owned any other land than this forty acres and the small parcel adjoining. Late in 1879 he admitted a man by the name of Allen, and received board from him. Complainant supplied his own bed, but retained no other of his household goods. After Allen left, which was in the course of a few months, the place was without a family until the fall of 1880, at which time complainant let in a man by the name of Mead. At this time complainant removed his bed. Mead occupied until the spring of 1881, and then went out. During the whole period subsequent to his wife's departure the complainant regarded the place as his home. His stopping elsewhere was transient. He divided his time between laboring for others about the neighborhood and working for himself on this farm, and from time to time he continued to repair to it for work, and sometimes to sleep or rest, and sometimes to eat. As we have seen, the property bore the stamp of a homestead during the wife's continuance with complainant. He had gained the privilege, and the wife's abandonment was not a fact in itself sufficient to destroy it. His right did not lie at her mercy. It did not necessarily depend on her staying or going. The change would be a circumstance to be considered with others on the question of waiver or abandonment, byt it could have no imperative and conclusive effect by itself. That the right did not immediately terminate is certain. It continued longer. Showers v. Robinson 43 Mich. 502; Pardo v. Bittorf 48 Mich. 275; Bunker v. Paquette 37 Mich. 79; Kenley v. Hudelson 99 Ill. 493; Kessler v. Draub 52 Tex. 575; Kimbrel v. Willis 97 Ill. 495; Silloway v. Brown 12 Allen 30. Can any point of time be specified when it did cease? Is it possible to say that the sort of connection with the property which entitled the complainant, after his wife's departure, to still hold it as a homestead has since been severed? The circuit judge maintains the negative. It is his opinion that, taking all the circumstances into account, they fall short of proving that the homestead right which was vested in complainant at the time his wife left him has in any 51 580 66 337 51 580 90 498 51 580 106 148 51 580 119 612 51 580 f149 90 manner come to an end. And this Court, upon full consideration, is not able to discover any ground in the record which would justify it in overruling that opinion. The case calls for nothing further. The result is that the decree must be affirmed with costs. The other Justices concurred. JOHN FLYNN V. PATRICK GLENNY. Boundaries between ow lots-Re-survey. Re-surveys cannot be allowed to unsettle the lines of town lots after the lot owners have established such lines in accordance with the stakes which they have found planted or recognized by authority, and in reliance on which they have purchased. Appeal from Marquette. (Grant, J.) INJUNCTION bill. Defendant appeals. Oct. 11.—Oct. 24. Affirmed. W. P. Healy for complainant. If two proprietors verbally settle by implied agreement among themselves the dividing line of their respective lands and for some time act accordingly, neither can depart from the arrangement: O'Donnell v. Kelsey 10 N. Y. 419; especially if they took such reasonable measures to ascertain and establish the line between their lots that prudent persons would do: Smith v. Hamilton 20 Mich. 433; Kellogg v. Smith 7 Cush. 379. F. 0. Clark for defendant. Monuments control courses and distances, and the question in case of a boundary between lots is not how an accurate survey would locate them, but how the original stakes did: Moore v. People 2 Doug. (Mich.) 424; where parties occupy premises under mutual mistake as to the boundary lines, improvements not interfered with work no estoppel : Cronin v. Gore 38 Mich. 385; the mere building of a division fence by adjacent land owners does not preclude their contesting the boundaries so fixed, nor does their occupancy to the line of the fence unless it is adverse for the full period required by the statute of limitations: Chapman v. Crooks 41 Mich. 595, 598; Van Den Brooks v. Correon 48 Mich. 287, 288; where streets were staked at the time of the original survey, and monuments fixed, courts will leave the excess or shortage in each block to be dealt with by itself: Twogood v. Hoyt 42 Mich. 612; the question is one of location of the premises described which may be proved by any kind of evidence which is competent to prove any fact: 3 Washb. R. P. 348; Purkiss v. Benson 28 Mich. 540; if parties occupied up to an erroneous line for more than twenty years, supposing it to be the true line, and relying upon it, the line could not be then disturbed though wrong, but if they did not rely upon the first survey, but expected to settle the line by another when convenient, then twenty years' mere possession would not bar: Bunce v. Bidwell 43 Mich. 543. COOLEY, J. The bill in this case is filed to quiet the title of complainant to a small strip of land which defendant is endeavoring to recover from him. The parties own and occupy adjoining lots in the city of Marquette, and the dispute