Garrison v. Grogan et al. lost machinery. It is also claimed that no notice was given to the carrier that such machinery could not be obtained at Cincinnati. It seems to us that the notice was sufficient in this case to warn the carrier of the consequences of a failure to keep their contract of transportation, and that the court was right in allowing it to the extent to which it appears to have been allowed. One hundred dollars was charged, and probably was allowed, for cost of men employed to find the lost box, and fifty dollars for expense of telegraphing. These seem to have been necessary expenses to avoid the more serious charge of negligence. We can not say that the judge committed error in allowing these items. We are satisfied that where, in a case of this sort, a carrier was informed, as it was here, that the publishers were waiting for the machinery to be transported from New York, and were ready to commence the publication, the notice was sufficient to make the carriers liable to such necessary and direct consequential damages as those which the judge seems to have allowed in the present case. This we hold as matter of law. On the question whether the judge was correct and judicious in his estimate of these items, we do not find reason to interfere. On the whole case, we conclude to affirm the judgment. E. G. GARRISON v. W. A. GROGAN ET AL. An antenuptial contract, by which the wife is to receive less than the value of her dower interest in the estate of her husband, must be reasonable, as compared with the rest of his estate and in respect of the circumstances of the parties to the contract, in order to be enforced by a court of equity. Where the husband owned a lot of ground thirty-five feet in front on Fifth street in Cincinnati, and by an antenuptial agreement settled upon his wife, in lieu of dower, a life estate in one-third of ten feet only of said lot, and where the personal estate was found to be only $74, such agree Garrison v. Grogan et al. ment was held not to be reasonable, and the court would not enforce it, by preventing the widow from having dower assigned in the thirty-five feet of ground. Swormstedt, for plaintiff. Goodman & Storer, for defendant. TAFT, J. This was a petition for dower filed by Emma Garrison, as widow of Wm. Grogan, deceased, making Wm. H. Grogan, only son and heir of her husband, and John Parker, the administrator of his estate, parties defendant. The suit is by her next friend, Edward L. Parris, she being a married woman. The answer of Wm. H. Grogan, by his guardian, avers that the petitioner, who was the second wife of his father, Wm. Grogan, entered into an antenuptial agreement, by which she accepted as her jointure, in lieu of dower, a lot of land in the answer described, which was, by the agreement, to be in full of her right in the estate of the deceased, unless he should make further provision by his will; and that by his will he gave her all his personalty, and gave his son, the defendant, all the rest of his estate except what was settled upon the petitioner by the antenuptial agreement. That after his father's decease, the petitioner declined to accept the bequest under the will, but did receive, under the order of the court, all the personal estate, which was but $74. To this answer the plaintiff demurs. Reference is made by the plaintiff's counsel to the case of Stilley and wife v. Folger, 14 Ohio, 610, in which the suit was for dower, and the defense set up was an antenuptial agreement giving the wife $600, in lieu and bar of dower. It was held "that a reasonable antenuptial agreement would bar the wife's dower, though its terms were not such as to constitute a good legal jointure," and that inasmuch as there was no showing that the agreement was not reasonable under all the circumstances, the agreement was held to be a bar. The court says, "There is not, however, Garrison v. Grogan et al. with the proofs, anything satisfactory to show the value of the real estate of the husband, or of which he died seized; and without such evidence, no such deduction can be legitimately drawn," and dismissed the bill. In the present case, the antenuptial agreement was not a legal jointure, and is to be sustained, if at all, as an equitable bar to the right of the widow to claim dower. In Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Ohio St. 417, the court said, "That it might, therefore, be well doubted whether the bare contract itself, although fair and reasonable in its terms, and bona fide, entered into by the parties, could, unless within the statutory provision, constitute a defense to a claim for dower at common law, or by writ of dower on the part of a widow. Indeed, it might be doubted whether the contract so made and entered into by the parties prior to the marriage, although valid as an antenuptial contract, would, in law or equity, constitute a bar to the plaintiff's right