For a plea in abatement to an indictment for libel, see R. v. Garan Duffy, 1 Cox, C. C. 282, and R. v. J. Mitchell, 11 L. T. (Old S.) 112.

For a plea of abatement on the ground that other proceedings for the same libel were still pending, see R. v. J. Mitchell, 3 Cox, C. C. 94, 106; with demurrer thereto and joinder in demurrer (ib. 96), and replication (ib. 107).

For a plea to the jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case of libel, and a demurrer thereto, see R. v. Hon. Robert Johnson, 6 East, 583; 2 Smith, 591; 29 How. St. Tr. 103.

No. 108.

Replication to the above Pleas.

And thereupon J. N. [the clerk of arraigns, &c.] who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, as to the plea of the said A. B. by him firstly above pleaded, and whereof the said A. B. hath put himself upon the country, doth the like, &c. And as to the plea of the said A. B. by him secondly above pleaded, the said J. N., who prosecutes as aforesaid, says that our said Lady the Queen ought not by reason of anything in the said second plea alleged to be barred or precluded from prosecuting the said indictment against the said A. B., because he says that he denies the said several matters in the said second plea alleged, and saith that the same are not, nor are nor is any or either of them, true; but that the said A. B. of his own wrong, and without the cause and matter of defence in his said second plea alleged and set forth, committed the offence and published the said libel in manner and form as in the said indictment is mentioned. And this he, the said J. N., prays may be inquired of by the country, &c. And the said A. B. doth the like.

See Crown Office Rules, 1886, Form, No. 83.

No. 109.

Demurrer to a Plea.

And J. N., who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, as to the said plea of the said A. B. by him above pleaded, saith that the same, and the matters therein contained, in manner and

form as the same are above pleaded and set forth, are not sufficient in law to bar or preclude our said Lady the Queen from prosecuting the said indictment against him the said A. B., and that our said Lady the Queen is not bound by the law of the land to answer the same; and this he, the said J. N., who prosecutes as aforesaid, is ready to verify wherefore, for want of a sufficient plea in this behalf, he the said J. N. for our said Lady the Queen, prays judgment, and that the said A. B. may be convicted of the premises in the said indictment specified.

See Crown Office Rules, 1886, Form, No. 84.

No. 110.

Joinder in Demurrer.

And the said A. B. saith, that his said plea, by him above pleaded, and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above pleaded and set forth, are sufficient in law to bar and preclude our said Lady the Queen from prosecuting the said indictment against him the said A. B., and the said A. B. is ready to verify and prove the same, as the said court here shall direct and award: wherefore, inasmuch as the said J. N., for our said Lady the Queen, hath not answered the said plea, nor hitherto in any manner denied the same, the said A. B. prays judgment, and that by the court here he may be dismissed and discharged from the said premises in the said indictment specified.

See Crown Office Rules, 1886, Form, No. 85.

APPENDIX B.

LORD COLERIDGE'S SUMMING UP TO THE JURY

IN THE CASE OF

REG. v. RAMSEY AND FOOTE,

48 L. T. 733; 15 Cox, C. C. 231; 1 C. & E. 126.

(As revised by the Lord Chief Justice.)

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY.

The two defendants are indicted for the publication of blasphemous libels; and the two questions which arise for your consideration, are:-First, Are these publications in themselves blasphemous libels? Secondly, If they are so, is the publication of them traced home to the defendants so that you can find them guilty.

I will begin with the last question, though it is reversing the logical order, because it is the shorter and more simple of the two. Both questions are entirely for you. When you have heard what I have to say to you as to the state of the law as I understand it, it will then be for you to pronounce a general verdict of Guilty or Not guilty.

