CHAPTER XIV. FLORIDA WAR.« The organization of the Army, as reported by the General in Chief, on the 30th of November, 1835, was as follows: The number of enlisted men present for duty at that date, constituting the whole fighting strength of the Army, was 3.888. Of this number 1,543, under General Scott, were in the Eastern Department, embracing the Atlantic coast and nearly all the territory cast of the Mississippi Valley. The remainder, commanded by General Gaines, was distributed in the Western Department, consisting of the seacoast from Key West to New Orleans, the Mississippi Valley, and the western country, as far as Fort Leavenworth and Fort Gibson. At this very time, then, although the population of the United States exceeded 15,000,000, less than 4,000 soldiers guarded its seacoast, its Canadian frontier, and all the outlying settlements in the vast territory, which swarmed with hostile Indians. In Florida, with an area of more than 52,000 square miles, were 9 companies of artillery and 2 of infantry, with 26 officers and 510 men; a total of 536. Of these 11 companies, 6 under Brevet Brigadier-General D. L. Clinch, Fourth Infantry, were posted at Fort King and numbered, present for duty, 244 officers and men." The remaining 5 companies were posted, 1 at St. Augustine, 3 at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, and 1 at Key West. The Administration, with this insignificant force at its disposal, was not ignorant of the certainty of a conflict, nor misinformed as to the character of the troops it ought to employ. "This is a very valuable chapter and can not be curtailed without lessening its value.-J. A. Garfield." The above was indorsed on the manuscript in the handwriting of General Garfield.-EDITORS. American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 633. с American State Papers, vol. 5, pp. 634–639. d American State Papers, vol. 6, p. 57. Referring to the removal of the Seminole Indians west of the Mississippi, Governor Eaton, of Florida, on the 8th of March, 1835, wrote to General Cass, Secretary of War: The employing a military force will be an act of war, and the Indians will embody and fight in their defense. In this event, you will want such an imposing force as shall overawe resistance. The few companies you have ordered will not produce this result. They will serve but to begin the fight and to awaken angry feelings, so that, in the sequel, the militia will have to be called, which will end in the butchery of these miserable people. Send a strong, imposing regular force which can be commanded and prevented from doing more than actually is needful to be done, and then that force, judiciously acting and forbearing, may do much. But send only a handful of men and difficulties will come upon you. * * * On the whole, and to conclude a tiresome letter, I offer this advice: Avoid the exercise of force as long as possible, and let it be the only, the last sad alternative; and then let not by any means the militia be appealed to; they will breed mischief.a To protect the defenseless citizens of North Florida from the impending danger, resort had once more to be made to raw troops. On December 9 the governor of Florida was requested, upon the requisition of General Clinch, to place under his command any portion of the militia of the Territory of Florida that he might find necessary for the suppression of Indian hostilities. December 22 General Call wrote to the President: Having heard of the distress and alarm on the frontier, occasioned by Indian depredations, I raised a detachment of 250 volunteer mounted riflemen for my brigade, and, under the orders of the acting governor, proceeded to this border, where I found about the same number of men under the command of Colonel Warren, of the East Florida militia. I have assumed command of the whole, making my force about 500 men. They were raised, however, for only four weeks, and many of them are badly armed and equipped. The services of these troops have been tendered to General Clinch and accepted for the prospect of protecting the frontie. I can, Sir, scarcely give you an adequate description of the frontier inhabitants. The whole country between the Suwanee and the St. Johns rivers, for the distance of 50 miles above the Indian boundary, is abandoned, the frontier inhabitants shut up in a few miserable stockade forts, and the Indians traversing the country at will, burning and destroying wherever they appear, e Such were the paltry dispositions for protection when, on the 28th of December, the Indians began the war by the massacre of Major Dade and his command. This unfortunate detachment, treacherously attacked while marching in fancied security from Fort Brooke to Fort King, was composed of portions of the Second and Third Artillery and of the Fourth Infantry, 110 officers and men in all, of whom only 3 escaped. The same day, the Indian agent, General Thompson, and Lieut. Constantine Smith, of the artillery, were waylaid and murdered about a mile from Fort King. Small as was the garrison at this post, it immediately took the offensive. On the 29th of December, General Clinch, with 6 companies of regular troops, amounting to about 200 men, proceeded from Fort King toward the Withlacoochee to attack the Seminoles, who were in force on the left bank of that river. In this expedition he was joined by Governor Call, with between 400 and 500 volunteers of Florida. On the 31st of December, General Clinch, with the regular troops under his command, crossed the Withlacoochee. He was here attacked by a large body of Indians, and, after a spirited engagement, the Indians