« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
same, and can still do so in the case of the Bloomingdale Asylum. Its right in this respect is paramount and indefeasible.
Fifth. It has long been settled that the capacity of a corporation, universally to be a trustee, is among the elementary principles in the law of trusts. 1 Saund. on Uses, 349; Willis on Trustees, 31; Lewin on Trusts, 10, 11; 2 Co. Litt. 706, note; Penn. v. Ld. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 453; Att'y-Gen. v. Foundling Hospital, 2 Ves. Jr. 46; Green v. Rutherford, 1 Ves. 467. Many American authorities may also be cited. Trustees Phillips Academy v. King, 12 Mass. 556; Am. Acad. of Sci. v. Pres. and Fellows of Harvard Univ., 12 Gray, 583; Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 169; Chambers v. Baptist Soc., 1 B. Monroe, 216; Harv. Coll. v. Soc. Th. Eng., 3 Graz, 280.
It will not be denied that these subsidies of the State were a gift to charitable uses, and, under the common law, charitable donations are to be liberally construed with a view to promote the general charitable intent of the donor. Att'y-Gen. v. Christ's Hosp., 1 Russ. and Myl. 626; Att'y-Gen. v. Caïus Coll., 2 Keen, 163.
Sixth. The grant to a corporation must be accepted as it is offered, and the grantees are not at liberty to act under part of its provisions and to reject the rest. 1 Kyd, 65. The Society of the New York Hospital, although the annual subsidies intrusted to them by the State were paid in gross, had no right to merge the Bloomingdale Asylum fund into their general funds.
In the present case the appropriations of the State were made under chap. 203 of 1816 for the express purpose, as recited in the title of this act, of enabling the Society of the New York Hospital to erect a new building for the accommodations of insane patients. These patients, belonging to the indigent class for which the Hospital was originally founded, were the cestui que trusts for whose beneficial use the State subsidies were granted. They were specifically designated. These funds were given to the Governors of the New York Hospital not as part of a general appropriation, to be subdivided by them according to their pleasure, but as specified trust funds to the uses of an insane department distinct from the hospital, and of which the State thus became the fundator perficiens; and the two departments, having distinct duties to perform, there was no necessary merger of one into the other.
Seventh. An ordinary hospital, whether incorporated or not, cannot convert itself at will into a lunatic asylum. For a lunatic asylum implies the right of permanent confinement of an insane person, meaning thereby the right of restraining his personal liberty. This is a prerogative right exclusively vested in the State, which alone can delegate authority to restrain personal liberty in accordance with the law of the land. Hence such authority is never presumed to exist as a natural right in any person or corporation, but must be specifically delegated. At common law all prisons were King's prisons, and since the passage of the Statute of 14 Geo. 3, c. 49, A. D. 1774, for the regulation of Insane Asylums, all such institutions in Great Britian must be legalized by public authority.
Now, under the Constitution of 1777, it was ordained that "such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the Legislature of the Colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said Colony on the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1775,
should form the law of the State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the Legislature of the State should from time to time make concerning the same."
Therefore, when the State founded the Bloomingdale Asylum it only delegated by implication the authority to hold lunatics in custody. It did not grant it absolutely, because it could not. That authority it can withdraw at any time, and it may in like manner direct that the institution be put to any other charitable use. The Society of the New York Hospital, as a charitable corporation, because intrusted with the erection of the Bloomingdale Asylum, have no continuing or vested right of management as against the State, for the State cannot divest itself of the right of controlling personal liberty, by gift to any person or corporation. Cooley's Const. Lim. 282-4. Therefore it may withdraw the right of personally restraining lunatics from the Bloomingdale Asylum at any time, and may convert it into any other form of public charity it pleases, for the power of custody can never be made the subject of contract between the State and a corporation, and no vested rights can accrue under it. It is one of the police powers of the State, which is inalienable. 8 Coke, 375.
Eighth. The trustees of the Asylum funds were bound to act up to the end or design for which they were incorporated, viz.: the care, chiefly, of the indigent insane. This is a fundamental principle in the law of corporate grants. Hence, the by-law adopted by them, which, in its effects, was calculated to exclude, and has always excluded, the indigent class from the Asylum was a willful abuse of the spirit and letter of their charter. For the intention expressed in the charter is in the nature of a duty imposed upon the corporation, and, as such, was, by implication, annexed to the grant of their franchise.
