have been known to the Lord Chancellor. But poor Mr. Cobbett will tease the court no more; and the Great Hall of Pleas will lose one of its most constant visitors. Its analogue in the French Palais de Justice is called "La Salle des Pas Perdus." How many tens of thousands of footsteps must not old Mr. Cobbett have utterly squandered and wasted in Westminster Hall!

The Queen's speech, read in Parliament to-day, contains the following paragraph:

Among other measures for the amendment of the law, a bill will be laid before you to simplify and express in one act the whole law and procedure relating to indictable offenses.

This confirms what I wrote to you in the autumn, of the intention of the Lord Chancellor to bring in a bill for the codification of the criminal law.

THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.

THE annual reports of the president and treasurer of

Harvard college, just issued, contain considerable of interest to the profession in relation to the Law school connected with the college. According to the report, "the condition and prospects of the Law school are in the highest degree satisfactory. It grows in numbers, improves as regards the quality of its students, earns a good surplus from year to year, adds steadily to its valuable library, and step by step enlarges its instruction and increases the significance of its degree." The reports criticize the rules of the Court of Appeals of this State, in relation to admission to the bar, in this respect, that they make no al

lowance to the candidate for admission for the time spent in attendance at law schools outside the State. The president says that the Law school does not desire to have its graduates admitted to practice without examination." But it feels justified in asking that its graduates who have spent two or three years in the study of law under the guidance of learned and faithful teachers, should not be placed, as regards admission to the bar, on a level with persons who have never opened a law-book, as is now the case under the rules of the New York Court of Appeals. In view of its own honorable history, as a national school of law, the school also thinks it a duty to protest against rules for admission to the bar which have a tendency to make legal education local in character, and to recruit each bar chiefly from its own locality. Rules which make discriminations in favor of the law schools of any particular State have this tendency. The result which such rules tend to produce, could it be completely brought about, would be a grave national misfortune. What the Harvard Law school, and every respectable law school, must desire at the hands of the States, or the courts, is, that time well spent in the school, as proved by passing its periodic examinations, should count toward admission to the bar in every State, like time spent in an attorney's or counselor's office in that State, except that one year of pupilage should have been passed in the State where the candidate applies for admission. The dean of the Law Faculty also presents some cogent arguments against the discrimination made by the New York rules. He says: "This school, therefore, has been excluded from the State of New York by legislation; and this has happened just as we had established an examination for admission to the school, and extended our course of study to three years. That the action is a

serious blow to this school there can be no doubt; for it makes it impracticable, as a rule, for two important classes of the graduates of Harvard college to remain here for their legal education; namely, those whose homes are in the State of New York, and who expect to remain there, and those who, not being residents of the State of New York, are ambitious to establish themselves in the city of New York. It is true, that any graduate of this school who has received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from a college (even from the meanest college in the United States) will be relieved from one year of clerkship; but it is not to be supposed that Harvard graduates, who intend to practice in New York, will go through a year's course in this school, passing severe examinations at the end of each year, if neither our degree nor the time spent here is to count for any thing in the State where they are to practice. Moreover, if the other States of the Union should follow the example of New York, in this respect (and this is a fair test to apply to the action of the latter State), it would seem that this school, or any other school of national scope, must cease to exist." The Court of Appeals is, however, not responsible for the discrimination in favor of New York law schools, that being the result of the legislative enactments in pursuance of which the rules were made. The report of the dean contains some valuable criticism on the

general subject of admission to the bar that are worthy of the attention of the profession. He does not approve of the adoption in this country of the English ideas upon the subject. The States have, as a rule, adopted the English notion, and in measuring the standard of qualification, have insisted on a thorough training of the candidate as an attorney. They have thus been at cross-purposes with this law school

which has endeavored to train its students to become counselors. Of course, a school cannot successfully teach the art of the attorney, which is in its nature local, while the science of the law, which is general, can be best taught there.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT, OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. State statute prohibiting transportation of cattle.A statute of a State, which prohibits driving or conveying any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle into the State between the first day of March and the first day of December in each year, is in conflict with the clause of the Constitution of the United States that ordains "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." (State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 281; Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 S. C. 275; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 Sup. Ct. 259; and Chy Lung v. Freeman, id. 275; Thorp v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 149; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 210.) Judgment of Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. Hannibal & St. Jo. R. R. Co., plaintiff in: error, v. Husen. Opinion by Strong, J.