to dower in the land." Section 4 seems to embrace precisely such a case in the provision, "That when any conveyance, intended to be in lieu of dower, shall, through any defect, fail to be a legal bar thereto, and the widow, availing herself of such defect, shall demand her dower, the estate and interest so conveyed to said widow shall thereupon cease and determine." But in that case, the plaintiff had received the property intended by the antenuptial agreement to be in lieu of dower, and accepted the provisions of the will in her favor, which were predicated upon the performance of the agreement on both sides, and to allow her to have dower also would have been inequitable and unjust to the heirs. In the present case, it seems that the plaintiff has not taken dower under the agreement, nor received the bequest under the will. From the petition it appears that the deceased was the owner of a lot of ground in the city, 35 feet in front by 116 feet in depth, and the agreement gave to the petitioner a life estate in one undivided third of ten feet of said lot, making 3 feet. And the personalty which she Hollingshead v. Green & Co. would have received under the will, and which she did receive from the court, was but $74. The court at Special Term held that this was not a reasonable agreement. It allowed the widow less than a third part of what the law would have given her. The judge regarded it as inequitable to enforce such an agreement. We should have been better satisfied with the plaintiff's petition if it had stated more specifically the circumstances of the deceased as to his indebtedness or otherwise, and the value of the property. We do not regard it as essential to a settlement by an antenuptial agreement, that it should give the wife as much as the law would give her. might exist in which it would be reasonably less. A case In the present case, however, there does not appear to be any good reason why the wife should not have her dower in this small estate, or its equivalent, and we have concluded to affirm the judgment at Special Term. HOLLINGSHEAD v. L. A. GREEN & Co. The defendants were stock brokers, and had money belonging to the plaintiff, to the amount of $1,600, on deposit as a margin on purchases and sales of stock made and to be made under a contract between the defendants and plaintiff. The plaintiff gave an order to the defendants to sell his Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company stock, and two hundred shares of Erie stock, which was one hundred more than he then had on hand. This order was not obeyed, but a larger amount of Erie stock was purchased, contrary to the plaintiff's order. If the order of the plaintiff had been obeyed, the amount on deposit would have been increased to $2,100, while the course taken resulted in a loss. The plaintiff called for his money, and was told by the defendants that if he would let it remain they would work the account, and would repay him all his money, viz: the $2,100, acknowledging their obligation to refund it. The defendants continued to speculate on the fund, and lost it all, and more. C. 8. C. REP. VOL. I-20 Hollingshead v. Green & Co. Held, that the defendants worked the account at their own risk, and were bound to refund to the plaintiff the $1,600 which he had when he gave the order which was disobeyed, and the additional $500 which he would have had if his order had been obeyed. In General Term on Error. Matthews & Ramsey, for plaintiff. Hoadly & Johnson, for defendants. TAFT, J. The original suit in this case was brought to recover $2,100 of money in the hands of the defendants as stock brokers, left as a margin on certain railroad stocks purchased and held by the defendants for the plaintiff. From the bill of exceptions, it appears that the plaintiff deposited $1,000 in money, which amount was increased by certain purchases and sales till the plaintiff had about $1,600 on deposit, as margin on a quantity of Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company stock, and Erie Railroad stock. On the 20th of July, 1868, the plaintiff ordered the sale of his stock, and of one hundred shares of the Erie short —that is, his order was to sell one hundred shares more than he then had-which order was disobeyed by the defendants, and a loss was sustained thereby. If the order had been obeyed, the amount on deposit would have been increased to $2,100. Finding that a loss had been caused by this disobedience of orders, the defendants told the plaintiff to give himself no trouble about it; they would work it out and replace the money, viz: the $2,100, acknowledging the indebted ness. We think from the evidence that they assumed the responsibility of the loss, and for the further operations, or, as they call it, "the working of the account." When he called for payment of the amount to which, by his contract with them, he was entitled, they requested him to |