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as the legislative discretion may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 650.
Since we have already held, in the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, that as a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States, we see nothing in the present case that can afford any sufficient ground for disturbing the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
Of course, we do not mean to lay down any rule at variance with what this court has decided with regard to the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States relating to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and amongst the several States, or otherwise. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Passenger Cases, 7 id. 283; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, id. 275; Railroad Co. v. Van Husen, 95 id. 465; etc., etc. That question
does not arise in this case.
The judgment was affirmed.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.*
1. Equity will not relieve against mere moral wrong. -The fraud against which equity will grant relief, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, consists in the refusal to perform an agreement upon the faith of, which the plaintiff has been misled to his injury, or the defendant has secured an unconscionable advantage, and not in the mere moral wrong involved in a refusal to perform a contract, which, by reason of the statute of frauds, cannot be enforced by action. Watson v. Erb (Com.).
2. Failure to fulfill verbal agreement as to purchase of land: where equity will not interfere.-A, in pursuance of a parol agreement for that purpose with B, who desired to become the owner of a certain tract of land adjoining his, and for personal reasons was not to be known in the transaction, but was to save A harmless from all loss or trouble, purchased the land, made a cash payment thereon, took the title in fee to himself as per the agreement, and gave to the seller his own several promissory notes and mortgage back, to secure the deferred payments. After contracting for the land, but before making the cash payment, or receiving the title, A repudiated his agency and gave notice to B that he would purchase for himself with his own money, and refused to receive from B the money to make the cash payment, but consummated the purchase for himself. Held, that the breach of the verbal contract to convey to B is not such a fraud upon him as authorizes a court of equity to decree a trust in the land and compel its execution. Ib. Decided June 5, 1878.
Condition avoiding policy in case of change of possession may be waived by verbal contract of company's agent.-A policy of insurance issued to a mortgagee
* To appear in 30 and 31 Ohio St. Reports. From E. Dewitt, Esq., State Reporter.
contained a stipulation that the insurance might be terminated at any time at the request of the assured, the company only retaining customary short rates; also, that if any change took place in the title or possession, the policy should be void. Without the knowledge of the company, the owner sold and couveyed the property and satisfied the mortgage. Held, that a subsequent assignment of the policy by the mortgagee to the purchaser, and a verbal agreement between the latter and an agent of the company, having power to make contracts and issue policies, that such assigned policy shall have the force and effect of a new policy to the purchaser, will bind the company. Amazon Insurance Co. v. Wall (Court). Decided June 4, 1878.
1. Evidence: charge of want of chastity: specific immoral acts.-In an action of slander by a woman, where the alleged defamatory words impute to her a want of chastity, specific acts of sexual intercourse by her cannot be given in evidence, for any purpose, under the issue made by a general denial. Duval v. Davey (Com.).
2. General reputation of plaintiff for unchastity may be shown.-Where the slanderous words set out in the petition charging the plaintiff, a female, with a want of chastity, under such issue it is competent, in mitigation of damages, to show that plaintiff's general reputation for chastity at and prior to the speaking of the words was bad. (Dewitt v. Greenfield, 5 Ohio, 225, overruled.) Ib. Decided May 29, 1878.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
Does not apply to foreign judgment.-The limitation of ten years prescribed by the 18th section of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to an action brought on a judgment rendered in another State or Territory. Fries v. Mack (Com.). Decided June 5, 1878.
RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.
To obtain possession of property: inability to give bonds: injunction.-The assignee cannot maintain a suit in equity to obtain possession of property alleged to belong to the estate; the remedy is at law. Where the party in possession claims title to the property, the inability of the assignee to give the requisite bonds in an action of replevin will not entitle him U. S. Dist. to an injunction to prevent its removal. Ct., Oregon. In re Oregon Iron Works, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 404.
CONFLICT OF LAW.
Promissory note negotiated through broker: sale to party in another State.-The bankrupts made certain notes for the accommodation of W. & Co., who placed them in the hands of brokers for sale as business paper. The brokers then wrote to the New Haven Trust Company, inclosing the notes and asking if it would take them. The Trust Company returned a check on a bank in New York for the amount of the notes less a discount of ten per cent. Held, that the notes were governed by the law of New York; that they had their inception when negotiated to the Trust Company and are usurious and void. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Dodge, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 504.