were finally defeated and fled into the hummocks. In this affair, it will appear that the regular troops bore the brunt of the action. Out of the 200 regular troops who crossed the river with General Clinch, 57 were killed or wounded, including 4 officers. Of the 400 or 500 volunteers who had joined General Clinch, with a view of aiding in subduing the Indians, only 27 men and 3 officers took part in the action. Why so many remained out of the action is not explained. Had the same zeal and bravery been displayed by the a American State Papers, vol. 6, p. 493. whole force, as was evinced by the regular troops, there is little doubt but that the war would have been terminated with the battle of Withlacoochee. @ The loss of the enemy was estimated at from forty to sixty killed. In his report to the President, dated January 9, General Call said: I had many difficulties to contend with in my late expedition, and, among others, mutiny and desertion among my troops; but the examples I have made of the offenders will have a salutary effect hereafter. The power of the enemy is variously estimated by those best informed, at from 1,200 to 2,000 warriors, and it is confidently believed that a large number of the Creek Indians have united with them. They are well armed; they are waging a war of extermination and will fight desperately. On the same day Governor Eaton wrote as follows to the Secretary of War: By the enclosed despatch from General Call, you will perceive that the volunteers have returned home, and the security of the frontier of this Territory and Georgia is now at the mercy of the Indians. A few regulars, equal to garrison duty, and 150 militia are all the force, by General Call's report, which is now in the field. Militia are few and wide scattered here, and as for arms there are none. Again, let me repeat that a large and imposing force will be necessary as being the most economical to put down these Indians. A force barely adequate; men with but little confidence in themselves, and are all the time going to and coming back from the war; such you will see was the case with General Call's volunteers. Their term had expired, and they would come home with an enemy just in view of them. * * * I have written the governor of Georgia to know if he can not take the responsibility of sending a force into the field. Prompt action and a good force will quiet everything here in forty or sixty days. Tardiness and want of decision may make it last a year. With the defenseless citizens of Florida at the mercy of the savage, the Government, for want of authority to increase the enlisted strength of the Army, was forced again to ask for raw levies. On the 8th of January, 1836, the Secretary of War, by direction of the President, wrote to Governor McDuffie, of South Carolina: Hostilities have been commenced by the Seminole Indians in Florida, and although there is just reason to believe that the regular and militia force employed there will be sufficient to subdue the Indians, still it is possible that their numbers and situation may enable them to carry on a protracted warfare. Under these circumstances, the President has directed me to request you, should Brigadier-General Clinch, commanding the troops in Florida, find it necessary, to resort to the State of South Carolina for additional force, to call into service, upon his requisition, and place under his command, such members of militia as he may require.< Similar letters were also written the same day to the governors of Georgia and Alabama. January 17 the Secretary of War again wrote to Governor McDuffie: I am instructed by the President to request you to call into the service of the United States, upon the requisition of Brigadier-General Eustis, and to place under his orders, such militia force as he may deem necessary to be employed in subduing the Seminole Indians in Florida.d CAMPAIGN OF 1836. To insure a speedy termination of the war, General Scott, the commander of the Eastern Department, was ordered, in January, 1836, to the scene of hostilities. @ American State Papers, vol. 6 p. 817. Official Report of Major-General Macomb, Commanding the Army. American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 218. c American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 219. dAmerican State Papers, vol. 6, p. 1029. The instructions given him by the Secretary of War, on the 21st of that month, stated: It is impracticable here to prescribe the amount of force which ought to be carried into the field; that must depend upon the actual circumstances which you may find existing when you reach the scene of operations. It is of course highly desirable that no unnecessary force should be employed, as the expense may be thereby greatly increased. Still I would not have you hesitate for a moment in calling out such a number of the militia as will enable you, with promptitude and certainty, to put an immediate termination to these difficulties. The horrors of such a warfare are too great to run any risk in its immediate suppression. This subject is therefore committed entirely to your own discretion." This letter revoked the authority to call out militia, heretofore granted to Generals Clinch and Eustis. On the same day the Secretary wrote to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama requesting them to fill General Scott's requisition for militia, to "serve for at least three months after arriving at the place of rendezvous." From the above we see clearly that at the beginning of this long contest, as in the War of 1812, security of life and protection of property were once more intrusted to