« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
fall of the market, the contract would have been and plaintiff was not familiar with the locality. Beillegal. Ib.
fore the station was reached the brakeman on the (Decided Dec. 11, 1877.)
train announced it. The train, however, went by the 3. Agreement to exchange farms: fraudulent misde- station a short distance, and plaintiff, supposing that scription in deeds.-Plaintiff and defendant by parol it was the place to get off, went out on the platform agreed to exchange farms, plaintiff agreeing to convey of the car, and was stepping down, when the train, to defendant his farm, and defendant to convey to without notice being given to the passengers, was plaintiff 183 acres of land, measuring from the south suddenly backed up, and plaintiff was thereby sudend of his farm. Plaintiff performed the agreement denly thrown down and injured. There was no depot on his part. Defendant executed and delivered to building at the station, or any other external indiplaintiff a deed which conveyed 183 acres of land from cation of where was the proper place for the train to the north end of his farm, and which he knew did not stop. Held, that a jury were warranted in finding describe the land he agreed to convey. Held, that that defendant was negligent in backing up without plaintiff, on discorering the error, was entitled, upon notice, and that plaintiff was not negligent in attempt. defendant's refusing to convey the land he had agreed, ing to leave the train as she did. Judgment below to a judgment that he perform his agreement. Judg- affirmed. Taber v. Delaware, etc., Railroad Company. ment below affirmed. Wilson v. Van Pelt. Opinion Opinion by Andrews, J. by Earl, J.
[Decided Dec. 18, 1877.) [Decided Dec. 21, 1877.]
STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
Action begun within a year after reversal of former 1. Meaning of words “ port risk ”must be explained by suit for same cause.—Under the provision of sec. 104 of experts.—The words “port risk," used in a marine in- the old Code, that, “If an action shall be commenced surance policy, held not to convey to the public gener- within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment ally, unacquainted with the business of insurance, any thereon be reversed on appeal, the plaiutiff may comdefinite meaning, and to require the testimony of ex- mence a new action within one year after the reversperts to explain their siguification. Such testimony al,” in a case where from a judgment of reversal by would not be to explain a usage, but for the purpose of the lower appellate court an appeal is taken to the finding out the meaning of a technical phrase. Judg
Court of Appeals and the judgment of reversal is ment below affirmed. Nelson v. Sun Mutual Insurance affirmed, the plaintiff is entitled to bring the action Co. Opiniou by Folger, J.
within one year after the final judgment of the Couro [Decided Dec. 18, 1877.]
of Appeals, and is not limited to one year after the 2. Who may not be entitled to be sworn as expert. - A judgment of the lower appellate court. Judgment witness testified that he was more or less familiar with below affirmed. Wooster v. Forty-second St., etc., Railgetting policies from underwriters and attending to road Company. Opinion by Andrews, J. marine matters, and that he knew of the term “port (Decided Dec. 18, 1877.] risk in the port of New York," but on cross-examination he said he had never seen the words “ port risk" in a policy, and did not declare that he had ever
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND INTERSTATE COMknown it to be used in the business of insurance save
MERCE. in a general way. He had never kuown it to be used in a policy. Held, that he was properly excluded from
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES -JANUtestifying as an expert as to the meaning of the words.
HALL V. DE CUIR.
A State statute which provides that all persons without
distinction on account of race or color shall have cbaser at an auction sale has made a deposit with the equal rights and privileges in all parts of public conveyauctioneer, and has become entitled to a returu of the ances is invalid so far as relates to conveyances run
ning between different States. deposit, he may maintain an action for such deposit By a statute of Louisiana carriers of passengers within the against the auctioneer or his principal, and prosecute
State were rejuired to give all persons traveling in their
conveyances equal rights and privileges in all parts the same to judgment, but a judgment against one thereof without distinction or discrimination on acwhich has been satisfied is a bar to a further prosecu
count of race or color. The plaintiff, a person of color,
took fassage at New Orleans for a point in Louisiana, on tion against the other. He is also entitled to interest, defendant's steamboat riinning between New Orleans both in the action against the principal and that
and Vicksburg, and was, on account of her color, re
fused admission into the cabin, set aside for white la-against the auctioneer. But where, in the action dies. In an action under the statute to recover dama
ges, held, that the act so far as it af plied to conveyances against the principal, interest was refused on the
ruuning from Louisiana into other States was an enground that no demand had been made for the return croachment upon the right of Congress to regulate of the money, and the judgment in that action had commerce among the States, and that the action could
not be maintained. been satisfied, an action against the auctioneer is en
error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisitirely barred, even though in the last-named action plaintiff might be entitled to interest. Judgment be
Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of low affirmed. Cockroft v. Muller. Opinion by Allen, J.
the Court. [Decided Dec. 4, 1877.)
