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lately working at cross purposes, because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking. It is not possible for anyone to place the army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia.a *

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Had General McClellan been directed to abandon his sick and such stores as could not be transported in the regular supply trains of the army, he could have begun the march to Fort Monroe the day the order was received, but the order directed him first to remove the sick and matériel. This was accomplished in eleven days, and on the 14th, the Fifth Corps, under Fitz John Porter began the retrograde movement. General McClellan, remaining with the rear guard, followed on the 16th.

Whether there was any lack of zeal in the movement of the troops will best appear by quoting the words of Horace Greeley:

General Porter was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing was complete, but, intercepting there a letter which apprised him that the enemy were concentrating rapidly on Pope with intent to crush him before he could be reenforced, he took the responsibility of pressing on to Newport News, which he reached on the 18th, having marched 60 miles in three days; and on the 20th his corps had embarked and was on its way to Aquia Creek. On that day the last of the army had reached its prescribed points of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe.

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The order to General Porter was received at 5 p. m. of the 14th. At 7 p. m. his corps was in motion and continued to march all night. The distance from Williamsburg to Newport News-45 miles-was made between daylight of the 17th and 8 a. m. of the 18th.

If it be considered that the Burnside fleet was not available for several days after the order to withdraw was issued, and that nearly every transport in service was used to supply the current wants of the eastern departments, besides transporting new troops from Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, it will be admitted that under orders to abandon neither sick, wounded, nor stores, the movement of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing to Fort Monroe was one of the quickest on record.

Nevertheless, nearly a year later, March 11, 1863, General Halleck was asked by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:

Had the Army of the Peninsula been brought to cooperate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

To which he replied:

I thought so at the time, and still think so. c

Upon this opinion chiefly have contemporary historians based the conclusion that the battle of the Second Bull Run was lost through the tardy movements of the Army of the Potomac.

April 6, 1863, three weeks after General Halleck made the above reply, the Committee on the Conduct of the War, ignoring the influence of its members in forcing the retreat from the Peninsula, reported to Congress as follows:

* * * In the history of that army is to be found all that is necessary to enable your committee to report upon "the conduct of the war." Had that Army fulfilled

a McClellan's Report, pp. 162, 163.

Greeley's American Conflict, vol. 2, p. 171.

C Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 454.

all that a generous and confiding people were justified in expecting from it, this rebellion had long since been crushed and the blessings of peace restored to this nation. The failure of that Army to fulfill those expectations has prolonged the contest to the present time with all its expenditure of life and treasure, for it has to a great extent neutralized, if not entirely destroyed, the legitimate fruits which would otherwise have been reaped from our glorious victories in the West."

That the reader may form his own conclusions, let us now consider the feasibility of uniting the two armies on the line of the Rappahannock. In effecting the concentration of troops it is a principle of strategy that the point of concentration must be nearer to your own corps than to those of the enemy.

Whether General Halleck be regarded as a free agent, or as the victim of a system which required implicit obedience to the Secretary of War, his neglect of this strategical axiom cannot be excused, particularly as the danger of its violation had just been illustrated in his own department in the West.

When assigned to the command of the Department of the Mississippi in March, 1862, the Army of the Ohio, under General Buell, was at Nashville and the Army of the Tennessee, under General Grant, was moving up the Tennessee River. The point of concentration first selected was Savannah, on the east bank, but the expedition against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad having fallen back and disembarked at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank 9 miles above, the remainder of the Army of the Tennessee was sent forward to the same place, on which the Army of the Ohio was also directed. From Pittsburg Landing to Nashville the distance was more than 100 miles; from the same point to Corinth, where the Confederate Army lay, it was scarcely 25 miles. Aware of the impending junction, the Confederates, as already stated, assailed the Army of the Tennessee on the 6th of April and steadily pressed it back, their last attack being only resisted by a heroic effort just as the leading division of the Army of the Ohio reached the field.

The chances of a successful concentration in Virginia were much less promising than at Pittsburg Landing. The Army of Virginia was on the Rapidan, 60 miles from Richmond; the Army of the Potomac was on the James River, 25 miles below. Directly between the two, under a single commander, lay the Confederate army, reenforced by all the troops that could be collected east of the Alleghenies.

To join the Army of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac had to march from Harrison's Landing to Fort Monroe, a distance of from 60 to 70 miles, proceed 125 miles by water from Fort Monroe to Aquia Creek, involving the delay of embarking and disembarking, and thence march to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, 30 miles farther-in all a distance of 215 miles.

By contrast with the uncertainties of water transportation, the Confederates had two railroads from Richmond--one leading to Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, the other to Rapidan Station, on the Rapidan-two points but 30 miles apart.

The first road was available for massing on our left, against the troops from the Army of the Potomac, arriving successively at Aquia Creek: the other was equally available for an attack on the Army of Virginia, while both could be used for a movement against the center, midway between Fredericksburg and Rappahannock station.

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 4.

With all these advantages, the separation of our armies gave to the Confederates an opportunity not to be neglected. Stonewall Jackson, the moment the Seven Days' battles were over, urged an offensive movement against the Army of Virginia. Lee, however, more cautious if not more sagacious, recognizing, like McClellan, that the defense of Washington lay at Richmond, waited till the 13th of July, when, knowing that no reenforcements had been sent to the Army of the Potomac, he moved Jackson with his own and Ewell's division to Culpeper Court House. Near this place, on the 9th of August, Jackson fought the battle of Cedar Mountain, and then fell back across the Rapidan. This temporary retreat resorted to for safety, was but preparatory to a general movement.

