these particulars, when committed in contemplation of bankruptcy, would seem to be within the competency of Congress. Any act committed with a view of evading the legislation of Congress passed in the execution of any of its powers, or of fraudulently securing the benefit of such legislation, may properly be made an offense against the United States, But an act committed within a State, whether for a good or bad purpose, or whether with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the State can alone legislate.

The act described in the ninth subdivision of section 5132 of the Revised Statutes is one which concerns only the State in which it is committed; it does not concern the United States. It is quite possible that the framers of the statute intended it to apply only to acts committed in contemplation of bankruptcy, but it does not say so, and we cannot supply qualifications which the legislature has failed to express.

Our answer to the question certified must be in the negative; and it will be so returned to the Circuit Court.

LIFE INSURANCE AND MANSLAUGHTER. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

MOBILE LIFE INSURANCE Co., plaintiff in
error, v. BRAME.

Defendant wrongfully killed one M., whose life was insured, and the insurance company was compelled to pay the amount of the policy. Held, that the insurance company had no right of action against defendant for the amount it was compelled to pay.

By the common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in death, and the death of a human being, though clearly involving pecuniary loss, is not the ground of an action for damages. And the act of 9 and 10 Victoria, giving an action in certain cases to the representatives of the deceased, which has been incorporated into the statutes of many of the States, does not include a claimant such as the one in this action.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff, a life insurance company, brought suit in the United States Circuit Court against the defendant to recover the sum of seven thousand dollars, on the following allegations:

That plaintiff had insured the life of one Craven McLemore, a citizen of Louisiana, for the sum of $2,000, in favor of John P. Kennedy, for the sum of $2,500 in favor of Sanders, Garner & Co. (which was subsequently assigned to John H. Garner, Sr.), and for $2,500 in favor of John H. Garner & Co.

That on the 24th day of October, 1875, while said policies were in force, in the town of Delhi, in Louisiana, the defendant Brame did willfully shoot the said Craven McLemore and inflict upon him a mortal wound, from the effects of which he died on the 26th day of October, 1875. That the said shooting was an illegal and tortious act on the part of said Brame, and caused damage to the plaintiff in the said sum of

$7,000, being the amount of said policies on the life of said McLemore, which plaintiff acknowledges to be due, and a part of which it alleges has been paid.

Defendant filed an exception (demurrer) to plaintiff's petition.

The Circuit Court gave judgment for the defendant, and to this judgment the present writ of error is brought.

The argument of the plaintiff is this, that the act in question was an injury to or violation of a legal right or interest of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff sustained a loss as a consequence thereof, and that the loss is the proximate effect of the injury.

The answer of the defendant is founded upon the theory that the loss is the remote and indirect result merely of the act charged, and the principle that at the common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in the death of the party injured, and that the statutes of Louisiana upon that subject do not include the present case.

The authorities are so numerous and so uniform to the proposition that by the common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in death, that it is impossible to speak of it as a proposition open to question. It has been decided in many cases in the English courts and in many of the State courts, and no deliberate, well-considered decision to the contrary is to be found. In Hilliard on Torts, p. 87, § 10, the rule is thus laid down: "Upon a similar ground it has been held that at common law the death of a human being, though clearly involving pecuniary loss, is not the ground of an action for damages." The most of the cases upon the subject are there referred to. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493; Conn. Ins. Co. v. N. Y. & N. H., 25 Conn. 265; Kramer v. Market, 25 Cal. 235; Indianapolis v. Kealy, 23 Ind. 133; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Shields v. Young, 15 Ga. 349; Peoria v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333. The only cases that tend to the contrary of this rule, so far as we know, are those of Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root, 90, of Plummer v. Webb, Weare, 75, and of Ford v. Monroe, 20 Hurd, 210. These cases are considered by the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Green v. The Hudson R. R. Co., 2 Keyes, 300, and compared with the many cases to the contrary, and are held not to diminish the force of the rule as above stated. In the case of Green v. Hudson R. R. the plaintiff alleged that on the 9th day of Janury, 1856, his wife was a passenger on the defendants' road, and by the gross carelessness and unskillfulness of the defendants a collision occurred by means of which his wife was killed, "whereby he has lost and been deprived of all the comfort, benefit and assistance of his said wife in his domestic affairs, which he might and otherwise would have had, to his damage," etc. A demurrer to this complaint, upon the ground that the facts alleged constituted no cause of action, was sustained by the New York Court of Appeals.

