Gambar halaman

dated would not be ground to set aside a conviction liable for loss occasioned by the use of kerosene oil as for obtaining goods under false pretenses. Judgment a light in any baru or outbuilding. Held, to refer to a below affirmed. Lesser v. People. Opinion by Ra- single use of kerosene on any occasion, aud not an pallo, J.

habitual use. Held, also, that the fire causing the loss [Decided March 19, 1878. Rer rted below, 12 Hun, must be occasioned by kerosene, and if a lamp fed by 668.]

kerosene should set fire when one fed by another DAMAGES.

lighting material would have done the same, the conMeasure of, in contract to pay in specified bonds : when

dition would not exempt the company from loss. judgment for face value of bonds not allowable.-By a

Held, further, that the use of kerosene by any memcontract between defendant C., and plaintiff and S.,

ber of the household of insured lawfully in the barus C. was to pay plaintiff and S. $50,000 in cash and $50,

was provided against, and not alone its use by him 000 in Northern Pacific bonds. Plaintiff and S. per

personally. Judgment below reversed. Matson v. formed the contract on their part. The cash was paid,

Farm Building Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Rapallo, J. but each claimed the entire amount of the bonds, and

[Decided April 16, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 415.] demanded them of C., and each one forbade him to pay any of the bonds to the other. Plaintiff then

JURISDICTION. brought this action against S. and defendant, asking for an accounting with S., and that plaintiff pay $50,

1. General appearance by non-resident defendant gives 000 in money or deliver the amount in bonds to a re- personal jurisdiction.- Where a non-resident defendceiver to be appointed, and be forbidden from paying

ant makes a general appearance in an action comany part of them to S. The complaint did not state

menced in a court of this State, by attachment, the any value to the bonds, or set up any claim for dam

court acquires jurisdiction of his person, and this is ages for the non-delivery of the bonds. A reference

not affected by the fact that he appears because his was had, and it was determined that plaintiff and S.

right to the attached property is imperiled by the were each entitled to one-half of the bonds. Held,

proceedings. Judgment of General Term reversed, that a judgment in the action against C. for the nom

and judgment on verdict ordered. Olcott v. McLean. inal value of the bonds in money was erroneous. Judg- Opinion per Curiam. ment below reversed. Wintermute v. Cooke. Opinion

2. Alienage not defense to violation of bankrupt law. by Rapallo, J.

- Alienage and non-residence do not relieve a de[Decided March 19, 1878.]

fendant from liability, under the provisions of the

bankrupt act, to account for property transferred to FIRE INSURANCE.

him by the bankrupt in fraud of that act. When an 1. Conditions in policy: occupution of buildings : saw- alien comes here and violates the bankrupt law he mill.-In a policy of insurance upon a saw-mill op- subjects himself and his property, if found here, to erated by water was a condition that if the premises the remedies given by the law, and alienage gives no should become “vacant and unoccupied” the policy immunity. Ib. should be void. Held, that the meaning of the condi- [Decided April 2, 1878. Reported below, 11 Hun, 394.) tion would be affected by the nature of the property

SLANDER. insured, and in this case a temporary interruption in the business of the mill caused by breaking of the ma- Evidence in: circumstances in mitigation must be chinery, low water or lack of custom, would not be in pleaded. - In actions for slander, circumstances in violation of such condition. Accordingly, when, for mitigation must be set up in the answer in order to sixteen days previous to the destruction of the mill by be admissible in evidence. Accordingly, when defire, which was in the month of May, there had been fendant in such an action was asked, when testifying po sawing done, but lumber was sold from the yard in her own behalf, if, during the conversations in during that time, and logs were at the mill ready to be which it was claimed that the slanderous words were Bawed, and nothing appeared to show that the owner uttered, certain statements were made in respect to of the mill intended to discontinue its use, held, that improper relations between plaintiff and defendant's the mill was not vacant or unoccupied within the husband, held, that if this was offered in mitigation of meaning of the policy. Judgment below affirmed. damages, it should have been pleaded. Judgment beWhitney V. Black River Ins. Co. Opinion by An- low affirmed. Willover v. Hill. Opinion by Rapallo, drews, J.

J. [Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 37.] [Decided January 15, 1878.]

2. Increase of risk: condition as to, applies only to future acts. — The policy contained a condition avoiding it if the insured premises “ shall be occupied or

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. used so as to increase the risk,” without the consent CIVIL DAMAGE LAW: WIFE CANNOT RECOVER UNof the company. Held, that this only prohibited a LESS ACTUALLY DAMAGED: STATUTORY CONSTRUCnew and different use of the property from that to TION: EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. - Threats and vulgarity which it was applied at the time the policy was issued directed by the husband to the wife, unaccompanied by which the risk would be increased, and the circum- by physical injury, will not entitle her to recover stance that the risk to the mill was greater by the use either actual or exemplary damages under the Iowa of a planer, which was in it unknown to the company, statute authorizing the wife to recover for injury to would not be a violation of the condition in the ab- her person caused by the sale of intoxicating liquor to sence of fraud and misrepresentation. Ib.

her husband. The words “in person," as used in that [Decided January 15, 1878.]

statute, mean in body, and hence threatening language 3. Conditions in policy: use of kerosene: single and or vulgar conduct not resulting in the impairment of general use: use by others than insured. A fire insur- her health does not constitute a ground for the reance policy provided that the company should not be covery of actual damages. There can be no exemplary

damages when there are no actual damages. Sup. Ct., into a higher grade he may take up such branches as luwa, December, 1877. Calloway v. Layton (West. he has carried satisfactorily in the lower grade, Jurist).

although he may have failed in others; but he cannot

take up studies in which he failed to pass. Sup. Ct., CRIMINAL LAW: ENTERING NOLLE PROSEQUI DOES

Illinois, January 22, 1877. People v. Van Allen (West. NOT BAR SECOND INDICTMENT.- A prisoner, under

Jur.). indictment for murder, pleaded in bar a former arrest and indictment for the same offense and discharge STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: PROMISE BY PARTNER OF under the statute after remaining uutried for two DISSOLVED FIRM DOES NOT BIND FIRM.-A promise by terms of court. The record showed that soon after a member of a late copartnership, made after dissoluthe second term of court, held subsequent to the tion and before a suit is barred by the statute of prisoner's commitment, had expired, a nolle prosequi limitations, to pay a partnership debt, will not prewas entered in his case and on motion he was dis- vent the running of the statute so as to estop the other charged. Held (affirming the judgment of the court partner from availing himself of the defense of the below), that the record did not show a discharge under statute as against the original cause of action; and the two term provision of the statute, and the entry this, whether the creditor was aware of the dissolution of the nolle prosequi was not a bar to the second indict- or not. Nor does an admission by one partner, after ment. Per Woodward, J. At common law a nolle pros- dissolution, that a debt is due, bind the other late equi may at any time be retracted, and it not only is no partner so as to take the case out of the statute as to bar to a subsequent prosecution on another indict- the latter. A member of a copartnership, after the ment, but may be so far canceled as to permit a dissolution, has no agency growing out of the former revival of proceedings on the original bill. Sup. Ct., partnership relation to create or to perpetuate a liaPennsylvania, October 2, 1877. Hester v. Common- bility of his late copartners for partnership indebtedwealth (W. Not. Cas.).

ness, as against the operation of the statute of limita

tions. Sup. Ct., Florida, January Term, 1878. Tale DAMAGES: WHAT ARE NOT TOO REMOTE.- In a suit

v. Clements. against a railroad company for loss by fire, alleged to have been occasioned by sparks from its engine, the

STATUTE OF FRAUDS: ASSUMPTION IN PURSUANCE damages are not too remote to authorize the plaintiff

OF AN ACT OF ASSEMBLY OF A STATUTORY LIABILITY to recover where the fire that did the injury origi

OF ANOTHER, NOT WITHIN: CONTRACT: CONSIDERAnated in an adjoining field and spread from that to

TION.–The O. and P. Railroad Co, entered into an plaintiff's. Ct. of App., Texas, January 19, 1878.

agreement to pay the plaintiff an annuity of $160, in Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. McDonough (Texas L. J.).

composition for the loss of her husband's life, caused PROMISSORY NOTES: INDORSEMENT: NOTICE OF PRO

by an accident on the said railroad. The O. and P. TEST.- Where a banker makes use of the public mail

Railroad Co. was afterward merged in the P. Railin forwarding a note for collection, and, through its

road Co. By a special act of Assembly, approved interference or neglect, the letter containing the note

