§ 6. As to being a general or special tax law.— It has been held to be a general and not a special law, and thus constitutional as such within the law of Maryland,' while in New York, and some other States, it has been held to be a special tax, but valid as such.2

$7. Not a poll tax.-It is not within the constitutional prohibition against levying a poll tax, exempting paupers, etc.

§ 8. As to being an equal and uniform tax.-Nor does a law imposing such tax conflict with a general constitutional requirement that all taxes shall be equal and uniform within the State.*

The terms equal and uniform apply only to a direct tax on property, and do not limit the power of the Legislature as to the object of tax. They are intended to prevent an arbitrary tax on property according to kind or quality without regard to value.5

While providing for a uniform mode of taxation on property it was not the purpose of the constitution to prohibit any other species of tax, but to leave the

1 Montague v. State, 1880, 54 Md. 482.

2 Matter of McPherson, 1887, 104 N. Y. 306; Matter of Enston, 113 N. Y. 178. See Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 436; Tyson v. State, 1868, 28 Md. 577; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Id. 294; 17 Atl.

Eyre v. Jacob, 1858, 14 Grat. 427; Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577; Pullen v. Commissioners, 1872, 66 N. C. 361; Peters v. Lynchburg, 1882, 76 Va. 927; Schoolfield v. Same, 1884, 78 Va.

5 Id., decisions, supra.

Legislature the power to impose such other taxes as the interests of the Government might require.1

$9. Double taxation.-There is nothing in the Federal constitution that forbids double or unequal taxation by a State, hence, the privilege under these laws may be taxed, although the property is also taxed; and it makes no difference that the same tax is imposed upon the succession in another State.*

3

§ 10. Not a taking of private property, etc.— Nor is it a taking of private property without compensation."

§ 11. Need not state object of tax.-It is not necessary that the act should state the object of the tax, or to what purpose it is to be applied, under the New York constitution, as that provision was only intended to apply to the annually recurring taxes known at the time of the constitution's adoption."

1 Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577; State v. Dalrymple, supra. A statute of Minn. requiring, as a condition precedent to probate proceedings for the settlement of estates, the payment to the County Treasurer of specified sums arbitrarily prescribed with reference to the value of the estate, Held unconstitutional, being contrary to the requirement of equality of taxation and the dispensation of justice freely and without purchase. State v. Gorman, 41 N. W. Rep. 948; contra, Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 368; Harrison v. Willis, 7 Heisk. 35.

2 Davidson v. N. O. 96 U. S. 97-106. See Matter of Enston, 113 N. Y. 182.

* See Com. v. Sharpless, 2 Chest. Pa. 246; Com. v. Schumach

er, 9 L. Bar. Pa. 199; but see Matter of Enston, 113 N. Y. 182, 183.

5 Strode v. Com. 1866, 52 Penn. St. 186.

Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; S. P. Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 427.

12. As to notice and hearing.-But parties against whom it is sought to assess the tax have a constitutional right to notice, and to an opportunity for a hearing upon the assessment. It would seem that all the statutes upon this subject sufficiently provide for such notice and hearing so as to obviate any constitutional objection, either under the State or under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.1

§ 13. Due process of law not violated.-Nor do these statutes violate the provision of the constitution as to due process of law."

3

§14. As to being retro-active and ex post facto.—In Maryland an interesting question arose as to the constitutional effect of a statute of that State releasing the rights of the State to claims for the tax against husbands, who, under a previous law, had been made liable, where such claims had not been actually paid. It was contended by the State that the act was retro-active and unconstitutional as against the State, as violating the rule of equality between those husbands who had actually paid the tax before the repealing law was passed, and those who had refused and thus obtained its benefits.

But the Court said: "If the legislature is satis

1 Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed. 362, 363; Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; 21 Am. Law Rev. 464-466; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. Rep. 184; citing Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Ky. Railroad Tax Cases, 115 Id. 321. 2 Matter of McPherson, supra.

3 Montague v. State, 54 Md. 486.

fied that a given tax is no longer necessary; that it is unjust; that a change of circumstances requires its repeal; that public policy demands that the repeal shall be prompt, should give instant relief, and should therefore extend to all who have not yet actually paid, the legislature has, in its discretion, the constitutional right so to enact, without being at the same time compelled to embarrass the treasury by at sweeping restriction to all who had paid the tax from the time of its imposition. Under some circumstances such a retrospective exemption might be highly expedient, and under others not. The question is of policy, and not of law for the courts.'

In Pennsylvania an amendatory statute of 1850 (amending Act 1826) provided that the estates of persons domiciled there who died before the passage of the Act of 1850, "shall be so construed as to relate to all persons who have been at the time of their decease or now may be domiciled within this commonwealth, as well as to estates." It was held that the act was retro-active, but constitutional as to estates within the State, and that under it stocks and moneys held abroad were liable to the tax, to be paid out of the assets in the hands of the executors.2

1 Montague v. State, 54 Md. 486. Many retrospective exemptions have been made in New York, particularly as regards adopted children, and those standing in the so-called relation of parent and child (Law 1885, ch. 483, sec. 1; L. 1887, ch. 713; L. 1889, ch. 479; see Chapter III, "Exemptions ").

2 In re Short's Estate, 1851, 16 Penn. St. 63; Carpenter v. Penn. 17 How. 456; Com. v. Smith, 5 Penn. St. 143. See, also, Alexander's App. 3 Penn. Law Jour. Rep. 87; In re Ewing, 1 Cromp. & J. 158; Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Penn. St. 184. But see Pullen v. Com. 1872, 66 N. C. 361.

In Short's case1 the court said: "The argument has been that we ought not to give the act a retro-active effect unless we are forced to do so by the stringency of the words. The principle is a sound one where retro-action would work an injustice,

but certainly no injustice is done by increasing a tax to meet an increase of the public burden."

Short's estate subsequently came before the Supreme Court of the United States. It appeared that decedent was a citizen of the State, had died in 1849, and his resident executor claimed that certain bonds not within the State, and legacies to foreigners, were not taxable, and that the Act of 1850 was retroactive, upon the ground that the rights of the legatees vested at decedent's death; it was also urged that the law was ex post facto. The latter contention the court overruled, with the observation that it only applied to criminal cases. In pass

ing upon the other objection the court said (p. 462): "Until the period for distribution arrives, the law of the decedent's domicile attaches to the property, and all other jurisdictions refer to the place of domicile as that where the distribution should be made. The will of the testator is proven there, and his executor receives his authority to collect the property by the recognition of the legal tribunals of that place.

The rights of the donee are subordinate to the conditions, formalities and administrative control prescribed by the State in the interest of its public order, and are only irrevocably established upon its abdication of this control at the period of distribution. If

1 Supra.

2 Sub nom. Carpenter v. Penn. 1854, 17 Howard. 456.