2. Police power: quarantine regulations. Such a statute is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. It is more than a quarantine regulation. Ib.

3. Over what police power cannot be exercised. The police power of a State cannot be exercised over a subject, such as interstate transportation of subjects of commerce, confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution. Ib.

4. Limit of State power as to sanitary laws. — While a State may enact sanitary laws, while, for the purpose of self-protection, it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection regulations, while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases from entering the State, it cannot interfere with transportation into or through its borders, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. Ib.

5. State cannot interfere with power delegated to Congress. Neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. Ib.

gold.

CONTRACT.

Construction of contract dependent on rise and fall of A contract was made between Q. and the firm of A. & Sons, reading thus: "Q. agrees to furnish us and we take from him 15,000 dozen long shovel-handles, to be of the best quality of timber and workmanship, for the present year, the price to be ($1.25) one dollar and twenty-five cents per dozen, basing the price on the present price of gold, $2.25. "If the price of gold goes up or down, then the price of handles shall be advanced or reduced accordingly. But it is understood that no advance or reduction of the price of gold of 25 per cent shall change the price of handles unless it shall remain at the advanced or reduced rate sufficiently long to affect the general price of merchandise." Held, that the contract meant this: Gold being at the price of $2.25, and having reference to that fact as giving their value, the one party agrees to deliver and the other to receive the goods at $1.25 per dozen. This price named should not, however, be fixed and absolute. If the price of gold shall change, the price of the goods shall also change. But they do not propose to embarrass themselves about trifles, and the gold regulation shall be modified by the extent of the change in its price. If it varies more than twenty-five per cent, we agree that that shall be deemed an important change, and shall of itself work a change in the price of the goods. If the variation does not exceed twenty-five per cent, it will not necessarily be important, and we agree that that variation shall not affect the price of the goods, unless it continues so long as to affect the general price of merchandise. If it does so continue and does so affect general prices, then that variation shall also regulate this contract. In error to Circuit Court, W. D., Michigan. New trial granted. Ames et al., plaintiff's in error, v. Quimby. Opinion by Hunt, J.

JURISDICTION.

Judgment remitted in part so as to reduce to $5,000: judgment payable in gold coin. · This was an action by Butler, the defendant in error, against Thompson, the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for not ac

cepting a quantity of iron under an alleged contract of purchase. Upon the trial the jury rendered a verdict against Thompson of $5,066.17 “in gold," but before judgment Butler remitted $66.17, and judgment was entered for five thousand dollars "in coin." Thompson having brought the case here by writ of error, Butler moves to dismiss because the "matter in dispute" does "not exceed the sum or value of five thousand dollars." Held, that as the writ of error was sued out by the defendant below, the amount in controversy was fixed by the judgment. (Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 34; Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73; Walker v. U. S., 4 Wall. 164; Merrill v. Petty, 16 id. 344.) Held, also, that the fact that the judgment was payable in coin, which was worth more than the same number of dollars in United States notes would be, did not render it a judgment for more than its face, and this court acquired no jurisdiction. Writ of error to Circuit Court, Massachusetts, dismissed. Thompson plaintiff in error, v. Butler. Opinion by Waite, C. J.

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

Bonds in aid of bridge: toll bridge, public highway. - Under a statute of Nebraska authorizing counties and cities, upon a vote by the people, to issue bonds in aid of "any railroads or other work of internal improvement," county commissioners issued bonds in aid of a bridge. In an action on the bonds it was set up as a defense that they were issued in aid of a toll and not a free bridge, and that the county commissioners were to regulate the tolls, which were to be applied toward paying the bonds. Held, (1) that the bridge was a work of internal improvement and the authority to aid it was not affected by the fact that tolls were to be levied for its use, nor (2) would the validity of the bonds be affected by any want of power on the part of the county commissioners to demand tolls for such use, and (3) that the answer was demurrable. All bridges intended and used as thoroughfares are public highways, whether subject to toll or not. Judgment of Circuit Court, Nebraska, affirmed. County Commissioners of Dodge, plaintiff in error, v. Chandler. Opinionby Bradley, J.