Entries on books of bankrupt: making notes payable to another party: claim proved against estate. -Entries of accommodation notes in the books of the bankrupt against the payee will not estop the bankrupt nor his trustee from disputing the claim of a holder of such notes. The making of notes payable to another party has never been held to be such a representation as estops the maker from showing that they were accommodation paper, even in favor of one to whom the payee has represented them to be business paper and who took them in good faith on such representations. The trustee is not estopped from disputing the claim of the holder of the notes, by reason of his having proved them against the estate of the payee in bankruptcy, where the holder has not upon the faith thereof parted with his money or changed his position as to such notes. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Dodge, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 504.
Sale by one partner to another where firm is insolvent, not.-At the advice of one of their creditors, V. sold out his interest in the firm to his partner B., B. agreeing to pay all the firm debts and giving V. his notes for $300. This was done upon the representation that the creditor would in that event give time. Instead of so doing, however, he immediately entered judgment upon a warrant of attorney held by him, and levied on the goods in B.'s possession. Afterward B. was adjudicated bankrupt at the petition of the firm creditors and V. Another creditor, G., who had obtained a judgment against the firm then levied upon the goods held by the sheriff under the former levy. The assignee afterward recovered possession of the proceeds of the property levied upon. In a suit by G.'s assignee to establish a lien by virtue of his levy, held, that the levy having been made after adjudication, no lien could attach unless the sale to B. was fraudulent in fact, or by necessary construction of law, so that the goods still remained firm assets and firm property. A sale of his interest for a valuable consideration by one partner to the other, where the firm is insolvent, does not of itself constitute fraud. U. S. Dist. Ct.. W. D. Michigan. Russell v. McCord, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 508.
Debt due State.-The warden of the Clinton State Prison sold to the bankrupts certain merchandise which at the time was the property of the State, and proved the claim as a debt due him as agent and warden of the prison. Held, that the debt was in fact a debt to the State and as such entitled to priority. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. New York. In re Miller, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 402.
Expunging claim tainted with: accommodation paper : burden of proof.-Where an assignee in bankruptcy moves to expunge a claim on the ground of usury, alleging that a promissory note on which the claim is founded was made or indorsed by the bankrupt for the accommodation of another person and took its inception in the hands of the present holder, who obtained the same at a discount of more than the lawful rate of interest, held, that the assignee must show clearly that the note was accommodation paper. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Many & Marshall, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 514.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
City ordinance forbidding steam on railroads in city: validity of.-A railroad company chartered by the State of Virginia, and permitted by the common council of Richmond to construct its road into said city and to use locomotives propelled by steam thereon, and which had made certain improvements asked for by the city as a condition and consideration for the construction and use of its road, thereafter changed its main line to another route. Thereafter the common council passed an ordinance forbidding the use of steam by said company in certain parts of the city. The charter of the company in terms subjected it to the government of the city in respect to the use of the road when constructed. Held, that the ordinance was not invalid either as impairing the obligatious of a contract or as depriving the company of its property without due process of law, or as denying the company of the equal protection of the laws. Judgment of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Co., plaintiff in error, v. City of Richmond. Opinion by Waite, C. J.
1. Indictment under R. S., § 3266, for illicit distilling Under the provision of section 3266 of the United States Revised Statutes, an indictment charging that the defendant "did knowingly and unlawfully cause and procure to be used a still, boiler, and other vessel, for the purpose of distilling, within the intent and meaning of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States, in a certain building, and on certain premises, where vinegar was manufactured and produced, against the peace of the United States and their dignity, and against the form of the statute of the said United States in such case made and provided," is insufficient; it is not enough to charge the offense in the words of the statute. Held, also, that it is not essential to aver in terms that the spirits distilled were alcoholic. On a certificate of division from U. S. Circuit Court, E. D. New York. Judgment against defendant. United States v. Simmons. Opinion by Harlan, J.