By the Constitution of Louisiana (art. 13) it is proviNEGLIGENCE.
ded that "all persons shall enjoy equal rights and privi1. Train overshooting station and backing up without leges upon any conveyance of a public character," and notice : contributory negligence.-Plaintiff, a passenger by an act of the general assembly, approved February in defendant's train, reached a station where she in- 23, 1869, to enforce this article, it was enacted as foltended to alight. It was in the night time and dark, lows.
“Section 1. All persons engaged within this State, in race or color. Such was the construction given to the business of common carriers of passengers, shall the statute in the courts below, and it is conclusive have the right to refuse to admit any person to their upon us as the construction of a State law by the State railroad cars, street cars, steamboats or other water courts. It is with this provision of the statute alone crafts, stage coaches, omnibuses, or other vebicles, or that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to to expel any person therefrom after admission, when do with it as a regulation of internal commerce or as afsuch person shall, ou demand, refuse or neglect to pay fecting anything else than commerce among the States. the customary fare, or when such person shall be of in- There can be no doubt but that exclusive power bits famous character, or shall be guilty, after admission been conferred upon Congress iu respect to the regula. to the conveyance of the carrier, of gross, vulgar or tion of commerce among the several States. The diffidisorderly conduct, or who shall commit any act tend- culty has never been as to existence of this power, but as ing to injure the business of the carrier, prescribed for to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it, for, the management of his business, after such rules and as has been often said, “legislation may in a great varegulations shall have been made known; provided, riety of ways affect commerce and persons engaged in said rules and regulations make no discriminatiou on it without constituting a regulation of it within the account of race or color; and shall have the right to meaning of the Constitution.” Sherlock v. Alling, 93 refuse any person admission to such conveyance where U. S. 103; State Tux on Railway Gross Receipla, 15 there is not room or suitable accounmodations; and, Wall. . 293. Thus, in Muun v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135, it except in cases above enumerated, all persons engaged was decided that a State might regulate the charges of in the business of common carriers of passengers are public warehouses, and in C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, forbidden to refuse admission to their couveyance, or id. 155, of railroads situate entirely within the State, to expel therefrom any person whomsoever.
even though those engaged in commerce among the
States might sometimes use the warehouses or the “Sectiou 4. For a violation of any of the provisions
railroads in the prosecution of their business. So, too, it of the first and second sections of this act, the party
has been held that States may authorize the construcinjured shall have a right of action to recover any
tion of daws and bridges across navigable streams damage, exemplary as well as actual, which he may
situate entirely within their respective jurisdicsustain, before any court of competent jurisdiction."
tions. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (Acts of 1869, p. 37; Revised Statutes of 1870, p 93.)
252; Pound v. Turck, not yet reported; Gilman v. Benson (the defendant below) was the master and
Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. The same is true of turuowner of the “Governor Allen," a steamboat enrolled
pikes and ferries. By such statutes the States regulate and licensed under the laws of the United States for
as a matter of domestic concern the instruments of comthe coasting trade, and plying as a regular packet for
merce situated wholly within their own jurisdictions, the transportation of freight and passengers between
and over which they have exclusive governmental conNew Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, and Vicks
trol, except when employed in foreign or interstate burg, in the State of Mississippi, touching at the in
commerce. As they can only be used in the State, termediate landings both withiu and without Louisi.