2. Railroad aid bonds: construction of statute: limit of taxation.- Railroad aid bonds were issued by a county under a statute of Missouri reading thus: "It shall be lawful for the corporate authorities of any city or town, or the County Court of any county desiring to do so, to subscribe to the capital stock of said company, and may issue bonds therefor and levy a tax to pay the same, not to exceed one-twentieth of one per cent upon the assessed value of taxable property for each year." The act imposed no limit upon the amount allowed to be subscribed, and there was no provision in the act that the proceeds of the special tax alone should be applied to the payment of the bonds. Held, that the holder of the bonds subscribed for under the act was not limited to the special tax of one-twentieth of one per cent for payment, but might look to the funds of the county raised by general taxation. (Supervisors v. United States, 18 Wall. 71; State y. Shortridge, 56 Mo. 126, distinguished.) Judgment of Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri, reversed. United States ex rel. Johnson, plaintiff in error, v. County Court of Clark County. Opinion by Strong, J. Waite, C. J., and Miller and Bradley, JJ., dissented.

NEGLIGENCE.

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1. Care required of traveler approaching a street railroad crossing: contributory negligence. The neglect of the engineer of a locomotive of a railroad train to sound its whistle or ring its bell on approaching a street crossing does not relieve a party from the necessity of taking ordinary precautions for his safety. He is bound to use his senses to listen and to look - before attempting to cross the railroad track, in order to avoid any possible accident from an approaching train. If he omit to use them, and walk thoughtlessly upon the track, he is guilty of culpable negligence, and if he receive any injury, he so far contributes to it as to deprive him of any right to complain. If using them, he sees the train coming and undertakes to cross the track instead of waiting for the train to pass, and is injured, the consequences of his mistake and temerity cannot be cast upon the railroad company. If one chooses in such a position to take risks, he must bear the possible consequences of failure. Judgment of Ciro. Ct., W. D. Missouri, reversed. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., plaintiff in error, v. Houston. Opinion by Field, J.

2. Instruction upon assumed facts, error. To instruct upon assumed facts to which no evidence applies is error. Such instructions tend to mislead the jury by withdrawing their attention from the proper points

involved in the issue. Ib.

SHIPPING.

1. Collision: vessels at anchor and moving vessels: negligence. Vessels in motion are required to keep out of the way of a vessel at anchor, if the latter is without fault, unless it appears that the collision was the result of inevitable accident, the rule being that the vessel in motion must exonerate herself from blame by showing that it was not in her power to prevent the collision by adopting any practicable precautions. (The Batavia, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 25; The Lochlibo, 3 W. Rob. 318; Strout v. Foster, 1 How. 94; Ure v. Coffman, 19 id. 62; The Granite State, 3 Wall. 314; The Bridgeport, 14 id. 119; The John Adams, 1 Cliff. 413.) Accordingly, where a steam dredge was anchored on the edge of an excavated channel in the harbor of Baltimore, and a tug with a vessel in tow had plenty of sea-room to pass on either side of the dredge, and the dredge had proper lights and lookout, held that the tug and vessel were liable, if unskillfully navigated, for damages sustained by the dredge from a collision occurring by reason of such unskillful navigation. Decree of Circ. Ct., Maryland, modified and affirmed. Steam tug Ehrman et al., appellants, v. Curtis et al. Opinion by Clifford, J. 2. Compensation of innocent parties.— Innocent parties in a case of collision are entitled to full compensation for the injuries received by their vessel, unless it occurred by inevitable accident, provided the amount does not exceed the amount or value of the interest of the other party in the colliding ship and her freight then pending. (9 Stat. at Large, 635; The Atlas, 3 Otto, 317; The Gamecock, 2 id. 695; The Gregory, 9 Wall. 516.) Ib.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Action upon several note: when plaintiff may elect as to parties defendant. By the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia (§ 827) it is enacted as follows, viz. : Where money is payable by two or more persons jointly or severally, as by joint obligors, covenantors, makers, drawers, or indorsers, one action may be sustained and judgment recovered against all

or any of the parties, by whom the 'money is payable, at the option of the plaintiff. But an action against one or some of the parties by whom the money is payable may, while the litigation therein continues, be pleaded in bar of another action, against another or others of the said parties."(14 Stat. at Large, 405, § 20.) In an action against two of several makers of a promissory note, and one of the indorsers thereof, there being other makers and indorsers, held, that the act of Congress was intended to produce the effect of the statutes of several of the States, to wit: "Persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including the parties to bills of exchange or promissory notes, may all or any of them be included in the same action, at the option of the plaintiff." (2 Edm. Stat. of N. Y., 32.) Judgment of Sup. Ct., Dist. Columbia, affirmed. Burdette, plaintiff in error, v. Bartlett. Opinion by Hunt, J.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.*

FORGERY.