2. Indictment under Revised Statutes, § 3281.- One count based upon section 3281 of the United States Revised Statutes charged that the defendant "did knowingly and unlawfully engage in and carry on the business of a distiller, within the intent and meaning of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States, with the intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled by him, against the peace," etc. Held, that this count contained an averment of an unlawful act and was sufficient to authorize judgment thereon. Ib.
Payment of debt due citizen of United States to Confederate government not.— In an action for goods sold in 1861, the defendant set up that from 1861 to 1865 plaintiff was a resident of Pennsylvania, one of the United States, and defendant was a resident of Virginia, which was under the government of the Coufederate States, a belligerent at war with the United States. That, by a law of the Confederate States, plaintiff's debt was sequestrated, and defendant, under a penalty, compelled to pay the same to the Confederate government. Held, no defense to the action. Order of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed. Williams, plaintiff in error, v. Bruffy. Opinion by Field, J.
COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
To Court of Appeals of case involving less than $500: case involving title to real estate.-In order to authorize an appeal to the Court of Appeals, where the amount in controversy is less than $500, on the ground that the action is one affecting the title to real property or an interest therein, it is not sufficient that the action relates to real property, or in some way affects it, it must itself affect the title or an interest therein. Therefore an action to have an assessment on real property declared void does not affect the title to the property, and if the amount involved is less than $500 an appeal is not allowable. Appeal dismissed. Nichols v. Voorhis. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided May 21, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 171.]
Discharges attachment by operation of law: attached debt paid may be recovered by assignee.-Under an attachment in a suit against one Yerkes, a debt due from defendant to Yerkes was seized. Bankruptcy proceedings had been commenced against Yerkes, but plaintiff knew nothing of them and paid the debt to the sheriff who levied the attachment. The bankruptcy proceedings were commenced within four months of the issue of the attachment. Held, that the bankruptcy proceedings dissolved the attachment by operation of law, and without any order of the court that the payment of the debt by defendant did not relieve him from liability therefor, and that the assignee in bankruptcy of Yerkes could recover the amount of the debt from him. Judgment below affirmed. Duffield, assignee, v. Horton. Opinion by Alleu, J. [Decided April 2, 1878. Reported below, 10 Hun, 140.]
Liability of stockholder: extinguishment of.—Where a stockholder in a manufacturing corporation formed under the act of 1848, loaned money upon an indorsed note of the corporation to the extent of the amount of his stock, which note was prosecuted to judgment and an execution was returned unsatisfied, held, that the liability of the stockholder for the debts of the company was extinguished. Judgment below affirmed. Agate v. Sands. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided May 21, 1878.]
1. Construction of: clause controlling details of description.-After particularly mentioning the boundaries, etc., of a tract of land conveyed, the description in a deed closed thus: "The premises hereby intended to be conveyed being the east half-part of the farm whereon Johnson Babcock, now deceased, formerly lived," etc. Held, that this clause would have a controlling effect on the details of the description, and the deed would not convey any more than the east half of the farm mentioned. Judgment below affirmed. Ousby v. Jones. Opinion by Folger, J.
2. Adverse possession: fence off of line.-Where a division fence was built off the true line, but did not extend along the whole line, and there was no fence or other visible line of demarkation between the adjoining premises, held, that an acquiescence by the adjoining owners in the location of the fence could
not be held an acquiescence in an invisible line continued in the same course. Ib.
3. Adverse possession: mere claim of title does not constitute.-An owner of land claimed continually that the building of a neighbor was located over on to his land. Held, not an adverse holding of the land built on. Ib.
[Decided May 21, 1878. Reported below, 4 Hun, 428.]
1. Judgment of, in courts of domicile of parties: decision of State court as to validity of its laws under its own Constitution conclusive. -Where a court of Louisiana authorized by valid statutes of that State to entertain actions for divorce under a law of that State, passed in 1870, gave judgment of divorce for acts committed in 1869, held, that the courts of this State would not pass upon the question whether the law mentioned was invalid under the Constitution of Louisiana and hold the judgment void. Judgment below affirmed. Hunt v. Hunt. Opinion by Folger, J.
2. Jurisdiction: State courts judges of jurisdiction under their own laws.-Of their own jurisdiction, so far as it depends upon municipal laws, the courts of every country are exclusive judges. In pronouncing a judgment they of necessity decide in favor of their jurisdiction. It is conclusive if they have jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Ib.