The reports of spies from Washington, where, after the injunction of secrecy was removed, army movements could be discussed in Congress, on the streets, and in the hotels; the advance of the Army of Virginia midway to the Confederate capital; the reembarkation of Burnside's corps at Fort Monroe, and its landing at Aquia Creek; the increase of the number of transports on the James River, together with the shipment of troops and stores, satisfied the mind of the Confederate commander that if Richmond was still our objective point, we had determined to reach it by the overland route."

No longer uneasy as to the safety of his capital, he designated a division for its protection, and on the 13th of August, the day before the Fifth Corps began the retreat from the Peninsula, put the main body of his army in march for the Rapidan.

Fortunately for the Union, the Confederates were slow in profiting by their advantage. With but 60 miles to march to the Rapidan, part of the troops proceeding by rail, and a further march of 20 miles to the Rappahannock, it was not till the 21st and 22d of August, that they were able to make demonstrations along the line of the latter river, which, owing to the judicious dispositions of General Pope, they were unable to cross until the 25th.

In the meantime, General Pope had been reenforced by Reno's division of Burnside's corps, and by the Fifth Corps under General Porter, the head of which only arrived at Aquia Creek on the 21st.

Thus, notwithstanding the tardiness of the Confederates, but one corps of the Army of the Potomac, by making forced marches and using every exertion to hasten its transportation by water, was able to join the Army of Virginia on the line designated by the General in Chief.

a Pollard's Lost Cause, p. 303.

CHAPTER XXIII.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND BULL RUN.

GENERAL POPE'S ORDERS AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.

Had General Pope been left to himself, it is probable that he would have conducted his army back to Bull Run or to the defenses where the concentration could have been effected in safety; but on the 21st, General Halleck telegraphed that in fully forty-eight hours he could be made strong enough, adding "Don't yield an inch if you can help it." a

This order General Pope carried out to the letter. On the 23d, he intended to cross the Rappahannock and give battle, but was prevented by a rise of the river. The same day, Heintzelman's corps from the Army of the Potomac, without its artillery, arrived by rail at Warrenton Junction, having, by a change of orders, been disembarked at Alexandria, instead of Aquia Creek. On the 25th, General Pope became fully aware of a turning movement by his right. On the 26th, in the evening, Stonewall Jackson, with about 30,000 men, seized his communications at Kettle Run, 6 miles east of Warrenton Junction.

For more than sixteen years, the mass of our loyal people of the country have been convinced that the second battle of Bull Run was lost on the 29th of August, and that the loss was due to the disobedience of orders, insubordination, and treachery of some of the high officers of the Army of the Potomac. This conviction was naturally produced by the official dispatches and subsequent report of the commander of the Army of Virginia.

In settling so important a question, the only safe data are despatches and official reports. From these it appears that up to the night of August 27, the dispositions of the commander of the Army of Virginia were all that could have been expected from a skillful commander. General Halleck had asked him to hold the Rappahannock till the 23d; he held it till the 26th. His army at the time consisted as follows: Banks's corps

Sigel's corps.

McDowell's corps (including Reynold's division of the Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac)

[blocks in formation]

5,000

9,000

15,500

7,000

18,000

4,000

58,500

The cavalry was so completely broken down that there were not more than 500 fit for effective service. Although short of this class of

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, pt. 2, p. 125, Supplement.

troops, called the eyes of an army, General Pope had exact information of the movements and strength of the enemy. He knew, on the evening of the 27th, that Jackson, with Ewell's, Taliaferro's and A. P. Hill's infantry divisions, supported by cavalry and artillery, the whole from 25,000 to 30,000 strong, had left the main body of Lee's army and gotten completely in his rear. He saw also, with satisfaction, that his own movements betokened an easy victory over his adversary.

The evening of the 27th, McDowell and Sigel, 24,500 strong, were at Gainesville, on the Warrenton and Centreville pike, the only route by which Jackson could escape through Thoroughfare Gap. Reno's command and Kearney's division, with a total of about 11,000, were at Greenwich. Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, moving along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad toward Manassas, on the afternoon of the 27th, had already had a fight with Ewell's divisions at Bristoe Station. Porter, with 9,000 men, was between Warrenton Junction and Bristoe. Banks, with 5,000 men, brought up the rear. guarding the material and trains.

Although the two armies had not been wholly united, the commander of the Army of Virginia saw himself at the head of 60,000 men, while the enemy had but 30,000. Another move, and his triumph would be complete. Confident of success, he sent the following order to General Porter at 6.30 p. m. from Bristoe Station:

The Major-General Commanding directs that you start at 1 o'clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here by daylight.a

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To General Kearny he sent orders from Bristoe at 9.30 p. m.:

At the very earliest blush of dawn push forward with your command with all speed to this place. You can not be more than 3 or 4 miles distant. Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Ewell are in front of us. Hooker has had a severe fight with them to-day. McDowell marches upon Manassas Junction from Gainesville to-morrow at daybreak. Reno upon the same place at the same hour. I want you here at day dawn, if possible, and we shall bag the whole crowd. Be prompt and expeditious, and never mind wagon trains or roads till this affair is over.

To General McDowell (commanding left wing, consisting of his own and Sigel's corps) he sent orders:

At daylight to-morrow morning march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to march from Greenwich at the same hour upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny, who is in his rear, to march on Bristo at daybreak. Be expeditious and the day is our own.

The order to General McDowell implied that he should march in parallel columns, or en échelon of columns, with sufficient distance between them to form line at any moment, his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad, his left well to the east."

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 144. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 145, Supplement.

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