their regulation for all purposes may properly be asana as occasion required. The defendant in error
sumed by the State until Congress acts in reference to (plaintiff below), a person of color, took passage upon
their foreigu or interstate relations. When Congress he boat, on her trip up the river from New Orleans,
dues act, the State laws are superseded only to the exfor Hermitage, a landing place within Louisiana, and being refused accommodatious, on account of her
tent that they affect commerce outside the State as it
copies within the State. It has also been held that color, in the cabin specially set apart for white persons, brought this action in the Eighth District Court for
health and inspection laws may be passed by the the Parish of New Orleans, under the provisions of the
States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 205, and that Conact above recited, to recover damages for her mental
gress may permit the States to regulate pilots and and physical suffering on that account. Benson, by
pilotage until it shall itself legislate upon the subject. way of defense, insisted among other things, that the
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, etc., 12 How. 319. The statute was inoperative and void as to him, in respect
line which separates the powers of the States from this to the matter complained of, because as to his business
exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly it was an attempt to “ regulate commerce among the
marked, and oftentimes it is not easy to determine on States," and, therefore, in conflict with article 1, sec
which side a particular case belongs. Judges not untion 8, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United
frequently differ in their reasons for a decision in States. The District Court of the parish beld that the
which they concur. Under suco circumstances it statute made it imperative upon Benson to admit Mrs.
would be a useless task to undertake to fix an arbitrary DeCuir to the privileges of the cabiu for white persons,
rule by which the line must in all cases be located. It and that it was not a regulation of commerce among
is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be the States, and, therefore, not void. After trial judg
settled in each case upou a view of the particular ment was given against Benson for $1.000, from which
rights involved. he appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where
But we think it may safely be said that State legisthe rulings of the District Court were sustained.
lation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon This decision of the Supreme Court is here for re
interstate commerce or to interfere directly with its examination under section 709, Rev. Stats.
freedom does encroach upon the exclusive power of For the purposes of this case, we must treat the stat- Congress. The statute now under consideration, in ute as requiring those engaged in interstate commerce our opinion, occupies that position. It does not to give all persons traveling in Louisiana, upon the act upon the business through the local instruments public conveyances employed in such business, equal
to be employed after coming within the State, but rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyance,
directly upon the business as it comes into the State without distinction or discrimination on account of
from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within Applying that principle to the circumstances of this the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to case, congressioval inaction left Benson at liberty to some extent in the management of his business adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for the throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursupassengers taken up and put down within the State, or ing her voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed taken up within to be carried without, cannot but to him most for the interest of all concerned. The affect in a greater or less degree those taken up with- statute under which this suit is brought, as construed out and brought within, and sometimes those taken by the State court, seeks to take away from him up within and put down without.
that power so long as he is within Louisiana; aud A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of while recognizing to the fullest extent the principle whites without the State must, when the boat comes which sustains a statute, unless its unconstitutionality within, share the accommodations of that cabin with is clearly established, we think this statute, to the such colored persons as may come on board after- extent that it requires those engaged in the transporward, if the law is enforced.
tation of passengers among the States to carry colored It was to meet just such a case that the commercial passengers in Louisiana in the same cabiu with whites, clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river is uncoustitutional and void. If the public good reMississippi passes through or along the borders of ten quires such legislation it must come from Congress different States, and its tributaries reach many more. and not from the States. The commerce upon these waters is immense and its
We confine our decision to the statute in its effect regulation clearly a matter of national concern. If
upon foreign and interstate commerce, expressing uo each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct of opinion as to its validity in any other respect. carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana likely to follow could not but be productive of great is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State
to reverse the judgment of the District Court and could provide for its own passengers and regulate the
direct such further proceedings in conformity with transportation of its own freight, regardless of the
this opinion as may appear to be necessary. interests of others. Nay more, it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the State in respect to passengers and property REMOVAL OF CAUSES TO FEDERAL COURTS, brought from without. On one side of the river or UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW. its tributaries he might be required to observe one set of rules and on the other another. Commerce cannot UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, LOUISIANA-FEBflourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No
RUARY 1, 1878. carrier of passengers can conduct his business with
IN RE PETITION OF WELLS ET AL. satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing
A law of Louisiana providing for the appointment, by the him, if on one side of a State line his passengers, both judges of the principal courts of New Orleans, of comwhite and colored, must be permitted to occupy the
missioners, whose duty it should be to select impar
tially from the citizens of the parish qualified to vote, same cabin and on the other be kept separate. Uui- the names of not less than one thousand good and formity in the regulations by which he is to be gov
competent men to serve on juries, from whom jurors
in actions to be tried should be drawn by lot, held not erned from one end to the other of his route is a open to any objection under the Federal Constitution;
and the fact that such law might be manipulated so as necessity in his business, and to secure it, Congress,
to produce a jury prejudiced against petitioner, held which is untrammeled by State lines, has been in- not to furnish ground for removal of a criminal provested with the exclusive legislative power of de
ceeding to the Federal court under section 641 of the
Revised Statutes. terminivg what such regulations shall be. If this the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, statute can be enforced against those engaged in
which guarantees the equal benefit of the laws to all,
only prohibits State legislation violative of that right. interstate commerce, it may as well against those en- It is not directed against individual infringements
thereof. gaged in foreign, and the master of a ship clearing from
THIS was a petition made to Mr. Justice BRADLEY,
, in Associate Justice of the United States Supreme the same cabiu during his passage down the river or Court, by J. Madison Wells, Thomas C. Anderson, be subject to an action for damages, "exemplary as Louis M. Kemer and Gordon Casanave for a writ of well as actual,” by any one who felt himself aggrieved certiorari to the Superior Criminal Court of the parish because he had been excluded on account of his color. of Orleans, etc. The facts fully appear in the opinion.