In Hubgn v. N. O. & C. R. R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 496, the same principle was decided, and in the same manner. In giving its opinion the court say: "The exception of the defendants presents the question whether the death of a human being can be the ground of an action for damages." Not being satisfied with this decision, Messrs. Ogden & Duncan asked for a rehearing, the argument for which is reported in the eleven following pages of the same volume, and which was denied in an elaborate opinion delivered by Chief Justice Eustis.

In Herman v. Carrolton [R. R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 21,

this principle was again affirmed in an opinion by Chief Justice Merrick.

It is only necessary to refer to one other case, which involves the same principle as those already cited, but which in its facts more closely resembles the case we are considering.

In Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co. v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, the declaration alleged that on the 20th day of March, 1850, the plaintiffs had outstanding and in force a policy of insurance for $2,000 upon the life of Samuel Beach; that Beach was on that day a passenger on the defendants' road; that the defendants so carelessly, negligently, and unskillfully conducted themselves that the train on which Beach was riding was thrown down a bank into the river; that Beach was greatly wounded and bruised, by means whereof he then and there died, by reason of which the plaintiffs were compelled to pay to his administrators the sum of $2,000 upon the said policy.

The allegation of the present plaintiffs is that Brame tortiously and illegally took the life of McLemore by shooting him. This is open to the inference that the act of Brame was felonious. The case in Connecticut is based upon the allegation of negligence and carelessness, and is the more favorable to a recovery in that it avoids the suggestion existing in the present case, that the civil injury is merged in the felony. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the action could not be sustained.

We have cited and given references to the important cases on this question; they are substantially uniform against the right of recovery.

Upon principle, we think no other conclusion could be reached than that stated. The relation between the insurance company and McLemore, the deceased, was created by contract between them. But Brame was no party to a contract. The injury inflicted by bim was upon McLemore, against his personal rights; that it happened to injure the plaintiff was an incidental circumstance, a remote and indirect result, not necessarily or legitimately resulting from the act of killing. As in Rockingham Ins. Co. v. Mosher, 39 Me. 253. where an insurance company brought suit against one who had willfully fired a store upon which it had a policy of insurance, which it was thereby compelled to pay, it was held that the loss was remote and indirect, and that the action could not be sustained. In Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N.Y 430, it was held that if A is under a contract to convey his land to B, and C persuades him not to do so, no action lies by B against C. So a witness is not liable for evidence given by him in a suit, although false, by which another is injured. Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Blackf. 234; Dunlap v. Gledden, 31 Me. 435. And in Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. 290, a contractor for the support of town paupers had been subjected to extra expense in consequence of personal injury inflicted upon one of the paupers, and brought the action against the assailant to recover for such expenditure. The court held the damage to be remote and indirect, and not sustained by means of any natural or legal relation between the plaintiff and the party injured. but simply by means of a special contract between the plaintiff and the town. Some authorities of text-writers are referred to as holding a different view, but we are not cited to any case in this country or Great Britain where a different doctrine has been held.

son abate by death, and cannot be revived or maintained by the executor or by the heir. By the act of Parliament of August 21, 1846 (9 and 10 Victoria), an action in certain cases is given to the representatives of the deceased. This principle, in various forms and with various limitations, has been incorporated into the statutes of many of our States, and among others, into that of Louisiana. It is there given in favor of the minor children and widow of the deceased, and in default of these relatives, in favor of the surviving father and mother. Acts of La., 1855, pr. 223, p. 270. The case of a creditor, much less a remote claimant like the plaintiff, is not within the statute.

In each of the briefs it is stated that the defendant was tried for the homicide and was acquitted. In the view we take of the case, the fact of a trial or its result is a circumstance quite immaterial to the present question, however important it may have been to the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

RIGHT OF REVENUE COLLECTOR TO EXAMINE PAID BANK CHECKS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

UNITED STATES, plaintiff in error, v. MANN.

Under section 3177 of the United States Revised Statutes, authority is given to any collector, deputy collector, or inspector of internal revenue, to enter, in the day-time, any building or place within his district, where any articles or objects subject to such taxation are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining such objects or articles, and the provision is that any owner of such building or place, or any person having the agency or superintendence of the same, who refuses to admit such officer or suffer him to examine such articles or objects, shall for every such refusal forfeit five hundred dollars. Held, that under this provision, paid bank checks, which were duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed and issued, are not articles or objects subject to taxation, and an officer of a bank where such checks are may lawfully refuse to suffer the collector to examine such checks.

RROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for

ERROR to let of Minnesota. The facts fully appear

in the opinion.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Authority is given to any collector, deputy collector, or inspector of internal revenue to enter, in the daytime, any building or place within his district, where any articles or objects subject to such taxation are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining such objects or articles, and the provision is that any owner of such building or place, or any person having the agency or superintendence of the same, who refuses to admit such officer or suffer him to examine such articles or objects, shall for every such refusal forfeit five hundred dollars. Rev. Stat, § 3177.

Founded upon that provision in the act of Congress the complaint filed in the Circuit Court alleges and charges that the defendant, having at the time mentioned the care and superintendence of the described bank and its place of business, in which certain paid bank checks were then and there kept, refused then and there to suffer the collector of the district, who then and there entered the bank for the purpose, to examine the said paid bank checks so kept then and

quested by the collector, which said refusal was then and there contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

Service was made and the defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint. Hearing was had and the court sustained the demurrer, the reasons for the conclusion not being exhibited in the transcript, but the record contains a statement to the effect that the plaintiffs standing on their complaint, the court rendered judgment for the defendant. Error was assigned by the plaintiffs, and they sued out the present writ of error. It is now contended by the United States that the judgment was for the wrong party. that it should have been rendered for the plaintiffs and not for the defendant, which is the only error assigned for the consideration of this court.

Bank checks, drafts, or notes for the payment of money, drawn upon any bank, broker, or trust company, at sight or on demand, are subject to a tax of two cents, to be paid by the person who makes, signs, or issues the same, or for whose use or benefit the same are made, signed or issued. Rev. Stat., § 3418; 18 Stat. at Large, 310. Exceptions exist to that requirement in behalf of Federal and State officers and in behalf of county, town, and other municipal corporations, when in the strict exercise of functions belonging exclusively to their ordinary governmental or municipal capacity. Id., § 3420.

Cases arise where such an instrument is issued without being duly stamped, and in such a case the provision is that neither the instrument nor any copy thereof shall be admitted or used in evidence in any court until a legal stamp denoting the amount of the tax is affixed thereto, as prescribed by law. Instruments of the kind are required to be stamped at the time of their issue, and the provision is that unless a stamp or stamps of the proper amount shall be affixed to the same and canceled, it shall not be lawful to record the instrument, and that the record, if so made, shall be utterly void. Provision is also made that parties violating those regulations by making, signing, or issuing any such instrument, document, or paper, without being duly stamped, shall for every such offense forfeit the sum of fifty dollars, and that the unstamped instrument shall be deemed invalid and of no effect. Id., § 3422.

Such officer may enter in the day-time any building or place within his district where any articles or objects subject to taxation are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects. Unless articles or objects of taxation are made, produced, or kept in any building belonging to another, the collector derives no authority under that act to enter the building at all, and even then his right to enter the same is strictly limited by the words so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining such articles or objects.

Where articles or objects subject to taxation are made, produced, or kept in any building, by whomsoever owned, the provision is that the collector or other officer named may enter the same, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects, but the act of Congress gives the officer no authority whatever to enter the building of another for any other purpose than that which the act specifically describes.

Strictly limited as the right conferred is, it is a privilege easily defined, and it is equally clear that the prohibition addressed to the owner or person in charge

of the place of business is explicitly confined to the refusal to suffer the officer to enter the building where the articles or objects subject to taxation are made, produced, or kept, for the special purpose particularly set forth in the section. Owners of such a building or persons having the agency or superintendence of the same are forbidden to refuse to admit the collector, deputy collector, or inspector to enter such building for the described special purpose, and the provision is that if they do so refuse and do not suffer the officer to examine such articles or objects, they shall for every such refusal forfeit five hundred dollars.

Persous other than the owner of the building or place of business cannot be held liable to the penalty prescribed in the section unless it be alleged and proved that he or they had at the time the agency or superintendence of the same, and that it was a building or place where articles or objects subject to taxation were made, produced, or kept, and that the person or persons accused of having violated the prohibition of the section, then and there refused to allow the officer to enter the building or place of business for the described purpose, or to suffer him to examine the articles or objects subject to taxation then and there kept in said building or place of business.

