the revised Edition of his Lordship's summing up in the case of R. v. Ramsey and Foote.

All decisions reported since 1881 have been noted down to the date of publication, and the whole Book carefully revised.

4, ELM COURT, TEMPLE, E.C.,

June, 1887.

W. B. O.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THIS book has been called "A Digest of the Law of Libel and Slander," because an attempt has been made to state the law on each point in the form of an abstract proposition, citing the decided cases in smaller type merely as illustrations of that abstract proposition.

Every reported case decided in England or Ireland during the last fifteen years has been noticed. Every case reported in England during this century has, I believe, been considered and mentioned, unless it has either been distinctly overruled or has become obsolete by a change in the practice of the Courts or by the repeal of some statute on which it depended. The earlier cases have been more sparingly cited, but I think no case of importance since 1558 has been overlooked. The leading American decisions have also been referred to, and whenever the American law differs from our own the distinction has been pointed out and explained. Canadian and Australian decisions have also been quoted, whenever the English law was doubtful or silent on the point. The cases have been brought down to the early part of January, 1881.

It would be of but little use to place all these decisions before the reader and leave him to draw his own conclusions. A huge collection of reported cases piled one on the top of the other is not a legal treatise, any more than a tumbled pile of bricks is a house. I have throughout attempted to strike a balance, as it were, and state the net result of the authorities. But this is a process requiring the greatest care and much expenditure of time. When I commenced this book in 1876, I did not at all realize the amount of labour which was requisite in order to ascertain the law and state it clearly in an abstract form.

It is often very difficult to determine whether or no a decision has ceased to be a binding authority: our judges in the present day seldom expressly overrule a previous decision; they comment on it, distinguish it, explain it away, and then leave it with its lustre tarnished, but still apparently a binding authority should identically the same facts recur. There is no rule which decides how long the process of "blowing upon" a case must continue before it may be considered overruled. Whenever such a case has been cited, I have always referred the reader to the places where it has been criticised, adding, however, my own opinion as to the effect of such criticism on the authority of the case. And in many places it has been necessary to review the cases in a note, showing how they bear one on another, and justifying the view which I have taken of their result. Such notes are printed in a medium type, smaller than that devoted to the abstract propositions of the Digest, larger than the Illustrations which follow them.

My object throughout has been to save the reader trouble. All the references to every decision have always been cited. All considerations of style, &c., have been sacrificed to clearness and convenience. I have abruptly changed from the third to the first or second person, whenever there was any possibility of mistaking the antecedent of any pronoun. It is sometimes difficult to follow A., B., and C., through a long sentence: it is easier to distinguish between "I," "you," and "he." Again, whenever I have been in doubt whether the law on a particular subject should be noticed in one chapter or in another, I have invariably stated it in both. Thus, nearly the whole of the chapter on Malice will be found scattered up and down the long chapter on Privilege. So, too, for the sake of practical convenience, all the cases as to the Innuendo and the construction to be put on Defamatory Words, have been collected in Chapter III. In Chapter XIV. all the law as to Husband and Wife, Principal and Agent, &c., &c., has been gathered together under the somewhat stilted but convenient title of The Law of Persons. A separate chapter has been devoted to the subject of Costs. In the chapters on Blasphemous and Seditious Words, I have not hesitated to express freely my conviction that many of the early decisions would not be followed in the present day.

One difficulty connected with the subject-matter of the book I

have endeavoured to avoid, by restoring the word "malice" to its simple and ordinary meaning. The distinction between "malice in law" and "malice in fact" is of comparatively recent origin. “Malice in law” is the vaguest possible phrase; it merely denotes "absence of legal excuse." The plaintiff is never called on to prove the existence of "malice in law;" the defendant has to show the existence of some legal excuse. In short, to say that a libel must be published "maliciously," means merely that it must be published" on an unprivileged occasion." I have therefore abandoned this technical and fictitious use of the word. Throughout this book (to use the words of Brett, L.J., in Clark v. Molyneux, see p. 271) "Malice' does not mean malice in law,' a term in pleading, but actual malice, that which is popularly called malice."

The second part of the book is devoted to Practice, Procedure, and Evidence. I have fought both a civil action and a criminal trial through from beginning to end, giving practical hints to each side. Indeed, I have taken up the subject at an earlier point than is usual in law books, and have submitted to the plaintiff certain matters which he should carefully consider before he issues his writ (p. 513).

In the Appendix will be found a full collection of Precedents of Pleadings, both in Civil and Criminal cases. Some are drawn from the reports; others are hypothetical cases of my own invention; but the majority are pleadings in actions in which friends of mine, or I myself, have been professionally engaged.

W. BLAKE ODGERS.

5, HARE COURT, TEMPLE, E.C.

February, 1881.