3. Construction of statutes of a State: decision of State courts binding on other courts.-The decisions of the tribunals of a State as to the true construction of the laws of their own sovereignty are binding on the Federal courts and upon the courts of other States. Ib.
4. Judgment: in divorce against one domiciled in State valid without personal service.-In a suit for divorce a valid judgment in personam so as to effect the dissolution of the marriage contract which shall be prevalent everywhere may be rendered against a defendant not within the territorial jurisdiction during the progress of the suit, if that be the place of his citizenship and domicile, though process be served upon him only in some method prescribed by the laws of that jurisdiction as a substitute for personal service and though he has not voluntarily appeared. Ib. [Decided January 29, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 622.]
Giving undertaking for re-delivery in replevin estops denying possession -Some stone were lying upon ground leased by plaintiff. Defendants sent men who commenced work cutting and carving the stone. Plaintiff thereupon commenced a replevin action, and the sheriff took possession of the stone. Defendants gave a statutory undertaking in which it was set forth that the stone had been taken from their possession, and asking a re-delivery of them, and they were re-delivered. Held, that by giving the undertaking defendants were estopped from setting up that the stone had not been in their possession. Judgment below affirmed. Diossy v. Morgan. Opinion by Rapallo, J. [Decided May 21, 1878.]
Conditions in policy as to description: reference to application not in company's possession.—A policy of fire insurance upon buildings contained a provision
that applicants for insurance must state ** the position, etc., of all contiguous buildings," and that the "survey. description and representations shall be taken and deemed to be a part of the policy and a warranty on the part of the insured." The policy, after stating the several amounts insured upon different buildings, and the place where situated, added, "As per application on file, No. 1234." There was no application on file in the insurance company's office, but in the office of the company's agents who issued the policy there was an old application made by the owner of the property for insurance in another company of which they were also agents. The company issuing the policy in question never had the application and knew nothing of it. Held, that the reference in the policy did not render the insured bound by the statements in the old application, and the company could not claim that the policy was void because of misstatements in such application. Judgment below affirmed. Vilas v. New York Central Ins. Co. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided February 22, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 121.]
Extending time of payment: what is not: indorsement: renewal notes.- Where it appeared that renewal notes were left by the maker at a bank for the purpose of taking up an indorsed note not yet due, held by the bank, and the bank officers objected that the renewal note was not indorsed by the indorser of the other, and the maker told the bank officers to keep the notes and the indorser would come in in a day or two and indorse, and the note was accepted on that condition. Subsequently a second renewal note, to take the place of the first renewal note, was left with the bank, the same promise made and the note accepted' thereunder. No indorsement was made on the renewal notes. Held, not an extension of the time of payment of the indorsed note, nor a suspension of the right to prosecute the same so as to discharge the indorser. (Place v. McIlwain, 38 N. Y. 96, distinguished. Judgment below affirmed. Auburn City National Bank v. Hensiker. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided January 29, 1878.]
Right of municipality to set off claim that the people of the State may sue on.— Chapter 49 of the Laws of 1875 does not deprive a municipality of the right to set off on an action a claim against the plaintiff although it may arise out of a transaction which might be the subject of a suit in behalf of the people. The act gives a right of action to the State in certain cases, but it does not deprive a municipality of a right to bring an action in the courts of this State to recover its funds or property unlawfully diverted, although proceedings in its behalf may be stayed under the provision of 2d section. Judgment below affirmed. Wood v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Andrews, J. [Decided May 21, 1878. Reported below, 7 Hun, 164.]
transact intelligently such business as he had to do, held, that a want of testamentary capacity was not shown. Judgment below affirmed. Horn v. Pullman. Opinion by Andrews, J.
2. Undue influence: change of testamentary intention. A change in testamentary intention, if made upon a reason satisfactory to the testator, although it may seem inadequate to a court investigating the question of undue influence, furnishes of itself no ground for setting aside the will. The question in all such cases is, was the will the free act of a competent testator. An old man who lived with his grandson became impressed with the idea that his children did not wish him to live with them. His children very seldom visited him, and his grandson and wife took care of him. He frequently expressed great gratitude for his grandson's care and attention and in his will gave the bulk of his property to the grandson. So far as appeared he acted freely in what he did. Held, that there was no ground for refusing to admit the will to probate. Ib.
