slander. They would, therefore, give an innocent meaning to the words complained of, if by any amount of legal ingenuity such a meaning could be put upon them; and would altogether disregard the plain and obvious signification which must have been conveyed to bystanders ignorant of legal technicalities. Thus where a married woman falsely said, "You have stolen my goods," and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, the Court entered judgment for the defendant, on the ground that a married woman could have no goods of her own, and that therefore the words conveyed no charge of felony. (Anon., Pasch. 11 Jac. I.; 1 Roll. Abr. 746; now overruled by Stamp and wife v. White and wife, Cro. Jac. 600.) Again, where the words complained of were, "He hath delivered false evidence and untruths in his answer to a bill in Chancery," it was held that no action lay; for though every answer to a bill in Chancery was on oath, and was a judicial proceeding, still in most Chancery pleadings "some things are not material to what is in dispute between the parties," and "it is no perjury, although such things are not truly answered"! (Mitchell v. Brown, 3 Inst. 167; 1 Roll. Abr. 70.) For further instances of such refinements, see Peake v. Pollard, Cro. Eliz. 214; Cox v. Humphrey, ib. 889; and Holland v. Stoner, Cro. Jac. 315.

But in the days of Charles II., the Court of Common Pleas decided in a case of scandalum magnatum (Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes (1676), 2 Mod. 159) that "words should not be construed either in a rigid or mild sense, but according to the general and natural meaning, and agreeable to the common understanding of all men." And this decision soon became law. In Naben v. Miecock (1683), Skin. 183, Levinz, J., said he was "for taking words in their natural, genuine and usual sense and common understanding, and not according to the witty construction of lawyers, but according to the apprehension of the bystanders." (And see Somers v. House, Holt, 39; Skin. 364; and Burgess v. Bracher, 8 Mod. 238.) In 1722, Fortescue, J., declared in Button v. Hayward et ux. (8 Mod. 24), "The maxim for expounding words in mitiori sensu has for a great while been exploded, near fifty or sixty years." In Peake v. Oldham (Cowp. 277, 278) Lord Mansfield commented severely on the constant practice of moving in arrest of judgment after verdict found: "What? After verdict, shall the Court be guessing and inventing a mode in which it might be barely possible for these words to have been spoken by the defendant, without meaning to charge the plaintiff with being guilty of murder? Certainly not. Where it is clear that words are defectively laid, a verdict will not cure them. But

where, from their general import, they appear to have been spoken with a view to defame a party, the Court ought not to be industrious in putting a construction upon them different from what they bear in the common acceptation and meaning of them." And his Lordship quoted a dictum of Parker, C. J., in Ward v. Reynolds, Pasch. 12 Anne, B. R. to the same effect. So in Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. 197, the Court says: "The rule that has now prevailed is that words are to be taken in that sense that is most natural and obvious, and in which those to whom they are spoken will be sure to understand them." (See also the remarks of De Grey, C. J., in R. v. Horne, 2 Cowp. 682-689; of Buller, J., in R. v. Watson and others, 2 T. R. 206; and the judgments in Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28.)

And such is now the law. The Courts no longer strain to find an innocent meaning for words primâ facie defamatory, neither will they put a forced construction on words which may fairly be deemed harmless. "Formerly," says Lord Ellenborough in 2 Camp. 403, "it was the practice to say that words were to be taken in the more lenient sense; but that doctrine is now exploded: they are not to be taken in the more lenient or more severe sense, but in the sense which fairly belongs to them."

And, again, in Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 95, the same learned judge says: "The rule which once prevailed, that words are to be understood in mitiori sensu, has been long ago superseded; and words are now to be construed by Courts, as they always ought to have been, in the plain and popular sense in which the rest of the world. naturally understand them." Now, therefore, the only question for the judge or the Court is whether the words are capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to them; if they are, then it is for the jury to decide what is in fact the true construction.

So long as the defendant's words are not absolutely unintelligible, a jury will judge of the meaning as well as other readers or hearers. All perplexity and obscurity will disappear under the narrow examination which the words will receive in a Court of law. It matters not whether the defamatory words be in English or in any other language that is understood in England, whether they be spelt correctly or incorrectly, whether the phrase be grammatical or not, whether cant or slang terms be employed, or the most refined and elegant diction. (R. v. Edgar, 2 Sess. Cas. 29; 5 Bac. Abr. 199.) The insinuation may be indirect, and the allusion obscure; it may be put as a question or as an "on dit;" the language may be ironical, figurative, or allegorical; still, if there be a meaning in the words at

all, the Court will find it out, even though it be disguised in a riddle or in hieroglyphics. In all cases of ambiguity it is purely a question for the jury to decide what meaning the words would convey to persons of ordinary intelligence. (Grant v. Yates (C. A.), 2 Times L. R. 368.)

And before answering that question the jury should well weigh all the circumstances of the case, the occasion of speaking, the relationship between the parties, &c. Especially they should consider the words as a whole, not dwelling on isolated passages, but giving its proper weight to every part. (Per Tindal, C. J., in Shipley v. Todhunter, 8 C. & P. 680.) The sting of a libel may sometimes be contained in a word or sentence placed as a heading to it. The defendant will often be held liable merely in consequence of such prefix, where, without it, he would have had a perfect answer to the action. So, too, a word added at the end may altogether vary the sense of the preceding passage. The defendant is, therefore, entitled to have the whole of the alleged libel read as part of plaintiff's case. (Cooke v. Hughes, R. & M. 112.) And for the purpose of showing that what he wrote is no libel, and will not bear the construction which plaintiff seeks to put upon it, the defendant may give in evidence any other passages in the same publication which plainly refer to the same matter, or which qualify or explain the passage sued on. (R. v. Lambert and Perry, 2 Camp. 400; 31 Howell St. Tr. 340; Darby v. Ouseley, 25 L. J. Ex. 229; 1 H. & N. 1; 2 Jur. N. S. 497; Bolton v. O'Brien, 16 L. R. Ir. 97.)