Informations for offenses or penalties created and defined by statute, like indictments, must follow the words of the statute, and where there is no substantial departure from that requirement, the information, like the indictment, is in general sufficient, except in cases where the statute is illiptical, or where, by necessary implication, other constituents are component parts of the offense. Offenses created by statute as well as offenses at common law consist, with rare exceptions, of more than one ingredient, and the rule is universal that every ingredient of which the offense is composed must be accurately and clearly expressed in the indictment or information, or the pleading will be held bad on demurrer. U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 74; 1 Bishop's Cr. Pro. (2d ed.), § 81; Arch. Cr. Pl. & Ev. (18th ed.) 54.

Orders for the payment of money, including checks and drafts drawn upon any bank, banker, or trust company, are subject to a tax of two cents, and it is understood to be the opinion of the department that the exaction specified is a tax upon the instrument, to be paid by the person who makes, signs, or issues the same, or the person for whose use or benefit the order or check was made, signed, or issued. Rev. Stat., § 3418; 18 Stat. at Large, 310.

Suppose that is so, then it may perhaps be suggested that a bank check, though paid, if it was made, signed, and issued without being duly stamped with a stamp denoting the amount of the tax, is still an article or object subject to taxation within the meaning of the provision under consideration, unless it can be beld that the tax is merged in the penalty prescribed for the violation of the requirement that the instrument shall be stamped at the time it is made, stamped, aud issued. Id., § 3421.

Such a question may arise in a subsequent case, but it is wholly unnecessary to discuss it in the case before the court, as it is not alleged in the information that the paid bank checks therein described were not duly stamped at the time the same were made, signed, and issued, as required by the act of Congress. Instead of that the charge in the information is to the effect that the paid bank checks were then and there kept in

ne bank or place of business then and there under the charge and superintendence of the defendant; that the collector of the district then and there entered the said bank or place of business for the purpose of examining the said paid bank checks, and that he, the collector, then and there requested the defendant to suffer him to examine the said paid bank checks so kept by the said bank then and there in their said place of business, and that the defendant then and there refused the said request of the said collector. Matters not alleged in the information cannot be regarded as confessed by the defendant, as the demurrer only admits what is well pleaded.

Certain bank checks which had theretofore been drawn upon and paid by the bank, it is alleged in the information, were then and there kept in the rooms and vaults of the bank, and it is proper to say that the| said checks are described in the preliminary part of the information as "articles subject to tax," but it is nowhere alleged in the information that the said paid bank checks were not duly stamped with stamps denoting the tax to which the same were subject at the time the checks were made, signed and issued.

Ingredients or elements not set forth in the information or other criminal accusation cannot be incorporated into the charge against the defendant after he is served with process, and it is equally clear that paid bank checks, which were duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed, and issued, are not articles or objects subject to taxation within the meaning of the act of Congress on which the information in this case is founded, and if so, then it follows as a necessary conclusion that the defendant might lawfully refuse to suffer the collector to examine the paid bank checks described in the information.

Penal offenses created by statute, whether to be prosecuted by indictment or information, must be accurately and clearly described in the pleadings for the recovery of the penalty, and if the offense cannot be so described without expanding the allegations beyond the mere words of the statute, then it is clear that the allegations of the accusation must be expanded to that extent, as it is universally true that no pleading in such a case can be sufficient which does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the charge is composed, so as to bring the accused within the true intent and meaning of the statute defining

the accusation.

In general, says Marshall, Ch. J., it is sufficient in a libel of information to charge the offense in the very words which direct the forfeiture, but the proposition we think is not universally true. If the words which describe the subject-matter of the prohibition are general, including a whole class, ** ** we think the charge in the libel ought to conform to the true sense and meaning of the words as used by the legislature. The Mary Ann, 8 Wheat. 389; The Hoppet, 7 Cr. 393; 2 Pars, on Ship. & Adm. 386.

Examples of the kind where it has been held that it is not sufficient to follow the words of the statute are quite numerous, and they show that many of the exceptions are as extensively recognized and as firmly settled as any other rule of pleading in such cases. Views of a corresponding character are expressed by this court in another case, where the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Story. Having stated the rule that it is in general sufficient to allege the offense in the very terms of the statute, he proceeds to remark: We say in general, for there are doubtless

cases where more particularity is required either from the obvious intention of the legislature or from the known principles of law, both of which exceptional requirements are applicable in this case.