This power of regulation may be exercised without BRADLEY, J. This petition states that the Attorlegislation as well as with it. By refraining from ney-General of Louisiana has filed in said crimival action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its own regula- | court an information against the petitioners, charging tions those which the common law or the civil law, them with "falsely and feloniously uttering and pubwhere that prevails, has provided for the goverument lishing as true a certain altered, forged and counterof such business, and those which the States, in the feited public record — to wit, the returns from the regulation of their domestic concerus, have established parish of Vernou of an election held for Presidential uffecting commerce, but not regulating it within the electors in the State of Louisiana on the 7th of Nomeaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional | vember, 1876, knowing the same to be false, altered legislation is only necessary to cure defects in existing and counterfeited; that the petitioners were arrested laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt sucb laws and gave bail, and that their trial is fixed for an early to new developments of trade. As was said by Mr. day.” Justice FIELD, speaking for the court in Welton v. It further states that on the 23d day of January, Missouri, 91 U. S. 282, "inaction (by Congress] * 1878, pursuant to the laws of the United States and
is equivalent to a declaration that interstate particularly section 641 of the Revised Statutes, they commerce sball remain free and untrammele d.”' filed a petitiou in the said Superior Criminal Court
New Orleans for Liverpool, having
passengerson board, THA
for the removal of the said information and proceed- Court the right to re-examiue the same, and, if found ings to the next Circuit Court of the United States sufficient, to issue a writ of certiorari or other writ of this circuit and district for trial, and that the facts for the removal of the proceedings from the State on which such application was made were fully stated court ? and set out in said petition, duly verified by oath, in Third-If the Circuit Court has the right, did the accordance with said section 641.
petition in this case present sufficient grouuds for reThe petitioners claim that by the presentation of moving the case ? said petition to the criminal court the cause stood I think the first and second questions must be removed, and that the said court had no authority to answered in the affirmative. The State court surely proceed further in the case. But they state that the is not bound to shut its eyes and yield to every applicourt and its officers and the Attorney-General dis- cation that comes to it. regarded said petition, and are proceeding with the Though removal (when authorized) is a matter of cause in coutempt of the authority of the United right and not of favor, yet the court must have the States court. A copy of the petition presented to right to see whether the application to remove comes the criminal court is appended to the present appli- within the meaning of the law. I have no doubt, cation.
