march by this road to the Warrenton pike and thence to Centreville. Its commander shortly after, hearing firing to his left, west of Groveton, and to his right and front in the presumed direction of General Sigel, went in person to the left, whence after the firing ceased, he arranged with General King to reenforce the latter at daylight. At 1 a. m. of the 29th, however, King having received no orders from his corps commander, took the responsibility of withdrawing, and directed his march upon Manassas.

During the whole afternoon of the 28th, Ricketts disputed the advance of Longstreet's corps through Thoroughfare Gap, but after dark, finding that both of his flanks were in danger of being turned. and receiving no orders, he fell back to Gainesville. There, learning that King's division was moving upon Manassas, he decided to march upon the same point via Bristoe.

With the retirement of King's and Ricketts's divisions of McDowell's corps, vanished the last chance of destroying Jackson. Longstreet's advance was already through Thoroughfare Gap: the Warrenton pike was left open, and now a distance of but 8 miles separated the two wings of the once divided army. While events thus favored the speedy junction of the Confederate army, lack of information caused the Union forces to be scattered more and more. The report of King's engagement reached General Pope at Centreville about 10 p. m., but unaware of the withdrawal of McDowell's two divisions, it only led him into another serious error. At 3 a. m. of the 29th, the following despatch was sent to General Porter at Bristoe:

McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary.a

This despatch, although dated 3 a. m. on the 29th, may be said to have closed the events of the 28th.

At the beginning of the campaign along the Rappahannock, all the advantages were on the side of the enemy. He had a united army against two disunited armies, whose junction on the line selected was, from the beginning, impossible.

This advantage, in his eagerness to attack the Union line of communications, he threw away. By an unwise movement the position of the contending forces on the morning of the 28th was reversed. The wings of Lee's army were separated and between them lay the whole army of Virginia, 60,000 strong. The force in its rear numbered less than 30,000. At dawn one-third of this scattered force was within 3 miles of McDowell's column of more than 25,000 men. On the night of the 28th, all of Jackson's troops were united and before 3 a. m. of the 29th, the date of Porter's order to march upon Centreville, his communication was fully restored with Longstreet. His escape was miraculous, but was in no sense accomplished by his superior strategy. It was due to the false movements of the left wing, under McDowell, which, within a radius of scarcely 3 miles, circled from the pike west of Gainesville to the pike east of Groveton without discovering till nightfall the enemy's position.

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, Supplement.

Corps and division commanders without professional experience, incompetent staff officers, a cavalry broken down and made useless less by long marches, than by inexperienced colonels and captains who did not yet know how to husband the strength of their horses, are some of the lessons conveyed by this lost opportunity to suppress the Rebellion.

The position of the Union troops at the close of the 28th was as follows: Kearny, Hooker, and Reno were near Centreville: Sigel near the Henry House on the Warrenton pike, facing toward Sudley Spring and Groveton; Reynolds's division on Sigel's left, facing west; King's division marching from Gainesville to Manassas; Ricketts's division marching from Thoroughfare Gap via Gainesville to Bristoe; Porter at Bristoe; Banks south of Bristoe guarding the trains.

The position of the enemy on the night of the 28th was: Jackson extending from the vicinity of Groveton to Sudley Church, facing toward Centreville; Longstreet's advance east of Thoroughfare Gap, his main body near its western entrance.

It will be seen from the relative positions of the forces, that the opportunity for decisive action so temptingly offered to the Union troops, on the morning of the 28th, passed to the Confederates, on the morning of the 29th. But in this emergency fortune was strictly impartial. Lack of information saved the Confederates on the 28th and, on the 29th, rendered the same service to the Union.

BOARD OF INQUIRY ON GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER.

In regard to the concentration of the Confederates, General Long

street states:

My command (25,000 in round numbers) was within supporting distance of General Jackson at 9 a. m., August 29, having passed Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn. My command was deployed in double line for attack between 10 a. m. and 12 m. on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap Railroad. My command was ready to receive any attack after 11 a. m.«

While this evidence should be conclusive as to the hour of the junction of the Confederate forces, the information in the possession of the Union commanders at the time, was sufficient to warn them of what was taking place. Ricketts had fought with the advance guard of Longstreet during the whole afternoon of the 28th, until his right flank was turned through Hopewell Gap, while his left was exposed by an advance through New Baltimore. But more definite information pointed to the exact time of the junction. General Buford notified General McDowell that at 8.45 a. m. on the 29th, seventeen regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and some cavalry had marched through Gainesville, on the way to Groveton.

