the late miscarriage, the brave were mortified to stop short of their object, and the timid thought laurels half won by the attempt.

On the morning of the 12th such was the pressure upon me from all quarters that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion and the service in disgrace.

Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, who had just arrived at the Fourmile Creek, had, late in the night of the first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own and his men's services; but he got my permission too late. He now again came forward, had a conference with Colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might have the honor of a command in the expedition. The arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to command one column of the 300 militia and Lieutenant-Colonel Christie a column of the same number of regular troops.

Every precaution was now adopted as to boats and the most confidential and experienced men to manage them. At an early hour in the night LieutenantColonel Christie marched his detachment by the rear road from Niagara to camp. At 7 in the evening Lieutenant-Colonel Stanahan's regiment moved from Niagara Falls; at 8 o'clock Meads's, and at 9 Lieutenant-Colonel Bloom's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeable to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two columns were to pass over together as soon as the heights should be carried. Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick's flying artillery was to pass over, then Major Mullany's detachment of regulars, and the other troops to follow in order.

Colonel Van Rensselaer, with great presence of mind, ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity and storm the fort. The service was gallantly performed and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction.

Soon after this both parties were considerably reenforced, and the conflict was renewed in various places. Many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone guardhouse, where a piece of ordnance was now briskly served. I ordered the fire of our battery to be directed upon the guardhouse, and it was so effectually done that, with eight or ten shots, the fire was silenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large storehouse, but in a short time the rout became general, and the enemy's fire was silenced, except from a 1-gun battery so far down the river as to be out of the reach of our heavy ordnance, and our light pieces could not silence it. A number of boats now passed over unannoyed, except by the one unsilenced gun. For some time, after I passed over, the victory appeared complete; but, in the expectation of further attacks, I was taking measures for fortifying my camp immediately. The direction of this service I committed to Lieutenant Totten, of the Engineers. But very soon the enemy were reenforced by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippewa; they commenced a furious attack, but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. By this time I perceived my troops were embarking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements, but, to my utter astonishment, I found that at the very moment when complete victory was in our hands the ardor of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all directions; urged the men by every consideration to pass over, but in vain. Lieutenant-Colonel Bloom, who had been wounded in the action, returned, mounted his horse, and rode through the camp, as did also Judge Peck, who happened to be here, exhorting the companies to proceed, but all in vain.

At this time a large reenforcement from Fort George was discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an important check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of ammunition, as I learned there were left only 20 shot for the 18-pounders. The reenforcements, however, obliqued to the right from the road and formed a junction with the Indians in the rear of the heights. Finding, to my infinite mortification, that no reenforcement would pass over, seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence, and knowing that the brave men at the heights were quite exhausted and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do was to send them a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment I dispatched a note to General Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation, leaving the course to be pursued much to his own judgment, with assurance that if he thought best to retreat I would endeavor to send as many boats as I could command, and cover his retreat by every fire I could safely make; but the boats were dispersed, many of the boatmen had fled panic-struck, and but few got off. My note, however, could but little more than have reached Gen. W. about 4 o'clock when a most severe and obstinate conflict commenced, and continued about half an hour, with a tremendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry. The enemy succeeded in repossessing their battery and gained advantage on every side. The brave men who had gained the victory,

exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect of their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict.

I can only add that the victory was really won, but lost for the want of a small reenforcement; one-third part of the idle men might have saved all.a

The above report shows plainly that Van Rensselaer, notwithstanding his evident good sense and ability, was compelled to forego his own judgment to escape charges of cowardice or treason, and to avoid seeing the whole campaign go for naught through the desertion of his militia; and further, that these troops by their insubordinate importunities forced him to give battle, only to abandon their comrades and disgrace their country when complete victory was within easy grasp. Unwilling to accept the true lessons of the battle, General Armstrong, in his "Notices," after expatiating on the violation of seven maxims of war as sufficient to explain the loss of the engagement, lays down, eighthly, a new principle, as follows:

The omission to ascertain, previously to the adoption of the project, the political sentiment of the militia on the question of invasion, and that of not promptly recalling the advanced corps after having ascertained that point, were errors of great magnitude.

The next effort to retrieve the national reputation was made by General Smyth, who excited a temporary enthusiasm by the following flowery proclamation:

To the men of New York:

For many years you have seen your country oppressed with numerous wrongs. Your government, although above all others devoted to peace, has been forced to draw the sword and rely for redress of injuries on the valor of the American people. That valor has been conspicuous, but the nation has been unfortunate in the selection of some of those who directed it. One army has been disgracefully surrendered and lost; another has been sacrificed by a precipitate attempt to pass it over at the strongest point of the enemy's lines with most incompetent means. The course of these miscarriages is apparent. The commanders were popular men, "destitute alike of theory and experience" in the art of war.