Ninth. The indigent insane of the city of New York were the beneficiaries intended by the State in the erection of the Bloomingdale Asylum, and nothing is better established in the law of charitable uses than that such beneficiaries have a vested equitable interest in such charity. Hence, ministers of the gospel may have a vested interest in a gift to a church according to the regulation of the founder. Att'y-Gen'l v. Pearson, 3 Meri. 402; Att'y- Gen'l v. Jones, Shelford, 765; note g; Doe v. McKeag, 10 Barn. and Cr. 721. So pensioners in a hospital. Att'y-Gen'l v. Locke, 3 Atk. 164. Also scholars in a free school. Att'y-Gen'l v. Lehigh, 3 P. Wms. 146, note; Shelford, 769. And it is a postulate sustained by the current of decisions, both in the United States as well as in England, that equity will carry out a gift to charitable uses, however vaguely stated. Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55; Vidal v. Mayor, Aldermen, etc., of Philadelphia, 2 Howard, 127.
Tenth. There has not been on their part so much even as a substantial performance of this intention so far as relates to the pauper insane of the county of New York. This misuse of their franchise has been continuous for over forty years. It cannot, therefore, be called either accidental or unintentional.
Eleventh. It is also well settled that non-performance of a particular act required by the charter of a corporation, whether for the benefit of an individual or of the State, is, or may be, a cause of forfeiture, although not specially declared to be such by the charter itself. Att'y-Gen'l v. Petersburgh R. R. Co., 6 Ired. 456.
Twelfth. If the Bloomingdale Asylum be a private corporation, it can only be so by virtue of having been founded by private donations. The mere fact that the funds for building it were intrusted to a private corporation does not constitute it a private charity, since, as before shown, a corporation has capacity to act as trustee of a fund, and the private character of the Society of the New York Hospital cannot impart itself, by implication, to the State funds intrusted to it for public uses.
If, on the other hand, the Bloomingdale Asylum be a public charity, it can only be so by virtue of opening its doors to all classes of the insane, whether self-supporting or not, for "it is the extensiveness of a charity," says Lord Hardwicke (in Att'y-Gen'l v. Pearce, 2 Atk. 87), "which makes it public."
It is evident, therefore, that the State may direct the use to which its funds, invested in the Bloomingdale Asylum, shall in future be put, and, as its founder, it may also appoint its own visitors to that institution, because the power of appointing visitors to any corporation is always a prerogative right in its founder. Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raymond, 8; Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.
Upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, it was referred to the Attorney-General to determine
First. What duty the Corporation of the New York Hospital owe to the State in respect to making provision for the pauper insane of the county of New York;
Second. What legislation is necessary to enforce such duty; and,
Third. Whether the State has power to appoint, as founder of the Bloomingdale Asylum, a Board of Governors for its management.
DROIT D'AUBAINE AND THE CONDITION OF ALIENS IN FRANCE.
those lawyers who are students of comparative jurisprudence and institutions no apology is due for an inquiry into the condition of aliens in Francethe representative civil law country of Europe. But aside from all theoretical value, this subject has immediate claims upon the attention of the general legal practitioner. The interest of the American traveler and the American merchant in the private law of France is an actual interest, looking to the protection of their personal and proprietary rights.
One of the most certain symptoms of the progress of civilization is the more and more kindly protection which peoples have extended to foreigners; and between the period when all strangers were regarded as enemies and barbarians and our own day, the distance is immense, almost beyond our power of realization. The origin of this feeling of hatred and contempt for foreigners is to be found in primitive religious and political institutions, and its survivals in racic feeling and national bias deserve careful study. When Alexander the Great, in a celebrated edict, proclaimed that all honest men, of whatever country they might be, should be regarded as brothers, and that criminals alone were aliens, he was guilty of a noble anachronism,* for neither Grecian polity, nor Grecian ethics, was sufficiently enlightened to apply this humane principle. The chances of such an edict be
ing obeyed were somewhat better when Charlemagne, in the name of Christ, urged upon his subjects the exercise of a large hospitality toward travelers and immigrants.
