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As thus; mine eye's due is thine outward part,
And my heart's right thine inward love of heart."

This sonnet illustrates the custom of the Poet to illustrate his thoughts with legal proceedings, which ever seemed at his command. In these lines is presented the whole array of legal procedure, in a cause between the eye and heart, as contending parties, over the right to the image of the Poet's friend, including the pleas filed, the impaneling of a jury and the return of the verdict.

The eye contended that the heart had no right to the image, while the heart denied the eye the freedom of the sight of the friend. The heart asserted the better title to the picture, while the eye denied the plea. To decide the title, a jury were impannelled, being the tenants of the heart, who, of course would be prejudiced jurors. By their verdict, which in the orderly course of such legal proceedings, would follow the pleas offered by the rival parties, it was decided that the eye was entitled to the outward vision, while the heart was vested with the inward love of the heart of his friend. From the entering of the plea, denied by the defendant, to the return of the verdict, this Sonnet shows a wonderful familiarity with legal proceedings in court, and follows the natural order of a trial, at law.2

Sec. 508. No cause alleged against lawful reason.

"Against that time when thought shalt strangely pass,
And scarcely greet me with that sun, thine eye,
When love, converted from the thing it was,
Shall reasons find of settled gravity;

Against that time do I ensconce me here
Within the knowledge of mine own desert,

1 Sonnets, XLVI, 1, 14.

It is surprising that Sewell (2d ed.) and Wyndham, should conclude that "'cide" was equivalent to "side," meaning that the jury would determine between the one side or the other, for the term clearly is a contraction of the word "decide," which is the very province of a jury, impannelled as this jury was.

And this my hand against myself uprear,
To guard the lawful reasons on thy part:
To leave poor me thou hast the strength of laws,
Since why to love I can allege no cause."1

The Poet looks forward to the time when his friend Southampton will be separated from him, for the latter's failure to dedicate poems to him, instead of dramas for the multitude. But the reflection that he is still true and loyal to his friend and his own conscience will comfort Shakespeare when this time comes. If lawful reasons are urged on his part, the Poet will raise his hand, even against himself, to enforce the rights of his friend, since his cause has the strength of the law, while Shakespeare has no right to love him. When law is on one's side a good cause of action can always be alleged, but when no legal reasons can be given, it is impossible to set forth a good plea, in law. This is the conclusion reached in this Sonnet.

Sec. 509. Grant failing for want of consideration.—
"For how do I hold thee but by thy granting?
And for that riches where is my deserving?
The cause of this fair gift in me is wanting,
And so my patent back again is swerving."2

A patent is an exclusive right, granted by an official document securing to the grantee the exclusive privilege to the thing granted, as a patent to land, by the Government.3

To constitute any valid grant, based upon a valuable consideration, there must be existing such consideration and if the consideration is wanting, the grant would fail.* The Poet intends to illustrate, by the use of the legal grant that the loss of his friend's love is owing to the fact that

1 Sonnets, XLIX, 5, 14.

" Sonnets, LXXXVII (5, 8).
3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
Tiedeman's R. P. (3d ed.).

the consideration of the grant from himself has failed, because he is wanting in the personal charms and gifts necessary to hold his love.

Sec. 510. Forfeiture of limited lease.

"Not mine own fears, nor the prophetic soul
Of the wide world dreaming on things to come,
Can yet the lease of my true love control,
Supposed as forfeit to a confined doom."i

These lines clearly refer to a conditional or determinate lease of realty, which is a contract between the lessor and the lessee, for the possession of land, for a fixed or determinate period, for a certain consideration, to be void, or forfeited, on the breach of some certain condition. The Poet had considered his love, formerly possessed, forfeited and ended, by Southampton's confinement in the Tower, but on the death of Elizabeth, the supposedly forfeited lease or tenancy of his friend's love, becomes again a vitalized, live estate, subject to no limitations or forfeiture, in law.

Sec. 511. Forfeiting mortgaged property.

"So, now I have confess'd that he is thine
And I myself am mortgaged to thy will,
Myself I'll forfeit, so that other mine

Thou wilt restore, to be my comfort still."

This verse clearly refers to the confinement of Southampton in the Tower and the former verse expresses the Poet's desire to be permitted to go his bail, by substituting

1 Sonnets, CVII (1, 4).

2 White, Mines & Mining Remedies, Chap. XI.

In the CXXV, Sonnet the same kind of a limited lease is referred to, in these lines:

"Have I not seen dwellers on form and favor,

Lose all and more, by paying too much rent?" (5, 6).

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his own person for that of his friend, in jail. A mortgage is the temporary pledging of land in security for a debt due the mortgagee, by the mortgagor. The land itself, not being susceptible of a manual delivery, the mortgagee holds the mortgage as an evidence of his right to the land as security for his debt, until it is paid. The only way to create a mortgage in early times, was to give livery of seisin of the freehold estate, thus passing the estate to the mortgagee. On breach of the condition of the mortgage, to pay the debt, the estate was forfeited and became the absolute property of the mortgagee. And the Poet here proffers to forfeit himself as security for his friend, recognizing that the condition of the obligation is broken

1 Tiedeman, R. P. (3d ed.).

INDEX.

References are to Sections.

Α

Abatement, pleas in, 473.

Abstract and brief, 179.
Accessory before the fact, 315.
Accomplice, 'peaching on, 219.
Accomplices, 233.

Accused, acquittal of, 314.
Accuser and accused, 188.
Accusing counselor, 354.
Accusing one face to face, 353.
Acquittal, of accused, 314.
Acquittances, 73.

Act distinguished from intent, 35.
Acting as both judge and juror,
355.

Action, 238.

Action of battery, 17.

Action of slander, 23.

Action on the case, 155.
"Action-taking" knave, 448.

Acts by attorneys, 114.
Acts of Parliament, 305.
Adjournment of court, 344.
Admission against interest, 11.
Adultery, 256.

Adversaries at law, 128.

Adverse party for advocate, 206.
Advocate, 417.

Advocate, adverse party as, 506.
"A friend i' the court," 244.
Agent, 161.

Agreement, articles of, 276.
Alias, 390.

Alien, 227.

Amercement by fine, 457.
Ancestors, 253.

Answer, 213.

Answering public laws, 387.
Antipathetic criminal, Iago, the,
482.

Antonio's confession of the bond,

94.

Antony's suicide, felo de se, 415.
Antony's tribute to Brutus' char-
acter, 409.

Apparitors, duties of, 74.
Appeal by king's ring, 357.
Appeal, motion to dismiss, 342.
Appearance in court, 340.
Appellant, 187.

Applying judgment to Judge, 441.
Apprehend in the fact, 283.

Apprentice, term of, 222.

Appurtenances, 467.

Arbitration, 175.

Arraignment of Hermione, 143.
Arrest, 152.

Arrest on mesne process, 154.
Arrest upon "hue and cry," 223.
Arrested in the act, 148.
Articles of agreement, 276.
Assault upon Lucrece, 497.
Assurance, security, 234.
Assurance, settlement by way of,
132.

Athenian law, jurisdiction of, 53.
Athenian law, parent's right of
infanticide under, 55.

Attachment, 151.

Attainder, 62.

Attestation, 362.

Attestation by notary, 496.

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