› and tracks, and other carriers may ignore their existaltogether. The same principle, if accepted as sound, I justify the refusal to exchange traffic with any railroad any whose lines, long or short, could not be shown to been built in response to some public demand. The York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, for ple, might refuse to exchange freight with the New , Chicago and St. Louis, and justify its refusal on proof the road of the last-mentioned company was wholly unssary, the traffic which it now carries having been sufatly accommodated by other lines before it was coneted.

ich a contention cannot be supported. All railroads in tence which are created under legislative authority must onclusively presumed for all the purposes of the Act to late commerce, to be of public convenience. The fact they are so is settled by the construction itself and the slative or other proper public authority that was given refor. Defendant cannot therefore refuse to exchange fic with complainant, or with others making use of its ks on any such ground as here suggested.

Some reliance is also placed by the defense upon the case Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Denand New Orleans Railroad Company, 110 U. S., 677, in ich it was decided that a provision in the constitution of lorado that "all individuals, associations, or corporations all have equal right to have persons and property transorted over any railroad in this State, and no undue or unasonable discrimination shall be made in charges or facilies for transportation of freight or passengers within the tate," did not compel a railroad company which had given rough routes and through rates to one railroad company o give them to its rival also. But the provision in the contitution of Colorado is very much less broad than that in he Act to regulate commerce; the requirement to afford equal" facilities is not the same as the prohibition of "unlue or unreasonable discrimination" in facilities; and when all the terms above quoted from the third section of the act are considered together, it is plain, we think, that a carrier

does not comply with the requirement to afford facilities without some active co-operation on its part in the receiv ing, forwarding, and delivering; and that a co-operation cannot be “equal" if it is restricted to one carrier or to less than all.

In its reliance upon its contract with the Louisville Brie Company the defendant suggests the question of the constitational power of Congress to pass any act which would invalidate the contract; and though counsel do not argue the question they insist that as a matter of construction the Act to regulate commerce should be given effect in such a way as to leave that contract in full force. To this point the language of Chief Justice Cockburn in South Eastern Ball vij O v. Rory Commissioners, L. R., 5 Q. B. Div., 231, is quot d. In that case the Chief Justice said:

"It seems to me next to impossible to suppose that Parlia peat, ever disposed to deal tenderly with vested rights, having coreeded these powers and rights, as the basis of these rat undertakings, could intend by a sin, 'e blow to plice these co upanies in a worse position than that of puivat ones. Having once made its bargain with a pule corapany in a matter of commercial enterprise in the at y which the company is constituted and its powers conferre 1, the Le_islature could not, unless such a power has been expressly reserved to it, with any consistency or justi e, afterwards impose fresh obligations upon the cong ty, or deprive it of any of the powers and vest d rights, the grant of which had been the inducement to undertake the etterprise."

Again the same learned judge says in the same case:

"I cannot but think beyond question that interference with the self overnment and financial meagement of railway companies once co istituted and established would be an interference with vestel nights. It seems to me to follow, thit while there can be no doubt that Parlament in the plenitu le of its legislative power can deal with such rights, yet that, looking to the tenderness with wlach vested rights are ever

d on, any legislative enactment in any way interfer1 such rights must receive the strictest construction carried no further than the language of the enactment rily requires."

pport of the same doctrine Nicholson v. Great Western 1 Nev. and Mac., 150, is also cited by the defense. doctrine thus stated is not likely to encounter much - in the United States. In so far as it expresses a rule t and justice it corresponds to the construction which ederal Supreme Court in Dartmouth College v. Wood4 Wheat., 519, gave to the provision in the Federal itution inhibiting the States from passing laws impaire obligation of contracts. Whether the power of Conis limited in this regard as the legislative power of the s is, is a question that is sometimes mooted, but the ssion of which we shall not enter upon. If it were con1 that Congress cannot by its legislation impair the oblin of contracts, the concession would in no respect affect ending controversy.

e slightest examination of the Act to regulate commerce nake it evident that Congress has not undertaken there> meddle with contracts or to affect them in any way, exas they may incidentally be affected by the rules it lays n and the regulations it prescribes. Those rules and lations are in the nature of police laws. They are prebed that facilities created for the public benefit may not bused; that right may be done and public conveniences certain class made as useful as possible. It is not one he purposes of Congress that contracts shall be abroed; much less that the obligation of this particular conet now brought to our attention, and which the act in no y refers to, shall in any particular be impaired or intered with.