At an early date, it is common learning, the Romans saw the necessity of allowing to the peregrini (aliens) who began to play an important part in the commercial and industrial life of the State, certain rights and privileges. They were not permitted to participate in the advantages accruing from the civil law (jus civile), and were debarred from all those rights which were peculiar to it. Their rights were governed by the jus peregrinorum jus gentium, law common to all nations, and the prætor peregriniis was chosen for its administration. As a result almost all forms of contracts originated and were developed in the jus gentium, as for instance, buying and selling (emptio et venditio), letting and hiring (locatio et conductio), partnership (societas), deposit (depositum), loan (mutuum), and others. Had these forms of contract been peculiar to the jus civile strangers could not have profited by them.
When the barbarians overran the Empire, the peregrini having obtained mastery, came to participate in the civil law, still preserving their personal laws by which their status was fixed. There was no longer any national point of view. Every one was regarded from the communal or tribal standpoint.
Mess. Malécot and Blin, in their Précis of Feudal and Customary Law, treating of the development of the law relative to the condition of strangers in France prior to the Revolution of '89, divide it into three main periods, the Frankish, the Feudal, and the Monarchical.
The first, or Frankish, is the tribal period. The principle of solidarity, or communal responsibility, was then universal, the solidarity of the members of the same family, of the inhabitants of the same city. This accounts for that rule of the Salic law which made the opposition of a single citizen, declared within a year, sufficient to prevent the permanent settlement of an alien within the city. Down to the time of Charlemagne, the prevailing principle had its origin in the communal organization of the people, each community protecting itself against emigrants from others.
When we reach the Feudal period the principle changes. It is no longer from the communal, but from the seigniorial standpoint that laws and institutions must be regarded. Every one born beyond the territorial limit of the seigniory was an alien. A man might be an alien both to the seigniory and to France, or being a Frenchman, alien to the seigniory alone. The latter, if belonging to the same diocese as the lord, was treated the same as an allodial proprietor; if belonging to a different diocese he was called a forain (non-resident, stroller), and allowed a year and a day in which to do homage and swear fealty. If he did this he became a regular dependent of his lord according to his anterior rank, either as noble (gentilhomme, vassal), or as mean (roturier, censistaire). In default of any such avowal the forain became the serf of the seigneur who acquired over him possession and seisin.
Aliens both to France and the seignory were known as aubains (foreign-born), and the difference between these and the forains were somewhat as follows: 1. Both alike might do homage, but while the homage of
the forain might not be refused without grave reasons, that of the aubain need be received only at the pleasure of the lord. 2. The forain who, in default of having done homage, had been reduced to serfage, might still make a will and dispose of his property upon condition of leaving to his lord a few pence in acknowledgment of his dependent condition. On the other hand the aubain, not permitted to do homage, having become a serf, lost all testamentary faculty.
We next reach the Monarchical period, and here we must begin to study institutions from the national point of view. The horizon has gradually widened from the commune to the feud, and from the feud to the nation. The emancipation of the communes had established new relations, and with a growing commerce change of residence became less difficult.
The Monarchical period may be divided naturally into two sub-periods. In the first the kings, claiming to be the patrons of the aubains, and exercising their patronage as an attribute of the crown, disputed with their nobles the exploitation of foreigners. In the second the kings, beyond all fear of competition or rivalry, ceased to play the roll of benevolent patrons, and appeared as exacting tyrants.
First period. During the 13th century, in those countries where the king was feudal seigneur, he received the homage of the aubains, not as seigneur, but as king, and in default of homage inherited their property. In the 14th century royalty, become bolder, no longer limited its claims to its own particular provinces, but spoke in the name of all France. Charles VI, in 1386, declared by letters patent that throughout France the crown alone had the right of succeeding to the goods of aubains. A hundred years later, say Malécot and Blin, the class of forains had disappeared, and the aubains were clients du roi, and no longer serfs of the seigneur. But it appears that anterior to Charles VI, and during the reign of Philip the Fair, the droit d'aubaine, as between different seigniories, had fallen into disuetude.