March 31st, 1860, it was provided that in case the P. is not delivered to the receiving bank, it does not ex

Railroad should be sold under certain mortgages, the cuse the indorser, even though the interference was

purchasers should become a body corporate, with caused by the postmaster's knowledge that the receiv

power to assume the debts of the P. Railroad, aud ing bank had failed, and the postmaster believed he

issue stock for the payment of the same. The P. was doing the forwarding bank a favor by returning Railroad was sold under certain mortgages, and was the letter. Although a bank fails pending the for

afterward transferred to the P. Railway Co., a corwarding of a letter containing a note, it is fair to pre

poration formed in pursuance of the act of 31st March, sume that its business, in the way of presenting notes

1860. In an action by the plaintiff against this latter for payment, will continue, and the failure of such company for the payment of her annuity, held (rebank, although causing some fifteen days' delay in versing the judgment of the court below), that the the presenting of a note, does not release the indorser.

question whether the P. Railway Co. assumed the Sup. Ct., Missouri, October, 1877. Pier v. Heinrich- liability of the O. and P. Railroad, under its agreeshofen (Cent. L. J.).

ment to pay the plaintiff an annuity, was one of fact,

aud ought to have been submitted to the jury. Held, REMOVAL OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURT.- Under further, that the Statute of Frauds did not apply to the act of Congress of 1875, a cause in equity, brought

this case. Held, further, that there was a sufficient conby a complainant, who is a citizen of Virginia, against

sideration to support an assumption of this debt by defendants, all of whom reside in Georgia except one,

the new company; in fact, that this was a statutory who was a member of a Georgia firm but now lives in liability of the O. and P. Railroad. Sup. Ct., PenuNew York, will be removed from the Superior Court sylvania, November 12, 1877. Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. of Georgia to the Circuit Court of the United States Ry. Co. v. Stokes (W. Not. Cas.). for the Southern District of Georgia, on petition and

WAREHOUSE RECEIPT: ON SAME FOOTING AS BILL affidavit in due form, although the defendants may set up certain equities among themselves by cross bill or

OF LADING.–The possession of a warehouse receipt,

even though indorsed in blauk, is presumptive eviother proceedings, the application for removal having

dence of ownership of property named therein; hence been made at the first term of the Superior Court to

it is negotiable and passes title by indorsement same which the bill was returnable. Sup. Ct., Georgia,

as a bill of lading. But notice given by owner that March 5, 1878. Tarver v. Ficklin.

the holder of receipt was only agent for sale of the SCHOOLS: RIGHT OF PUPIL TO SELECT STUDIES AT property, would retain ownership. Sup. Ct., CaliPUBLIC SCHOOL.-A pupil in a public school has a right foruia, March 21, 1878. Davis v. Russell (California to eleot which studies he will take, and when passed Leg. Rec.).


COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. HE following decisions were passed down Tuesday,

April 16, 1878: Judgment affirmed with costs — Meyer v. Lathrop; The Trustees of St. Jacob's Lutheran churo v. Bly; Madan v. Sherrard; White's Bank of Buffalo v. Myles; Eleventh Ward Savings Bank v. Koehler; Odell v. Hoyt; Lynch v. McNally; Griffith v. Mangam. Order affirmed with costs – Roberts v. White.Order granting new trial affirmed, and judgment absolute for plaintiff on stipulation with costs – Krekeler v. Thaule. — Appeal dismissed with costs – Kennedy v. Kennedy; Cochran's executor v. Ingersoll — Motion denied with $10 costs Davis v. Toulmin.Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event-Black River Insurance Company v. New York State Loan and Trust Company; Beers v. Shannon; Matson v. Farm Building Insurance Company; Gildersleeve v. Landon; Hill v. Syracuse, etc., Railroad Co., Jenkins v. Fahey; Kennedy v. The Mayor, eto. — Order granting new trial reversed and judg. ment on report of referee affirmed, with costs-Comstock v. Hier.-Judgment reversed, and judgment for plaintiff on demurrer, with leave to defendants to answer, costs to abide event of the action-Guest v. City of Brooklyn and Whitney.-Order of General Term modified, and judgment ordered for plaintiff upon the verdict, with costs, unless the defendant, within thirty days after notice of filing the remittitur, cancels and returns the notes in suit to the plaintiff and pays the plaintiff's costs, in which case the complaint is dismissed–Thayer v. Manley.

useful, in fact almost indispensable to guard him against mistake as to the authority of reported decisions. The value of such a work entirely depends upon the thoroughness and accuracy with which it is prepared. This book, so far as we are able to judge, is carefully done. The labor of preparation must have been considerable, the editor having examined more than seven thousand three hundred cases and noted whether the case under examination was overruled, doubted, explained or limited. To Connecticut lawyers the volume will be a necessity, and to those of other States having occasion to examine Connecticut law it will prove a great assistance.