1. Alteration of power of attorney renders it void.-A power of attorney to confess a judgment, which is materially altered whilst in the hands of the payee of the indebtedness, without any explanation of the alteration, is made void by such alteration, and a judgment entered by confession under it is also void. Burwell v. Orr.

2. Alteration of promissory note.-Where a promissory note, containing a promise to pay a certain sum as attorney's fee, is altered whilst in the hands of the payee, increasing the amount of such fee, the alteration will be presumed to have been made by him, and the note becomes thereby utterly void, and cannot be collected, even by a subsequent indorsee in good faith without notice. Ib.

3. Alteration in date of promissory note, material.— An alteration in the date of a note and cognovit, so as to make the note fall due one year later, is a material alteration, at least, as to a surety on the note. Wyman v. Yeomans.

INSANITY.

Presumption in regard to.-The legal presumption is, that all persons of mature age are of sane memory, and this presumption continues until inquest found, when, perhaps, the presumption is reversed until rebutted by evidence that sanity has returned. Titcomb v. Van Tyle.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. Duty of employer to furnish safe machinery.—It is the duty of railroad companies to furnish good, wellconstructed machinery, adapted to the purposes of its use, of good material and of the kind that is found to be safest when applied to use; and whilst they are not required to seek and apply every new invention, they must adopt such as is found by experience to combine the greatest safety with practical use. Toledo, Wab. & West. R'way Co. v. Asbury, Admx.

2. Employee required to use care commensurate with danger of employment.-Although machinery furnished by a railroad company for the use of its employees may be unsafe, yet if an employee, knowing the character of the machinery, continues to use it, he is bound to exercise care commensurate with the danger; and if he fails to do so, and is injured, his *To appear in 84 Illinois Reports,

negligence will preclude a recovery against the company on account of such injury. Ib.

MUNICIPAL AID BONDS.

1. Municipal subscription without vote of the people.— A vote of the people of a town to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, in the absence of any law authorizing such vote or subscription, is not binding upon the town. Barnes v. Town of Lacon.

2. Legalization of void subscription.-Where an election for the purpose of voting upon a subscription to a railroad company is held without any authority of law, and in pursuance of a vote at such election a subscription is made by the supervisor of the town without any authority of law, the whole proceeding is void, and the legislature cannot, by any subsequent act, legalize the same. Ib.

3. Limit of legislative power.-The legislature has no power to authorize the supervisor and town clerk of a town to create a corporate debt, without the consent of the people, expressed at the polls. Ib.

4. Municipal bonds in hands of purchaser for value.— If municipal bonds are simply voidable, they may be enforced in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, but if they are absolutely void, they cannot be enforced either by the original holder or a purchaser for value. Ib.

5. When holder bound by recitals.-Where a municipal bond contains a recital that it is issued in payment of a subscription made in pursuance of a vote of the people at an election therein specified, and there was no law authorizing such election and subscription, the holder has notice, by such recital, of the illegality of such subscription. Ib.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Care required in running railroad trains in proportion to the danger of injury at a given place.-Where stock is permitted by law to run at large in a town or village through which a railroad runs, and the fact is known to the operators of the road, they will be held to a higher degree of care than where they have the road fenced and have no reason to expect stock will be found on their track. Chic. & Alt.R. R. Co. v. Engle.

2. Permitting stock to run at large is not, unless prohibited by law. It is not negligence for the owner of stock to permit it to run at large in a village through which a railroad runs, if it is not prohibited by law. Ib.

3. Running trains through towns at high rate of speed. It is the duty of a railroad company, whose road runs through a village, to run their trains, whilst in the village, at such a rate of speed as to have them under control, and be able to avoid injury to persons or property, though there is no ordinance of such village on the subject; and if they fail to do so they are guilty of negligence. Ib.

