112 Opinion of the Court. officers of the United States. . .,' ," thereby centralizing all such cases in the Court of Claims. Congress made no provision for cases pending at the effective date of the Act withdrawing jurisdiction and, for this reason, Courts of Appeals ordered pending cases terminated for want of jurisdiction. United States v. McCrory, 91 F. 295 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1899); United States v. Kelly, 97 F. 460 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1899). Thereafter, Congress restored the jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts to consider cases pending on the date that jurisdiction had been withdrawn." The Act of October 31, 1951, withdrawing the jurisdiction of the District Court over suits by "employees," did not reserve jurisdiction over pending cases,' even though reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases had been held required and later had been made by Congress in respect to the 1898 provisions withdrawing jurisdiction over suits by "officers." Absent such a reservation, only the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation brought by employees of the United States even though the District Court had jurisdiction over such claims when petitioner's action was brought. Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541 (1867). In Ritchie, a case arising under the internal revenue laws, jurisdiction was based upon an Act of 1833 granting the circuit courts jurisdiction over all cases arising under the revenue laws. After decision in the Circuit Court and while an appeal to this Court was pending, an Act of 1866 withdrew the jurisdiction of the circuit courts 530 Stat. 494, 495 (1898). See H. R. Rep. No. 325, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (1898). 631 Stat. 33 (1900). No mention of pending cases is found in the Act. In § 56 (1) of the same Act, Congress expressly saved "any rights or liabilities" existing at the effective date of the Act under statutes repealed by § 56. 65 Stat. 710, 730 (1951). 994084 0-52-12 Opinion of the Court. 343 U.S. over cases arising under the internal revenue laws, without any reservation saving cases such as Ritchie's. This Court held: "It is clear, that when the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction. And it is equally clear, that where a jurisdiction, conferred by statute, is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is, so far, a repeal of the statute conferring the jurisdiction. "It is quite possible that this effect of the act of 1866 was not contemplated by Congress. The jurisdiction given by the act of 1833 in cases arising under the customs revenue laws is not taken away or affected by it. In these cases suits may still be maintained against collectors by citizens of the same State. It is certainly difficult to perceive a reason for discrimination between such suits and suits under the internal revenue laws; but when terms are unambiguous we may not speculate on probabilities of intention." 5 Wall. at 544–545. In another case arising under the same jurisdictional statutes, the Court, in following Ritchie, stated the applicable rule as follows: "Jurisdiction in such cases was conferred by an act of Congress, and when that act of Congress was repealed the power to exercise such jurisdiction was withdrawn, and inasmuch as the repealing act contained no saving clause, all pending actions fell, as the jurisdiction depended entirely upon the act of Congress." The Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575 (1870). This rule that, when a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all 112 Opinion of the Court. cases fall with the law-has been adhered to consistently by this Court." This case is not affected by the so-called general savings statute which provides that "repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute." Congress has not altered the nature or validity of petitioner's rights or the Government's liability but has simply reduced the number of tribunals authorized to hear and determine such rights and liabilities. Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508 (1916). Compare Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934). Under the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of October 31, 1951, the jurisdiction of the District Court does not extend to actions for compensation brought by either "officers" or "employees" of the United States. Since we find that Act applicable to petitioner's action, the judgment of the District Court dismissing petitioner's complaint for want of jurisdiction is correct. Accordingly, the judgment below is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent. 8 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869); Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, 401 (1879); Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U. S. 679, 680 (1887); Gurnee v. Patrick County, 137 U. S. 141, 144 (1890); Gwin v. United States, 184 U. S. 669, 675 (1902). See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234 (1922). This jurisdictional rule does not affect the general principle that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication. Compare United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1, 3 (1926), with Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56, 61 (1927). 1 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 109. Syllabus. 343 U.S. LYKES v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 173. Argued November 29-30, 1951.-Decided March 24, 1952. Under § 23 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, an individual taxpayer was not entitled to deduct from his gross income, for federal income tax purposes, an attorney's fee paid for contesting the amount of his federal gift tax in the circumstances of this case. Pp. 119-127. (a) The attorney's fee was not deductible under § 23 (a) (2) as an expense "for the production or collection of income." Pp. 121-124. (b) There is no adequate basis in the record in this case for holding the attorney's fee deductible under § 23 (a)(2) as an incident of petitioner's "management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income." Pp. 124-125. (c) Expenses for legal services do not become deductible merely because they are paid for services which relieve a taxpayer of liability; nor because the size of the claim to which the services relate is large in proportion to the income-producing resources of the taxpayer; nor because the claim, if allowed, will consume income-producing property of the taxpayer. Pp. 125–126. (d) The result here reached is not inconsistent with 1944 Treasury Regulations; and it is in accord with specific provisions of Treasury Regulations since 1946, containing an administrative interpretation of § 23 (a) (2) which is entitled to substantial weight, especially since Congress has made many amendments to the Internal Revenue Code without revising that administrative interpretation. Pp. 126-127. 188 F.2d 964, affirmed. In a suit for a refund of federal income tax, the District Court entered judgment for petitioner. 84 F. Supp. 537. The Court of Appeals reversed. 188 F. 2d 964. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 810. Affirmed, p. 127. George W. Ericksen argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Chester H. Ferguson. 118 Opinion of the Court. Harry Baum argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Slack and John F. Davis. MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether, for federal income tax purposes, an individual taxpayer was entitled to deduct, from his gross income, an attorney's fee paid for contesting the amount of his federal gift tax. For the reasons hereafter stated we hold that he was not. In 1940, Joseph T. Lykes, petitioner herein, gave to his wife and to each of his three children, respectively, 250 shares of common stock in Lykes Brothers, Inc., a closely held family corporation. In his federal gift tax return he valued the shares at $120 each and, on that basis, paid a tax of $13,032.75. In 1944, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revalued the shares at $915.50 each and notified petitioner of a gift tax deficiency of $145,276.50. Through his attorney, petitioner sought a redetermination of the deficiency, forestalled an assessment, and, in 1946, paid $15,612.75 in settlement of the deficiency pursuant to a finding of the Tax Court based on stipulated facts. In 1944, petitioner had paid his attorney $7,263.83 for legal services in the gift tax controversy but, in his federal income tax return, had not deducted that expenditure from his taxable income. In 1946, he claimed a tax refund on the ground that the attorney's fee should have been deducted under § 23 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 His claim was denied by the Commissioner and petitioner 1"SEC. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: "(a) EXPENSES. "(2) NON-TRADE OR NON-BUSINESS EXPENSES.-In the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred |