fall of the market, the contract would have been illegal. Ib.

[Decided Dec. 11, 1877.]

3. Agreement to exchange farms: fraudulent misdescription in deeds.-Plaintiff and defendant by parol agreed to exchange farms, plaintiff agreeing to convey to defendant his farm, and defendant to convey to plaintiff 183 acres of land, measuring from the south end of his farm. Plaintiff performed the agreement

on his part. Defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff a deed which conveyed 183 acres of land from the north end of his farm, and which he knew did not describe the land he agreed to convey. Held, that plaintiff, on discovering the error, was entitled, upon defendant's refusing to convey the land he had agreed, to a judgment that he perform his agreement. Judgment below affirmed. Wilson v. Van Pelt. Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided Dec. 21, 1877.]

EVIDENCE.

1. Meaning of words “port risk "must be explained by experts.-The words "port risk," used in a marine insurance policy, held not to convey to the public generally, unacquainted with the business of insurance, any definite meaning, and to require the testimony of experts to explain their signification. Such testimony would not be to explain a usage, but for the purpose of finding out the meaning of a technical phrase. Judgment below affirmed. Nelson v. Sun Mutual Insurance Co. Opinion by Folger, J.

[Decided Dec. 18, 1877.]

2. Who may not be entitled to be sworn as expert.-A witness testified that he was more or less familiar with getting policies from underwriters and attending to marine matters, and that he knew of the term "port risk in the port of New York," but on cross-examina-* tion he said he had never seen the words "port risk" in a policy, and did not declare that he had ever known it to be used in the business of insurance save in a general way. He had never known it to be used in a policy. Held, that he was properly excluded from testifying as an expert as to the meaning of the words. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

When satisfied judgment against one of several persons liable a bar to action against others.-Where a purchaser at an auction sale has made a deposit with the auctioneer, and has become entitled to a return of the deposit, he may maintain an action for such deposit against the auctioneer or his principal, and prosecute the same to judgment, but a judgment against one which has been satisfied is a bar to a further prosecution against the other. He is also entitled to interest, both in the action against the principal and that against the auctioneer. But where, in the action against the principal, interest was refused on the ground that no demand had been made for the return of the money, and the judgment in that action had been satisfied, an action against the auctioneer is en

Be

and plaintiff was not familiar with the locality. fore the station was reached the brakeman on the train announced it. The train, however, went by the station a short distance, and plaintiff, supposing that it was the place to get off, went out on the platform of the car, and was stepping down, when the train, without notice being given to the passengers, was suddenly backed up, and plaintiff was thereby suddenly thrown down and injured. There was no depot building at the station, or any other external indication of where was the proper place for the train to stop. Held, that a jury were warranted in finding that defendant was negligent in backing up without notice, and that plaintiff was not negligent in attempting to leave the train as she did. Judgment below affirmed. Taber v. Delaware, etc., Railroad Company. Opinion by Andrews, J. [Decided Dec. 18, 1877.]

STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

Action begun within a year after reversal of former suit for same cause.-Under the provision of sec. 104 of the old Code, that, "If an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment thereon be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year after the reversal," in a case where from a judgment of reversal by the lower appellate court an appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals and the judgment of reversal is affirmed, the plaintiff is entitled to bring the action within one year after the final judgment of the Cours of Appeals, and is not limited to one year after the | judgment of the lower appellate court. Judgment below affirmed. Wooster v. Forty-second St., etc., Railroad Company. Opinion by Andrews, J. [Decided Dec. 18, 1877.]

CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-JANUARY, 1878.

HALL V. DE CUIR.

A State statute which provides that all persons without distinction on account of race or color shall have equal rights and privileges in all parts of public conveyances is invalid so far as relates to conveyances running between different States.

By a statute of Louisiana carriers of passengers within the State were required to give all persons traveling in their conveyances equal rights and privileges in all parts thereof without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color. The plaintiff, a person of color, took passage at New Orleans for a point in Louisiana, on defendant's steamboat running between New Orleans and Vicksburg, and was, on account of her color, refused admission into the cabin, set aside for white ladies. In an action under the statute to recover damages, held, that the act so far as it applied to conveyances ruuning from Louisiana into other States was an encroachment upon the right of Congress to regulate commerce among the States, and that the action could not be maintained.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Train overshooting station and backing up without notice: contributory negligence.-Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's train, reached a station where she intended to alight. It was in the night time and dark,

error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisi

ana.

Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

By the Constitution of Louisiana (art. 13) it is provided that "all persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any conveyance of a public character," and by an act of the general assembly, approved February 23, 1869, to enforce this article, it was enacted as follows.

