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In addition to the officers, two cadets were assigned to each company and troop.

The general and staff officers allowed for this increase of the Army were: 2 brigadier-generals, each with an aid-de-camp selected from the line, 2 brigade inspectors, 2 brigade quartermasters, and not to exceed 5 hospital surgeons, and 15 sergeon's mates.

The brigade inspectors, quartermasters, and paymasters, as well as the regimental adjutants and quartermasters, were selected from the line.

To hasten the recruiting of these new regiments Congress, on the 24th of December, 1811, enacted a law granting a bounty of $16 to all recruits and soldiers who would enlist or reenlist for five years, with a provision that all soldiers, upon being honorably discharged, should receive, in addition to the bounty, three months' pay and 160 acres of land.

January 2, 1812, the President was empowered to accept, for the protection of the frontiers, 6 companies of volunteers or rangers, to be enlisted for twelve months.

January 11 the Regular troops were again increased by 10 regiments of infantry, 2 regiments of artillery, and 1 regiment of light dragoons, enlisted for the term of five years. The infantry regiments consisted of 18 companies formed in 2 battalions, with an aggregate of 1,980 enlisted men; the artillery regiments were composed of 20 companies formed in 2 battalions, with an aggregate of 1,800 enlisted men; the regiment of light dragoons consisted of 12 companies formed in 2 battalions, with an aggregate of 1,092 enlisted men. The field staff and noncommissioned staff of all of the above regiments comprised 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 2 adjutants, 1 quartermaster, 1 paymaster, 1 surgeon, 2 assistant surgeons, 2 sergeant-majors, 2 quartermaster-sergeants, and 2 service musicians.

The Army, as organized by the above law, in connection with the laws of 1802 and 1808, consisted of 17 regiments of infantry, 4 regiments of artillery, 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 regiment of rifles, and the Corps of Engineers (16 officers and 4 cadets), numbering in the aggregate, when completed, 35,603.

So long as Congress, in time of peace, shall neglect to provide for national defense, great confusion must ensue at the beginning of our wars, and no better evidence of this is needed than a recapitulation of the military legislation of this period.

The companies in the different regiments of infantry organized by the three laws numbered 64, 68, and 100 privates, respectively, while the number of companies varied from 10 to 18; the artillery regiment raised by the act of 1802 consisted of 20 companies formed in 5 battalions; the regiments raised by the act of 1811 numbered 20 companies divided into 2 battalions; the regiment of light dragoons raised by the act of 1808 was composed of 8 troops; that raised by the law of 1811 consisted of 12 companies divided into 2 battalions of 6 companies each.

Notwithstanding the bounty inducements, recruiting proceeded so slowly that the Army, which numbered, exclusive of the staff, but 2,765 in 1810, only reached in July, 1812, the aggregate of 6,686, its full complement being 35.603.

February 6, 1812, the President was empowered to accept companies of volunteers not exceeding 30,000, and to organize them into battalions, regiments, and brigades.

February 24, he was authorized to mount the regiment of light artillery raised in 1808.

April 8, returning to the principle of short enlistments so disastrous in the Revolution, he was authorized to reduce the term of enlistment, fixed at five years by the act of 1811, to eighteen months, provided that the number of men so enlisted should not exceed 15,000.

April 10, the President was empowered to require the governors of States to hold in readiness to march at a moment's notice, a detachment of militia not exceeding 80,000 officers and men.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The chaos which reigned in the line of the Army subsequent to the Revolution was fully equaled in the staff.

In the departments of supply no systematic organization was attempted till the 28th of March, 1812, when the Quartermaster's Department was regularly established by act of Congress and made to consist of 1 Quartermaster-General, with the rank of brigadier-general, deputy quartermasters, taken in part from the line at the option of the President, and to receive additional pay, and as many assistant deputy quartermasters as the public service might require, to be selected in part from the line at the option of the President, and with additional compensation.

The eighteenth section of the act abolished the military agents and assistant military agents, who since the law of 1802 had performed the duties of the Quartermaster's Department.

