all Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle during eight months of each year, without any distinction between such as may be diseased and such as are not. It is true a proviso to the first section enacts that "when such cattle shall come across the line of the State, loaded upon a railroad car or steamboat, and shall pass through the State without being unloaded, such shall not be construed as prohibited by the act; but the railroad company or owners of a steamboat performing such transportation shall be responsible for all damages which may result from the disease called the Spanish or Texas fever, should the same occur along the line of transportation; and the existence of such disease along the line of such route shall be prima facie evidence that such disease has been communicated by such transportation." This proviso imposes burdens and liabilities for transportation through the State, though the cattle be not unloaded, while the body of the section absolutely prohibits the introduction of any such cattle into the State, with the single exception mentioned.

It seems hardly necessary to argue at length, that, unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, it is an usurpation of the power vested exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a State over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign nations. Power over one is given by the Constitution of the United States to Congress in the same words in which it is given over the other, and in both cases it is necessarily exclusive. That the transportation of property from one State to another is a brauch of interstate commerce is undeniable, and no attempt has been made in this case to deny it.

The Missouri statute is a plain interference with such transportation, an attempted exercise over it of the highest possible power-that of destruction. It meets at the borders of the State a large and common subject of commerce, and prohibits its crossing the State line during two-thirds of each year, with a proviso, however, that such cattle may come across the line loaded upon a railroad car or steamboat, and pass through the State without being unloaded. But even the right of steamboat owners and railroad companies to transport such property through the State is loaded by the law with onerous liabilities because of their agency in the transportation. The object and effect of the statute are, therefore, to obstruct interstate commerce, and to discriminate between the property of citizens of one State and that of citizens of other States. This court has heretofore said that interstate transportation of passengers is beyond the reach of a State legislature. And if, as we have held, State taxation of persons passing from one State to another, or a State tax upon interstate transportation of passengers, is prohibited by the Constitution because a burden upon it, a fortiori, if possible, is a State tax upon the carriage of merchandise from State to State. Transportation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself, and every obstacle to it, or burden laid upon it by legislative authority, is regulation. State Freight Tux Cases, 15 Wall. 281; Wellon v. The State of Missouri, 91 S. C. 275; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 S. C. 259; and Chy Lung v. Freeman, id. 275. The two latter of these cases refer to obstructions against the admission

of persons into a State, but the principles asserted are equally applicable to all subjects of commerce.

We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute is a lawful exercise of the police power of the State. We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce and commerce among the States was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police power. What that power is, it is difficult to define with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health, and safety. As was said in Thorp v. The Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company, 27 Vt. 149, "it extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State. According to the maxim, Sic ulere tuo ut alienum non lædus, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may use his own as not to injure others." It was further said that by the general police power of a State "persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." It may also be admitted that the police power of a State justifies the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a State may legislate to prevent the spread of crime, or pauperism, or disturbances of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded, as intimated in the Passenger Cases (7 How. 283), by Grier, J., in the sacred law of self-defense. Vide 3 Sawyer, 283. The same principle, it may also be conceded, would justify the exclusion of property dangerous to the property of citizens of the State; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases. All these exertions of powers are in immediate connection with the protection of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or such an use of property as is injurious to the property of others. They are self-defensive.

But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a State, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution. It cannot invade the domain of the National government. It was said in Henderson et al. v. The Mayor of New York et al., 92 8. C. 272, to "be clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that whenever the statute of a State invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied it may be to powers conceded to belong to the States." Substantially the same thing was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 210. Neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers properly conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Many acts of a State may, indeed, affect commerce without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional seuse of the term. And it is sometimes difficult to define the distinction between that which merely af

fects or influences, and that which regulates or furnishes a rule for conduct. There is no such difficulty in the present case. While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. Upon this subject the cases in 91st U. S. Sup. Court Reps., to which we have referred, are very instructive. In Henderson v. The Mayor, etc., the statute of New York was defended as a police regulation to protect the State against the influx of foreign paupers, but it was held to be unconstitutional, because its practical result was to impose a burden upon all passengers from foreign countries. And it was laid down that "in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect." The reach of the statute was far beyond its professed object, and far into the realm which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. So in the case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, where the pretense was the exclusion of lewd women, but as the statute was more far-reaching, and affected other immigrants, not of any class which the State could lawfully exclude, we held it unconstitutional. Neither of these cases denied the right of a State to protect herself against paupers, convicted criminals, or lewd women, by necessary and

254. Regarding the statutes as mere police regulations, intended to protect domestic cattle against in. fectious disease, those courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition did not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether, therefore, the statutes were not something more than exertions of police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature and not for the courts. With this we cannot concur. The police power of a State cannot obstruct foreign commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise; and under color of it, objects not within its scope cannot be secured at the expense of the protection afforded by the Federal Constitution. And as its range sometimes comes very near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion.

