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of $150 a year in addition to all taxes and assessments, ordinary and extraordinary. The lessees under this lease. had an option of purchase at $5000. Complainant had also some personal property, and a sum of money not ascertained in amount.

Not a great while after going to live with defendant, complainant gave him a general power of attorney not only to lease but also to sell his real estate, and to collect rents. He also seems to have executed several different wills. He is shown to have been in some way induced to believe that his son Enoch had defrauded him of eighteen hundred dollars, and that he was only safe under defendant's watchfulness. This idea about Enoch was absolutely unfounded. It was such a delusion as either indicated mental unsoundness-which we do not think existed-or such a working upon his suspicions as completely led him astray. The facts seem to be that, while at this period he was not insane, he was affected by a disorder which rendered him weak in mind and body, and peculiarly liable to be handled by designing persons. Between the arrival at defendant's and the execution of the deed in 1875, complainant gave defendant a voluntary note for $1000, and signed with him a note to one Stone for $500, which defendant claims was borrowed for complainant, but which we are satisfied was for defendant's own benefit. During this same period also, there were opportunities for selling the farm for $4500, which were not accepted by defendant.

On the 23d of February, 1875, complainant made the warranty deed now in suit to defendant for an expressed consideration of $4000, and defendant claims that it was an actual sale and not a gift. Complainant claims he did not understand that he was making such a transfer to defendant, but supposed he was making a will. There was no occasion for his selling to defendant or to any one, inasmuch as he had an income beyond his wants. The sale, if made for $4000, was at a large sacrifice for which no reason appears But the alleged consideration and the fact of a sale, prop

erly so called, cannot be reconciled with any plausible theory of a fair transaction.

To make up the $4000, or $4500, whichever is claimed to have been the real sum, defendant explains that his father had willed him $2000; that defendant gave up the beforementioned note of $1000, and agreed to pay the Stone note of $500 and interest; and the balance was made up out of an agreement to support complainant, for which a security of $1000 was given. Apart from the agreement to support, these considerations were entirely illusory. Complainant was not bound on any of them, and none of them could have been enforced. But the facts do not indicate that any such consideration was agreed on. It is entirely clear that when this deed was made complainant made some kind of a will, and that then or thereafter some bond or other agreement was made by defendant, which was intended for something more than mere support. Complainant, if he understood the matter at all, which is doubtful, understood that he was not depriving himself entirely of property, as he would have done if defendant's claim is true. These papers were left with the judge of probate who afterwards de. livered them to defendant on his suggestion that his father desired it. These papers have disappeared, and according to defendant were voluntarily destroyed by complainant who chose to remain without written security. In 1876 defendant procured a receipt in full to be prepared, whereby complainant acknowledged full payment for his property, but it is clear he received nothing for it, and was left utterly destitute.

If we gave credit to defendant's own version of these transactions, complainant has, while living with defendant, allowed him to absorb his personal property and all of his real estate, and is left without anything to represent it, and without any security whatever for his support. He has been rendered practically a pauper, and has destroyed or given up such partial assurances as he at one time had. That such a result has been the deliberate and understood purpose of a person of sound mind and free from fraud or un

due influence, is preposterous. Such a state of things indicates beyond question either incapacity or dishonest management or both. We think there is enough appearing in the case to indicate cunning and deception. But the dealings, however managed, are intrinsically wrong when a person in the fiduciary relation occupied by defendant as his father's agent and factotum, manages to get all that his father possesses into his own hands. Nothing but a clear and satisfactory explanation could under any circumstances save dealings which have such an outcome. The old man's feebleness of memory left him very much at defendant's mercy, but defendant's own showing is anything but satisfactory.

Upon the whole case we think complainant has made out a case for rescission. Defendant's counsel suggested that he should be allowed compensation for his expenditures, and for the care of the old man. We think his possession of the property has given him sufficient compensation for what he has spent on it, and that he has no equity to recover his other outlays, which we cannot but think greatly exaggerated, when the old man's residence with him was constantly taken advantage of to further defendant's unlawful designs.

The decree must be reversed with costs of both courts, and the deed rescinded and a reconveyance decreed, the decree to stand meanwhile in lieu of a conveyance.

The other Justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE V. DAN VAN WAGNER.

Limitation on review in criminal cases-Certiorari.

Writs of error and of certiorari are barred after five years from judgment, and if sued out will be dismissed.

The writ of certiorari is appropriate to accompany the writ of error in

criminal cases, if issued in time.

Error to Kalamazoo. (Hawes, J.) June 19.—June 22.

ASSAULT with intent to kill and murder. Respondent brings error. Dismissed.

Blanchard & Cagwin for appellant.

Attorney General Jacob J. Van Riper for the People.

CAMPBELL, J. Respondent, who pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with intent to murder, now seeks on writ of error to reverse the judgment for an alleged irregularity.

It is sufficient to say that the writ was not sued out until about six years after judgment, five years being the statutory limitation, allowing for all disabilities, both for writs of error and writs of certiorari; the latter writ being appropriate to accompany the writ of error, if issued in time. The writ must be dismissed.

The other Justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE V. FRANK LEWIS.

Examination as to plea of guilty-Age of offender.

A prisoner who had pleaded guilty was asked by the judge if he understood that if the plea was entered he would not be entitled to trial but would be subject to sentence. He said he so understood and wished the plea to be entered. He was sentenced the same day, the judge asking him if he had any reason to urge why judgment should not be passed against him, to which he answered that he knew of none. The judge made no other examination as to whether the prisoner's plea was voluntary, and this was in the presence of the prosecuting attorney and other officers of the court, but he made return that he was satisfied at the time from the prisoner's statements that the plea was voluntary. Held, sufficient.

It is presumed that a judge before sentencing a convict performs his duty as to ascertaining the latter's age, unless the contrary is implied in the record of the proceedings.

Certiorari to Oceana. (Russell, J.) June 19.-June 22.

LARCENY from a dwelling in the day time. In response to a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, the trial judge returns that the information on which respondent was arraigned was distinctly read to him by the prosecuting attorney, and on being asked by the court whether he was guilty or not guilty, he stated that he was guilty and desired to have that plea entered. The court then asked him if he understood that in case he entered a plea of guilty, he would not be entitled to a trial, but would be subject to sentence, and he stated that he so understood and desired to enter a plea of guilty. The plea was then entered, and on the same day he was brought to the bar, and on motion of the prosecuting attorney the court proceeded to pass sentence by asking him if he had any reason to urge why judgment should not be passed. He said he knew of none. The judge then asked him his age and occupation and sentenced him. The judge adds "I was satisfied at the time from respondent's statements that the plea of guilty was voluntary. I further return that I made no examination outside of the regular routine court business as to whether the plea of guilty was voluntary or otherwise, or as to his age, and that all examination that was made was in the presence of the prosecuting attorney and other officers of the court." Respondent was convicted and sentenced to the State House of Correction and Reformatory at Ionia for one year and three months. Affirmed.

Gurney & Stevens for respondent appellant.

Attorney General Jacob J. Van Riper for the People.

GRAVES, C. J. We think no error was committed by the circuit judge against the statute requiring a certain examination before sentence on plea of guilty. Pub. Acts 1875, p. 140. The case is governed by People v. Coveyou 48 Mich. 353, and Bayliss v. People 46 Mich. 221.

We are referred to the note in People v. Stickney 50

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