The functions of the Quartermaster's Department, as laid down in the third section of the law, were

to purchase military stores, camp equipage, and other articles required for the troops, and, generally, to procure and provide means of transport for the Army, its stores, artillery, and camp equipage.

COMMISSARY DEPARTMENT.

The fourth section created the office of Commissary-General of Purchases, and empowered the President to appoint as many deputy commissioners as the public service might require.

The law made it the duty of the Commissary-General, under the Secretary of War, "to conduct the procuring and providing of all arms, military stores, clothing, and generally all articles of supply requisite for the military service of the United States."

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

This Department was not established until the 14th of May, 1812, the number of its commissioned officers being fixed as follows: One Commissary General of Ordnance, with rank of colonel of infantry, 1 Assistant Commissary General of Ordnance, with the rank of a major of infantry, 4 deputy commissaries, with the rank of captain of infantry, and at the discretion of the President, not to exceed 8 assistant deputy commissaries, with the rank of second lieutenant.

The strict subordination of the Chief of the Department to military commanders in the field, was enjoined in the sixth section of the law, which reads:

That the Commissary-General of Ordnance shall execute all orders issued by the Secretary for the Department of War in conveying all ordnance, ammunition, and

apparatus to the respective armies, garrisons, magazines, and arsenals; and in time of war he shall execute all orders of any general officer commanding in any army or garrison for the supply of ordnance, ammunition, carriages, pontoons, forges, furnaces, or apparatus for garrison, field, or siege service, and forward the same without delay and in good condition.

INCREASE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY.

So long as our relations with England and France were such that we could safely maintain an army of less than two or three thousand men, the lack of army officers was hardly perceptible, but when war was momentarily looked for, the nation was pained to discover that after twenty-five years of independence, it was about to enter upon another great struggle with officers hardly more efficient than those who led the Continental Army at the opening of the Revolution.

As an indication that but few of our statesmen had appreciated the usefulness of a Military Academy, we may remark that up to the year 1812 only 71 cadets had graduated.

By the law of the 29th of April, increasing the Corps of Engineers, it was enacted that all of the cadets appointed in the cavalry, artillery, infantry, and riflemen might be attached as students to the Military Academy, and that the number of cadets should at no time exceed 250. The law also directed that the cadets should be arranged into com panies of noncommissioned officers and privates, officered, for the purpose of military instruction, from the Corps of Engineers, and as a key to the character for efficiency and discipline which the graduates have since maintained, further prescribed that the said corps of cadets should be trained and taught all the duties of a private, noncommissioned officer, and officer."

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With such a foundation, it should not excite surprise that officers familiar with both the theory and practice of war, should have made their mark among the thousands of inexperienced and often illiterate men who owed their commissions to the favor of their subordinates.

The increase of the cadets to 250 gave vitality to the Military Academy and made it able to supply most of the officers our Army needed in time of peace. Next to the law which created the Military Academy, the act of April, 1812, was the most important in its history.

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

At the date of the declaration of war against Great Britain, June 18, 1812, the enemy's regular troops in Canada did not number 4,500 effectives," while our whole standing army was only 6,744 strong, notwithstanding that Congress six months before had increased, on paper, the regular establishment to 35,000 men. Powerless, therefore, to take advantage of the enemy's weakness, military legislation had to take the place of military action. On the 26th of June, the infantry regiments, with their diverse organizations under the acts of 1802, 1808, and 1811, were remodeled on the common basis of ten companies to a regiment, the number of regiments being increased to twenty-five.

The field, staff, and noncommissioned staff of each regiment consisted of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 paymaster, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates, 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, and 2 principal musicians; total, 13.

Each company consisted of 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 6 corporals, 2 musicians, and 90 privates; total 106; making the total of each infantry regiment 1,073. The entire "Regular Army," including 25 regiments of infantry, 4 of artillery, 2 of dragoons, 1 of riflemen, with engineer troops and artificers, numbered 36,700 on paper.