Now for the purpose of this second question, which I deal with first, I will assume for the moment that these are blasphemous libels, but though I assume it now, I will discuss it with you afterwards. Assuming them then to be blasphemous libels, is the publication of them traced home to the defendants? As you are not the same jury who tried Mr. Bradlaugh, it is necessary for me to repeat to you the direction on this subject which I gave a few days ago to the jury which tried him. As to the matter of publication, the law has been altered in most important respects by a statute passed early in the

reign of the present Queen,-6 & 7 Vict. c. 96. It used to be the law that the proprietor of a newspaper was criminally, not merely civilly, but criminally responsible for a libel inserted in his paper, and that a bookseller or publisher was criminally responsible for a libel in any book which was sold or published under his authority, even though the newspaper proprietor, or the bookseller or publisher did not know of or authorize the insertion of any libel, and did not even know of its existence. But this in the criminal law was an anomaly and a grievance which the statute I have referred to was, in its seventh section, intended to remedy. That section came to be considered in the case of Reg. v. Holbrook, in which a gross libel on the Town Clerk of Portsmouth had been published in a Portsmouth newspaper. The case was twice tried at Winchester, first before Lord Justice Lindley, and secondly before Mr. Justice Grove. On each occasion the ruling of the judge who tried the case was questioned in the Queen's Bench in the time of my predecessor in this seat; on each occasion by the same three judges, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, and Mellor, and Lush, JJ.; on each occasion there was the same difference of opinion, the Lord Chief Justice, and Lush, J., holding one way and Mellor, J., the other. But, notwithstanding this difference of opinion, the case is a binding authority upon me, and I lay down the law to you in the terse and clear language of Mr. Justice Lush. "The effect of the statute," says he (L. R. 4 Q. B. 50), "read by the light of previous decisions, and read so as to make it remedial, must be, that an authority from the proprietor of a newspaper to the editor or publisher to publish what is libellous, is no longer to be, as it formerly was, a presumption of law, but a question of fact. Before the act the only question of fact was, whether the defendant authorized the publication of the paper, now it is whether he authorized the publication of the libel. Criminal intention is not to be presumed, but is to be proved, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person who employs another to do a lawful act, i.e., to publish, is to be taken to authorize him to do it in a lawful and not in an unlawful manner." Such is now the law laid down in admirable language by great authority; and it is for you to say whether according to the law as so laid down these defendants (either or both of them) did or did not authorize the publication of these libels.

On the trial of Mr. Bradlaugh this question of fact was the question in the case; he grounded his defence upon the contention, that whatever was the character of the published matter, the publication was not by his authority. That was his defence; and upon that

defence, so far as I may presume to assign reasons for the general verdict of a jury, he was acquitted. In the trial before us the process has been reversed. The fact of publication by the defendants has hardly been contested. The evidence is all one way; it is uncontradicted, and it is overwhelming. It is proved that the defendant Ramsey sold the papers which contained the libels. It is proved that the articles charged as libellous were inserted by the express direction of the defendant Foote. There is nothing to qualify this proof; the defendants in fact do not deny their liability; and though the case is for you, I do not know that I need refrain from saying that, if upon the evidence you have heard, you think both the defendants liable for the publication of these alleged libels, I shall entirely agree with you.

That, however, is, comparatively speaking, the least matter you have to decide; for the proof is clear, and it is not disputed. The great point still remains, Are these articles within the meaning of the law blasphemous libels? Now that, as you have been truly told, is a matter absolutely for you. On you is the responsibility, after looking at them and reading them, of saying whether they are or are not blasphemous libels. My duty is to explain to you as clearly as I can what is the law upon the subject. My duty, further, is not to answer the speeches of the defendants (that is no part of the duty of a judge), but to point out to you what in their arguments is in my judgment well-founded, and what is not; and then, when you have listened to me, the question is entirely for you. I am sure from my experience of juries that, in a criminal case especially, they will obey the law as declared by the judge; they will take the law from the judge, whether they like it or do not like it, and apply it honestly to the facts before them.

Gentlemen, I have said before, and I take the freedom to repeat, that it is far more important the law should be administered with absolute integrity, than that in this case or in that the law should be a good law or a bad one. The moment juries or judges go beyond their functions, and take upon themselves to lay down the law or find the facts, not according to the law as it is, but according to the law as they think it ought to be, then the certainty of the law is at an end; there is nothing to rely upon; we are left to the infinite variety and uncertainty of human opinion; to caprice which may at any moment influence the best of us; to feelings and prejudices, perhaps excellent in themselves, but which may distort or disturb our judgment, and distract our minds from the single simple operation of ascertaining whether the facts proved bring the case within the law as we are bound to take it. Forgive me if I seem to press too earnestly upon a