The judgment of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be reversed, and the record remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Grundy county and to direct that court to award a new trial.

COMPOSITIONS IN BANKRUPTCY.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT NEW YORK.

IN THE MATTER OF ALLEN.

When upon looking at the assets of a bankrupt's estate it is evident that the interests of the creditors will be better promoted by a proposed composition than by administering the estate in bankruptcy, the court has no alternative but to confirm the resolution of compo sition, notwithstanding previous acts of the bankrupt in disregard of the interests of his creditors.

but it was rumored that the right could only arise from vital necessity, and that it could not be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. These cases, it is true, speak only of laws affecting the entrance of persons into a State; but the constitutional doctrines they maintain are equally applicable to interstate transportation of property. They deny validity to any State legislation professing to be an exercise of police power for protection against evils from abroad, which is beyond the necessity for its exercise wherever it interferes with the rights and powers of the Federal government.

Tried by this rule, the statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of Congress. It is not a quarantine law. It is not an inspection law. It says to all natural persons and to all transportation companies, "you shall not bring into the State any Texas cattle or any Mexican cattle or Indian cattle between March 1st and December 1st, in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not; no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not; and if you do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the State without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities." Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of a State to enact. To hold otherwise would be to ignore one of the leading objects which the Constitution of the United States was designed to secure.

In coming to such a conclusion, we have not overlooked the decisions of very respectable courts in Illinois, where statutes similar to the one we have before us have been sustained. Yeazel v. Alexander, 53 Ill.

facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Fanning and Williams, for opposing Creditors. John Van Voorhis und E. S. Jenney, for Bankrupts. WALLACE, J. The requisite quorum of creditors having assented to the resolution for composition, confirmation is opposed by dissenting creditors on the ground that the interests of creditors will not be promoted by the composition.

The evidence presented discloses the common case of a composition conceived in the interest of the bankrupts. When insolvency was apprehended the bankrupts began paying themselves and their favored creditors out of the firm assets, then attempted to compromise with their creditors; failing in this, made an assignment to a favored creditor, and shortly after procured a petition in bankruptcy to be filed against themselves, and thereupon took proceedings to effect a composition. In the meantime the bankrupts have had charge of their property, ostensibly as agents for the assignee and the purchaser from the assignee. The attorneys who advised the assigument and prosecuted the petition in bankruptcy now represent most of the creditors.

From the beginning to the end of the transactions not one step has been taken to protect the interests of creditors.

It shocks the moral sense to assist this dishonest scheme by judicial action; but this court is only an instrument to administer the law as it finds it. The bankrupt law permits just such schemes as this, and if the requisite number of creditors consent the court is powerless, unless it shall appear that the interests of the creditors will not be promoted by the terms of

composition. If, looking at the assets of the estate in their present condition, it is apparent that the pecuniary interests of the creditors will be better promoted by the composition than by administering the estate in bankruptcy, there is no alternative but to confirm the resolution of composition.

I am constrained to agree with the Register that the interests of the creditors here will be promoted by confirming the resolution. I cannot say that there are any circumstances to show that the assenting creditors have been actuated by any motive other than to promote their own interests as well as those of all the creditors.

All the assets of the estate rest in litigation, and, it seems to me, a prudent consideration of the contingencies dictates the acceptance of the offer of the bankrupts. It is probable the bankrupts will profit by the composition, but this by no means proves that it will not be advantageous to the creditors.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS, NEW JERSEY.*

ACTION.

1. For seduction of daughter. An action for the seduction of the daughter, in the life-time of the father, may be maintained by his personal representative. Noice, administratrix, v. Brown.

2. For enticing away servant. - An action will lie for enticing away a servant at will, where a subsisting service is interrupted by the act of the defendant. Ib.

AGENCY.

1. Notice to agent, notice to principal.- Notice to the agent is notice to the principal, if the agent comes to the knowledge of the fact while he is acting for the principal, in the course of the very transaction which becomes the subject of the suit. Such knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal for the benefit of an innocent third party who has dealt with the agent in good faith. Stanley v. Chamberlin.