[Decided January 29, 1878.]
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.
THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday,
June 18, 1878:
Carroll v. Waydell, No. 257, judgment affirmed; on opinion of court below.— Demarest v. Mayor, etc., of New York, No. 246, judgment affirmed; opinion by Earl, J.- Dunlop v. Paterson Fire Ins. Co., No. 417, order affirmed; opinion by Folger, J.-Doyle v. Sharp, No. 241, judgment affirmed; opinion by Miller, J. Hawks v. Winans, No. 276, judgment affirmed; no opinion. Higgins v. Murray, motion for re-argument, with $10 costs, denied; no opinion.- - Hunn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., No. 233, judgment affirmed; on opinion of court below.- - In re application of Attorney-General v. Atlantic Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 402, order affirmed; costs out of the fund to each party appearing at argument; opinion by Folger, J.- - In re petition of Rector, etc., of St. Mark's Church, No. 407, order affirmed; no opinion.— Keilsy v. Dusenbury, motion to dismiss appeal denied; no opinion.—Pfohl v. Simpson, No. 155, judgment affirmed; opinion by Folger, J.- - Randolph v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., No. 266, judgment affirmed; no opinion.-Stuart v. Palmer, No. 141, judgment affirmed; opinion by Earl, J.- - Weller v. Hersee, No. 256, judgment affirmed; no opinion.-Whiton v. Spring, No. 253, judgment reversed and new trial ordered, unless plaintiffs stipulate to reduce their recovery in the sum of $566.21, and interest thereon from June 6, 1872, in which event judgment as so modified affirmed, without costs to either party in this court. Deductions to be made ratably from the several recoveries; opinion by Earl, J.
The following order was handed down on Friday, June 14, 1878:
Ordered, That this court take a recess ou the 21st day of June instant, until Monday, the 16th day of September next, at 10 A. M., and that a new calendar be made for the session then to be held. The cases undisposed of on the present calendar will be transferred to the new calendar without further notice; in other cases notice of argument must be filed with the clerk on or before the second day of September next.
NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CONFLICT OF LAW: STATUTES HAVE NO EXTRA-TERRITORIAL FORCE.-Acting under authority of a statute of Arkansas, a probate court of that State ordered and adjudged that the disability of non-age of G. be removed, "so far as to authorize him to demand, sue for and receive all moneys belonging to him in the State of Missouri, in the hands of his curator or any other person, and to execute releases therefor in the same manner as if he was of full age." In a suit brought by G., in Missouri, against his curator, held, that the statute of Arkansas was inoperative in Missouri, and that the infant could not sue in his own name. Sup. Ct., Missouri, October Term, 1877. State v. Bunce (Cent. L. J.).
CONTRACT: PROMISE TO PAY DEBT WHEN ABLE.-A debt due plaintiff from defendant was barred by a discharge under the insolvent laws of Massachusetts. Thereafter defendant wrote plaintiff this: "Your account will certainly be paid if I live." Held, to be no more than a conditional promise by defendant to pay when he was able, and no action was maintainable without proof of ability to pay. Sup. Jud. Ct., Massachusetts, March, 1878. Randidge v. Lyman.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INJURIES TO STOCK BY RAILROADS: ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHICH IMPOSES LIABILITY WITHOUT REGARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES OF KILL
ING.-An act which fixes an absolute liability on a corporation, to make compensation for injuries done to property in the prosecution of its lawful business, without any wrong, fault or neglect on its part, when under the general law of the land, no one else is liable under such circumstances, is not "due process of law, and is, therefore, void. Sup. Ct., Alabama, Dec. Term, 1877. Zeigler v. S. & N. R. R. Co.
CRIMINAL LAW: INDICTMENT: VARIANCE.-An indictment for the theft of a gelding is not sustained by proof of the theft of a ridgling, or partly gelded horse. Ct. App., Texas, May 15, 1878. Brisco v. State (Tex. L. J.).