undisciplined troops, whose number depended upon the discretion of military commanders and governors. On his way to the scene of hostilities, General Scott, on the 29th of January, made his first requisition upon the governor of South Carolina, asking him to increase the detachment of 600 men called for by General Eustis, to a regiment of ten companies, and stating "that mounted infantry or riflemen are not required." Writing to the Secretary of War, on the 31st of January, from Augusta, Ga., General Scott gave it as his opinion that the Seminoles would not be promptly subdued by much less than 5,000 men; and having changed his views as to the kind of troops needed, from further information as to the character of the country, he added that "the greater part of the force ought to be mounted."e The same day he called upon the governor of Georgia for two mounted regiments and upon the governors of South Carolina and Alabama for one mounted regiment each. The governors of South Carolina and Georgia were authorized to organize their two regiments into a brigade, with the prescribed complement of general and staff officers." The term of service, as usual, was fixed at three months after arrival at the principal rendezvous; this, for the South Carolina troops, was on the Savannah River: for Georgia, in the direction of Picolata, on the St. Johns, Florida; for Alabama, Mobile, whence the troops were to move to Tampa Bay. February 2 General Scott reported to the Adjutant-General, that none of the patent rifles ordered to Charleston had arrived; that in consequence he would be obliged to arm the volunteers and drafts with muskets, and that there was also a deficiency of knapsacks, accouterments, camp kettles, and tents. a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 216. American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 226. e American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 223. d American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 226-227. The principle of conscription was fully recognized in the law of 1792 and was repeatedly applied in the militia from that time till the Florida War. e In regard to procuring arms he wrote: It is useless under such disappointments to waste time in sending to the arsenal at Mount Vernon. I shall take it for granted that that depot, like all the other ordnance establishments in this quarter, is deficient in its supplies. In this state of disappointment and vexation, I shall endeavor to borrow of South Carolina, say, 1,500 musket accouterments and twice as many knapsacks, but it is doubtful whether South Carolina has them to lend." Notwithstanding the lack of arms, equipments, rations, forage, and transportation, General Scott pushed forward his preparations so rapidly, that by the 8th of March he hoped to take the field and close the war in a single campaign. The troops, as they arrived in Florida, were divided into three columns, the right under General Clinch at Fort Doane," the left under General Eustis at Volusia, on the St. Johns, the center under Colonel Lindsay at Tampa Bay. These columns, commanded by regular officers, were to beat up the country from their several starting points, and converge near the head of the Withlacoochee. The execution of this plan was, however, deranged by the unexpected arrival of troops from another quarter. As soon as news of Dade's massacre reached New Orleans, MajorGeneral Gaines, commanding the Western Department, without waiting for instructions from Washington, called upon the governor for militia, and with a mixed force of 1,140 regulars and volunteers, sailed, on the 3d of February for Tampa. He thence pushed forward to Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d, nearly destitute of rations and forage. Having replenished his supplies at Fort Doane, he resumed his march toward the Withlacoochee, on the banks of which river he was attacked on the 27th and besieged till the 6th of March, when reenforcements under General Clinch arrived. As soon as the siege was raised, General Gaines turned the command over to General Clinch, and returned to his department. The latter, after relieving the hunger of the troops, who had been compelled to subsist on horseflesh, fell back to Fort Doane. The loss during the siege was 51 killed and wounded. The exhaustion of the supplies at Fort Doane, necessarily compelled General Scott to postpone his plan of campaign. In writing to General Clinch from Picolata, February 26, General Scott stated: I have heard with equal astonishment and regret that Major-General Gaines, without reference to my arrangements, perhaps in ignorance, possibly in defiance of them, should have made a premature movement from Tampa Bay, and having arrived within 20 miles of Fort Doane, should have called for nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in deposit at that place, on which I had relied for the movement of the right wing, in concert with the other parts of the army, c The supplies having been replenished, General Eustis, at the head of 1,400 men, crossed the St. Johns, on the 22d of March; the same day, with a force nearly equal, Colonel Lindsay left Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay. On the 26th, General Clinch, in command of 1,968 men, moved from Fort Doane. Colonel Lindsay, after marching northward for 60 miles a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 225. Fort King was about 20 miles south of Orange Lake. Fort Doane was 12 miles west of the south side of Orange Lake and 22 miles northwest of Fort King. e American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 244. |