and the room, if the use of it is calculated and intended to facilitate the wagers, and the proprietor derives his profits from them, is a gaming-room. We do not overlook the fact that the games upon which the wagers are laid do not take place in the room but at a distance. It is not necessary that persons be present at the place of game or contest in order that they may participate in the mischiefs of gaming. Betting upon a game of billiards which is being played in New York can as readily be carried on in a distant city, in a room appropriated to the purpose, as in the very room where the playing is going on; and if the latter is a gaming-room, so must the other be. Nothing seems more unimportant than that the game -the part that in itself is innocent, and which only furnishes the occasion and gives opportunity for the criminality-is at a distance. To hold this room a gaming-room it is not necessary to proceed upon any strained construction of the statute; it is only necessary to give it effect according to its obvious intent. The statute is aimed at the particular evils of keeping, for hire, gain or reward, a room to aid and facilitate gaming. This is the precise purpose, and so far as we are informed, the sole purpose, for which the defendant keeps the room in question. So far we have assumed that it was necessary for the State to establish the proposition that the defendant's room is a gaming-room even though the recorder was mistaken in holding the pooling itself to be a game. But we are not satisfied that he erred in this. The word "game" is very comprehensive, and embraces every contrivance or institution which has for its object to furnish sport, recreation or amusement. Let a stake be laid upon the chances of the game, and we have gaming. Eminent judges have thought the pooling scheme was to be considered a game, • Tollett v. Thomas L. R. 6 Q. B. 514; Scollans v. Flynn 120 Mass. 271, 273; and it was so decided in Edwards v. State 8 Lea 411. It does not furnish sport, recreation or amusement except so far as the excitement of the choice of chances may furnish it; but this is true of many contrivances which are always called games and which the law There is no good reason for a distinction aims to suppress. between pooling and such games. The exceptions are not sustained and the Recorder will be advised to proceed to judgment. The other Justices concurred. THE PEOPLE V. SOPHIE LYONS. Impeachment and credibility of witness. In seeking to impeach a witness whose reputation is well known all over the city where he lives, it is unnecessary to restrict the inquiry as to reputation to the immediate neighborhood of his dwelling-place. A jury in a criminal case is not at liberty to convict on the testimony of one who has been conclusively shown, by impeaching evidence, to be unworthy of belief. One cannot be examined on the assumption that he is an unfriendly witness before there is any showing to that effect or any evidence from him to warrant it. Error to Washtenaw. (Joslin, J.) June 19:-July LARCENY. Respondent was convicted. Reversed. Attorney General Jacob J. Van Riper for the People. GRAVES, C. J. Since our reversal of the first conviction in this cause-49 Mich. 78—a second trial has taken place, resulting in a second conviction, and again the defendant alleges error. The objections are very numerous, but most of them are destitute of force. Some relate to mere matters of discretion, and others derive no support from the record. It is scarcely necessary to refer to more than one or two points. A few other questions might merit attention, if it were likely they would arise again. A Mrs. Lewis was a material witness for the prosecution, and her credit with the jury was a consideration of importance. And as the credibility of a witness is always in issue, the defendant submitted general evidence to prove that she was not worthy of belief, and no supporting evidence was given or proposed. She was an inhabitant of Detroit, and had been for several years, and was, moreover, a person of much notoriety. Persons of more or less prominence in different parts of the city knew of her, and many, if not all, of the chief officials connected with the police were acquainted with her. As matter of fact, she was a paid agent of the police. Her life had not been in a corner, nor was her reputation confined to any huddle. It had a degree of' publicity which carried it beyond ward boundaries, and caused it to receive a considerable measure of attention in different walks and in many companies. It was a moral odor which penetrated into many recesses without being misconceived. Under these circumstances the witnesses