Second period. In the 14th century strangers in France had been declared capable of exercising all rights juris gentium (du droit des gens), such as those of acquisition and possession, but were still held incapable of performing any acts peculiar to the civil law (droit civil), such as those of inheritance, or transmission ab intestat, or by testament. It had been a principle of the Roman law, and laid down in the digests as we are reminded by Kent (Comm. I, 8), that a stranger passing from his own country to another became immediately a slave. Now, during that period of French law of which we are speaking, the maxim was that the foreigner was a freeman while alive, but died a slave, peregrinus vivit liber et servus moritur. The king was his heir absolutely, until the 16th century, when it was admitted that the succession of the aubain passed to his French heirs if there were any such. But the fiscal spirit soon turned back the tide of amelioration. The system of the Roman emperors was reproduced by the legists. Under the inspiration of the Roman jurisconsults, holding the faculty of transmission by succession or testament as essential to the civil law, they laid it down as legally a complimentary principle, that the king was in all cases whatever absolute owner of the goods of a deceased alien. Consequently, when any one was permitted to inherit the goods of an aubain, the king was reputed to have granted a license which he might revoke at will.
Hence there resulted for the alien, in respect of succession, three main incapacities:
1st. He could not acquire property or goods situated in France, either by succession, testament, or donatio causa mortis.
2d. He was incapable of making a will; and
3d. He could at the utmost only transmit his property to his legitimate descendauts, born or naturalized in France, and living there.
But the Revival of Learning, the Reformation, and all those varied agencies and indices of civilization which are best summed up in the single word Commerce, had been steadily modifying international relations in Europe. And national cupidity, or what, had it been more enlightened, might be called legitimate desire for national prosperity, played a leading part in modifying the rigors of private international law. Exemptions from the droit d'aubaine were accorded by Louis XI and Charles VIII to the province of Languedoc. Henry IV, Louis XIII and Louis XIV accorded like privileges in the interest of industry and manufactures, and to certain seaport towns; and it was because of such exemptions that Bordeau, Lyons, Marseilles and Dunkirk grew in wealth and prosperity. When the French government went about establishing the funds and a public credit, it saw clearly enough that they could not co-exist with the droit d'aubaine. Foreigners resorting to France for political, scientific or commercial purposes, had by this time been generally permitted to transmit their movables to their kinsmen, whoever they might be. Under Louis XV and Louis XVI numerous treaties were concluded with the European powers for a reciprocal abolition of the droit d'aubaine, or the right in the State to confiscate the property of a deceased foreigner to the exclusion of his heirs. But these treaties reserved to the King of France the right to the tenth or the twentieth of the estate of the deceased, which reservation was known as the droit de détraction. So far as the subjects of Great Britain were concerned, Louis XVI in 1787 abolished the droit d'aubaine without reservation or reciprocity, notwithstanding the rigor of the English law, according to which an alien could not acquire or hold immovable property. Prior to this, by the treaty of amity and peace of 1778, it was provided that the subjects of the United States should not be reputed aubains in France, and should be exempted from the droit d'aubaine or other similar duty under any name whatever, and might by testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their goods, movable and immovable, to whomsoever they willed, and that their heirs might succeed ab intestat without naturalization.
Such was the state of the law relative to the transmission and acquisition of property by aliens down to the end of the period of the Ancient Law, by which term French lawyers designate all law prior to the Revolution of '89. Independent of the incapacities that have been already spoken of an alien could not be a tuteur (stand in loco parentis), witness a solemnity (un acts solennel), or take the benefit of an insolvent assignment. He could claim no rights by prescription. His right to come into the French courts was limited; and he could only appear as plaintiff upon giving security for costs (judication solvi). He was subject to bodily constraint in civil cases, and was deprived of all political rights. To briefly sum up, he possessed all the rights warranted by the law common
to all nations, and no more. Thus at the conclusion of the period of the Ancient Law the condition of the aubain (alien) was almost exactly similar to that of the peregrinus at Rome after the development of the jus gentium, and but slightly more advantageous. To attain to full legal capacity an alien had to become naturalized, that is, had to acquire the qualité de francais. And the inverse of this latter principle was, that he who had lost the qualité de francais, no matter what his prior condition, was incapacitated to exactly the same extent as an alien.
