formed a low opinion of appellants' moral character, or because the Sheriff was dissatisfied with their knowledge of the geography of the County, or for lack of the $50 operator's license. Without some explanation, it is impossible for this Court to decide that the County is justified in excluding appellants from engaging in foreign commerce in the County. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 565. In comparable situations this Court has felt. the need of greater particularity for adjudication. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 575.

Of course, it might be unnecessary for the County to explain the precise reason why the permits were denied, if the ordinance itself limited the Sheriff to constitutionally valid reasons. But this ordinance does not so limit the Sheriff's decisions. For example, § 9 of the ordinance in question here contemplates that the Sheriff will deny a driver's permit to any person who has failed to comply with the other provisions of the ordinance. While we cannot be sure, on this record, why the Sheriff refused to issue the permits to appellants, it is likely that his refusal was based on the fact that appellants had not previously acquired a license to operate their taxicabs in San Diego County, as required by § 4 of the ordinance.10

The Superior Court opinion refers to bad moral character as a proper ground for denial of permits. Without a record showing as to the facts upon which that conclusion is based, we cannot appraise the significance of the comment.

10 "Section 4. (Amended by Ord. No. 958 adopted 4-10-50, and amended again by Ord. No. 964 (New Series) adopted 5-22-50 to read as follows:) Within 10 days from the effective date of this ordinance every taxicab operator shall apply to the sheriff and procure from the Tax Collector a license and pay an annual license fee of $50.00 (plus $1.00 per year per taxicab), which shall be paid by the applicant to the Tax Collector and shall be due on the first day of June of each year. Licenses issued subsequent to the first day of September, the first day of December, and the first day of March shall be issued at a quarterly reduction of $12.50 per quarter. . . .”

That section imposes an annual flat fee of $50 (plus $1 for each taxicab) on the privilege of operating taxicabs in San Diego County. There is no suggestion that the $50 fee is levied only as compensation for the use of the roads of the County, or to defray the expense of regulating motor traffic. Clearly such a tax for the privilege of engaging in foreign commerce could not constitutionally be imposed by San Diego County. Cf. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163; Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183; Ingels v. Morf, 300 U. S. 290; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602. See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Commissioners, 332 U. S. 495. Nor can the County indirectly enforce the unconstitutional privilege tax of § 4 by denying the driver's permit without explanation. Thus it is clear that this ordinance purports to impose an unconstitutional burden on foreign commerce. While it is possible that appellants' permits were denied for some other, and valid, reason, only the County (not appellants) could show that this is true. Since the County has offered no explanation for prohibiting appellants from engaging in foreign commerce within the County, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for such action. as might be deemed desirable and not inconsistent with this opinion.

Syllabus.

343 U.S.

BRUNER v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 391. Argued January 30, 1952.-Decided March 24, 1952.

The Act of October 31, 1951, 65 Stat. 727, amending 28 U. S. C. § 1346 so as to withdraw the jurisdiction of federal district courts over actions against the United States to recover compensation for official services of "employees," applies to actions pending on the effective date of the amendment. Pp. 113-117.

(a) When a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation of jurisdiction over pending cases, all pending cases fall with the law. Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541. Pp. 115-117.

(b) A different result is not required by the provision of 1 U. S. C. § 109 that "repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute." P. 117.

189 F.2d 255, affirmed.

Petitioner's action against the United States to recover compensation for official services was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 189 F. 2d 255. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 858. Affirmed, p. 117.

Denmark Groover, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Charles J. Bloch and Ellsworth Hall, Jr.

James R. Browning argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Paul A. Sweeney.

Monroe Oppenheimer and Robert E. Sher filed a brief for Beal et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal.

112

Opinion of the Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1941, petitioner was appointed a civilian fire chief at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, by a local army commander acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of War. In 1948, petitioner brought this action in the District Court to recover overtime compensation allegedly due for his services as fire chief. Jurisdiction to enter judgment against the United States was based on the Tucker Act which granted to the District Court jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, over certain civil actions against the United States.1

At the time this action was commenced, Congress had provided that nothing in the Tucker Act shall be construed as giving the District Court

"jurisdiction of cases brought to recover fees, salary, or compensation for official services of officers of the United States or brought for such purpose by persons claiming as such officers or as assignees or legal representatives thereof; but no suit pending on the 27th day of June 1898 shall abate or be affected by this provision." 2

The District Court, holding that petitioner was an "officer of the United States," entered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 189 F. 2d 255.

124 Stat. 505 (1887), now 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1346.

2 30 Stat. 494, 495 (1898), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20). As incorporated into the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the provision read:

"The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of:

"(2) Any civil action to recover fees, salary, or compensation for official services of officers of the United States." 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1346 (d).

Opinion of the Court.

343 U.S.

In Beal v. United States, 182 F. 2d 565 (1950), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sustained jurisdiction of the District Court over a suit brought by another civilian fire fighter appointed by the War Department on the ground that he was only an "employee" and not an "officer of the United States." We granted certiorari in the case at bar to resolve the conflict of decisions. 342 U. S. 858.

After certiorari had been granted in this case, the Act of October 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 248, became effective. Section 50 (b) of that Act amended the applicable clause of the Judicial Code "by inserting, immediately after 'officers' in such clause, the words 'or employees'

.

.

As a result of this amendment we are confronted at the threshold of this case with the question whether the Act of October 31, 1951, withdrawing the jurisdiction of the District Court over actions for compensation brought by "employees," applies to an action pending on the effective date of the Act. The power of Congress to withhold jurisdiction from the District Court "in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good" is not challenged.

4

The problem presented by this case has arisen before in the administration of the Tucker Act. In 1887, jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims was given the circuit and district courts in all cases involving claims below stated dollar amounts. In 1898, difficulties in defending claims for compensation brought in different courts prompted Congress to withdraw from the circuit and district courts jurisdiction over cases "brought to recover fees, salary, or compensation for official services of

3 65 Stat. 710, 727 (1951).

Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845).