4. Railroad running trains at rate prohibited by law.― It is gross negligence on the part of a railroad company to run its trains through a town at a rate of speed prohibited by law, and if the company does so run its trains, and thereby causes the death of a person who is himself in the exercise of due care and caution, it is liable in an action by the representatives of the person so killed. Chic. & Alt. R. R. Co. v. Becker.

5. Rule as to adult not applicable to infant.-The general rule is, that a person approaching a railroad crossing is required to look up and down the track, in either direction, and watch for the approach of trains, before attempting to cross, and if such precaution is

neglected and injury to the party ensues, he cannot recover; but this rule cannot be applied to an infant of tender years. Ib.

6. Parents permitting children to cross railroad track. -It is not negligence in parents to send a child of six or seven years to Sabbath school, in company with and under the care of an older brother, in a village through which a railroad track runs, and which track the children have to cross in going to and returning from the Sabbath school; but it might be otherwise to permit such infant to go alone. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Partners liable for each other's torts committed as partners.-Partners are liable in solido for the torts of one, if committed by him as a partner and in the course of the business of the partnership; but if a partner commit a tort, not as a partner, but as an individual, in respect to a matter entirely foreign to the business of the partnership, the other partners are not liable. Schwabacker v. Riddle.

2. Partners selling their interest, not liable for false representations in relation thereto by other partners. — Where one partner induces a stranger to purchase the interest of the other partners in a partnership business, by fraudulent representations, the parties selling are not liable for such false representations, unless they instigate or approve of them, or the partner making such representations is acting as their agent in making the same. The mere fact of their relation as partners will not make them liable. Ib.

SALE AND DELIVERY.

1. Sale of growing crops: delivery.-In case of the sale of standing crops the possession is in the vendee until it is time to harvest them, and until then he is not required to take manual possession of them. Ticknor v. McClelland et al.

2. Sales: manual delivery of ponderous goods, not required.-Where goods are ponderous and incapable of being handed over from one to another, there need not be a manual delivery, but it is different where the property is capable of being immediately removed. Ib. 3. Sale: fraudulent, if possession retained by vendor. -Any sale of personal property, where it remains with the vendor, if it is that character of property that is capable of being removed, is fraudulent in law as to creditors and subsequent purchasers, notwithstanding the sale may be in good faith, and for a valuable consideration. Ib.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Parol gift of real estate, when enforced.-A father agreed, by parol, to convey a tract of land to his son, as a gift, and the son took possession of the land, and made lasting and valuable improvements thereon, and resided there with his family for four or five years, when he died, in possession of the land, leaving a widow and one child. The father brought ejectment, against the widow and child, for the land, and upon a bill filed by them to enjoin the prosecution of the ejectment suit, and to compel a conveyance to the child, subject to the dower of the widow, the relief sought was properly granted. Worth v. Worth.

2. Evidence to take case out of the statute.-In order to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, upon the ground of part performance of a parol contract, it is not only indispensable that the acts done should be clear and definite, and referable exclusively to the contract, but the contract must also be established by

competent proofs to be clear, definite and unequivocal in all its terms. Ib.

3. Relief where valuable improvements have been made under a contract.-Where a son, by permission of his father, takes possession of land, and puts lasting and valuable improvements thereon, and continues such possession for a number of years, and dies in possession, claiming that the father, by parol, agreed to convey the land to him, although a court of equity may not decree a conveyance to the heirs of the deceased, it will require the father to pay for the improvements. Ib.

4. Contract: by a child with parent, to release to other children all claim to parent's estate, is valid and binding. Where a father executes a deed for a tract of land to one child, who accepts and takes possession of the same, upon the express understanding and agreement that it is in lieu of all claim such child may have in and to the residue of the father's estate upon his death, and that such child will release to the other children all his claim in expectancy to the residue of the estate, such contract is legal and binding, and will be enforced in equity. Galbraith v. McLain.

5. When not within Statute of Frauds, nor contrary to Statute of Wills.-A contract made by a child with his father, in consideration of a conveyance of land to him by the father, that he will release to his brothers and sisters all claim in expectancy to the residue of the father's estate, is not within the Statute of Frauds, nor is it contrary to the provisions of the Statute of Wills. Ib.

TELEGRAPH.