In France the ancient and the modern law are separated by an interval of revolutionary legislation, the law of which time is called by French writers the Droit inter mediaire. In 1790 and '91, the Constituent Assembly felt that the laws in respect of the treatment of aliens, like almost every other institution in France, were much in need of reform. Had not Montesquieu called them droits insensis and the philosophers characterized them as droits barbares? They remembered the words of Le Trône upon provincial administration: "Has it not in general been to your advantage that strangers should come among you, that they should bring you their wealth, their industry, become consumers, and augment the number of your subjects? When a desire has been felt to especially favor some particular institution, such as the markets of Lyons,
or some privileged manufacture, and to attract strang- PROC
ers, a commencement has always been made by re-
The Constituent Assembly, apart from all questions of administrative utility, believed it to be its destiny to realize the dream of the fraternity of nations. This was its decree: "The National Assembly, considering that the droit d'aubaine is contrary to the principles of fraternity, which ought to bind all men, whatever their country or their form of government; that that law, established in times of barbarism, should be proscribed among a people which has founded its Constitution upon the rights of man, and of the citizen, and that France liberated ought to open its bosom to all the peoples of the earth, by inviting them to enjoy, under its free government, the sacred and inalienable rights of humanity, has decreed and doth decree as follows: The droit d'aubaine and the right of detraction are abolished forever." The Assembly hoped, as Mourlon says, that all other nations, abjuring, as it had done, all national egoism, would with an equal liberality permit the French to enjoy among them "the sacred and inviolable rights of humanity." But in place of a general fraternity their overtures were only met with the most extreme illiberality, and the barriers between nations were not broken down.
The abolition of the droit d'aubaine gave to aliens in France the right of transmission ab intestat or by testament, and the right to recover property left by alien ancestors in France, but it did not give them the
power of succession to the property of their French ancestors. This last concession was made, however, by the law of 1791 and by the Constitution. Such was the law when the compilers of the Code, unwilling longer to permit France to be the victim of her too hasty and too generous action, designed a system of reciprocity such as that which in certain instances had made its advantages felt during the latter days of the monarchy. And we here touch the Modern Law and the more immediately practical part of our study.
EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE STATES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NEW JERSEY,
IN THE MATTER OF NOYES.
A fugitive from justice extradited under the act of Congress from one State of the Union on the charge of the commission of a specific crime, can be held by the courts of the State to which he is surrendered for trial for another and a different crime.
When such a fugitive has been surrendered without legal authority, he can be detained for it by the authorities of the State to which he is surrendered.
ROCEEDINGS by habeas corpus to secure the release of the petitioner. The facts appear in the opinion.
NIXON, J. I am quite clear that the facts presented by the return and testimony in this case preclude the court from discharging the prisoner on these proceedings, whatever may be the opinion of the court in regard to the methods adopted by the agents of the State to obtain the possession of the body of the petitioner, and I should be sorry to say or do any thing which might be construed into disapproval of such methods and proceedings. It, nevertheless, appears affirmatively that the prisoner is detained by the legal authority of the State to answer certain alleged violations of the criminal laws of New Jersey. The case falls within the provisions of section 753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which restricts the writ of habeas corpus to a case, where a prisoner in jail is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States * *
or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.
It appears in the petition, return and evidence that the prisoner was brought into the State of New Jersey, from the District of Columbia, by persons claiming to act under the Constitution and laws of the United States in regard to the extradition of fugitives from justice.
The second section of Article IV of the Constitution provides that a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or any other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State whence he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.
The act of Congress of February 12th, 1793 (§ 5278 of
Rev. Stat. of U. S.), was passed to provide the machinery to carry into effect this provision, and it is thereon made the duty of the executive of the State or Territory, to which a person charged with crime, generally designated in the Constitution, has fled, upon lawful demand, to cause the fugitive to be arrested and surrendered up.
The alleged fugitive in the present case being in the District of Columbia, the demand was made upon the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, under section 843 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, wherein that officer is directed to deliver up fugitives from justice in the same manner as the executive authorities of the several States are required to do, under the extradition act.
The demand of Governor McClellan upon Chief Justice Carter was dated March 11th, 1878, and was based upon the allegation that the prisoner stood charged with the crime of perjury, committed in the county of Essex, State of New Jersey, that he had fled from the justice of said State, and had taken refuge within the District of Columbia.
