quarters in houses where persons have lately departed this life through the assistance of these diseases. To such particular persons it may be a comforting reflection to know that Lord Abinger thought that if a new tenant found that the old one had left because some one had recently died in the lodgings of the plague or scarlet fever, the incomer might legally retire (Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5); and that in Massachusetts a man who caught small pox, through no fault of his own, but because the owner of the house willfully neglected to inform him that the rooms were infected with that disease, might recover damages from the landlord (Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477), always provided, we suppose, that he recovered from the smallpox in the first place.

Chairs and tables in furnished apartments are ofttimes weak in the legs (owing to their long standing); it is well, therefore, to know that an occupier of such places is not responsible for deterioration by ordinary wear and tear in the reasonable use of the goods by the landlord. Add. on Cont. 377.

If a lodger sports a brass plate, bearing his patronymic, on the front door, the landlord is not at liberty to take it off. A Dr. Lane hired certain rooms from one Johnson, with the privilege of putting up his plate on the door; Johnson shortly after leased the whole premises to one Dixon for twenty-one years. The health of the community being good, the doctor got behind in his rent; 80 Dixon removed the plate and refused him access to his rooms; in fact, he actually fastened the outer door against the doctor. The medico sued for damages, and the jury gave him £10 for the breaking and entering his rooms, expelling him therefrom and seizing his et ceteras, and £20 for the removal of the plate. Dixon was dissatisfied with the verdict, and appealed to the court, but the judges sustained the finding, considering the removal of the plate a distinct and substantial trespass. Lane v. Dixon, 3 M. G. & S. 776.

A different decision was arrived at in Hartley v. Bloxham, 3 Q. B. 701, where the defendant, claiming that money was due him by the plaintiff, his lodger, locked up the defaulter's goods in the room, pocketed the key, and refused poor Hartley access to them until the bill was paid; it was held that there was no trespass. But in this latter case the landlord never actually touched the goods, he only locked up the door and kept the key. Where a landlord, before his boarder's time was up, contrary to his wishes, entered his room, and removed therefrom books, maps and papers, placing them where they were damaged by the rain, the court decided that he was a trespasser, and made him pay for all the injuries sustained, both that arising from the direct and immediate act, and that happening remotely from the act of God. Nowlan v. Trevor, 2 Sweeny (N. Y.), 67.

And now we think that we have given the amiable persons mentioned in the beginning of this article as much advice as they can stand at present; if they need further information let them apply to some practitioner near at hand and pay for it. All we would now say is, "Do not go to law with your landlord," for, as Mr. Owen Feltham wrote in 1670, "To go to law is for two to contrive the kindling of a fire to their own cost. to warm others, and singe themselves to cinders."

R. VASHON RODGERS, JR., in the Canada Law Journal.

CONTROL OF RECEIVERS.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, JUNE TERM, 1877.

SAFFORD V. THE PEOPLE.*

1. INJUNCTION BY STATE COURT — receiver appointed by Federal court. Where an injunction is granted by a State court, and served on a railway company, restraining it and its servants from obstructing a public avenue in a city with its trains, etc., the same will be binding upon a receiver of the company subsequently appointed by the United States court, and such receiver, the same as a subsequent purchaser, will be punishable for contempt for disobeying the mandate of the writ.

2. SAME-punishment after removal from office. If the receivers of a corporation disobey an injunction against the corporation, made before their appointment, the fact that they have been removed at the time they are tried for a contempt, affords no defense whatever. 3. SAME-as to receiver not actually participating. Where a railway company passes into the hands of receivers after it and its servants and agents are enjoined from obstructing a certain avenue, etc., with its cars, and in managing its business the injunction is disobeyed, one of the receivers cannot be exonerated because he took no active part in the matters complained of. It is his duty to see that the injunction is obeyed.

4. RECEIVER — of railroad company as its agent. A receiver of a railway company, appointed by the court to manage its business, is legally the agent of the company, although under the direction of the court appointing him.

5. SAME - powers. The court, in appointing a receiver for a corporation, has no power to enlarge or restrict the corporate powers and duties conferred on the corporation by its charter. The receiver is bound by the charter to the same extent as the directory. If the company

is under a legal duty to perform or not to do a certain act, the same will devolve upon its receiver.