2. When notice of immoral acts of agent not imputed to principal: renting house for gambling.—The law will not impute turpitude to a principal by charging him with constructive notice, when he had no actual knowledge, for the benefit of one who sets up his own wrongful act in his defense. An agent rented premises to the defendant, knowing that he intended to use them for gaming purposes; held, that the principal, who had no actual knowledge of such intended unlawful use, could disown the agent's contract, and recover, on a quantum valebat, for the use of her premises. Ib.

crime of the person administering it, the law making it no crime in her to take the potion. State v. Hyer. 2. Conviction on unsupported evidence of accomplice. -Although the practice of courts is to advise juries not to convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, yet a conviction founded on such evidence is strictly legal. Ib.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. Compensation for land taken must be in money.— The act of 1875 (Pamph. Laws, p. 621), for the condemnation of lands for the construction of a sewer, provided the following method of compensation to the owner of condemned lands: The commissioners appointed to make the award were empowered to issue improvement certificates, in their own names, in payment of the award, payable at such times as they might therein designate, not exceeding two years. Held, that the act did not provide a constitutional method of securing compensation to the land-owner. There is no power in the legislature to provide for the payment of the award in any thing but money, nor to postpone the right of the land-owner to receive the same after the award becomes a finality. State, Butler, prosecutor, v. Ravine Road Sewer Commissioners. 2. Election to pursue or abandon proceedings.—Where the power of eminent domain is conferred upon a merely public agent, and the compensation to be made is to be ascertained by another body, as commissioners or a jury, the agent has an election, whether to pursue or abandon the condemnation, after the price is fixed, unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly indicated. State, Mabon, relator, v. Halsted.

3. Reconsideration of election not permitted.— If such an election has been once made, no right of reconsideration remains. Ib.

Quantum of proof to support defense of willful burning in action on fire insurance policy.-In an action on a policy of insurance against loss by fire, where the defense is that the property insured was willfully burned by the assured, the rule in civil, and not in criminal cases, as to the quantum of proof, applies, and a charge to the jury that the defendant is bound to establish the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and by the same measure of testimony that would be necessary to convict the plaintiff if he was on trial upon an Kane indictment charging that offense, is erroneous.

v. Hibernia Ins. Co. (Court of Errors and Appeal.)

LEASE.

Effect of assignment of.-A plea setting up that a lessee assigned his lease, and that the lessor accepted such assignee as his tenant, does not show a bar to an action of covenant for rent on the lease, against the original tenant. Hunt v. Gardner.

STATUTE.

Statute requiring township to pay debt morally but not legally due. A statute is valid that requires a township to pay a debt that is morally, but not legally due from it to an individual, for work done upon the public streets. Rader v. Township of Union.

SURETYSHIP.

Sureties on official bond: how far liable.- Sureties on the bond of the State treasurer are liable for moneys

received by him during the continuance of their suretyship, and used by him in payment of arrears due from him to the State at the time the bond was given. S. was treasurer of the State from January, 1873, to September, 1875. In April, 1875, he gave a new bond, with new sureties. He was then a defaulter to the State. After April, 1875, he received a large sum of public moneys, part of which he applied to discharge his prior defalcation, and part he failed to account for. Held, in an action on the new bond, that his sureties were liable for both amounts. State v. Sooy.

TAXATION.

1. Must extend over whole of district benefited.— While the burthen of a particular tax may be placed exclusively upon any political district to whose benefit such tax is to inure, the legislature has no power thus to impose it upon any territory narrower in bounds than the political district of which it is a part, without having regard to the special benefits which may accrue to those upon whom it is made to fall. State, Baldwin, prosecutor, v. Fuller.

2. Recovery back of tax voluntarily paid.- Where an owner of lands assessed for a city improvement has paid the amount assessed, and the assessment is afterward set aside on certiorari, he may, after such reversal, and demand made, recover back the amount paid, in an action of assumpsit, though the assessment was voluntarily paid. City of Elizabeth v. Hill.

USURY.

What does not constitute.- Where, on a loan of money, the borrower agreed to repay at a certain time the amount of the money loaned, with lawful interest, and further agreed, upon default made in such payment, to perfect and surrender to the lender certain shares of stock pledged as collateral security for the loan, held, not to be usurious. Ramsey v. Morrison.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. Action: interference with lery by railroad agent. That the agent of a railroad company obstructed an officer in levying an attachment upon goods loaded upon one of the trains of the company, and that he removed the goods out of the State, by running out the train, will not furnish a cause of action against the company, at the instance of the plaintiff in attachment. Sup. Ct., Georgia, Jan. 31, 1878. Western R. R. Co. v. Thomas.