Pending this junction, the dispositions of the Union right wing were as follows: Sigel and Reynolds facing westward attacked Jackson at daylight. Kearny, ordered to march from Centreville at 1 a. m., moved at daylight and came up on Sigel's right between 9 and 10 a. m. Hooker, following Kearny, arrived at 11 a. m., Reno an hour later. To the attack of Sigel and want of correct information, may be ascribed the failure of the enemy to profit at this time by their superior numbers.

a Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 1, p.46.

The situation of our left wing was much more critical than the right. At 9.30 a. m., instead of being in line of battle, it was marching, pursuant to orders, away from the field toward Centreville, the head of Porter's corps being east of Manassas.

At the above time General Porter received the order:

Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. Be expeditious or we will lose much. a

Countermarching pursuant to this order, the head of General Porter's corps arrived at 11.30 a. m. at Dawkins Branch, about 3 miles from Gainesville and 94 from Thoroughfare Gap. Here, half a mile south of the Manassas Gap Railroad and 24 miles south of Groveton, in a position which General McDowell told him "was too far out," "this is no place to fight a battle," he met the enemy and began to deploy. In front of him Longstreet, in line of battle, was ready to receive an attack as early as 11 a. m.

In describing the situation at this juncture "The Proceedings and Report of the Board of Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter`

states:

In contrast to this evident preparation of the enemy for battle, only Porter's 9,000 or 10,000 men were ready for action, of the 35,000 men then composing the left wing of the Union army. Banks's corps, 10,000, was still at Bristoe, without orders to move beyond that point. Ricketts's division, 8,000, was near Bristoe, under orders to move to the front, but his men were so worn out by constant marching, night and day, that they could not possibly be got to the field even for defensive action that day. King's division, 7,000, was just in rear of Porter, but was so fatigued as to be unfit for offensive action, and hardly able to march.

Thus, this long column, stretching back from Dawkins Branch by way of Manassas Junction to and even beyond Bristoe, had struck the right wing of the Confederate army in line of battle, while a gap of nearly 2 miles remained in the Union line between Porter and Reynolds, who was on the left of Sigel, near Groveton. * *

*

This was the military situation on the Union left and Confederate right of the field, when McDowell arrested Porter's advance, and Porter's operations under the direct orders from Pope, heretofore mentioned, ceased, and, under new orders just received, Porter became subordinate to McDowell. Not only had the effort to destroy Jackson before he could be reenforced totally failed, but the Confederate army was on the field and in line, while the Union Army was not. The time to resume defensive action, awaiting the concentration of the Army, had not only arrived, but had been too long postponed.

On his way to the front McDowell had received the following General Orders, No.5 from General Pope, dated from Centreville August 29, addressed jointly to him and Porter, and Porter had received a copy of the same order a moment before McDowell's arrival:

"Generals McDOWELL and PORTER: You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in anyway with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aid-de-camp last night, which were to hold his

@ Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 2, p. 1806.

The Board of Officers appointed to investigate the military record of Gen. Fitz John Porter was composed of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. Army, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, and Col. George W. Getty, brevet major-general, U. S. Army, with Maj. Asa B. Gardner, judge-advocate, U. S. Army, as recorder of the board. It was instituted by an order of the War Department of April 12, 1878, and completed its investigations about a year later.—EDITORS.

position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out.

"One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps or at this place.

*

This order and the sixty-second article of war made it the duty of McDowell to command the combined corps. * * Upon McDowell devolved the responsibility of modifying the joint order as its terms authorized and as the military situation seemed imperatively to require. The terms of the order contemplating that communication should be established with the troops on the other road, or, as General McDowell interpreted it, that line should be formed in connection with those troops, that the whole command should then halt, and that the troops must not go beyond a point from which they could reach Bull Run by that night or the next morning, and the military situation as it then appeared to them was briefly discussed by the two generals.