It is requested that the petitioner be delivered up to Robert Lang and Andrew J. McManus, who were authorized to receive and convey him to the State of New Jersey, there to be dealt with according to law.
The grounds alleged in the petition for the discharge of the petitioner were that he was a citizen of Connecticut, residing at New Haven, in said State; and in the latter part of February last he left his home for the purpose of attending to certain business in the city of Washington in relation to the legislation pending before the Congress of the United States, and under consideration by a committee of the Senate; that he passed openly in the daytime through the State of New Jersey, took rooms at a hotel in the city of Washington, where he remained from day to day in the open and public pursuit of the business objects for which his presence was required at the capital, and attended from time to time before the Senate committee, and held conferences with different members of Congress, concerning business which he had in hand; that he was thus engaged on the 11th day of March last, and in the evening of that day had retired to his bed as usual, when, at about midnight, he was awakened and disturbed by the entrance of three men into his room, who informed him that they had authority to arrest him and take him to the State of New Jersey, which they did. *
That the indictments which formed the basis of such extradition proceedings do not charge any crime under any statute or at common law, and that, therefore, the arrest in the manner aforesaid was illegal, and a violation of the rights of the petitioner as a citizen of the United States.
If the return had been made to the writ of habeas corpus in this case, that the warden annexed to the writ, issued for the prisoner on his application to the Supreme Court of the State to be admitted to bail, to wit that he was held in custody only by virtue of the commitment issued by the Governor to the keeper of the jail of the county of Essex, the sole question presented would be, whether it was competent for this court to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Governor of New Jersey and the Chief Justice of the District of Columbia acted, in making the requisition by the one and the order for the rendition by the other.
But the return, as amended, set forth the exist
ence of new facts, which had arisen since the writ was allowed.
It not only averred that the prisoner had been delivered into his custody by virtue of the writ of commitment, issued by Governor McClellan, of New Jersey, but also that he was held (1) by writs of capias from the Court of Oyer and Terminer in and for the county of Essex for the term of April, 1877, and the term of April, 1878; (2) by virtue of orders of said court remanding him to his custody for trial upon the indictments to which he had hitherto pleaded, the tenors of which were annexed, and which were the cause of his detention.
The writ of habeas corpus was tested and allowed April 16, 1878. It appears by the copies of the papers annexed to the return, that on the 19th day of April the Court of Oyer and Terminer, of the county of Essex, caused the prisoner to be placed at the bar to be charged on the indictments for perjury, upon which the requisition had been made, and, on his plea of not guilty, the court had remanded him to the custody of the warden of the jail for trial upon the 8th of May, upon the indictments to which he had before pleaded; that on the 26th of April he was again set to the bar of the court, to be charged upon another indictment for conspiracy, and, upon his plea of not guilty, the court had again remanded him to the same custody and control, to be held for trial.
The traverse to the return substantially admits the truth of these allegations, but it seeks to break their force by claiming that if the arrest of the petitioner, by means of which he was brought within the jurisdiction of this State, was unlawful, he is entitled to his discharge from custody, and return to his home, notwithstanding he was charged upon other indictments and has been ordered to be held for trial since the service of the writ of habeas corpus.
We are thus brought to the consideration of the naked questions: (1) Whether a fugitive from justice extradited from one State of the Union to another on the charge of the commission of a specific crime can be held by the courts of the State to which he is sent for trial, for another and different crime? And (2) whether such persons may be detained by the authorities of the State for prosecution notwithstanding it may appear that his arrest under the rendition proceedings was without legal authority?
If these inquiries are answered in the affirmative; if the State court, without regard to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the methods adopted to obtain the custody of the body of the prisoner, may detain him for trial upon the same or other indictments charging him with offenses against the criminal laws of the State, he has no claim upon this court for a discharge on the ground that his rights as a citizen were violated by the parties who secured his person in a foreign jurisdiction other than by due process of law.
Questions were discussed in the argument which may properly arise between governments, as to the construction of the extradition treaties or between individuals, as to responsibility for the invasion of personal rights, but which, in my judgment, are not involved in the present inquiry.
It may be true that where a treaty exists between two independent nations in regard to the surrender of fugitives, or a criminal is given up on the allegation that he had committed a specified crime, good faith between the governments requires that he should not be tried for other offenses.