however, that the Circuit Court, by virtue of its supeThe principal facts stated in said petition as a ground rior right to try the cause (if subject to removal) is for removing the cause, are, that by reason of the entitled to assert its jurisdiction by proper process prejudice existing against the petitioners in the court, directed to the State court. This view is corroborated in the jury and in the public mind in the parish of
by certain express provisions of the statute. Section New Orleans, and throughout the State, on account 716 of the Revised Statutes declares that the United of their having been the returning officers of the elec- States courts may issue all writs which may be necestion held in November, 1876, and Republicans in sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions politics, and acting in the canvass and compilation of and agreeable to the usages and principles of law; and the returns of the said election, out of which the in the very case under consideration it is provided by present prosecution originates, in consequence of all section 642 of the Revised Statutes that if the defendwbich the most vindictive prejudice exists in the law ant be in actual custody on process issued by the State making and law administering authorities of the court, and have performed all the acts necessary to a State against them; they believe that they will be removal of his cause, the clerk of the Circuit Court is denied their rights as citizens in the said court and authorized to issue a habeas corpus cum culi8(, which before any jury that may be impaneled therein, un- the Marshal of the United States is authorized to der the existing jury law of the State, and that they serve, by taking the body of the defendant into his will not be enabled to enforce their rights in said
custody, to be dealt with in the Circuit Court accordcourt in consequence of the inadequate remedies to ing to law and the orders of said court or at invitathat end provided. They further allege that the Jury tion of any judge thereof. This is the proper writ for Law was passed March 13, 1877, and that, in so far as removing both the cause and the person in such a it provides for the appointment of Jury Commission- case. Of course the writ should not be issued by ers, and the method of selecting the jury, it was in- the clerk without being allowed by a judge of tended for and operates in favor of white citizens, and the court, which is the regular course in issuagainst those of African descent; and that under it ing writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. I think, a jury has been drawn for the trial of the petitioners, therefore, that the Circuit Court may issue either the effect and intention of the law being to exclude a habeas corpus cum
a certiorari, acpersons of African descent, and other unprejudiced cording as the defendant is in custody, for the purpersons from the jury, and to substitute in their place pose of removing the cause into that court. When prejudiced white men, and thereby deprive two of the this is done it will be the duty of the State court and petitioners, Keuner and Casanave (who are colored its officers to yield obedience to such writs, and it will men), of a trial by their peers, and to bring them to be presumed that they will do so without any further trial by a white and prejudiced jury to the exclusion inhibition, either by writ or otherwise. The course of men of their own color; and all the petitioners pointed out in section 641 for the defendant to docket arer that through and by the machinery of said jury the case in the Circuit Court if the clerk of the State law, artfully contrived for the purpose, the State offi- court refuses to furnish copies of the proceedings is cers and the court and its officers can and have so an additional and summary method of proceeding, manipulated said law (as it is capable of) as to deprive when only the clerk is delinquent. But it does not the petitioners of an impartial jury, and have organ- meet the exigency of a refusal ou the part of the State ized a jury so prejudiced that defendants canuot have court itself to recognize the defendant's right to rea fair and impartial trial thereby, or by that court, move the cause. These require the more formal and and would be deprived of the full and equal benefits orderly process of the court as above specified. The of the laws and proceedings for the security of their removal of causes from one court to another is a forin persons in this case. They contend that the Jury of quasi appellate jurisdiction, well known in the Law is in violation of the Constitution of the United English system of proceedings to which our own has States, and of the equal civil rights of the petitioners.
constant reference. The forms of protest necessary The application now made to the Circuit Court and to be used for the purpose, and the principles upon presented to me raises these questions:
which they are framed are familiar to every studeut of First - Was the mere presentation of the petition the common law. The only peculiarity in the present for removal sutficient to arrest the jurisdiction of the case is that the causes of removal are special and limState court, or had that court the right to examine | ited, and application therefor must be first made to into its sufficiency?
the court a qua, the reason for which is undoubtedly Second - If the court had the right to examine into to be found in the anxiety of the legislative departthe sufficiency of the application, has the Circuit ment to aroid every possible cause of jealousy and
complaint. I should have no hesitation, therefore, to ern Ry. Co., p. 71. A mechanics' lien attaches allow the writ of certiorari in this case if I were sat- from the commencement of the building and takes isfied with the sufficiency of the application.
precedence over a mortgage executed after that time, This brings us to that question as regards the law though the particular work for which the lien is complained of, passed March 13, 1877, prescribing the claimed was not commenced until after the execution mode of selecting and drawing jurors. I have care- of the mortgage. Williamson v. City of Keokuk, p. fully examined its provisions and am unable to see 88. Municipal bonds issued by corporations not bavally thing in it open to any Constitutional objection. ing the power to issue are absolutely void, even in the It provides for the appointment, by the judges of the hands of an innocent holder for value. Thompson v. principal courts in New Orleans, of the commission- Lambert, p. 239. The doctrine of ultra vires will be apers, whose duty it is made to select impartially from plied to contracts of corporations only when such the citizens of the parish qualified to vote, the names contracts ro'nain wholly executory. Bosch v. B. & M. of not less than one thousand good and competent R. R. Co., p. 402. Defendant cut off access to the river men to serve on juries. These pames are to be placed from plaintiff's house by constructing its railroad and in a box and from them is to be drawn the general buildings; plaintiff's house took fire, and the fire depanel for each term. This is the principal feature of partment not being able to reach the river and obtain the law. Substantially the same method is in use in water to put on the house, the same was burned. Held, several other States. The commissioners, it is true, that the damages were too remote and defendant was may abuse their trust, but no system can be devised not liable for the destruction of the house. Fell v. that will not be liable to abuse.
