without further engagement. This was the case in the last war. ar. I greatly fear its operation amongst the soldiers of the other colonies, as I am sensible this is the genius and spirit of our people." Those who are familiar with our military history will not be surprised at the conduct of these Connecticut troops. Each succeeding year of the Revolutionary struggle found American soldiers behaving in like manner; and during the War of the Rebellion a similiar course was followed by the regiments whose terms of service expired on the morning of the first battle of Bull Run. During the year, other regiments and battalions were raised in the different colonies, the number of troops for the Northern Department, New York, being fixed by resolution of Congress of July 25 at 5,000. In reorganizing these troops on the Continental basis 400 commissions, signed in blank by the President of Congress, were sent to General Schuyler to be filled out and returned. Commissions in blank were also sent to the different colonies to be filled out by the conventions of the colonies or, in their recess, by the councils of safety. BOUNTY. Any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits. Even at that early day the letters of Washington refer to the bad effects of this practice, and the danger of admitting it as a principle was recognized by Congress when it resolved, on the 6th of December, 1775, "That the charge of bounty in the account exhibited by Rhode Island against the United Colonies be not allowed.” Notwithstanding this disapproval, the sequel will show that bounties were paid throughout the Revolution, and, as was the case during the War of the Rebellion, were at all times potent factors of evil and discontent. DESERTION. During the campaign of 1775, the attention of Congress being called to the prevalence of desertions, an evil which is closely allied to the systems of voluntary enlistments and bounties, this body, on the 4th of November, recommended the several legislatures, assemblies, and conventions of colonies to enact laws inflicting a punishment of not less than $30 nor more than $50 upon such as knowingly harbor deserters, and if unable to pay the fine to be punished with whipping, not exceeding 30 lashes for each offense.” In a letter to the president of the council of Massachusetts Bay, dated August 7, Washington says: By the general return made to me for last week, I find there are great numbers of soldiers and noncommissioned officers who absent themselves from duty, the greater part of whom, I have reason to believe, are at their respective homes in different parts of the country; some employed by their officers on their farms and others drawing pay from the public, while they are working on their own plantations or for hire. My utmost exertions have not been able to prevent this base and pernicious conduct. I must, therefore, beg the assistance of the General Court to cooperate with me in such measures as may remedy this mischief. I need not enlarge upon the ruinous consequence of suffering such infamous deserters and defrauders of the public to go unnoticed or unpunished, nor use any arguments to induce the general court to give it immediate attention. The neces a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 3. sity of the case does not permit me to doubt the continued exertions of that zeal which has distinguished the general court upon less important occasions.a All of the preceding remarks refer to the army under Washington's command. MILITIA. Recognizing the importance of having a body of men to reenforce the Regular Army in times of emergency, on the 18th of July, 1775, Congress recommended "to the inhabitants of the United English Colonies that all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia to consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, and 58 privates. That the officers of each company be chosen by the respective companies." These companies were to be formed into regiments and battalions, each with 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 1 adjutant, and 1 quartermaster, all officers above the rank of captain being appointed by the provincial assemblies or conventions, or if in recess by the committees of safety. The militia could only be called out with the consent of the State legislatures. They were specially intended for home defense and to make head against forays of the enemy in the absence of the Regular or Continental Army. MINUTEMEN. In imitation of a resolution of the provincial congress of Massachusetts in 1774, Congress, on the 18th of July, 1775, recommended— That one-fourth part of the militia in every colony be selected as minutemen of such men as are willing to enter into this necessary service, formed into companies and battalions, and their officers chosen and commissioned as aforesaid, to be ready at shortest notice to march to any place where their assistance may be required for the defense of their own or neighboring colony. Such of the minutemen as desired it were to be relieved by drafts from the whole body of the militia once in four months. This organization of one-fourth of the militia as "minutemen" is interesting as being our first scheme of mobilization. DISCIPLINE. The discipline of Washington's army has been touched upon in the extracts from his letters already given. General Schuyler, commanding the Northern Department, refers to the same topic as follows: The vexation of spirit under which I labor, that a barbarous complication of disorders should prevent me from reaping those laurels for which I have unweariedly wrought since I was honored with this command; the anxiety I have suffered since my arrival here, lest the Army should starve, occasioned by a scandalous want of subordination and inattention to my orders in some of the officers that I left to command at the different posts; the vast variety of vexations and disagreeable incidents that almost every hour arise in some department or other, not only retard my course, but have put me considerably back for some days past. If Job had been a general in my situation, his memory had not been so famous for patience. But the glorious end we have in view, and which I have a confident hope will be attained, will atone for all. * * * Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides. Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, a discharge, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 3, pp. 55, 56. detained a few days to cross Lake George, they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity. * * Our Army requires to be put on * a different footing. Habituated to order, I can not, without the most extreme pain, see that disregard of discipline, confusion, and inattention which reign so generally in this quarter, and I am therefore determined to retire. Of this resolution I have advised Congress. General Montgomery on the 13th of October, while investing St. Johns, wrote to General Schuyler: I had had a road cut to the intended ground and some fascines made, when I was informed by Major Brown that a general dissatisfaction prevailed, that unless something was undertaken in a few days there would be a mutiny, and that the universal sense of the army was to direct all our attention to the east side. The impatience of the troops to get home has prevented their seeing the impossibility of undertaking this business sooner, the duty being hard for the troops in the present confined state of operations. When I mentioned my intentions I did not consider that I was at the head of troops who carry the spirit of freedom into the field and think for themselves. Upon considering the fatal consequences which might flow from a want of subordination and discipline should this ill humor continue, my unstable authority over troops of different colonies, the insufficiency of the military law, and my own want of powers to enforce it, weak as it is, I thought it expedient to call the field officers together, etc.b RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. No matter how absolute the necessity for calling out undisciplined troops, history teaches that useless extravagance, often accompanied by inaction or disaster, will surely ensue. Such was the case in the campaign of 1775. The battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, fought before any of the troops were taken into Continental pay, were the only military operations of the army near Boston during the year. When Washington took command his army numbered 17,000 men, but the number fit for duty did not exceed 14,500. The