W

RIT of error to the Circuit Court of Alexander county; the Hon. DAVID J. BAKER, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Samuel P. Wheeler, for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Justice WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

It appears that on the 6th day of March, 1873, a bill was filed praying an injunction against the Cairo and Vincennes Railroad Company, to restrain it, its agents, employees and attorneys from the further use of Commercial avenue, in the city of Cairo, for loading and unloading cars, from leaving them standing thereon, or making up trains, and from using railroad tracks for switching cars or trains thereon, or for any purpose other than for transit of cars and trains over their tracks, except the company might use their tracks south of and below Sixth street for making up trains and switching, and of using their tracks below Fifth street, except at street crossings, for storing, loading and unloading cars, and of using their tracks between Seventh and Eighth streets, aud between Eighth and Ninth streets, for standing passenger trains for such time as might be necessary on the arrival or departure of trains. A writ was, on that day, granted, according to the prayer, restraining them until the further order of the court. The writ was served on an agent of the company on the next day.

On the 5th day of March, 1874, plaintiffs in error were appointed receivers of the road by the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and entered upon the discharge of their duty as such. They, in disregard of the injunction, caused to be switched, daily, upon the side track large numbers of cars to be loaded and unloaded, and allowed cars to be left standing on the side track in the portion of the avenue in respect of which the company had been restrained.

*From N. L. Freeman, Esq., State Reporter, and to appear in 85 Ill. See, to the same effect, St. Joe, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 16 A.b. Law Journal, 408.

It is, however, set up as a defense, that they were not the agents or servants of the railroad company, but, being appointed receivers of the Federal court, they were its agents, and not amenable to nor were they restrained by the injunction of the State court, and if they were, by force of the writ, it was, in effect, annulled by a decree of the Federal court, authorizing them to perform the several acts which are charged as violations of the injunction.

The railroad company was under restraint, by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, at the time plaintiffs in error were appointed receivers, and no question can be, with any pretense of legal principle for its support, urged against the binding force of the injunction. According to every principle of the law, it was binding upon all persons to whom it was directed, and in the very necessities of the case its scope and operation must be broader than is claimed by plaintiffs in error. The order and writ are matters of public record, of which all persons are bound to take notice, at their peril. If the court were to enjoin a person from doing a specified act, in reference to a piece of property of which he was the owner, and he were to sell it pending the injunction, can it be possible that the authority of the law, as spoken by its appropriate tribunals, could be defied and successfully resisted by the purchaser doing the very act the law had prohibited his vendor from performing? Most assuredly not.

Suppose, in this case, the road, property and franchises of the company had been sold, would that have revoked and annulled the restraining order of the court, and permitted the purchaser to have proceeded to the performance of the prohibited act? Most unquestionably not. The authority of the law cannot be so easily evaded and thwarted. It surely has some vigor, and its decrees must have some force. To hold otherwise would be to render the courts impotent, and their power only effective so far as litigants might choose to acquiesce. In the cases supposed, besides a large number of others that might be cited, the purchaser would take the right precisely as it was held by the seller. If he were under restraint as to its use, the vendee would be under the same restraint.

In this case the injunction was against the corporation as a legal entity, and its agents, servants, etc. When the receivers were appointed by the Federal court, there was no change in the corporate body. Its existence was intact, with its legal functions unimpaired, but simply its acts were performed by agents appointed by the court, and not by the corporation. The agents appointed by the court to perform its duties and exercise its functions are legally its agents, although they are under the direction of the court appointing them, within the limits of its charter. The court only authorizes the receiver to exercise the privileges and perform the duties prescribed by the charter. The court does not, nor could it if attempted, enlarge or restrict the powers and duties conferred by the charter. When it appoints the receiver, the court assumes the management of the corporation under and in accordance with the charter, and is bound by its provisions to the same extent that are the directory, and the agents appointed by the court are required by it to act within the limits of the charter, and to perform all duties imposed thereby.

When the court thus seized the control and management of the road, the company was not thereby released from any debt, legal liability incurred or the

performance of any duty imposed. In this case, this company was under the duty to obey the injunction, and the Federal court did not nor could it legally dissolve the injunction rightfully granted by the State court. The decree appointing the receivers does not, in the least, pretend to do such an act. The petition for their appointment does not ask for it, nor does the decree in any, the remotest, manner refer to or purport to, in anywise, dissolve, modify or affect the injunction, and the law did not operate to interfere with its operation in any degree. The receivers were, then, bound to observe and obey the injunction whilst in force, precisely as though they had been appointed and were acting under the directory of the company. The decree of the Federal court neither required nor authorized them to act differently.