"Section 1. All persons engaged within this State, in the business of common carriers of passengers, shall have the right to refuse to admit any person to their railroad cars, street cars, steamboats or other water crafts, stage coaches, omnibuses, or other vehicles, or to expel any person therefrom after admission, when such person shall, on demand, refuse or neglect to pay the customary fare, or when such person shall be of infamous character, or shall be guilty, after admission to the conveyance of the carrier, of gross, vulgar or disorderly conduct, or who shall commit any act tending to injure the business of the carrier, prescribed for the management of his business, after such rules and regulations shall have been made known; provided, said rules and regulations make no discrimination on account of race or color; and shall have the right to refuse any person admission to such conveyance where there is not room or suitable accommodations; and, except in cases above enumerated, all persons engaged in the business of common carriers of passengers are forbidden to refuse admission to their conveyance, or to expel therefrom any person whomsoever.

"Section 4. For a violation of any of the provisions of the first and second sections of this act, the party injured shall have a right of action to recover any damage, exemplary as well as actual, which he may sustain, before any court of competent jurisdiction." (Acts of 1869, p. 37; Revised Statutes of 1870, p. 93.)

Benson (the defendant below) was the master and owner of the "Governor Allen," a steamboat enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States for the coasting trade, and plying as a regular packet for the transportation of freight and passengers between New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, and Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi, touching at the intermediate landings both within and without Louisiana as occasion required. The defendant in error (plaintiff below), a person of color, took passage upon he boat, on her trip up the river from New Orleans, for Hermitage, a landing place within Louisiana, and being refused accommodations, on account of her color, in the cabin specially set apart for white persons, brought this action in the Eighth District Court for the Parish of New Orleans, under the provisions of the act above recited, to recover damages for her mental and physical suffering on that account. Benson, by way of defense, insisted among other things, that the statute was inoperative and void as to him, in respect to the matter complained of, because as to his business it was an attempt to "regulate commerce among the States." and, therefore, in conflict with article 1, section 8, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United States. The District Court of the parish held that the statute made it imperative upon Benson to admit Mrs. DeCuir to the privileges of the cabin for white persons, and that it was not a regulation of commerce among the States, and, therefore, not void. After trial judgment was given against Benson for $1.000, from which he appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where the rulings of the District Court were sustained.

This decision of the Supreme Court is here for reexamination under section 709, Rev. Stats.

For the purposes of this case, we must treat the statute as requiring those engaged in interstate commerce to give all persons traveling in Louisiana, upon the public conveyances employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyance, without distinction or discrimination on account of

race or color. Such was the construction given to the statute in the courts below, and it is conclusive upon us as the construction of a State law by the State courts. It is with this provision of the statute alone that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to do with it as a regulation of internal commerce or as affecting anything else than commerce among the States.

There can be no doubt but that exclusive power bas been conferred upon Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among the several States. The difficulty has never been as to existence of this power, but as to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it, for, as has been often said, "legislation may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution." Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 293. Thus, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135, it was decided that a State might regulate the charges of public warehouses, and in C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, id. 155, of railroads situate entirely within the State, even though those engaged in commerce among the States might sometimes use the warehouses or the railroads in the prosecution of their business. So, too, it has been held that States may authorize the construction of dams and bridges across navigable streams situate entirely within their respective jurisdictions. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 252; Pound v. Turck, not yet reported; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. The same is true of turnpikes and ferries. By such statutes the States regulate as a matter of domestic concern the instruments of commerce situated wholly within their own jurisdictions. and over which they have exclusive governmental control, except when employed in foreign or interstate commerce. As they can only be used in the State, their regulation for all purposes may properly be assumed by the State until Congress acts in reference to their foreign or interstate relations. When Congress does act, the State laws are superseded only to the extent that they affect commerce outside the State as it comes within the State. It has also been held that health and inspection laws may be passed by the States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 205, and that Congress may permit the States to regulate pilots and pilotage until it shall itself legislate upon the subject. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, etc., 12 How. 319. The line which separates the powers of the States from this exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly marked, and oftentimes it is not easy to determine on which side a particular case belongs. Judges not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a decision in which they concur. Under such circumstances it would be a useless task to undertake to fix an arbitrary rule by which the line must in all cases be located. It is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view of the particular rights involved.

But we think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce or to interfere directly with its freedom does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or goes out from within. While it pur

ports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up within and put down without.

A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterward, if the law is enforced.