So, too, with a slander; very often the words immediately preceding or following may much modify those relied on by the plaintiff. (Bittridge's Case, 4 Rep. 19; Thompson v. Bernard, 1 Camp. 48.) When the language sued on is ambiguous, and some extrinsic evidence is necessary to construe it, evidence may even be given of other libels or slanders published by the defendant of the plaintiff, which explain or qualify that sued on. But such evidence is not admissible where the meaning of the words is clear and undisputed. (Stuart v. Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Pearce v. Ornsby, 1 M. & Rob. 455; Symmons v. Blake, ib. 477; 2 C. M. & R. 416; 4 Dowl. 263; 1 Gale, 182; Traill v. Denham, Times for May 4th, 1880.) And when such evidence is admitted, the jury should always be cautioned not to give any damages in respect of it. (Per Tindal, C. J., in Pearson v. Lemaitre, 5 M. & Gr. 720; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253; 7 Jur. 748; 6 Scott, N. R. 607.)

Illustrations.

The Observer gave a correct account of some proceedings in the Insolvent Debtors' Court, but it was headed "Shameful Conduct of an Attorney." The

rest of the report was held privileged; but the plaintiff recovered damages for the heading.

Clement v. Lewis, 3 Br. & B. 297; 7 Moore, 200; 3 B. & Ald. 702.
And see Mountney v. Watton, 2 B. & Ad. 673.

Bishop v. Latimer, 4 L. T. 775.

Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 446; 7 Dowl. 210; 1 H. & H. 408.

Harvey v. French, 1 Cr. & M. 11; 2 M. & Scott, 591; 2 Tyr. 585. Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

Street v. Licensed Victuallers' Society, 22 W. R. 553.

Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 21.

An action was brought for an alleged libel, published in the True Sun newspaper::-"Riot at Preston.-From the Liverpool Courier.-It appears that Hunt pointed out Counsellor Seager to the mob, and said, 'There is one of the black sheep.' The mob fell upon him and murdered him. In the affray Hunt had his nose cut off. The coroner's inquest have brought in a verdict of wilful murder against Hunt, who is committed to gaol.-Fudge." The plaintiff contended that the word "Fudge" was merely introduced with reference to the future, in order that the defendants might afterwards, if the paragraph were complained of, be able to refer to it, as showing that they intended to discredit the statement. Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., told the jury that the question was, with what motive the publication was made. It was not disputed that the paragraph, which was copied from another paper, stood without the word "Fudge," it would be a libel. If they were of opinion that the object of the paragraph was to vindicate the plaintiff's character from an unfounded charge, the action could not be maintained; but if the word "Fudge" was only added for the purpose of making an argument at a future day, then it would not take away the effect of the libel. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, one farthing. Hunt v. Algar and others, 6 C. & P. 245.

Of the Innuendo.

In arriving at the meaning of the defendant's words, the Court and jury are often materially assisted by an averment in the plaintiff's statement of claim, called an innuendo. This is a statement by the plaintiff of the construction which he puts upon the words himself, and which he will endeavour to induce the jury to adopt at the trial. Where a defamatory meaning is apparent on the face of the libel itself, no innuendo is necessary: though even there the pleader occasionally inserts one to heighten the effect of the words. But where the words primâ facie are not actionable, an innuendo is essential to the action. It is necessary to bring out the latent injurious meaning of the defendant's

words; and such innuendo must distinctly aver that the words bear a specific actionable meaning. (Cox v. Cooper, 12 W. R. 75; 9 L. T. 329.)

It is the office of an innuendo to define the defamatory meaning which the plaintiff sets on the words; to show how they come to have that defamatory meaning; and also to show how they relate to the plaintiff, whenever that is not clear on the face of them. But an innuendo may not introduce new matter, or enlarge the natural meaning of words. It must not put upon the defendant's words a construction which they will not bear. It cannot alter or extend the sense of the words, or make that certain which is in fact uncertain. (James v. Rutlech, 4 Rep. 17.) If the words are incapable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, and are prima facie not actionable, the judge at the trial will stop the case. If, however, the words are capable of the meaning ascribed to them, however improbable it may appear that such was the meaning conveyed, it must be left to the jury to say whether or no they were in fact so understood. (Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472; Broome v. Gosden, 1 C. B. 728.) This is so in America. (Patch v. Tribune Association, 38 Hun. (45 N. Y. Supr. Ct.) 368.)

An innuendo now requires no prefatory averment to support it. (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 61.) The libel or slander sued on must of course be set out verbatim in the statement of claim; the innuendo usually follows it immediately. Such a pleading is to be considered as two counts under the old system, one with an innuendo and one without. And if the plaintiff can show a good cause of action, either with or without the alleged meaning, he is entitled to recover. (Per Blackburn, J., in Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 402; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.)

The defendant is in no way embarrassed by the presence of the innuendo in the statement of claim: in fact it is to him an advantage. He can either deny that he ever spoke the words, or he can admit that he spoke them, but deny that they conveyed that meaning. He can also assert that the words he spoke were true, either with or without the alleged meaning. It will then be for the jury to say whether