V. could not hold G. liable
for the money advanced. Van Camp v. Gilbert, 358.
See COMMON CARRIER, 2. CORPORATIONS, 5.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See PRACTICE, 16, 19, 21.
BILL OF LADING. See BAILMENT, 1; SALE.
BOARD OF CITY IMPROVEMENTS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
Board of Equalization-Confirmation of Sale.
1. The city board of equalization are entitled to compensation for their
services from the county treasury, and county commissioners are ob-
ligated to fix and allow the same without reference to the rate of the
compensation allowed the county board of equalization. Baum et
al. v. County Commissioners, 553.
2. An erroneous valuation for taxes by the assessor is not void, but may
be corrected by the board of equalization on appeal to them by the
party aggrieved. The auditor will not be enjoined from placing
on the duplicate the valuation for taxes of realty returned by the
assessor, or the board of equalization be enjoined from acting
thereon, until an appeal from such valuation has been had to the
board, and their action has been had on such appeal. Mills v. Board
of Equalization, 563.
BOND. See PRACTICE, 5.
BOUNDARY. See DEED.
BROKER. See BAILMENT, 2, 3.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION. See CORPORATIONS, 6.
CHARTER. See CORPORATION, 5.
CHECK. See CONTRACT, 9; DEMAND; NOVATION; PAYMENT.
CITY COMMISSIONER. See MUNICIPAL CORPorations, 2.
CIVIL DEATH. See EVIDENCE, 4.
CLEARING HOUSE. See NOVATION, 1, 2.
CODE. See CoVERTURE, 2; INSURANCE, 2; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 3;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 4
COMITY. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.
1. A telegraph company is bound to transmit to their destination all mes-
sages in the order of time they are received. Davis v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. 100.
2. A wrongful delivery of goods after an order given by the consignor,
founded on the inability of the consignee to pay, to stop in transitu,
renders the carrier liable; and the subsequent receipt by the con-
signor of the consignee's note packed in blank with the goods, and
an attempt on his part to collect it, does not relieve the carrier's lia-
bility unless the note be paid. Where the facts justify it, the notice
not to deliver constitutes part of the carrier's contract. Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Wentworth, 142.
See BAILMENT, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 2; PLEADING, 6.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
CONFIRMATION OF SALE. See PRACTICE, 20.
Conflict of Laws-Constitutional Law.
1. Where the plaintiff and cross-petitioners were slaves: Held, that no
comity now required a recognition and enforcement by this court of
the laws of slave States, which made all slave children illegitimate,
and so prevented collateral inheritance among slaves. Price v.
Slaughter et al. 429.
2. The defendants resided at Aurora, Indiana, and were shipping a
quantity of hay to New Orleans in barges. Hayes, who also resided
in Aurora, sent up to the office of the plaintiff, at Cincinnati, an ap-
plication for insurance on the hay. The policy was issued, and the
suit is for the premium. Hayes received a commission from the
plaintiff. The defendants set up as a defense the statute of Indiana,
that a foreign insurance company shall not enforce any contract
made by an agent in Indiana; and also the act of Indiana, that it
shall not be lawful for any agent of a foreign insurance company to
take risks, or transact any business of insurance in said State, without
first producing a certificate of authority from the auditor of said
State. Held, that the insurance was not to be considered as transacted
in Indiana, but in the State of Ohio, where the suit is brought, and
is not affected by the law of Indiana against agents of foreign in-
surance companies. Nor would it be affected in the courts of Ohio,
even though the law of Indiana should prevent its enforcement in
that State. Eureka Ins. Co. v. Parks et al. 574.
CONSIDERATION. See CONTRACT, 5; DAMAGES, 5.
CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE. See SALE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
1. In November, 1861, the relation existing between the people and State
of Ohio, and the people and State of Arkansas, one of the Confed-
erate States then waging war against the United States, was that of
enemies, and the judicial proceedings under such Confederate States
government do not fall within section 1, of article 4, of the con-
stitution of the United States, which provides that "full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other State." Pennywit et al. v. Kellogg
et al. 17.
2. A vendee, in quiet possession under the deed, is bound to pay the notes
and rely on the covenants in the deed for indemnity against any
future eviction; such is the settled construction of the contract
between the parties; and an act passed after suit on the notes, but a
few days before judgment, authorizing a vendee in such a case to
have the title investigated and damages for defect of title assessed
and set off against the notes given for the purchase money, is not to
be construed as applicable to existing deeds; and if it were neces-
sary to so construe the act, it would be unconstitutional. Great
Western Stock Co. v. Saas, 21.
Constructive Trust-Contract.
3. The act of the legislaturo of Ohio, passed May 4, 1869, authorizing
any city of the first class, having a population exceeding one
hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, to construct a railroad
terminating in and essential to the interests of such city, and to
borrow as a fund for that purpose a sum of money not exceeding ten
millions of dollars, is not a violation of section 6, article 8, of the
present constitution of the State of Ohio, which provides: "That the
general assembly shall never authorize any county, city, town, or
township, by a vote of the citizens or otherwise, to become a stock-
holder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association what-
ever, or to raise money for, or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such
company, corporation, or association." The said act, and the act of
March 25, 1870, supplementary thereto, are constitutional and valid.
Walker v. City et al. 121.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. See LIMITATION, 5.
CONTEMPT. See PRACTICE, 9.
CONTRACT-
1. W., the owner of an insurance policy, wrote to the company,
sider your policy, No. 39, as canceled from the 18th inst., and make
a new policy from that date for one year, with privilege added, at
same rate." The company answered, "I can not agree to proposed
change, and therefore cancel, pro rata, charging returned premium.”
A subsequent loss occurred prior to the date of the expiration of the
original policy. Held, that W.'s letter was not a cancellation of the
policy, but, until accepted, a mere proposition so to do. That the
proposition was indivisible, and if not accepted as a whole the origi-
nal contract remained unaltered, and W. was not estopped to sue
thereon. Wilkins v. Tobacco Ins. Co. 349.
2. The city of Cincinnati contracted with Bearly to erect a school-house for
$81,000, and Bearly made subcontracts with plaintiffs and with others
to do parts of the work. The plans of the building were in some respects
modified, and considerable extra work, including an extra privy, was
done, increasing the cost beyond the original contract price. The con-.
tractor failing to pay plaintiffs, they served a notice of the balance
due on their claim for work which would have been included within
the terms of the original contract. At the time of the service of the
notice by the plaintiffs, the city had paid Bearly the entire sum of
$81,000, which was the amount called for by the original contract,
but the city nevertheless owed Bearly $1,377 by reason of the extra
work. Several of the defendants filed claims for work done on the
same building, but not provided for in the original contract, unless it
were under the clause providing that extra work should be stipu-
lated for in writing and signed by the parties. Held, that the for-
malities required by the contract for extra work might be and were
waived, and that the extra work was to be regarded as done under
one general contract embracing the entire job, and that the plaint-
|