GIFFARD ON THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. Summary and Tutelary Jurisdiction of Magistrates under

11 and 12 Vict., c. 43, and appeal from the decisions of justices. By H. Stanley Giffard, of The Inner Temple, Barrister at Law, London : Reeves & Turner, 1878. This work is a carefully prepared treatise on the summary jurisdiction of magistrates in England. While it must be a very convenient book for the English practitioner it will be found of but little use to most of the profession on this side of the water. The practice as well as the law administered is very largely statutory, and the statutes are so many of them unlike those in force here that the remarks made thereon and explanations given can be of but little help to us. A criminal lawyer with an extensive business might, however, find the book sometimes useful, and to such we would recommend it.



of a

Reports of cases determined in the Supreme Court of the State

of Nevada, during the year 1877. Reported by Chas. F.
Bicknell, clerk of the Supreme Court, and Hon. Thomas
P. Hawley, Chief Justice. Volume XII. San Francisco:
A. L. Bancroft & Co., 1878.

of cases of general value, among which we notice the following: State v. Thompson, p. 140. Temporary insanity produced by intoxication does not destroy responsibility so as to excuse a party who has committed homicide, if he, when sane, made himself voluntarily intoxicated. Ex parte Robinson, p. 263. An act of the State legislature taxing commercial travelers held to be constitutional. State v. Crozier, p. 300. When any part of a statute is declared unconstitutional such part is regarded as having never at any time been possessed of any legal force. State v. Cowell, p. 337. In order to constitute the crime of burglary it is just as essential to prove the intent as to prove the entry. Courtney v. Turner, p. 345. An alien will be protected in the possession of the public lands, the same as a citizen, against mere naked trespassers who do not connect themselves with the government title. The reporting is carefully done and the book is well printed and bound.

E. DELAFIELD SMITH. E. Delafield Smith, a well-known member of tho New York bar, died on the 12th inst., at Shrewsbury, N. J., aged 52 years. He was for some years district attorney of New York, and afterward corporation counsel. He edited the well-known Reports of the New York Court of Common Pleas, in four volumes bearing his name.

GEORGE TYLER BIGELOW. George Tyler Bigelow, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and a jurist of eminence, died on the 12th inst., at his residence in Bogton, at the age of 68. Mr. Bigelow was born in 1810, at Watertown, Mass., and was educated at the Boston Latin School and subsequently at Harvard College.


NOTES. ESSRS. Little, Brown & Co. have issued a Cata

logue of Law Books, published or for sale by them, which is in some respecte a model catalogue, and is in every respect worthy of a place on every lawyer's table. It contains an Index of Subjects, the full titles of law books with dates and places of publication, list of American Reports, abbreviations used in referring to American law reports, lists of English, Scotch, Irish and Colonial reports and explanations of abbreviations used in reference to them.

SHARSWOOD'S TABLE OF CONNECTICUT CASES. Judge Peck of the Court of Claims has resigned. A table of cases in the reports of the State of Connecticut The prominent candidates for the place are ex-Con

which have been cited, erplained, limited, doubted or overruled in subsequent decisions. By George Sharswood, Jr.,

gressman Paine of Wisconsin, Kenneth Raynor, of the bar of New London county. Philadelphia : T. solicitor of the treasury, and Judge Hunt, of Louis& J. W. Johnson & Co., 1878.

iana, candidate for Attorney-General on the Packard This is one of those works which every one who ticket. It is said that Judge Hunt will probably has occasion to examine case law finds exceedingly I receive the appointment.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALL communications intended for publication in the

accused." The conclusion of the court is in acLAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the cordance with the views so ably maintained in this name of the writer should be given, though not necessa

Journal by Dr. Spear, and establishes the only safe rily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be ad- rule, and one which we believe was accepted by dressed to the publishers.

most persons, until doubt was thrown thereon by the decisions in Caldwell's Case, 8 Blatchf. 131; United States v. Lawrence, 13 id, 295; and Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110.