It appears that plaintiffs in error and two of their employees, being attached for contempt of court in disregarding the injunction, applied to the Federal court to annul the injunction, and to have the attorney causing their arrest attached for contempt of that court, and for leave to lay additional track in a portion of the avenue. Of course, the prayer to annul the order granting the injunction by the State court, and the attachment of the attorney, was not, as it could not be, granted. But the court authorized the laying of the side track, as asked, for the purpose of passing of trains, and "for standing of cars thereon, above Twentieth street, in such manner as not to unnecessarily interfere with the public right thereon, or obstruct street crossings, and only such reasonable length of time as may be required for loading and unloading such cars." Now, here was only permission to stand cars above Twentieth street, and yet these plaintiffs in error, in violation of the injunction of the State court, and in utter disregard and contempt of the order of the Federal court, permitted cars to stand on the avenue, and to be loaded and unloaded, below Twentieth street. They thus seem to have been actuated by a disregard for all authority, both Federal and State, in their management of the road in the city. When they have so acted, it is strange that we shall be asked to indorse and sanction their acts.

We do not perceive the slightest excuse for their conduct. They first defy the injunction of the State court, and when they are about to be compelled to submit to its power and authority, they, to carry out their purposes, appeal to the Federal court to abrogate the order of the State court, and puuish its officers for attempting to enforce its decree, and to obtain permission to proceed in acts violative of the injunction, and, failing in that, by only obtaining leave to stand, load and unload cars above Twentieth street, they persistently continued in their purpose, and did stand and load and unload cars below that point, and then ask this court to say that such defiance of authority is legal, justifiable, and not a contempt of the authority of the State.

Nor is it any, the slightest, excuse, to say they did not know the force and effect of the injunction. They, by their petition to the Federal court, set out, in terms, the order of the judge granting the injunction, and cannot be heard to say they did not understand its force, as the language was plain, simple and easily understood by the most ordinary intellect. But, had it not been easily comprehended, it was their duty to learn its import. They do not say, in their petition to the Federal court, that they cannot understand its import, but they ask that it be held to be void. Even

if they had not seen the writ, knowing that it had been issued, it was their duty to see and learn its import.

Nor is Safford exonerated from responsibility because he, by arrangement with Morrill, took no active part in the running arrangements of the road. He was equally bound for Morrill's acts, and, knowing of the injunction, and the limitation of their powers by the order of the Federal court, on his own petition, he was bound to see that the orders were not disobeyed by Morrill or their employees. He could not escape liability by merely remaining inactive. He was bound to act to prevent disobedience to these orders, and cannot shield himself by saying others did the act.

Nor is it any defense to say, if they did defy the authority of the State, acting through its properly constituted authorities, they have been removed from the receivership, and their contempt was thereby purged. As well say, an officer committing a criminal official act cannot be punished because he has been removed from office or his term has expired.

An examination of the entire record presented to us in this case discloses no ground for a reversal, and the judgment of the court below must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1878.*

PUBLIC POLICY.

1. Contracts void by: contracts against public morality. -Courts will always refuse to enforce contracts which are contrary to public morality or policy, whenever and however, in actions upon them, that fact may be made to appear. Wight v. Rindskopf. Opinion by Ryan, C. J. Decided February 5, 1878.

2. Admission of accomplice as witness on implied promise of pardon.-The admission of an accomplice as a witness for the government upon implied promise of pardon, in any case, is not at the pleasure of the public prosecutor, but rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court. Ib.

3. When accomplice not to be admitted as witness.If an accomplice in one crime be also indicted for another, and the fact be within the knowledge of the court, he will not, in general, be admitted as a witness; but, if admitted, though he testify in good faith against his accomplices upon one indictment, he will be put upon his trial on the other, and punished upon conviction. Ib.

4. Agreement with public prosecutor, when a fraud on court. An agreement of the public prosecutor, unsanctioned by the court (if such sanction could be given in such a case), for immunity or clemency to several defendants, in several indictments, upon one of them becoming a witness for the prosecution upon still other indictments, would be a fraud upon the court, and an obstruction of public justice. Ib.

5. Witness not allowed an attorney.-A witness, as such, cannot have an attorney; and though an accomplice may act by advice of his attorney on the question whether he will become a witness for the prosecution, when he once becomes such a witness, the relation of attorney and client ceases quoad hoc. Ib.

