without paying or tendering him any damages therefor. Defendant claimed the right to do what was alleged against it under the reservation contained in its deed, above quoted. If defendant had such right, no claim is made that it did not exercise it in a careful and considerate manner, at the proper time, and without doing any unnecessary damage.

Upon the trial the plaintiff proved the entering upon the land of plaintiff, the removal of the logs against his consent, and the damage caused thereby. The corporate existence of the defendant was admitted, and that it had existed and carried on the business of booming, running, and rafting logs on the Tittabawassee river, and other streams, under and by virtue of the laws of this State, for upwards of 20 years prior to the commencement of this suit. It was admitted upon the trial that defendant was ready and willing to remove the logs from the land as soon as practicable after they went there, and offered to do so, and was forbidden by the plaintiff to remove them without paying the damages claimed. It was further admitted

"That the defendant has never conveyed or parted with its rights contained in said reserves and exceptions in said deed, unless barred from enforcing them by plaintiff's possession, such as is herein admitted; that defendant's business on December 21, 1869, and since its organization as aforesaid, now is, and ever since has been, that of running, rafting, booming, and sorting saw-logs on the Tittabawassee river and other streams in said Midland county and elsewhere, and business incident thereto, a very considerable portion of said business being the removal of saw-logs which have floated out of such streams upon its shores, and the land adjacent thereto, and returning them to the river for the purpose of running them to the place of destination; that it is the custom of said defendant, where it admits or believes that the owners of land are entitled to damages, to pay them before removing the logs. The defendant placed no logs

in the stream except to return them to the stream where they have floated out while in transit. It has the custody and control of them through contract with their owners for the purpose of running and delivering them to their owners at the places of destination."

If the defendant was protected in what it did in removing the logs by the reservation in its deed to Sias, then the statute, passed ten years later than the date of the deed, has no application to the case before us. The Legislature did not by Act No. 238, Laws of 1879, intend to interfere with vested rights.'

We must construe this deed in the light of the admissions contained in the record as to the business which the defendant has carried on for more than 20 years, and ever since its organization. A very considerable portion of its business consists in the removal of saw-logs which have floated out of such streams upon their shores adjacent thereto, and returning them to the river for the purpose of running them to their destination. Applying this reservation to these facts, it is evident that the intention of the parties to the Sias deed was that the company reserved the right, among other things, of entering upon, along, and across the premises conveyed, and with men and teams, to remove the saw-logs that had floated out of the river upon the adjacent land, for the purpose of running them to their destination. This was essential in carrying on its business; as much so as the right to use the river in front of the premises for booming logs, and as much so as constructing and maintaining booms necessary or convenient for its business. These rights, reserved in the first part of the reservation, carried with them, as incident thereto, the right to pass along the banks in running logs, and to attach the booms to the shore when necessary; and hence the last reservation must have been 'Amended by Act No. 142, Laws of 1885,

intended to apply to something different from the rights reserved in the former clauses, and that was to that considerable portion of its business of hauling back to the river logs which had floated in time of high water over the banks and lodged upon the adjacent lands.

The admission also contains the statement that

"It is the custom of said defendant, where it admits or believes that the owners of land are entitled to damages, to pay them before removing the logs;"

And counsel for plaintiff insists that this admission holds the company to the payment of damages before it removes the logs. But that custom only applies to cases where the company has no legal right to go upon the land to remove the logs without the owner's consent. It could not apply to cases where it had a right to go upon the land for that purpose, secured to it by contract or deed; and the fact that it did enter upon the plaintiff's land, and remove the logs, without his consent, and without paying damages, is evidence that it did not admit or believe plaintiff was entitled to any damages from it. This construction of the reservation disposes of the case. The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted. The other Justices concurred.

WILLIAM W. SUTHERLAND V. SAMUEL S. BURRILL AND
WALTER 0. BURRILL, GARNISHEES OF FRANK

WILCOX.

Garnishment-Justices' courts-Disclosure-Evidence.

1. A garnishee in justice's court is not required to sign his disclosure,
nor need it be under oath, unless required by the plaintiff.

2. Under the rules and practice in garnishment proceedings in justice's court, the garnishee is treated as a witness for the plaintiff, who is bound by the disclosure.

3. The minutes of the examination of a garnishee, taken by a justice of the peace under How. Stat. § 8036, are not such a record as imports absolute verity, and, on a trial of the issue framed on the issuance of a summons to show cause, the garnishee may show that the justice failed to take down in such minutes the disclosure actually made.

Error to Saginaw. (Gage, J.) Argued June 11, 1890.` Decided July 2, 1890.

Garnishment proceedings. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Wheeler, McKnight & Grant, for appellant, con

tended:

1. The disclosure was made on oath, and in writing, and was signed by the party making it, and there can be no dispute about its contents, or what the party really did disclose; citing Newell v. Blair, 7 Mich. 103; Isabelle v. Iron Cliffs Co,, 57 Id. 120.

Tarsney & Weadock, for defendants.

CAHILL, J. The plaintiff, having an uncollected judgment against Frank Wilcox for $206.68, commenced garnishee proceedings against Samuel S. Burrill and Walter 0. Burrill before J. W. Thorn, a justice of the peace of Saginaw county. On the return-day of the summons, Samuel S. Burrill, one of the garnishee defendants, appeared, and made and subscribed a disclosure under oath as follows:

"I am

one of the garnishee defendants. Walter 0. Burrill and myself are copartners. Some time last winter, we employed Frank Wilcox to saw some lumber for us. We were to pay him three dollars per thousand feet. He had sawed some fifty thousand feet for us. We have paid Frank Wilcox fifty dollars towards the work as

saw-bill. We still owe on the sawing of the lumber the sum of one hundred dollars. I made the bargain for sawing the lumber with Mr. Wilcox, and paid him fifty dollars on the contract. I have had nothing to do with any person but Wilcox in this transaction. Wilcox was running the mill, and this was all the money, property, or effects in our hands, or under our control, belonging to the said Frank Wilcox. And further this deponent saith not.

"SAMUEL S. BURRILL. "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of May, 1889.

"J. W. THORN,
"Justice of the Peace.”

Thereupon a summons was issued, directed to the garnishee defendants, requiring them to appear before the same justice on May 29, 1889, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, then and there to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them as garnishee defendants in the suit of Sutherland v. Wilcox.

On May 29 the parties appeared in person and by attorneys. Plaintiff declared orally against the defendants on the common counts in assumpsit, and in trover. Defendants pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that on the trial they would show that the money stated in the disclosure as owing to Wilcox was in fact owing to Melville G. Gardner, and that such disclosure was made under a mistake of fact. By consent of both parties the case was adjourned from time to time until July 11, 1889, at which time the parties, being present, proceeded to trial. Plaintiff offered in evidence the docket entries of the judgment against Wilcox, also the disclosure of the garnishee defendants, signed by Samuel S. Burrill. Judgment was rendered by the justice in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendants, for $96 damages and $4 costs.

The case was taken by the defendants to the circuit