In a few days the troops under my command will plant the American standard in Canada. They are men accustomed to obedience, silence, and steadiness. They will conquer or they will die. Will you stand with your arms folded and look on this interesting struggle? Are you not related to the men who fought at Bennington and Saratoga? Has the race degenerated? Or have you, under the baneful influence of contending factions, forgotten your country? Must I turn from you and ask the men of the Six Nations to support the Government of the United States? Shall I imitate the officers of the British King, and suffer our ungathered laurels to be tarnished with ruthless deeds? Shame, where is thy blush! No. Where I command, the vanquished and peaceful man, the child, the maid, and the matron shall be secure from wrong. If we conquer, we will "conquer but to save."

Men of New York, the present is the hour of renown. Have you not a wish for fame? Would you not choose in future times to be named as one of those who, imitating the heroes whom Montgomery led, have, in spite of the seasons, visited the tomb of the chief and conquered the country where he lies? Yes. You desire your share of fame. Then seize the present moment. If you do not you will regret it and say, "the valiant have bled in vain; the friends of iny country fell, and I was not there.

Advance, then, to our aid. I will wait for you a few days. I can not give you the day of my departure. But come on. Come in companies, half companies, pairs, or singly. I will organize you for a short tour. Ride to this place, if the distance is far, and send back your horses. But remember that every man who accompanies us places himself under my command and shall submit to the salutary restraints of discipline.c

a Van Rensselaer's Affair of Queenstown, Appendix, p. 62.

b Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 19.

James's Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States, vol.

1, pp. 391, 392; also Thompson's Late War, p. 82.

In response to this call his force for the brief space of one month increased to 4,500 men.

Smyth's first effort to invade Canada was made on the 28th of November. His advanced guard, under cover of night, crossed the river and returned after spiking several of the enemy's batteries. At daylight the main body began to embark, but late in the afternoon the expedition was postponed and the men ordered back to land. On the 1st of December the attempt was renewed with a similar ending. After advancing nearly a quarter of a mile from the shore, the front line of boats was recalled and the announcement made that the expedition was given up.

Although the officers of the volunteers and militia had advised in council of war against invasion, the behavior of their men on receiving this information is thus described by Thompson:

The scene of discontent which followed was without a parallel. Four thousand men without order or restraint indignantly discharged their muskets in every direction. The person of the commanding general was threatened. Upward of 1,000 men of all classes of society had suddenly left their homes and families, and had made great sacrifices to obey the call of their country under General Smyth's invitation. He possessed their strongest confidence and was gaining their warmest affections. He could lead to no post of danger to which they would not follow. But now the hopes of his Government, the expectations of the people, the desires of the Army, were all frustrated, and he was obliged to hear the bitter reproaches and the indignant epithets of the men whom he had promised to lead to honor, to glory, to renown. The inhabitants refused to give him quarters in their houses, or to protect him from the rage of those who considered themselves the victims of his imbecility or his deceit. He was obliged constantly to shift his tent to avoid the general clamor, and to double the guard surrounding it, and he was several times fired at when he ventured without it. a

The general sincerity of this outburst is somewhat impeached by the following passage in Smyth's official report:

There were some groups of men not yet embarked; they were applied to, requested, and ordered by the brigade-major to get into the boats; they did not. He estimated their number at 150; it was probably greater.

Thus another effort to lean on the "broken reed," as the militia were styled by Washington himself, had come to naught, and the troops under Smyth's command had failed to conquer or to die" in the language of his high-flown proclamation. Unable to withstand the odium he had called upon himself, the commanding general "was hissed and hunted from one hiding place to another, and at length compelled to fly for safety to his own home in Virginia." When their anger had cooled, the militia made their way home as best they might, while the regulars, like the Continentals of the Revolution, retired to their winter quarters.

THE NORTHERN ARMY.

The forces assembled in the neighborhood of Lake Champlain, under General Dearborn, were intended to invade Canada by way of Montreal. Without, however, performing any exploit which history has recorded, save a reconnaissance across the line to the La Colle River and the capture of a blockhouse, the troops, 5,737 strong, fell back and went into winter quarters.

a

Thompson's Late War, p. 87.

Fay's American War, p. 64.

c Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 113.

The construction which the militia troops put on the powers of Congress to call them out, under the Constitution, to "repel invasions," was again illustrated on this occasion.

Of the 3,000 militia who marched with Dearborn for Canada, nearly all refused to cross the line, including a company who advanced with Pike, but halted at the very border, a

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1812.