If

It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten different 3tates, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense and its regulation clearly a matter of national concern. each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay more, it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the State in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe one set of rules and on the other another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it, Congress, which is untrammeled by State lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of deIf this termining what such regulations shall be. statute can be enforced against those engaged in interstate commerce, it may as well against those engaged in foreign, and the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on board,

would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the same cabin during his passage down the river or be subject to an action for damages, "exemplary as well as actual," by any one who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of his color. This power of regulation may be exercised without legislation as well as with it. By refraining from action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its own regulations those which the common law or the civil law, where that prevails, has provided for the government of such business, and those which the States, in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have established affecting commerce, but not regulating it within the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional legislation is only necessary to cure defects in existing laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt such laws to new developments of trade. As was said by Mr. Justice FIELD, speaking for the court in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282,"inaction [by Congress] * * is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammeled.”

*

Applying that principle to the circumstances of this case, congressional inaction left Benson at liberty to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for the disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing her voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed to him most for the interest of all concerned. The statute under which this suit is brought, as construed by the State court, seeks to take away from him that power so long as he is within Louisiana; and while recognizing to the fullest extent the principle which sustains a statute, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly established, we think this statute, to the extent that it requires those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the States to carry colored passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites, is unconstitutional and void. If the public good requires such legislation it must come from Congress and not from the States.

We confine our decision to the statute in its effect upon foreign and interstate commerce, expressing no opinion as to its validity in any other respect.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to reverse the judgment of the District Court and direct such further proceedings in conformity with this opinion as may appear to be necessary.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES TO FEDERAL COURTS, UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, LOUISIANA-FEBRUARY 1, 1878.

IN RE PETITION OF WELLS ET AL.

A law of Louisiana providing for the appointment, by the judges of the principal courts of New Orleans, of commissioners, whose duty it should be to select impartially from the citizens of the parish qualified to vote, the names of not less than one thousand good and competent men to serve on juries, from whom jurors in actions to be tried should be drawn by lot, held not open to any objection under the Federal Constitution; and the fact that such law might be manipulated so as to produce a jury prejudiced against petitioner, held not to furnish ground for removal of a criminal proceeding to the Federal court under section 641 of the Revised Statutes.

The fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the equal benefit of the laws to all, only prohibits State legislation violative of that right. It is not directed against individual infringements thereof.

THIS

HIS was a petition made to Mr. Justice BRADLEY, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, by J. Madison Wells, Thomas C. Anderson, Louis M. Kenner and Gordon Casanave for a writ of certiorari to the Superior Criminal Court of the parish of Orleans, etc. The facts fully appear in the opinion.

BRADLEY, J. This petition states that the Attorney-General of Louisiana has filed in said criminal court an information against the petitioners, charging them with "falsely and feloniously uttering and publishing as true a certain altered, forged and counterfeited public record- to wit, the returns from the parish of Vernon of an election held for Presidential electors in the State of Louisiana on the 7th of November, 1876, knowing the same to be false, altered and counterfeited; that the petitioners were arrested and gave bail, and that their trial is fixed for an early day."

It further states that on the 23d day of January, 1878, pursuant to the laws of the United States and particularly section 641 of the Revised Statutes, they filed a petition in the said Superior Criminal Court

for the removal of the said information and proceedings to the next Circuit Court of the United States of this circuit and district for trial, and that the facts on which such application was made were fully stated and set out in said petition, duly verified by oath, in accordance with said section 641.

The petitioners claim that by the presentation of said petition to the criminal court the cause stood removed, and that the said court had no authority to proceed further in the case. But they state that the court and its officers and the Attorney-General disregarded said petition, and are proceeding with the cause in coutempt of the authority of the United States court. A copy of the petition presented to the criminal court is appended to the present application.