The question whether a municipal corporation, ALBANY, APRIL 27, 1878.

having authority from the State in which it is situ

ated to impose taxes upon real and personal property CURRENT TOPICS.

within its limits, may tax a debt owed by it as The case of Commonwealth v. Hares, decided by the property and deduct the amount of the tax from Kentucky Court of Appeals on the 17th inst., tled in the negative by the Supreme Court of the

the interest it has agreed to pay, has just been setand reported in our present issue, is a very impor- United States in Murray v. City Council of Charlestant one upon the question of the right of the

ton and another case, appearing in our present numcourts of this country to try a person who has been surrendered under the extradition treaty with Great of the Federal Constitution forbidding States to

ber. The court in its opinion says that the provision Britain, for an offense different from the one for which he was surrendered, and not included in the list pass laws impairing the obligations of a contract is a

limitation upon the power of taxation, as well as of offenses for which a surrender is to be made. One

upon other legislation. "A change of the expressed Hawes was indicted in one of the Kentucky courts stipulations of a contract, or a relief of a debtor for embezzlement and also for forgery. At the time he resided in the Dominion of Canada and his ments, can no more be effected by the exertion of

from strict and literal compliance with its requiresurrender was demanded upon the charge of forgery, the taxing power than it can be by the exertion of and he was given up and brought to trial. He was


other acquitted on the charge of forgery, and the prosecuting tion to change the expressed stipulations of con

power of a State legislature.” A disposiattorney then moved his trial for embezzlement, but

tracts by means of an exercise of the taxing power the trial court held that this could not be done without first allowing the defendant an opportunity bodies, notably in a bill now pending in the legisla-.

is very frequently manifested by State legislative to return to Canada. The 10th article of the treaty ture of this State designed to shift the burden of mentioned provides for the delivery up for trial of

taxation from mortgaged real estate to the holders persons who may be charged with any one of cer

of mortgages thereon. In reference to this kind of tain enumerated offenses, among which is forgery but not embezzlement. The Court of Appeals sus

legislation, the Supreme Court says: “It may then tains the decision of the trial court, saying that the safely be affirmed that no State, by virtue of its taxright of one government to demand and receive from ing power, can say to a debtor ‘You need not pay to another the custody of an offender, who has sought your creditor all of what you have promised him, an asylum upon its soil, depends upon the existence you may satisfy your duty to him by retaining a part

for yourself, or for some municipality or for the State of treaty stipulations between such governments, and in all cases is derived from and is measured and treasury.'” In the imposition of taxes the State must restricted by the provisions, express and implied, of

deal with the owner of the property and collect its

taxes from him and it cannot permit or require a the treaty. That the view taken by the court as to

debtor to assume the duty of paying the taxes of his the meaning of the extradition treaty was the one which prevailed when such treaty was entered into creditor out of the money he has agreed to pay such

creditor. The court does not enter into the is indicated by the legislative enactments in both England and the United States, made for the pur- question whether a State cap tax a debt due by one

of its citizens to a non-resident creditor, but it expose of effectively carrying out that and other like treaties. An act of Parliament passed in 1843, re

presses itself emphatically against all legislation

which under the guise of an exercise of the taxing ferring to this treaty, directed that persons should be delivered up thereunder to be conveyed “ to the power attempts to relieve debtors from their con

tract obligations. United States to be tried for the crime of which such person shall be accused;" and an act of Congress A bill designed to render possible the collection passed in 1848, provides for the surrender of per- of debts due from defaulting States to citizens of sons demanded under the extradition treaties with this State has been introduced in the Senate. various countries, and declares the purpose of the As a State cannot be sued in the Federal courts by surrender to be that the alleged offender may “be a private person, and many of the States make no tried for the crime of which such person may be provision for the enforcement of claims against

VOL. 17. - No. 17.