Bill of exchange: custom as tɔ, not invalid.-A custom to allow a fixed sum by way of liquidated damages in lieu of re-exchange upon bills returned dishonored is not invalid in law. English Priv. Council, Dec. 10, 1877. Willans v. Ayers (37 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 732).

Corporate stock: transfer of rights and liabilities of parties and corporations: when stock wrongfully transferred. Where a plaintiff by his own negligence furnishes a third person with the means of perpetrating a wrongful act, whereby the plaintiff incurs a loss, he cannot recover, even though the exercise of due diligence and proper care on the part of the defendant might have prevented the occurrence of the loss. A corporation is not justified in transferring stock on its books upon a blank power of attorney, signed by the owner many years previously (in this case thirteen), without making due inquiry as to whether the power has been revoked. But where, in such case, the owner of stock had intrusted the certificates, with blank

powers of attorney to transfer the same, to an agent for safe-keeping, by whose fraudulent transfers the loss was incurred, the plaintiff cannot recover from the corporation. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Jan. 11, 1878. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.'s appeal (W. Not. Cas.).

Counter-claim: against United States. - The act of March 3d, 1797, does not contemplate the adjudication of any sum against the United States. A defendant who is sued by the United States is not entitled to a finding in any form of a sum due him by the United States in excess of the claim for which he was sued. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Pennsylvania, Jan. 8, 1878. Schaumburg v. United States.

Nuisance: claim that it is necessary to enable performance of duty imposed by law. In an action to restrain a gas company from creating a nuisance at their gas manufactory, held, that the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847, is incorporated with the Metropolis Gas Act, 1860, except so far as its provisions are inconsistent with that act; and a company performing the obligations of the act of 1860 cannot justify creating a nuisance by setting up incapacity to make or supply gas without so doing. Eng. High. Ct. of Justice, Chanc. Div., Nov. 16, 1877. Altorney-Gen. v. Gas L. & Coke Co. (37 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 746).

Receiver: action against foreign, not maintainable.The defendant was appointed by a decree of the Cir cuit Court of Alexandria, Virginia, receiver of a railroad in that State. The plaintiff was injured while a passenger on such road and brings this action against the receiver for damages; and it was held that the action would not be maintained in this jurisdiction without leave of the court which appointed defendant such receiver. Sup. Ct., Dist. Columbia, General Term, Jan., 1878. Barton v. Barbour, receiver (Wash. L. Rep.).

Respondeat superior: when rule applies: blasting.— The city employed one to construct a sewer; in doing which it was necessary to blast rocks, by which a building was damaged in consequence of insufficient protection to the blasting. It was claimed that the contractor, and not the city, was responsible. Held, that the rule of respondeat superior applies, in all cases, where the contract directly requires the performance of work intrinsically dangerous, however skillfully performed. In such case, the party authorizing the work is regarded as the author of the mischief resulting from it, whether he lets the work out by contract, or does it himself. Sup. Ct., Illinois. Jan. 21, 1878. City of Joliet v. Harwood.

Stock exchange: notice of right of member to seat.The right of a member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange to seat in that body is not such property as can be attached at the suit of a creditor of the member. Philadelphia Ct. Com. Pleas, Dec. 29, 1877. Pancoast v. Houston.

Surelyship: construction of contract: agreement to supply goods: past debts.- A merchant was in the habit of supplying C., a retail trader, with goods on credit. An acceptance given by C. having been dishonored, M. (the merchant) refused to supply more goods. C.'s wife, who was entitled to separate estate, thereupon gave the following guaranty: "In consideration of you, the said M., having, at my request, agreed to supply and furnish goods to the said C., I do hereby guarantee to you, the said M., the sum of £500. This guaranty is to continue in force for the period of six years and no longer:" Held (reversing the de

cision of Fry, J.) that the guaranty extended only to the price of goods supplied subsequently to its date by M. on the faith of the guaranty, and not to moneys due for goods supplied before the date of the guaranty. Eng. Ct. of Appeals, Dec. 3, 1877. Morrell v. Cowan 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 586).

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

COMPOSITION.