The principal facts stated in said petition as a ground for removing the cause, are, that by reason of the prejudice existing against the petitioners in the court, in the jury and in the public mind in the parish of New Orleans, and throughout the State, on account of their having been the returning officers of the election held in November, 1876, and Republicans in politics, and acting in the canvass and compilation of the returns of the said election, out of which the present prosecution originates, in consequence of all which the most vindictive prejudice exists in the law making and law administering authorities of the State against them; they believe that they will be denied their rights as citizens in the said court and before any jury that may be impaneled therein, under the existing jury law of the State, and that they will not be enabled to enforce their rights in said court in consequence of the inadequate remedies to that end provided. They further allege that the Jury Law was passed March 13, 1877, and that, in so far as it provides for the appointment of Jury Commissioners, and the method of selecting the jury, it was intended for and operates in favor of white citizens, and against those of African descent; and that under it a jury has been drawn for the trial of the petitioners, the effect and intention of the law being to exclude persons of African descent, and other unprejudiced persons from the jury, and to substitute in their place prejudiced white men, and thereby deprive two of the petitioners, Keuner and Casanave (who are colored men), of a trial by their peers, and to bring them to trial by a white and prejudiced jury to the exclusion of men of their own color; and all the petitioners aver that through and by the machinery of said jury law, artfully contrived for the purpose, the State officers and the court and its officers can and have so manipulated said law (as it is capable of) as to deprive the petitioners of an impartial jury, and have organized a jury so prejudiced that defendants cannot have a fair and impartial trial thereby, or by that court, and would be deprived of the full and equal benefits of the laws and proceedings for the security of their persons in this case. They contend that the Jury Law is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the equal civil rights of the petitioners. The application now made to the Circuit Court and presented to me raises these questions: -

First-Was the mere presentation of the petition for removal sufficient to arrest the jurisdiction of the State court, or had that court the right to examine into its sufficiency?

Second - If the court had the right to examine into the sufficiency of the application, has the Circuit

Court the right to re-examine the same, and, if found sufficient, to issue a writ of certiorari or other writ for the removal of the proceedings from the State court?

Third-If the Circuit Court has the right, did the petition in this case present sufficient grounds for removing the case?

I think the first and second questions must be answered in the affirmative. The State court surely is not bound to shut its eyes and yield to every application that comes to it.

Though removal (when authorized) is a matter of right and not of favor, yet the court must have the right to see whether the application to remove comes within the meaning of the law. I have no doubt, however, that the Circuit Court, by virtue of its superior right to try the cause (if subject to removal) is entitled to assert its jurisdiction by proper process directed to the State court. This view is corroborated by certain express provisions of the statute. Section 716 of the Revised Statutes declares that the United States courts may issue all writs which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law; and in the very case under consideration it is provided by section 642 of the Revised Statutes that if the defendant be in actual custody on process issued by the State court, and have performed all the acts necessary to a removal of his cause, the clerk of the Circuit Court is authorized to issue a habeas corpus cum causa, which the Marshal of the United States is authorized to serve, by taking the body of the defendant into his custody, to be dealt with in the Circuit Court according to law and the orders of said court or at invitation of any judge thereof. This is the proper writ for removing both the cause and the person in such a case. Of course the writ should not be issued by the clerk without being allowed by a judge of the court, which is the regular course in issuing writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. I think, therefore, that the Circuit Court may issue either a habeas corpus cum causa or a certiorari, according as the defendant is in custody, for the purpose of removing the cause into that court. When this is done it will be the duty of the State court and its officers to yield obedience to such writs, and it will be presumed that they will do so without any further inhibition, either by writ or otherwise. The course pointed out in section 641 for the defendant to docket the case in the Circuit Court if the clerk of the State court refuses to furnish copies of the proceedings is an additional and summary method of proceeding, when only the clerk is delinquent. But it does not meet the exigency of a refusal on the part of the State court itself to recognize the defendant's right to remove the cause. These require the more formal and orderly process of the court as above specified. The removal of causes from one court to another is a form of quasi appellate jurisdiction, well known in the English system of proceedings to which our own has constant reference. The forms of protest necessary to be used for the purpose, and the principles upon which they are framed are familiar to every student of the common law. The only peculiarity in the present case is that the causes of removal are special and limited, and application therefor must be first made to the court a qua, the reason for which is undoubtedly to be found in the anxiety of the legislative department to avoid every possible cause of jealousy and

complaint. I should have no hesitation, therefore, to allow the writ of certiorari in this case if I were satisfied with the sufficiency of the application.

This brings us to that question as regards the law complained of, passed March 13, 1877, prescribing the mode of selecting and drawing jurors. I have carefully examined its provisions and am unable to see any thing in it open to any Constitutional objection. It provides for the appointment, by the judges of the principal courts in New Orleans, of the commissioners, whose duty it is made to select impartially from the citizens of the parish qualified to vote, the names of not less than one thousand good and competent men to serve on juries. These names are to be placed in a box and from them is to be drawn the general panel for each term. This is the principal feature of the law. Substantially the same method is in use in several other States. The commissioners, it is true, may abuse their trust, but no system can be devised that will not be liable to abuse.

The allegations with regard to the manipulation of the law in such manner as to secure a jury inimical to the petitioners and with regard to the existence of a general prejudice against them in the hands of the court, the jurors, the officials, and the people are not within the purview of the statute authorizing a removal. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution which guarantees the equal benefit of the laws, on which the present application is based, only prohibits State legislation violative of said right. It is not directed against individual infringements thereof.