It re

them in their own courts, when one of these or- 48, to concur in the Senate's resolution for the ganizations sees fit to repudiate its obligations, those appointment of a Joint Committee to consider the to whom it is bound can do nothing but submit to question of Code Revision. A motion to reconsider the wrong. Usually where a State is guilty of this

was tabled and it is not unlikely the matter may dishonesty, its creditors are for the most part non-resi- come up again; but whether or not a different dent there, and very generally residents of our own result be reached, the vote shows very clearly that State. A State, however, can maintain an action the Governor's veto of the nine chapters will be against another State in the Federal Supreme Court, sustained by the Assembly. We are to repeat the and the object of the bill mentioned is to authorize folly of 1849 and have but a fragmentary Code. A the transfer to this State of debts due to its citi- numerously signed petition has been prepared, askzens from other States, and the institution of suits ing that a committee be appointed to revise the thereon in the Supreme Court in the name of the Codes reported by the former Code and Practice State against the debtor. The plan proposed is cer- Commissions and that such Codes, as so amended, tainly an ingenious one, but the idea of the State be adopted. The petition contains the names of going into the business of collecting bad debts will, sume ten or eleven judges. we think, hardly meet with general approval. It is said that there is a possibility that the repeal

NOTES OF CASES. of the bankrupt law may be defeated in the House.

N interesting question, under the law of set-off, The judiciary committee of the House to which the Senate bill was referred, was understood to be in Of New Amst. Sav. Bank v. Tartter, 54 How. 385, defavor of reporting that bill without amendment, but cided by Mr. Justice Westbrook. On the 5th of it is now stated that this course will not be taken. July, 1875, Tartter borrowed of the New AmsterThere is a very great pressure for the

passage of the Senate bill from the mercantile and other inter- he executed his bond and mortgage. On the 20th

dam Savings Bank five thousand dollars, for which ests of the country, one petition alone from the city of September, 1876, the bank became insolvent, and of New York containing more than a thousand names

a receiver was appointed. At that time Tartter had of merchants and prominent business men. mains to be seen whether the small but active and that he was entitled to set off his deposit against the

on deposit in the bank $1,748.01. The court held persistent body of individuals who make profit by amount of the bond and mortgage. The court the continuance of the bankrupt law can perpetuate distinguished the case from those of Holbrook v. its existence in defiance of the wishes of a great Receiver of Am. Fire Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 620,

and majority of the people of the country.

Lawrence v. Nelson, 21 N. Y. 158. In the first of The London Lancet is publishing some interesting the cases cited a debt due from two persons jointly contributions upon surgical evidence in courts of to an insolvent corporation was held not subject to law, written by a certain Mr. Erichsen. The writer the set-off of a claim due from the corporation to reaches the not very satisfactory conclusion that one of them alone. In the last cited case, the juries cannot be made to understand the meaning of debtor, a member of

mutual insurance company, medical witnesses. The use of medical terms is nec- asked to set off the amount due on adjusted loss essary to convey the exact truth, but these are intel-due him on a policy of the company, against premiligible to medical men only and incomprehensible to

ums owed by him to the company. This was not courts and juries. He suggests that what he names allowed, the court holding that in this way the accident cases be tried before juries composed of debtor would have an advantage over other memsurgeons. We are confident the writer underesti-bers of the company who must pay their premiums mates the comprehension of the average jury. There in full. The decision in the principal case is in may indeed be cases where the exact idea of a wit-direct conflict with that in Osborn v. Byrne, 43 Conn. ness who uses without explanation technical terms 151; 21 Am. Rep. 641, where it is held that, upon may be lost, but in most instances physicians inter- the insolvency of a savings bank, a depositor cannot sperse enough English through their testimony to set off his deposit against a debt due from him to enable a man of ordinary intelligence to understand the bank. The ground taken in the latter case is what they mean. Then most of the terms used are that a savings bank is the agent for the depositor, capable of translation and can be explained; in- and, if it loses his money by unfortunate business deed, in very many instances there is no need of transactions, he must bear the loss, and not the using them at all, and they would not be used if bank. Set-off against banks other than savings witnesses did not wish to impress the jury and court banks has been allowed in numerous cases, but not with a high notion of their learning and skill.

on all demands. The proceeds of a discounted

note on deposit in the bank which discounted it On Wednesday, after a protracted and heated have been allowed against the note, but not a check debate, the Assembly refused, by a vote of 52 to drawn by another depositor. Butterworth v. Peck,

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