Known principles of law require greater particularity to be observed in order that all the ingredients which constitute a violation of the statutory offense may be accurately and clearly alleged, and it is equally clear that the intention of Congress requires the same thing, as it is obvious that Congress never could have intended that paid bank checks duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed and issued should be regarded as articles or objects subject to taxation within the meaning of the provision in the act of Congress under consideration. The Caroline, 7 Cr. 500; The Anne, id. 571; Conkl. Treat. (5th ed.) 546.

Authorities other than those already referred to are not necessary to show that an information to recover a penalty created by statute must state all the material facts and circumstances which constitute the offense, so as to bring the party impleaded precisely within the provisions of the statute defining the offense; but should it be desired to consult other authorities, it will be found that the following fully support the propositions. 2 Colby's Cr. Law, 114; People v. Wilbur, 4 Park. C. C. 21; Com. v. Cook, 18 B. Monr. 149; Steel v. Smith, 1 Barn. & Ald. 99; Conkl. Treat. (5th ed.), 548.

Viewed in the light of these suggestions it is clear that the right conferred upon the officer to enter the building or place of business of another in such a case is strictly limited to a building or place of business in which articles or objects subject to taxation are, at the time of the proposed entry and examination, made, produced, or kept, and that paid bank checks, unless it is alleged and proved that they were not duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed and issued, are not articles or objects subject to taxation within the meaning of the act of Congress on which the information is founded. Nothing is admitted by the demurrer except what is well pleaded in the information, aud inasmuch as the only charge of the information in that regard is that paid bank checks were then and there kept in the said building or place of business described, the court is of the opinion that the information does not set forth any legal offense against the defendant, as defined by the said act of Congress. Judgment affirmed.

LEGAL NOTES FROM ABROAD.

LONDON, January 17, 1878. HERE is a universal complaint throughout legal cir

Teles, ais, un rart, soup all classes in any way interested in litigation, of the delay to business in our law courts, especially on the common law side. The Times takes advantage of the opening of "Hilary Term" to publish a statement three columns long, compiled by its court reporter, from which it appears that the term opens with 750 remanets, and that the arrangements of sittings at nisi prius are such that not more than 30 400 causes are likely to be heard, so that at the end of the term there will be over 300 old cases to be added to the new ones that may be set down for trial.

The Judicature Acts come in for a large share of the blame for this state of things, but the assignments of the judges, for which the acts are not responsible,

seem to be the principal cause of the block of business. So many are required to sit in banc, and so many at the Assizes, that the number and continuity of the nisi prius hearings in London and Westminster are greatly interfered with. Of course the remedy for this is suggested by the mere statement of it; a different class of judges ought to sit in the appeal courts from that which sits in London and the counties, and the jurisdiction of the minor courts ought to be enlarged. In some respects, however, the Judicature Acts have not done what was expected of them. The judges of the common law division of the High Court hoped that, under the terms of the acts, they would get rid of the jury trials sent to them from chancery. But, whatever may be the proper construction of the statutes, the chancery judges have proved practically too strong for their common law brethren, and have made them do the chancery work. This, however, is no hardship to the general body of suitors, as the chancery business would have been proportionately delayed by putting the chancery judges to conducting jury cases. Again, the whole system of official referees has utterly collapsed. It seemed, when the creation of these authorities was first proposed, that a sort of special judges to try complicated cases would greatly lighten jury work. But the official referees are useless for that purpose, because no one need go to them who does not wish to do so; and very few suitors wish it; so that when their services are called in it is merely as a sort of clerks to the judges, for getting up and submitting statements of fact.

The result of this state of things is likely to be the appointment of two or three more common law judges, perhaps with special assignments to nisi prius

business.