strength of the enemy was estimated by the council of war at 11,500; but after deducting the sick and wounded his real effective strength was not over 6,500. Notwithstanding this disparity in numbers, neither Washington nor his generals deemed it prudent to attack, and the year passed away in hopeless inactivity. The invasion of Canada, the only important offensive movement of the campaign, ended in disaster. General Montgomery, after occupying Montreal and joining Arnold, who had made his famous march through the wilderness of Maine, attempted to take Quebec by assault, this step being resolved upon on account of the approaching expiration of the terms of service of nearly all his men. In the action which followed, fought on the last day of the year, Montgomery lost his life, and his troops were repulsed, about 60 being killed and wounded and between 300 and 400 made prisoners. The total number of troops in Continental pay during the campaign of 1775, as appears from the report of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, submitted to Congress in 1790, was 27,443. In addition to the above, it is estimated that the colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, furnished 10,180 militia, making the whole American Army 37,623. For the most part this force, from want of supplies, organization, and discipline, was maintained at public expense in a state of demoralizing inactivity. Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 3, note on pp. 132-191. CHAPTER II. CAMPAIGN OF 1776. CONDITION OF WASHINGTON'S ARMY. Washington thus describes the conditions of his army at the beginning of 1776 in letter of January 4, 1776, to Joseph Reed: Search the volumes of history through, and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to be found, namely, to maintain a post against the flower of the British troops for six months together, without powder, and then to have one army disbanded and another to be raised within the same distance of a reinforced enemy. It is too much to attempt. What may be the final issue of the last maneuver, time only can unfold. I wish this month was well over our heads. The same desire of retiring into a chimney corner seized the troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, so soon as their time expired, as had wrought upon those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of them made a tender of their services to continue till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened. We are now left with a good deal less than half-raised regiments and about 5,000 militia, who only stand engaged to the middle of this month, when, according to custom, they will depart, let the necessity of their stay be ever so urgent. Thus for more than two months past I have scarcely emerged from one difficulty before I have been plunged into another.« Up to January 14, but 10,500 men had been enlisted in the establishment of 20,370 authorized by Congress in the previous October, and of this number a large portion was reported as not joined. The recruiting was obstructed by discontented officers and progressed so slowly that Washington gave up all hopes of raising the army by voluntary enlistments, and on the 16th of January he wrote to the general court of Massachusetts Bay mentioning the use of "coercive measures" to fill the regiments to their proper strength. Meantime the term of service of the 5,000 militia called in from the 10th of December till the 15th of January having expired, Washington, on the 16th of January, deeming it indispensably necessary to make a bold attempt to conquer the ministerial troops in Boston, before they could be reinforced in the spring," requested the opinion of the council of war as to the feasibility of an attack, and the council agreed that an attempt ought to be made. As the present force was inadequate, it recommended that 13 regiments of militia be called into service till the 1st of April; this number was afterwards reduced to 10, in consequence of 3 regiments being needed for service in Canada. In a written communication Washington called the attention of Congress to the importance of engaging men for the war even at the expense of a bounty. His remarkable letter on this subject, dated February 9, 1776, plainly and forcibly points out the evils, dangers, and extravagance of short enlistments: The purport of this letter will be directed to a single object. Through you I mean to lay it before Congress, and, at the same time that I beg their serious atten tion to the subject, to ask pardon for intruding an opinion, not only unasked but in some measure repugnant to their resolves. The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those who are eyewitnesses of them to render any animadversions necessary, but to gentlemen at a distance whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects the case may be otherwise. That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt, for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued to blockade Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed. And that we were not one time obliged to dispute these lines under disadvantageous circumstances proceeding from the same cause, to wit, the troops disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in, is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment, and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation or restrained by his instructions from putting anything to hazard till his reinforcements should arrive. The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced) proves that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. Since the 1st of December I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and though I am sensible that we never have since that period been able to act upon the offensive and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men, bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences which have arisen and which it is scarce possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time ready for any emergency would have done. To this may be added that you never can have a well-disciplined army. To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty, and in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen. Men who are familiarized to danger meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service often apprehend danger where no danger is. Three things prompt men to regular discharge of their duty in time of action; natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment. The two first are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier; but the last most obviously distinguishes the one from the other. A coward, when taught to believe that if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but a man who thinks little of the one and is fearful of the other acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences. Again, men of a day's standing will not look forward, and from experience we find that as time approaches for their discharge they grow careless of their arms, ammunition and camp utensils. Nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and lay us under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh set when we find it next to impossible to procure such articles as are absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp and the loss consequent thereupon. But this is not all. Men engaged for a short, limited time only have the officers too much in their power, for to obtain a degree of popularity in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgences incompatible with order and good government; by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged is spent in undoing what you were aiming to inculcate in the first. To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great danger of the army and the expenses incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run and must run between the discharging of one army and the enlistment of another, unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred, would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. What I have already taken the liberty of saying will serve to convey a general idea of the matter; and therefore I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion that if the Congress have any reason to believe that there will be occasion for troops another year, and consequently for another enlistment, they would save money and have infinitely better troops, if they were, even at a bounty of $20, $30, or more, to engage the men already enlisted, till |