6. What services are not within scope of professional retuiner. While several indictments were pending in

a Federal court against defendant and six other persons for violation of the revenue laws, plaintiff told defendant that his relations with the prosecuting attorneys were such that he thought he could render these parties essential service. Thereupon it was agreed between defendant and plaintiff that the former should give evidence for the United States, under the counsel and direction of the latter, against persons, other than those included in the agreement, against whom still other indictments for violations of the revenue laws were pending in the same court; and plaintiff undertook that defendant and the other six persons above mentioned should be permitted severally to plead guilty to those counts only, in the several indictments against them, involving the least punishment, and receive upon those the lowest punishment of the law; and for this service, if successful, defendant was to pay plaintiff a large sum for each person mentioned. The agreement required no disclosure, evidence or other aid to the government from any other person than defendant, and did not require him to make full disclosure to the prosecuting attorneys, or to put himself in their hands as their witness. Held, that the services on plaintiff's part thus stipulated for were not within the legitimate scope of a professional retainer of an attorney at law, and a contract therefor is void as against public morality and policy. Ib.

7. When court will not assume agreement to be sanctioned by another court.-The mere fact that the judgments of the Federal court on the indictments were such as to fulfill plaintiff's agreement, will not warrant this court in assuming that such agreement was sanctioned by that court; nor could it hold the agreement valid even upon that assumption. Ib.

REPEAL.

Of penal act without saving clause affects pending actions. After the repeal of chapter 273 of 1874 (the Potter Law), no recovery could be had in any action then pending under the penal provisions of that act, either by virtue of section 33, chapter 119, R. S. (Dillon v. Linder, 36 Wis. 344), or by virtue of the clause in the repealing act (ch. 57 of 1876), which provided that nothing therein contained should "in any manner affect any litigation" then pending in any of the courts of this State, or of the United States. To save pending actions for statutory penalties, or pending prosecutions for statutory offenses, upon the repeal of the statute, an express saving of all penalties incurred or offenses committed under it, whether in the course of prosecution or not, is essential. Rood v. C., M. & St. P. Railway Co. Opinion by Ryan, C. J. Decided Jan. 3, 1878.

WITNESS.

Though party cannot impeach his own he may contradict him. Although the general rule is, that a party cannot impeach the general reputation for truth of his own witness, yet he may prove the truth of any particular fact relevant to the issue by any other compe-tent testimony, in direct contradiction of what one of his witnesses has testified, even where such proof may collaterally show such witness to be generally unworthy of belief. Thus, in an action on a promissory note alleged by the answer to have been without consideration, after plaintiff, as a witness for defendant, had testified that the note was for the price of specified chattels sold by him to defendant, the latter was entitled to show by his own testimony that he was not indebted to plaintiff on account of such chattels when the note was given. Smith v. Ehnert. Opinion by Cole, J. Decided Jan. 3, 1878.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

BAILMENT.

Factor's Acts: agent intrusted with the possession of goods: agent broker and also merchant: goods left in possession of paid vendor: pledge: 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 2. -H., a merchant dealing in tobacco and a broker in that trade, had fifty hogsheads of that article lying in bond in his name in the K. dock. The warrants for them had been issued to him. The plaintiff bought the tobacco from H. and paid for it, but he left the dock warrants in the possession of H., and took no steps to have any change made in the books of the dock company, as to the ownership of the tobacco. H., being the ostensible owner of the tobacco, fraudulently obtained advances on the pledge of a portion of the tobacco from the defendants respectively, and handed to them the dock warrants. Both the defend

ants acted in good faith, and took fresh dock warrants from the dock company. Held, that H. was not intrusted by the plaintiff as his factor or agent with the documents of title, within 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 2; and that the conduct of the plaintiff, in leaving the indicia of title in H.'s hands and thus enabling him to obtain advances on the security of the goods, was not such as to disentitle the plaintiff to recover its value from the defendants. Johnson v. The Credit Lyonnais Company, L. R., 3 C. P. D. (C. A.) 32.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