The Civil Rights bill of 1866 was broader in its scope, undertaking to vindicate those rights against indvidual aggression, but still only when committed uuder color of some law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom. And when that provision in this law, which is transferred to section 641 of the Revised Statutes, gave the right to remove to the United States courts a cause commenced in a State court against a person who is denied or cannot enforce any of the rights secured by the act, it has reference to a denial of those rights or impediments to their enforcement arising from some State law, statute, regulation or custom. It is only when some such hostile State legislation can be shown to exist, interfering with the party's right of defense, that he can have his cause removed to the Federal court. This being my view of the act it follows that I cannot grant the application. If I am wrong the petitioners, having claimed the right of removal, and it being denied by the State court, may carry the case, after final judgment of the highest court in the State, to the Supreme Court of the United States and obtain its judgment on the question. The application is refused.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

IOWA REPORTS, VOLUME 44.

Reports of cases in Law and Equity determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. By John S. Runnells, Reporter. Vol. VII, being Vol. XLIV of the series. Des Moines: Mills & Company, 1877

AMONG the cases of value in the present volume, we

notice these: Gokey v. Krapp, p. 32. When an agent for the loaning of money takes usury, he will not be presumed to have the authority of his principal therefor. Van Buskerk v. Dougherty, p. 42. The drinking of two glasses of beer by a juror pending trial after the adjournment of court and eleven hours before another session, held not to vitiate the verdict. Neilson v. Iowa East

ern Ry. Co., p. 71. A mechanics' lien attaches from the commencement of the building and takes precedence over a mortgage executed after that time, though the particular work for which the lien is claimed was not commenced until after the execution of the mortgage. Williamson v. City of Keokuk, p. 88. Municipal bonds issued by corporations not having the power to issue are absolutely void, even in the hands of an innocent holder for value. Thompson v. Lambert, p. 239. The doctrine of ultra vires will be applied to contracts of corporations only when such contracts remain wholly executory. Bosch v. B. & M. R. R. Co., p. 402. Defendant cut off access to the river from plaintiff's house by constructing its railroad and buildings; plaintiff's house took fire, and the fire department not being able to reach the river and obtain water to put on the house, the same was burned. Held, that the damages were too remote and defendant was not liable for the destruction of the house. Fell v. Cook, p. 485. After his discharge in bankruptcy the bankrupt executed his note for a debt previously existing, upon condition that the payee would dismiss a proceeding instituted by him to set aside the discharge. Held, that the note was void. Huff v. Cook, p. 639. There is no constitutional inhibition upon the right of a woman to hold the office of county superintendent. Leighton v. Orr, p. 679. The influence possessed by a woman pretending to be a spiritualistic medium over one who was given to drink and with whom she was living in adulterous intercourse, held undue, and a voluntary deed from him to her set aside. The reporting as usual in this series is well done and the mechanical execution of the book is good.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Alteration of notes.-A note payable to the order of G. and indorsed first by G. and then by H. was thereafter altered by the maker so as to make it payable to G. and H. Thereafter it was discounted by plaintiff. Held, that the alteration discharged the indorsers. Sup. Ct., Michigan, October, 1877. Aldrich v. Hackley.

Bill of exchange: insolvency of acceptor: bills drawn in foreign country: claim by drawer for charges incurred for re-exchange.-The drawer of a bill is entitled to recover from the acceptor all proper and reasonable expenses which he has incurred in consequence of the bill being dishonored by the latter, including re-exchange or charges in lieu of re-exchange. Woolsey v. Crawford, 2 Camp. 445, and Napier v. Schneider, 12 East, 420, treated as overruled. Eng. High Ct. of Just., Ch. Div., Nov. 24, 1877. Re General So. Amer. Co., Claim of Bk. of Lima, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 599. Contributory negligence: killing in self-defense: evidence: reasonable doubt.-Where, under such a statute, the killing is in self-defense no damages can be recovered. And the law of self-defense is the same as in a criminal prosecution, except as to the rule of evidence which, in a criminal prosecution, gives a defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt. Sup. Ct., Texas, Dec. 8, 1877. March v. Walker, Texas L. J.

Contributory negligence: death by wrongful act: misconduct of deceased.-Where in an action under the statute for the death of plaintiff's intestate the death was caused by the wrongful act of the defendant, it is no defense that the death was the result of the misconduct or neglect of the deceased; but that