concerns the location of the boundary line. It appears that the original plat of the village of Marquette was laid out by the Cleveland Iron Company in the year 1854. It was crossed by Front, Third and Fourth streets running east and west, and by Fisher, Rock, Superior and Spring streets crossing the others at right angles. Each block was divided into lots, which were intended to be parallelograms, of equal size. Subsequently at several different times adjoining territory was platted into blocks and lots, and the streets on the original plat, with the exception. of Spring street, were extended by direct lines through the new plats. In 1872 defendant purchased lot nine fronting on Fisher street between Third and Fourth, and complainant pur chased the adjoining lot numbered eight. Moriarty had previously become owner of lot ten, which was on the corner of Fisher and Fourth. The lots, according to the plat, were all fifty feet in width, and Moriarty had fenced off his lot of that width, beginning at the line of Fourth street where he and those who had previously bought lots upon it supposed it to be. When complainant purchased, he measured off one hundred feet from the supposed line of Fourth street, and took that as the point of beginning. That left fifty feet between himself and Moriarty, and this was taken possession of by defendant as being lot nine. Complainant and defendant, immediately after their purchases, built upon their lots respectively, and joined in building a fence on what they supposed was the dividing line between their lots. The line of this fence is the one which complainant now insists upon and seeks to maintain. The other lots fronting on Fisher street in the same block were numbered from one to seven inclusive, and these had all been sold off by the original proprietor. Lot five was purchased by one Steele in 1867, who was told by Peter White, the agent of the proprietor, that he would find stakes to indicate the boundary, and he did find stakes which located the lot with one hundred feet for lots six and seven between it and the premises now occupied and claimed by complainant as lot eight. One Neddeau purchased lot four the next year, and found it staked out in the same way as a fifty foot lot adjoining that of Steele. It is probable that these stakes were not the stakes planted at the time of the original platting, but there is nothing in the evidence to raise any suspicion that they had been planted without authority, or for any other purpose than to indicate the lot boundaries; and it is reasonable to infer that they were either the original stakes or others which had been planted in the same places when the original stakes had gone to decay. It seems very plain on the evidence that they were recognized by the original proprietor and its general agent as stakes which correctly designated the lot boundaries until all the lots fronting on Fisher street, on the block now in question, had been sold and taken possession of by purchasers. Recently, and after these parties had been in possession of their respective lots for nearly ten years, occupying with practical recognition of the fence they had jointly constructed as the dividing line, doubt has been thrown upon it by a survey which has been made of this part of the town, and which has led to the present litigation. A surveyor whose skill and competency is not questioned, taking for starting points certain monuments planted at the intersection of Front street with Spring street and Superior street, and also another at an intersection on one of the new plats, has demonstrated to his entire satisfaction, and by tests which in his opinion make his conclusions correct to a mathematical certainty, that the lot lines on this block are all wrongly located; that Moriarty is some two feet over the line of Fourth street; that defendant encroaches on Moriarty to the same extent, and complainant upon defendant. Defendant insists upon locating the dividing lines in accordance with this survey, and complainant contends for the correctness of the practical location. If it were certain that the monuments which are no w found at the intersection of Front with Spring and Superior streets were planted at the time the original plat was laid out, and that the survey of the plat was made with those monuments as the guides, and was itself mathematically correct, the conclusions which have been reached on the survey just made would no doubt be reliable and accurate. But we have no evidence that the monuments were planted when the platting was done: we are only told that they are monuments which are generally accepted and relied upon. In the absence of any evidence of the time when or the person by whom they were located, it is quite as supposable that there may have been an error in locating Front street when the monuments were planted, as that there was an error in locating Fourth street when the lots upon it were were purchased and taken possession of. It is pure assumption that there must necessarily be an error on Fourth street because |