But the Act to regulate commerce is a general law, and tracts are always liable to be more or less affected by neral laws, even when in no way referred to. This is the Se with State laws as well as with Federal. There probawas never an act passed in restraint of the sale of intox

icating drinks that did not affect some contracts, and render their literal enforcement impossible. The same may be sad of the Federal revenue laws. Nothing is more likely than that a considerable change in customs regulations or custo duties, or in the provisions made for enforcement of excise laws will deprive some party of a right he supposed he hal secured by contract. But this incidental effect of the general law is not understood to make it a law impairing the obligation of contracts. It is a necessary effect of any considerable change in the public laws. If the Legislature had Lo power to alter its police laws when contracts would be affected, then the most important and valuable reforms might be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose. No doctrine to that effect would be even I lausible, much less sound and tenable.

But it does not follow that when we hold that defen ant is bound to receive traffic offered to it by complainant, notwithstanding it may have come to it from the Ohio and Mis sissippi Railway Company, that thereby the contract between that con pany and the defendant is abrogated or its oblig tion inapaired. On the contrary, if that contract was legal in its inception, and may be lawfully performed by the Orjo and Mississippi Railway Company, notwithstanding any provision contained in the Act to regulate commerce, then requiring defendant to receive such traffic from complainant or even from the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company at the point of connection of the lines of complainant and de fendant when tendered by the one or the other will not take from defendant the customary remedy for any breach of the contract. What we decide in this case is, that when the traffic is offered to defendant at the point of connection afore said, it is not at liberty, in view of the strong and positive requiremen's of the Act to regulate commerce, to take redress in its own hands, and if it finds that the traffic is affected by a previous breach of contract, then instead of affording “equal" facilities for it as required by the act, to refuse to afford any facilities. This is not the proper mode for obtaining redress in case of even unquestionably legal contracts. the law prescribes judicial remedies for a breach which are

sed to be adequate, and to those remedies the party resort. No order in this case will preclude it.

rth. Defendant further insists that for the purposes of gh business there must be through rates, and that no r is under obligation to make through rates except on a leration of its own interest; joint rates being purely a

of agreement. On the other hand complainant conthat the same rates the defendant makes with one carmust make with others. This contention was advanced, understood it, with special reference to the business of hio and Mississippi Railway Company.

the case before us there is nothing to justify any dison of rates. No company is before us asking rates of dant. The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company is ere as a party, and we cannot know what it desires. We ot even know that it considers the rates now made by lefendant with other carriers reasonable, or that it would tisfied to accept them for itself. When that company es here with a complaint we shall deal with it on the instances and equities of the case as they are then made pear. The only complainant now here is the Kentucky Indiana Bridge Company. On its complaint that deLant refuses to receive traffic from it as a common carrier, old that in our opinion defendant is obliged to receive and to afford such equal facilities for the traffic as it rds to other carriers. We also hold as necessarily or at t properly within the issue, that defendant cannot lawy base a refusal as to any part of the traffic on the ground t it is brought to it in violation of contract. The decision avor of complainant on the ground of its being a common rier, necessarily announces a general principle of which er carriers making use of its bridge and tracks may of ht avail themselves.

It is undoubtedly true as defendant contends, that through Siness requires through billing, and is more conveniently ne under joint rates. And joint rates are made by conat. On this subject we say in this case only, that in view the provision in the third section of the act that common