1. Enjoining creditors from harassing bankrupt pending proceedings for.-The Bankrupt Court has a right to, and will on application enjoin creditors from harassing the debtor as long as his composition proceeding is pending. An injunction in such case can extend only to unsecured debts or debts in respect to which any security has been surrendered. The proceeding is pending until the time allowed by the resolution for making the last payment has expired. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Hinsdale, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 550.

2. Terms of: contempt of creditor: payment: tender.— A general provision in a resolution of composition that a payment of so much money, at such time or times, to be evidenced by such and such notes, shall be accepted by the creditors in satisfaction of the debts due them, is not, as respects the creditors, an executing provision which the court is authorized to enforce. A tender of the money according to the terms of such composition is equivalent to payment, but the court cannot imprison the creditor for contempt unless he will physically take the offered money. Ib.

CONTRACT.

With third party to forbear proceedings against debtor not forbidden by bankrupt law: validity of.-The Baukrupt Act does not forbid a creditor to take any contract, covenant or security from a third party as an inducement to forbear instituting proceedings against his debtor. But to constitute the forbearance a valid consideration for such contract, covenant or security, the creditor must, at the time of receiving it, have a right to proceed in bankruptcy against his debtor. Ct. of Appeals, Maryland. Ecker v. Bohn, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 544.

EXEMPTION.

1. Homestead: when claim must be made: title to property sold by assignee: power of State court.-A claim to a homestead exemption, under the laws of Alabama, must be asserted before a sale. The validity of a sale of property by an assignee in bankruptcy cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding in the State courts. If a bankrupt fails to claim such exemption in his schedules, he must be deemed to have waived it. If the bankrupt has, from inadvertence, misdescribed in his schedules the land claimed by him as exempt the Bankrupt Court alone has power to correct such error. A State court cannot receive mere parol evidence to cure such mistake. Sup. Ct., Alabama. Steele v. Moody, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 558.

2. When the sale by the assignee took place more than two years after the assignment to him, the limitation of suits by and against assignees prescribed by the Bankrupt Act cannot be set up as a defense to a collateral action brought against the bankrupt by one claiming title under such sale. The bankrupt should avail himself of it on application to vacate the sale. Ib.

JURISDICTION.

Of Bankrupt Court to relieve from judgment: laches.The Bankrupt Court has no jurisdiction to relieve against a judgment obtained against a bankrupt in a suit brought against him after his adjudication, in which for any cause he has failed to plead his discharge. Even if the court had such jurisdiction, it would not interfere to relieve the bankrupt against the laches of his counsel and himself. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Virginia. In re Ferguson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 530.

PREFERENCE.

One taking cannot prove debt: what constitutes.-A creditor who has received a preference contrary to the provisions of section 5084 of the Revised Statutes cannot prove his debt after the preference has been recovered from him by the assignee. Where M., in pursuance of a scheme to obtain a preference for H., a creditor of the bankrupt, purchased logs of the bankrupt and subsequently took a transfer of a note held by H., held, that he held such note as trustee for H., and that the acceptance of the logs was a preference. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Stein, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 569.

SURETYSHIP.

Mortgage to secure surety afterward becoming insolvent: rights of creditors of principal as to. -If a mortgage, pledge or lien is given by a principal debtor to secure his surety, and both become insolvent, the holders of the debts for which the surety is bound have an equity to require the property to be applied to the discharge of their debts specifically. But if the surety has been discharged by the negligence of the creditors, or if the state of the accounts between the parties is such that the surety has lost his lien, the creditors have no equity. The creditors must apply their security so as to prove against either estate for the deficiency only. If the creditors prove in full, they waive their security. U. S. Dist. Ct., Massachusetts. Ex parte Morris, In re Foye, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 572.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

APPEAL.

1. When amount in controversy is less than $500 no appeal to this court, even if judgment is for more.— A judgment appealed from was for $543.84 damages. An item of $140.50, about which there was no controversy at the General Term, although it was put at issue in the pleadings and was in controversy at the Circuit up to the time the case was submitted to the jury, entered into the judgment. Held, that the case was not appealable to the Court of Appeals. Appeal dismissed. Brown v. Sigourney, appellant. Opinion by Folger, J. 2. Amount of judgment docketed does not govern, but amount in controversy.- Under the act of 1874 (chap. 322), the judgment is not appealable, and the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review it if the amount in controversy is less than $500, whatever may be the amount at which the judgment is docketed. Ib. [Decided January 15, 1878.]