1. Effect of cancellation, as between payee and acceptor, without full payment.-The plaintiff obtained from the defendants an advance of 15,0001. upon the security of goods then in transitu to Monte Video, consigned to one S., and of six bills of exchange drawn by the plaintiff upon and accepted by S. against the shipments. Two of these bills were duly paid; but, other two having been dishonored, the defendants (at Monte Video) proposed to realize the goods at once, whereupon the plaintiff handed them a cheque for 2500l., accompanied by a letter requesting them not to sell, and authorizing them to hold the 2500l. as collateral security for S.'s acceptances, to be returned to the plaintiff when all the bills should have been paid. The remaining bills having also been dishonored by S., the defendants took proceedings against him at Monte Video, which resulted in a judicial arrangement under which the goods were sold, and the bills were delivered up to S. canceled without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff. The sale of the goods did not produce sufficient, even with the 25007., to pay all the bills. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendants to recover back the 2500l., held, that, notwithstanding the effect of the cancellation of the bills was to discharge both the plaintiff and S. from all liability on the bills, and also to deprive the plaintiff, as drawer, of all remedy upon them against S. as acceptor, the circumstances under which such cancellation took place was not equivalent to payment of the bills in full; and, consequently, that the plaintiff was not entitled to call upon the defendants to refund the 2500l., or any part of it. sias v. The Mercantile Bank of the River Plate, L. R., 3 C. P. D. 60.

Ygle

2. Bills drawn and accepted by same parties.-Although bills of exchange, drawn and accepted by the same parties, may be in strictness promissory notes rather than bills, yet where the intention to give and receive such documents as instruments capable of being negotiated in the market as bills of exchange is

clear, both the holders and the parties may treat them accordingly. Willans v. Ayers, L. R., 3 App. Cas.

P. C. 133.

3. Custom as to damages in lieu of exchange: re-exchange, etc.-A custom as to allowing a fixed percentage by way of liquidated damages in lieu of exchange, re-exchange, and other charges, when bills are returned from the colonies dishonored, however valid in law, does not apply in the absence of an agreement, express or implied, to allow re-exchange. Ib.

4. When re-exchange not allowed.-Where the holders of bills drawn by P. L. & Co. in London on P. L. & Co. in Australia, having no occasion to transfer money from London to Australia, sent them to the latter country, not for the purpose of employing the proceeds there, but of having them remitted to London, the dishonor of such bills does not entitle the holders to recover damages by way of re-exchange. Ib.

5. When right to re-exchange arises.-The right to "re-exchange," in the absence of express agreement, arises when the holder of a bill who has contracted for the transfer of funds from one country to another has sustained damages by its dishonor through having to obtain funds in the country where the bill was payable. " Re-exchange" is the measure of those damages. Ib.

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

JURISDICTION.

When Federal courts have not exclusive: statutory construction.-Section 711 of the U. S. Revised Statutes, which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal courts overall matters and proceedings in bankruptcy," does not extend to actions brought by assignees to collect the assets of bankrupts. The only effect of the amendment of 1874 (chap. 178, § 2) is to permit the Federal courts to decline to entertain actions brought to recover legal assets of a bankrupt not exceeding five hundred dollars in amount. Subject to the authority thus conferred, the Federal and State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over all actions brought by an assignee to collect the assets of the bankrupt, whether legal or equitable, and of whatever amount. Supt. Ct., New York, 4th Dep. Wente v. Young, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 90.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Note given by partners individually for firm debt a firm liability: security on separate estate. Where T. and S. had become copartners, and, preliminary to beginning their copartnership business, negotiated a loan of money, giving therefor their joint note, but signing the same by their individual names, and the money was treated as a copartnership fund and applied to the business uses of the firm, held, that the debt was a firm liability. A firm creditor, holding mortgage security upon the separate estate of one of the partners, may prove his whole debt against the joint estate, without valuation or surrender of the security, even though the individual schedules of the partner whose separate estate is thus mortgaged, do not show that he owes individual debts. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Wisconsin. In re Thomas, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 54.

2. Adjudication against firm: one member adjudged bankrupt. The adjudication of a copartnership must be made in one proceeding and on one petition. Where an individual member of a firm is adjudged a bankrupt, without any adjudication against the firm, and there were assets of the firm when the proceeding was

instituted, the estate of the firm is not in the Bankruptcy Court in any such wise as to make a discharge operative as to the debts of the firm. Adjudication of the members of a firm by adjudication of one member in one proceeding, and of the other members in another, is not an adjudication of the copartnership, and the Bankrupt Court will not thereby acquire jurisdiction over the estate of the copartnership. A bankrupt in a given proceeding must be discharged as to all his debts or from none. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Plumb, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 76.

PRIORITY OF PAYMENT.

Out of what assets preferred creditor entitled to payment: debt due a State. A creditor who is entitled to preference under section 5101 can only have a priority in payment out of what assets the debtor has which would go to his assignee. Where it appears that there are no assets of any value, he cannot demand that his claim shall be paid in full before confirmation of a composition, or that such composition shall be subject to his debt. But he may examine the debtor and other witnesses in the composition proceedings to show that the debtor has other assets. Although, under the laws of the State, the moneys to be collected upon a bond given to the People of the State are to be paid into the treasury of the city of New York, the State is the creditor. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. Chamberlin, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 49.

TRADESMAN.

In re

Who is a merchant or tradesman: livery stable keeper. -A livery stable keeper who only purchases horses for use in his business and sells them when disabled and unfit for use, and who boards the horses of other parties and feeds them with hay, etc., which he has purchased, is a merchant or tradesman within the meaning of subdivision 7 of section 5110 of the U. S. Revised Statutes. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Odell, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 73.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT, OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

BAILMENT.

1. Right of pledgee to possession of securities pledged. -A bank took from its debtor, as a pledge to secure notes against him, held by it, certificates of indebtedness of a corporation. Before the notes became due the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and the assignee demanded possession of [the certificates. Held, that the bank, in virtue of the 'pledge, acquired a special property in the certificates of indebtedness. It was entitled to retain possession until the objects for which they were pledged had been fully accomplished. Until the note for $5,000 was fully paid it was not bound to return the certificates either to the bankrupt or to the receiver or assignee in bankruptcy. Judgment of Circuit Court, Louisiana, affirmed. Yeatman, assignee, plaintiff in error, v. New Orleans Savings Institution.

2. Bankrupt law does not impair rights of pledgee.Held, also, that these rights of the pledgee were not impaired or affected by any of the provisions of the bankrupt law. The established rule is that except in cases of attachments against the property of the bankrupt within a prescribed time preceding the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, and except in cases where the disposition of property by the bankrupt is declared by law to be fraudulent and void, the assignee takes the title subject to all equities, liens, or incumbrances, whether created by operation of law

or by act of the bankrupt, which existed against the property in the hands of the bankrupt. Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atkyns, 160; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 637; Gibson v. Warder, 14 Wall. 248; Cook v. Tullis, 18 id. 332, and Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 739. He takes the property in the same "plight and condition" that the bankrupt held it. (Winsor v. McLellan, 2 Story, 495; Goddard v. Weaver, 1 Wood, 260.) Ib.

3. Refusal of pledgee to appear in bankruptcy proceedings does not impair rights to pledge.-Held, also, that the right of the bank to the certificate would not be impaired by its refusing to appear in the bankruptcy proceedings and prove its claim. The only effect of its failure to make that proof was to lose the privilege of participating in such distribution of the bankrupt estate as might be ordered in the bankruptcy court. It had the right to forego that advantage, and look for ultimate security wholly to the certificates of indebtedness which it held under a valid pledge. Ib.

LIFE INSURANCE.

Conditions in policy as to payment: forfeiture: waiver: authority of agent.-In a policy of life insurance it was provided that if the premium should not be paid when due, or if the principal of, or interest upon, any note or other obligation given for the premium upon said policy shall not be paid at the time the same shall become due and payable, then and in every such case the company shall not be liable to pay the sum assured, or any part thereof, and said policy shall cease and be null and void without notice to any party or parties interested herein," and "in case a loan of, or credit,for, a portion of said premium shall be made on this policy, said policy shall be subject to all of the terms and conditions expressed in the acknowledgment or obligation given for such loan or credit." By an indorsement on the policy, it was declared that "agents of the company are not authorized to make, alter, or abrogate contracts, or waive forfeitures." All the premiums were paid except the last one, which was settled by the payment of $50 in cash, and the balance in two promissory notes of the insured to the insurance company, payable respectively in two and three months, and maturing one on the 20th of June, the other on the 20th of July, 1875. Each note contained a clause declaring that if it were not paid at maturity the policy would be void - this being the usual form of premium notes. A few days after the first note came due the son of the insured asked the agent to extend the time of payment for thirty days to which the agent agreed; before the expiration of the thirty days payment of the note was tendered and refused.

In an action on the policy, held that the forfeiture incurred by the non-payment of the note could be waived by an agreement made for extending the note after its maturity, and that evidence that the insurance company had on previous occasions permitted the agent to extend such indulgence, was admissible as indicative to the power given to the agent, and it was not error to submit to the jury upon such evidence, to find whether the defendant had, or had not, authorized its agent to make such extensions; nor in submitting it to them, to say whether, if such authority had been given, an extension was made in this case. Judgment of Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois, affirmed. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., plaintiff in error, v. Norton. Opinion by Bradley, J.

Strong and Swayne, JJ., dissented on the ground that there was no evidence that the company gave its agent authority to waive a forfeiture after it had occurred.