Cook, p. 485. After his dischargé iu bankruptcy the The allegations with regard to the manipulation of baukrupt executed his note for a debt previously the law in such manner as to secure a jury inimical to existing, upon condition that the payee would the petitioners and with regard to the existence of a dismiss a proceeding instituted by him to set aside the general prejudice against them in the hands of the discharge. Held, that the note was void. Huff v. Cook, court, the jurors, the officials, and the people are not p. 639. There is no constitutional inhibition upon the within the purview of the statute authorizing a re- right of a woman to hold the office of county supermoral. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitu- intendent. Leighton v. Orr, p. 679. The influence postion which guarantees the equal benefit of the laws, on sessel by a woman pretending to be a spiritualistio mewhich the present application is based, only prohibits dium orer one who was given to drink and with whom State legislation violative of said right. It is vot di- she was living in adulterous intercourse, held undue, rected against individual infringements thereof. and a voluntary deed from him to her set aside. The
The Civil Rights bill of 1866 was broader in its scope, reporting as usual in this series is well done and the undertaking to vindicate those rights against indvidual mechanical execution of the book is good. aggression, but still only when committed under color of some law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom. And when that provision in this law, wbich is trans
NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. ferred to section 611 of the Revised Statutes, gave the
Alteration of notes. - A note payable to the order of right to remove to the United States courts a cause
G. and indorsed first by G. and then by H. was therecommenced in a State court against a person who is
after altered by the maker so as to make it payable to denied or cannot enforce any of the rights secured by
G. and H. Thereafter it was discounted by plaintiff. the act, it has reference to a denial of those rights or
Held, that the alteration discharged the indorsers. impediments to their enforcement arising from some
Sup. Ct., Michigan, October, 1877. Aldrich v. HackState law, statute, regulation or custom. It is only when some such hostile State legislation can be shown
Bill of exchange : insolvency of acceptor: bills drawn to exist, interfering with the party's right of defense,
in foreign country: claim by drawer for charges inthat he can have his cause removed to the Federal court. This being my view of the act it follows that I
curred for re-exchange.—The drawer of a bill is enti
tled to recover from the acceptor all proper and reacannot grant the application. If I am wrong the pe
sonable expenses which he has incurred in consequence titioners, having claimed the right of removal, and it
of the bill being dishonored by the latter, including being denied by the State court, may carry the case,
re-exchange or charges in lieu of re-exchange. Woolafter final judgment of the highest court in the State,
sey v. Crawford, 2 Camp. 445, and Napier v. Schneider, to the Supreme Court of the United States and obtain
12 East, 420, treated as overruled. Eng. High Ct, of its judgment on the question.
Just., Ch. Div., Nov. 24, 1877. Re General So. Amer. The applicatiou is refused.
Co., Claim of Bk. of Lima, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. 8.) 599.
Contributory negligence: killing in self-defense : eriNEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.
dence: reasonable doubt.-Where, under such a statute, JOWA REPORTS, VOLUME 44.
the killing is in self-defense no damages can be recovReports of cases in Law and Equity determined in the Su- ered. And the law of self-defense is the same as in a
preme Court of the State of Iowa. By John S. Runnells, Reporter. Vol. VII, being Vol. XLIV of the series.
criminal prosecution, except as to the rule of evidence Des Moines : Mills & Company, 1877
which, in a criminal prosecution, gives a defendant MONG the cases of value in the present volume, we
the benefit of a reasonable doubt. Sup. Ct., Texas,
Dec. 8, 1877. Murch v. Walker, Texas L. J. for the loaning of money takes usury, he will uot be pre- Contributory negligence: death by wrongful act: sumed to have the authority of his principal therefor. misconduct of deceased.-Where in an action under Van Buskerk v. Dougherty, p. 42. The drinking of two the statute for the death of plaintiff's intestate the glasses of beer by a juror pending trial after the adjouru- death was caused by the wrongful act of the defendment of court and eleven hours before another session, ant, it is no defense that the death was the result of held not to vitiate the verdict. Neilson v. Iowa East. the misconduct or neglect of the deceased; but that