In regard to the best organization to be given to the "volunteer" force contemplated by existing laws, the President in his message to Congress on the 30th of June stated, that

With a view the better to adopt to the public service the volunteer force contemplated by the act passed on the 6th day of February, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the expediency of making the requisite provision for the officers thereof being commissioned by the authority of the United States.

July 6, the law relative to the acceptance of 30,000 volunteers was so modified as to authorize the President, by and with the advice and

According to James, an English writer, this force consisted of the Eighth, Fortyninth, and One hundredth Regiments, a small detachment of artillery, the Tenth Royal Veteran Battalion, and the Canadian, Newfoundland, and Glengary Fencibles, amounting in the whole to 4,450 men. A large portion of this force was composed of old men and invalids, fit only for garrison duty. (James' Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States).

In a private letter to General Dearborn, dated Washington, May 15, 1813, the Secretary of War states: "From information the most direct and respectable, I am assured that her (Great Britain's) regular force in both the Canadas has at no time, since the declaration of war, exceeded 3,000 men."

These figures included the garrison of the seacoast fortifications and of the posts on the Indian frontiers, but excluded recruits for the month of May.

consent of the Senate, to appoint all the company, field, and general officers who were to have the same pay and emoluments as officers in the Regular Army.

Although nominally called "volunteers," had this force been raised as contemplated, it would have constituted, but for the limitation of their service to twelve months, a second Regular Army. The measure, however, did not succeed, and its sole effect, like that of all similar expedients during the Revolution, was to deter enlistments in the one organization that could have been effective.

Had Congress, on the 11th of January, declared that all men owed their country military service, and decided to raise the Army immediately, by volunteering or by draft, to 35,000 men, to be held for the term of five years or during the war, it scarcely admits of a doubt that after six months' training and discipline this force could have occupied Canada and ended the war in a single campaign.

REFUSAL OF MASSACHUSETTS AND CONNECTICUT TO FURNISH MILITIA.

The wisdom of the Constitution in giving Congress the sole power of raising and supporting armies, was demonstrated at the beginning of this war by the refusal of the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut to furnish their quotas of the 100,000 militia, authorized by the act of April 10, 1812. This force was called out to relieve the regular troops in the seacoast fortifications, so that these might be sent to the northern frontier to take part in an invasion of Canada.

The governors were thus able to paralyze for the time being the military power of their respective States, and defeat the plans of the General Government. In Massachusetts the grounds upon which this refusal was based, are clearly set forth in the following opinion of three of the members of its supreme judicial court, to whom the quesion was referred:

As the militia of the several States may be employed in the service of the United States, for the three specific purposes of executing the laws of the Union, of suppressing insurrection, and of repelling invasions, the opinion of the judges is requested whether the commanders in chief of the militia of the several States have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies aforesaid exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the President, to be commanded by him pursuant to acts of Congress.

It is the opinion of the undersigned that this right is vested in the commanders in chief of the militia of the several States.

The Federal Constitution provides that whenever either of these exigencies exist, the militia may be employed, pursuant to some act of Congress, in the service of the United States; but no power is given either to the President or to the Congress to determine that either of the said exigencies do in fact exist. As this power is

not delegated to the United States by the Federal Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the United States, it is reserved to the States, respectively; and from the nature of the power it must be exercised by those with whom the States have, respectively, intrusted the chief command of the militia.

It is the duty of these commanders to execute this important trust agreeably to the laws of their several States without reference to the laws or officers of the United States in all cases, except those specially provided in the Federal Constitution. They must, therefore, determine when either of the special cases exist, obliging them to relinquish the execution of this trust, and to render themselves and the militia subject to the command of the President. A different constitution, giving to Congress the right to determine when these special cases exist, authorizing them to call forth the whole of the militia, and taking them from the commanders in chief of the several States, and subjecting them to the command of the President, would place all the militia, in effect, at the will of Congress, and produce a military consolidation of the States without any constitutional remedy, against the intentions of the

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