CRIMINAL LAW: RAPE: FORCE NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE.-The taking of improper liberties with a female, whereby her sexual passion is excited so as to render her unable to resist the solicitations of a man with whom she is, to allow carnal intercourse with her, no actual force being used, is not rape. Sup. Ct., California, April, 1878. People v. Royal (Cal. L. Rec.).
CRIMINAL LAW: ROBBERY: VENUE.-The defendant committed a robbery in Fayette county while being taken to Shelby county as a prisoner in charge of an officer, and the property was recovered from him in the latter county. Held, that he carried the property voluntarily into and could be lawfully indicted and tried in the latter county. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, April, 1878. Margerum v. State (Cent. L. J.).
CRIMINAL LAW: TRIAL: IN MISDEMEANORS WHEN PRISONER NEED NOT PERSONALLY APPEAR: BAIL.
In misdemeanor cases punishable only by fine, the defendant, if he has given bail, may appear by counsel, and the trial may proceed without his personal presence; and his counsel are not required to bring into court the money "to pay the fine and costs to entitle him to a trial in his absence. Where a party charged with a misdemeanor punishable only by fine, appears by counsel, and not in person, a forfeiture of his bail bond cannot be legally taken. Ct. App., Texas, April 18, 1878. Neaves v. State (Tex. L. J.).
PROCEEDINGS OF THE REVISION COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE.
Ta meeting of the special committee of the Senate of this State on the revision of the statutes, held in this city on the 17th inst., there were present Senators Samuel S. Edick, Edwin Hicks, and Charles Hughes, who constitute the entire committee.
On motion of Senator Hicks the following resolution was passed unanimously:
Resolved, First, That in the opinion of this committee it is not expedient that a new Code of Civil Procedure be enacted; but it is expedient that the Code of Civil Procedure now in force, as sought to be amended by the Legislature at the session which has just closed, be retained, with such further amendments, if any, in matters of detail, as may appear to be necessary upon a careful examination and review thereof, or as the result of the practical experience of the bench and the bar thereunder.
Secondly, That in the opinion of this committee the said Code of Civil Procedure should be completed so that it will contain the entire revised legislation of the State upon the subject of procedure in civil causes, and thereupon that the former statutes upon that subject should be repealed; for which purpose this committee will report at the next session of the Legislature a bill containing the nine supplementary chapters reported to the Legislature at the session which has just closed by the commissioners to revise the statutes, with such amendments as may appear to be expedient upon a careful examination and review thereof.
Thirdly, That for the purpose of assisting this committee in preparing such bills as may be necessary to carry out the objects above stated, the members of the bench and of the bar of this State are requested to furnish to any member of this committee any suggestions which may occur to them for amendments, either to the thirteen chapters of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force, or to the nine chapters pro posed to be added thereto.
SAMUEL S. EDICK,
Chairman of the Committee.
NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.
ORDRONAUX'S JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF INSANITY. Commentaries on the Lunacy Laws of New York, and on the Judicial Aspects of Insanity at Common Law and in Equity, including Procedure. By John Ordronaux. LL. D., State Commissioner in Lunacy, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in the Law School of Columbia College, etc. Published by John D. Parsons, Jr. Albany, 1878.
E have here, in a neat octavo volume of five hundred pages, a manual suitable as a text-book for students, and convenient as a work of reference on its particular topic to members of both the professions, of Law and Medicine. The book may be consulted. with profit by all who have occasion to deal with questions of mental incapacity, either in the domain of civil or of criminal responsibility, or who desire, on behalf of the afflicted, to intelligently avail themselves of the restraints and safeguards which the laws of this State, in a spirit of almost paternal benevolence, throw around the persons and property of those who may be suspected or adjudged incapable of the assertion, maintenance or exercise of their own rights, or of the due observance of the rights of others, amid the excitements of every day life.
The work appropriately opens with an introduction and digest of adjudicated principles in the law of Insanity, a thing we believe never before attempted by any writer. It consists of a series of maxims of the first importance, fortified, where of a scientific nature, by citations of high medical authority, and where of a legal nature, by reference to the cases wherein the principle laid down has been judicially determined. A