An extraordinary case of fraud, resulting in an extraordinary sentence, has been concluded to-day. One Frederick Dimsdale, a solicitor, a man of mature years, and a resident in the fashionable district of Mayfair, was convicted of fraud and forgery, and sentenced to penal servitude for life. The following extract from a local report of the case gives a fair idea of the frauds perpetrated:

"It appeared that in the year 1867, a gentleman named Latham, holding an official position in the Borough of Margate, was possessed of a considerable quantity of land at Croydon, and he proposed to build a number of houses upon that land, and houses were erected under the title of Belmot-villas, South-villas, etc. In the course of his building operations Mr. Latham found it necessary to borrow money for the purpose of carrying on his building operations, and at various times large sums of money were raised from different parties by way of mortgage. In the course of the proceedings Mr. Latham got into difficulties, and he eventually was compelled to have his affairs put in liquidation, and a receiver was appointed to collect the rents, the whole of the different mortgages being at that time consolidated into one mortgage. Things continued in this way until the year 1876, when it appeared that the defendant Dimsdale entered into negotiations for the purchase of the equity of redemp tion on behalf of a person named Harriet Meredith, who was represented as living at Clifton, near Bristol, and whom he represented as his client. The purchase of the equity of redemption was pleted on the 1st of January, 1876, and the effect of s proceeding was, that so long as the interest was regularly paid upon the consolidated mortgage, Dimsdale, who acted as the solicitor of the supposed purchaser, was entitled to receive the rents, and in fact had the entire control over the property; and as he was believed to be a man of large property, and to be carrying on an extensive and respectable business, this, to a great extent, tended

to do away with any suspicion that might possibly have been entertained with regard to the character of the transactions in which he was engaged of raising large sums of money upon the security of fictitious leases upon the property referred to With reference to the specific lease that was the subject of inquiry, it appeared that a sum of £15,000 was obtained from the Credit Company, but, in order to show the guilty knowledge of the parties, evidence was proposed to be given that the same proceeding had been adopted in twenty-three other cases, and the result was that £300,000 was obtained by this enormous fraud."

It was contended for the crown, on the above state of facts, that though Dimsdale and his accomplices signed their own names to the fraudulent leases, yet

their offense fell within the technical definition of forgery; and Mr. Justice Lopes so ruled; and he said that, having regard to Dimsdale's position, his knowledge of the whole moral and legal responsibility he was incurring, and the vast extent of his frauds, he felt bound to pass a very heavy sentence upon him—and he did.

Another remark of the judge is worth quoting. He said: "If crimes of this kind were not put a stop to, all these important business transactions would be "placed in doubt and difficulty." It does not require any sympathy with Mr. Dimsdale, nor any particular refinement of reasoning, to bring us to the conclusion that transactions, which, in America, are fully protected by records, must here be protected by the imposition of excessive penalties.

Mr. William Cobbett, a son of the historian, fell dead last Saturday, in Westminster Hall, from an attack of heart disease. The telegraph says:

The name of this aged and eccentric gentleman, for many years past has been a kind of household word in Westminster Hall, owing to his persistency in bringing futile actions and pestering the judges with trivial applications, and on Saturday he was making his way through the central lobby of the Houses of Parliament, toward one of the Lords' committee rooms, where he was bent on prosecuting an appeal before the Lords Justices in the phantom action of Cobbett v. Lopes," when he was seen to stagger and fall. Assistance was promptly rendered, but it was in vain. He had died on the scene which for years had been his field of battle. In the Queen's Bench and the Common Pleas, in the Exchequer and the now defunct Bail court, the contentious William Cobbett's more contentious son, had, during more than a quarter of a century, waged fierce but fruitless war. He always conducted his own case-unless, indeed, Mrs. Cobbett was good enough to move the court for him-for bold would have been the barrister who consented to hold a brief for a plaintiff who habitually fought with shadows, and was accustomed to make his giants first before he tried to slay them. For some years Mr. Cobbett lay, mainly, through his own choice, in the Queen's Bench Prison; and his delight was then to bring action on all kinds of occult grounds, against the Governor and the Deputy-Governor. A writ of Habeas Corpus could in those days be obtained for the moderate sum of two pounds ten shillings; and it was rarely indeed, that, in the course of a term, Mr. Cobbett did not indulge himself with one or two of these little legal luxuries, for the purpose of being brought up to Westminster, and moving for something against somebody. always return to our first loves; and in the evening of his life the litigious patriarch reverted to his earliest passion for the Palladium of our liberties. The case of "Cobbett v. Lopes," a record now withdrawn forever, was only one of a series of suits which this indefatigable plaintiff had brought against her Majes ty's Judges in connection with an attempt on his part to obtain the release of the "unhappy nobleman,' lately "languishing at Dartmoor," but now seemingly getting on very nicely at Portland (the Tichborne claimant) on a writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Cobbett was very well known to the judicial bench-as well known, indeed, as crazy Miss Flyte and the aggrieved Man from Shropshire Bleak House, in

We

must