to credit were interrogated as to her reputation in the city of Detroit. No mention was made of any minute locality or fractional division, and it does not appear to have been necessary. Greater nicety concerning the theater of her reputation was not called for. The witnesses had no difficulty. They swore that they were acquainted with her reputation for truth and veracity in the city, and that it was so bad they would not believe her under oath. When the circuit judge proceeded to instruct the jury on this portion of the case, he gave them to understand that this impeaching evidence was entirely irregular and unwarranted because the questions propounded did not restrict the inquiry to the narrow circle or vicinity of the place which she made her home. In view of the circumstances, this opinion was wrong and misleading. It supposes that no person belonging in the city of Detroit, however generally known, can have a city reputation for veracity, either good or bad, a proposition which is contradicted by uni form observation. That the evidence of what her reputation was in the city was entirely legitimate, seems hardly questionable. In a later portion of the charge addressed to this subject of impeachment, the jury were further told that, although a witness were "completely impeached," they might still believe him; or, in other words, that they were at liberty to convict the defendant on the testimony of one who was shown, by impeaching evidence, to be unworthy of belief. Of course, it was not the intention of the circuit judge to convey that idea to the jury, but unfortunately his language was so chosen as to carry that meaning. We also think that the examination of Mrs. Brew, upon an assumption that she was an unfriendly witness, before there was any showing to that effect or any evidence given by her to warrant it, was unauthorized by the rules of evidence. The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, and the defendant will be surrendered to the sheriff of the county of Washtenaw for such further proceedings as shall be necessary. The other Justices concurred. SLUMAN S. BAILEY V. GEORGE W. CADWELL ET AL. Ne exeat. The writ of ne exeat is not issuable in Michigan by a circuit court commissioner or injunction master as a matter of interlocutory chancery practice. History of the practice in England and the United States as to the writ of ne exeat. Error to Kent. (Montgomery, J.) June 19.-July 2. DEBT on bond. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. 51 217 53 205 Thomas J. O'Brien for appellant. Execution for debt cannot issue on a decree until it is enrolled: Brown v. Haff 5 Paige 235; Gleason v. Bisby 1 Clarke Ch. 551; and alimony is not a debt: Lyon v. Lyon 21 Conn. 185; but the writ of ne exeat is issuable: Chancery Rule 17; Cadwell v. Randall 36 Mich. 251; and a proper occasion is an application for alimony: 2 Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 1469, 1871; 2 Bish. M. & D. 508; Kirby v. Kirby 1 Paige 261; Yule v. Yule 2 Stockt. 138; Denton v. Denton 1 Johns. Ch. 364; and if a circuit judge in chancery can grant it, a circuit court commissioner can: Const. art. vi. § 16; Comp. L. §§ 5570, 5582; Jennison's Ch. Pr. 327; and the sufficiency of the showing on which he acts cannot be questioned in a collateral suit on the bond: Miller v. Brinkerhoff 4 Den. 118; Bassett v. Bratton 86 Ill. 152; Jesup v. Hill 7 Paige 95; Blue v. Sheppard 28 Ga. 566. Champlin & More for appellees. The writ of ne exeat is in the nature of an arrest: Raynes v. Wyse 2 Meriv. 472; and cannot issue unless a debt is due: Rice v. Hale 5 Cush. 244; and for alimony, only after decree: Dan. Ch. Pr. 1802, 1806; it will not issue in cases of fraud: id. 1803; the demand which supports it must be equitable, pecuniary and actually due: id. 1805; Story's Eq. Jur. § 1474; alimony is a debt within the meaning of Const. art. vi. § 33 prohibiting imprisonment for debt: Steller v. Steller 25 Mich. 159; the writ was discharged in Peltier v. Peltier Har. Ch. 29; Cable v. Alvord 27 Ohio St. 654;. Exp. Harker 49 Cal. 465; Adams v. Whitcomb 46 Vt. 708; see Aiken v. Richardson 15 Vt. 500; where issuable it cannot be allowed by a circuit court commissioner: Samuel v. Wiley 50 N. H. 356; the ground on which the writ issues is stated in it, and if improperly issued it must be discharged: Hyde v. Whitfield 19 Ves. 345; the writ is in the nature of equitable bail, and in cases of alimony is allowed only for arrears actually due, and for costs: Oldham v. Oldham 7 Ves. 410; it lies for money demands only Cowdin v. Cram 3 Edw. Ch. 231; and not unless defendant owes complainant a debt actually due or complain- |