Non-delivery of message: liability.-In an action by a father against a telegraph company, for negligence in failing to deliver a telegram sent by him to his son, summoning the son home to the death-bed of his mother, the plaintiff is entitled to recover at least nominal damages, including the price paid the company to send the dispatch. Logan v. West. Un. Tel. Co.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. Infancy: liability of parent for maintenance by volunteer. A brother, as a volunteer, undertook the maintenance and education of his sister, who had abandoned her father's home, and without his fault. Held, under such circumstances, no promise to pay by a mere volunteer for the maintenance of the child can be implied on the part of the parent. He who intervenes in such a case, to make the child independent of the parent, does but encourage its alienation from the line of filial duty, and stands in no relation to be favored by the law. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, Oct., 1877. Toncray v. Toneray (Tenn. L. J.)

Official bond: when sureties on, liable for damages resulting from neglect of principal to perform duty.— The statute requires the inspector's bond to be "conditional for the faithful performance of the duties imposed by the act," and such bond is "for the use of all persons aggrieved by the acts of neglect of such inspector." The petition averred that the inspector in default and breach of the conditions of his official bond, branded one hundred empty casks as "approved," that the casks belonged to Cobb & Co., who afterward filled them with oil below test; that the inspector refused to inspect the same; that Cobb & Co. sold one of these casks to O'Connell, a grocer, who sold a gallon of the oil to the relator's family, and that a lamp filled

therewith, exploded, causing the death of relator's wife, etc. To this petition a demurrer was sustained; we think it improper. The petition states a good cause of action against the inspector and the sureties on his official bond, which is not affected by the fact that the manufacturers, Cobb & Co., were also liable under section 4 of the same chapter, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Opinion by Sherwood, C. J. Sup. Ct., Missouri, Oct., 1877. County Court of St. Louis, to use of Jenks, v. Fassett (Cent. L. J.)

Principal and factor: pledge of chattels by factor: bankruptcy: rights of trustee and pledgee: order and disposition. — A. bought of J. Sillence and paid for two horses, which were returned as not being according to warranty. Sillence then supplied A. with two other horses, to be retained and used by her until the warranty was performed. The horses had been placed with Sillence to sell or job on commission, but of this A. was ignorant, she having considered throughout that the horses belonged to Sillence. Upon the bankruptcy of Sillence the County Court Judge decided that the horses so placed with him were, under the circumstances, in his order and disposition with the consent of the true owner, Held, that A., as against the trustee in bankruptcy, could not claim to retain the two horses in her possession either by way of set-off or as having a lien upon them for the purchase-money. English Court of Bankruptcy, Nov. 19, 1877. Ex parte Roy, Re Sillence (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 508).

Nuisance: bawdy-house: damages. A person renting a house to be used as a bawdy-house, or who knowingly allows it to be so used, is liable, at the suit of an adjoining owner, for the special damage caused by the depreciation in value of his property from the existence of a nuisance, over and above the wrong and injury done to the general public. St. Louis Ct. App., Nov. 1877. Givens v. Van Studdiford (6 Cent. L. J. 6). Practice in Federal courts: application of statutes regulating. The Act of Congress of June, 1872, § 914, U. S. Rev. Stat., which requires that the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, shall conform as nearly as may be to the practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such Circuit or District Courts are held, has no application to the manner of taking depositions to be used in the Federal courts. The requirements which must be followed in taking depositions to be used as evidence in the Federal courts are prescribed by $$ 863, 864 and 865, U. S. Rev. Stat., which have not been repealed by § 914. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. Ohio, Dec. 1877. Sage v. Tauszky (6 Cent. L. J. 7).

Stoppage in transitu: insufficient notice.-W. P., in Hamilton, bought from plaintiffs in England fifteen packages of goods, which were shipped at Liverpool, 8th November, 1876, by T. M. & Co., plaintiff's shipping agents, in whose name as consignors the bills of lading were made, W. P. being the consignee. On the 23d. November, the way-bill of the major part of the goods arrived at Hamilton, and on the same day M. P. & Co., creditors of W. P., obtained an indorsement to them of the bill of lading, and notified defendants on the 4th December. The plaintiff's branch house at St. John, N. B., were telegraphed by W. P., who had become insolvent, to detain the goods. The branch