The militia called into service during the year 1812 numbered 49,187, of whom 208 were from Massachusetts and none from Connecticut." Adding 15,000 regulars (the number of volunteers not being stated) we find that the total strength of the troops who drew Government pay during the year 1812 was not less than 65,000 men.

year,

The British estimated their regular force at 1,450, but General Brown, afterwards Commander in Chief, computed the whole number of British regulars in the province of Upper Canada, during the at less than 1,200 men, still further qualified by the remark thatat no time did the command of this distinguished chief (General Brock) consist of less than one-third of old men and boys, fit only for garrison duty.

COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The failures and disasters of the campaign can be plainly traced to the pernicious military organization established by the act of 1792. It will be remembered that instead of relying upon a small but welldisciplined regular establishment, this law intrusted the safety and honor of the nation to armies of militia supported by the several States during the long intervals of peace. These armies, though elaborately organized on paper, into battalions, brigades, and divisions, were only to receive such drill and instruction as the various States might think proper.

Though an alarming defect became apparent at the very outset of the war, when the unlooked-for opposition of two State governors deprived the President of the control of a portion of the militia, it remained for the fruitless campaigns at the West and the cruel and disheartening experiences at Queenstown to fully reveal the utter worthlessness of the new system.

Led to a certain extent by those who had gained actual military experience during the Revolution or on the Indian frontier, endowed with perhaps more average intelligence and education than the regulars; supplied with the same food, clothing, and equipments as they were, the marked inferiority of the militia troops was largely due to the brief period of their service, to the conviction that their time would soon be "out," and that others must take their places and bear the burdens and dangers of the contest.

While their pay was no greater than that of other troops, when we deduct the time lost in coming and going, as well as that consumed in

a Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 101.

The above figures were furnished by the Adjutant-General of the Army.

C The return from the Army in February, 1813, shows 19,036.

d James's Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States, vol. 1, p. 56.

Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 224. Extract from letter from General Brown, dated July 20, 1813.

partial and unavailing instruction, their real cost to the country was infinitely greater.

OPERATIONS OF THE NAVY.

The first naval exploit of the war took place on the 13th of August, when Captain Porter with the Essex frigate captured the English sloop of war Alert in the brief space of eight minutes; on the 19th of August, after an engagement of thirty minutes, the English frigate Guerriere, 38 guns, was taken by the Constitution, Captain Hull; on the 17th of October the American sloop of war Wasp, Captain Jones, captured the brig Frolic, 22 guns, after a contest of forty-three minutes, but the same day, with its prize, was compelled to surrender to the enemy's seventy-four gun ship Poictiers; on the 25th of October the frigate United States, Commodore Decatur, captured the English frigate Macedonian, 49 guns. The destruction of the Java, 38 guns, by the Constitution, Commodore Bainbridge, on the 29th of December, closed the brilliant record of our Navy for the year.

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It has been fortunate for the fame of our country, no less than for its finances, that Congress has never been tempted to delegate to the States any portion of its constitutional power to provide and maintain a navy. As a consequence, in this branch of the national defense the honor of our flag and the protection of the persons and property of our citizens have been intrusted to disciplined seamen, commanded by officers of professional training and experience.

To that skill, discipline, and valor, which are essential elements of a regular service, must be ascribed this series of brilliant victories on the sea which electrified the nation and made it justly proud of its Navy. Far from appreciating the excellent footing upon which Congress had placed our Regular Navy, and ignorant of the character and discipline of its officers and men, the Cabinet was completely overawed by the supposed naval supremacy of Great Britain, and adopted the timid policy of passive resistance as the only means of preventing the destruction or capture of our national ships.

So suicidal a resolution can only be explained by the disposition only too prevalent among many of our public men to ignore in the management of military and naval affairs the opinions and advice of professional experts.

The urgent verbal and written remonstrances of Captains Bainbridge and Stewart alone induced the President to overrule the twicematured resolution of his Cabinet, to dismantle our men-of-war and convert them into floating batteries for mere harbor defense.

The change of policy brought about by these brave officers amply indemnified the Government for every dollar expended on the Navy since its foundation, and largely atoned for the universal discomfiture of our land forces.

In speaking of the deplorable results that might have otherwise ensued, Ingersoll states:

Importunity overcame Cabinet deliberation which might have brought the war to an end, with nothing but defeats by land, without one redeeming triumph on the water. If so, the Administration must have been borne down by overpowering opposition and its own incapacity, the war spirit discouraged, the war party overthrown, Congress either not called together at all till December, instead of being convoked in extraordinary session in May, 1813, and in December not to vote taxes for vigorous prosecution of hostilities, but to ratify dishonorable peace.

a Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 382.

a