The situation was exceedingly critical. If the enemy should attack, as he seemed about ready to do, Porter's two divisions, about 9,000 men, were all the force then ready to stand between Lee's main army, just arrived on the field, and McDowell's long and weary column, or the left flank of Pope's army near Groveton. McDowell was excessively anxious to get King's division over on the left of Reynolds's, who then occupied with his small division that exposed flank; and he quickly decided that considerable advantages were to be gained by departing from the terms of the joint order, so far as to make no attempt to go farther toward Gainesville, and to at once form line with the troops then engaged near Groveton; and this departure from the strict letter of the joint order was evidently required by the military situation as it then appeared and as it did actually exist. *

*

*

McDowell then left Porter very hurriedly, announcing his decision, as he testified, by the words, "You put your force in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point against the enemy," or words to that effect." * * *

However zealous and patriotic a general might be, his impatience to attack would have been restrained by the joint order. It stated distinctly

*

I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force (i. e., the one at Groveton) and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be on account of our supplies. * * One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. During the afternoon, after General McDowell left, General Porter made several efforts to communicate with the troops on his right, but without success.

*

The Board states:

*

*

The scouts were all driven back or captured. As it turned out, this resulted from the fact that King's division did not get up on the right of the woods at all. That division reached a point some distance in rear of its position in the line about 4.30 p. m., and then, after some marching and countermarching, was sent northward to the Warrenton pike. Thus the gap in the line which McDowell's troops were to occupy remained open all the afternoon, and the margin of the timber remained in possession of the enemy's pickets. * * * On the Confederate side, as it now appears, Porter's display of troops, three brigades in line, in the early part of the afternoon, had given rise to the expectation of an attack on their right. This having been reported to General Longstreet, that commander sent his reserve division (Wilcox's), from his extreme left, just north of the Warrenton turnpike, to his extreme right on the Manassas and Gainesville road. Wilcox reached this

a Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 2, pp. 1807, 1808, 1809.

latter position about 4 o'clock p. m., and Porter having before that time withdrawn his troops under cover, some troops from the Confederate right (D. R. Jones's) were pushed to the front in the woods occupied by Porter's skirmishers, apparently to reconnoiter. This movement gave rise to the impression among Porter's officers (Morrill's division) that the enemy was about to attack about 5 p. m. a * * *

So far as the joint order entitled General McDowell to command, it ceased when he took King's division and started to the right.

The only order received by General Porter from General Pope on the 29th, was dated 4.30 p. m., and read:

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping our right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

It will be observed that the order "to keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries," with the intimation that he might have to fall back, was sufficient to destroy the energy of the contemplated attack. The order however, was not received till 6.30 p. m., too late, had it been carried into effect, to obtain decisive results.

The Board states:

If the 4.30 order had been promptly delivered a very grave responsibility would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based upon conditions which were essentially erroneous and upon expectations which could not possibly be realized. It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not be made, and that the attacking force keep closed on Reynolds, who was far to the right and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to correct the error and have the order modified. That order appeared to be part of a general plan. It must be executed promptly or not at all. If Porter had made not the impossible attack which was ordered, but a direct attack upon the enemy's right wing, would he have been blameless for the fruitless sacrifice of his troops? We believe not. It is a wellestablished military maxim, that a corps commander is not justifiable in making an apparently hopeless attack, in obedience to an order from a superior who is not on the spot, and who is evidently in error in respect to the essential conditions upon which the order is based. The duty of the corps commander in such a case is to make not a real attack, but a strong demonstration, so as to prevent the enemy in his front from sending reenforcements to other parts of his line.

*

*

*

The display of troops made by Porter earlier in the afternoon, had all the desired and all possible beneficial effect. It caused Longstreet's reserve division to be sent to his extreme right in front of Porter's position. There that division remained until about 6 o'clock-too late for it to take any effective part in the operations at other points of the line.

A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Porter's corps and King's division upon the enemy's right wing, if it had been commenced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part of the field so large a part of Longstreet's force, as to have given Pope some chance of success against Jackson, but an attack by Porter alone could have been but an ineffective blow, destructive only to the force that made it, and, followed by a counter attack, disastrous to the Union Army. Such an attack, under such circumstances, would have been not only a great blunder, but, on the part of an intelligent officer, it would have been a great crime.

What General Porter actually did do, although his situation was by no means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems to have been only the simple, necessary action which an intelligent soldier had no choice but to take. It is not possible that any court-martial could have condemned such conduct, if it had been correctly understood. On the contrary, that conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful, and judicious. It saved the Union Army from disaster on the 29th of August. This ends the transactions upon which were based the charges of which General Porter was pronounced guilty.c

*

*

*

a Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John

Porter, vol. 2, p. 1704.

b Ibid., p. 1706.

eIbid, pp. 1709, 1710.