or to define how far one might depart from it in believing or teaching without offending the law. The only safe and, as it seems to me, practical rule, is that which I have pointed at, and which depends on the sobriety and reverence and seriousness with which the teaching or believing, however erroneous, are maintained." Baron Parke (at p. 565) agreed "that the preaching of doctrines called Unitarian is not on that account illegal at common law, and all the statutory penalties have been repealed." Chief Justice Tindal said (at p. 578) : -"I consider that since the statute 53 Geo. III. c. 160, all distinction between Unitarians and other Protestant Dissenters as to this purpose is by law taken away."

These opinions are, of course, of the highest authority, and have been treated as settling the law in all subsequent cases in which they have been cited. Thus in 1846 in Shrewsbury v. Hornby (5 Hare's Reports, 406), a bequest to the treasurer of the Unitarian Association to assist Unitarian congregations and maintain a Unitarian missionary was upheld. In Re Barnett (29 L. J. Ch. 871), a legacy to the minister of Cross Street Chapel, Manchester, to be applied "towards the support of the Unitarians," was also upheld. In Scotland, Lord Jeffrey, in an eloquent judgment, gave a similar decision. (General Assembly of General Baptist Churches v. Taylor, 3 Dunlop & Bell, 2nd Series, Cases in the Court of Session, p. 1030.) It was in accordance with these judgments that it was held in February, 1874, in a Scotch Court that the Rev. Page Hopps's Life of Jesus, a Unitarian book written in a reverent spirit, could not be pirated with impunity by an orthodox missionary, who sought to justify his piracy by the plea that it was a blasphemous publication and therefore incapable of copyright. (See Copinger on Copyright, 2nd edition, p. 91.) It cannot therefore be maintained that Unitarianism is, or ever was, blasphemous at common law, and it follows that the dicta in Woolston's case are unreliable, and cannot be regarded in the present day as good law without considerable qualification. And see the recital in the Dissenters' Chapels Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 45. Again, trusts and legacies to promote the spread of the Jewish religion clearly" strike at the very root of Christianity;" yet they are always enforced in our law courts. Formerly, no doubt, it was different. In 1754 Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Da Costa v. De Pas (Ambler, 228; 2 Swanston, 487, n.), decided on the express authority of R. v. Taylor and R. v. Woolston, that a bequest of 1,2007. to found a "Jesuba or assembly for reading the law and instructing people in our holy religion," was void, as being "in contradiction to the Christian religion, which is part of the law of the land." But

this is not law now. By the statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 59, Jews are now placed on the same footing as Protestant Dissenters, and all bequests to promote the propagation of Judaism are now valid. And, indeed, trusts and legacies in favour of Jewish synagogues were valid before this statute, a distinction being taken between an act of worship and the inculcation of anti-Christian doctrine. (Per Abbott, J., in Lazarus v. Simmonds (1818), 3 Mer. 393, n.)

There is only one recent equity case in which either the letter or the spirit of Woolston's case has been followed, and that is Briggs v. Hartley (1850), 19 L. J. Ch. 416. There a testator left a legacy for the "best essay on the subject of natural theology, treating it as a science, and demonstrating the truth, harmony and infallibility of the evidence on which it is founded, and the perfect accordance of such evidence with reason; also demonstrating the adequacy and sufficiency of natural theology when so treated and taught as a science to constitute a true, perfect, and philosophical system of universal religion (analogous to other universal systems of science, such as astronomy, &c.), founded on immutable facts and the works of creation, and beautifully addressed to man's reason and nature, and tending, as other sciences do, but in a higher degree, to improve and elevate his nature, and to render him a wise, happy, and exalted being." And this was the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Shadwell :— "I cannot conceive that the bequest in the testator's will is at all consistent with Christianity, and therefore it must fail." The editors of Jarman on Wills, 4th edition, p. 210, say "this case would probably not be followed; no cases were cited in the argument at all." This decision stands alone. In Thornton v. Howe (1862), 31 Beav. 14, a trust for "printing, publishing, and propagating the sacred writings of the late Joanna Southcote " was held good by Romilly, M. R., and in Pare v. Clegg (1861), 29 Beav. 589, the same learned judge held that there was nothing illegal or immoral in a society whose chief object was to propagate the visionary doctrines of the late Robert Owen.

It must, of course, be admitted that the law laid down by Lord Coleridge in R. v. Ramsey and Foote cannot be reconciled with every one of the earlier decisions. It is not to my mind inconsistent with R. v. Taylor, but it is certainly opposed to the dicta, if not to the decision, in R. v. Woolston. Was then Lord Coleridge bound by these dicta? I think not. It is in no way the duty of a judge to accept all the dicta of his predecessors without regard to the circumstances in which they were uttered and apply them literally in a different age and in other circumstances. Still less is this the duty

of a judge when those dicta are avowedly based on considerations of public policy which are now admitted to be erroneous. Again, it must be admitted that Lord Coleridge's view of the law is entirely opposed to both the dicta and the decision in the civil case, Cowan v. Milbourn, ante, p. 455. And since the summing-up was delivered his view has not been universally accepted by the Bench. Huddleston, B., was certainly disposed to dissent from it in Pankhurst v. Thompson, 3 Times L. R. 199; but the case was settled, so that it was unnecessary to deliver any judgment. And see Pankhurst v. Hamilton, 3 Times L. R. 500. And Mr. Justice Stephen, in his "History of the Criminal Law of England" (vol. ii. p. 474), undoubtedly inclines to the view that "the true legal doctrine upon the subject is that blasphemy consists in the character of the matter published, and not in the manner in which it is stated;" though he admits that "there is no doubt some authority in favour of a different view of the law." But in a former work, "The Digest of Criminal Law" (p. 97), Mr. Justice Stephen placed his present definition of the law and that given by Lord Coleridge in parallel columns as equally good law, adding in a note, "There is authority for each of these views; most of the cases are old, and I do not think that, in fact, any one has been convicted of blasphemy in modern times for a mere decent expression of disbelief in Christianity."

Those who wish to pursue this inquiry further are referred to an article by Mr. Justice Stephen in the "Fortnightly Review" for March, 1884, and to a pamphlet by Mr. Aspland, Q.C. (Stevens and Haynes, 1884), in which the views expressed in that article are candidly examined. In conclusion, I may say that I have stated the law laid down in Shore v. Wilson and R. v. Ramsey and Foote at the beginning of this chapter as the existing law of blasphemy, not only because it appears to me to be "the better opinion" in point of law, but also because it is, I am sure, the only law on the subject that it is possible to enforce in the present day, the only law which is at all consonant with our modern ideas of universal toleration and religious equality.

In aid of the common law, many statutes have at different times been passed to punish particular species of blasphemy. Of these the following appear to be still unrepealed:

"Whatsoever person or persons shall deprave, despise,

or contemn the most blessed Sacrament in contempt thereof by any contemptuous words or by any words of depraving, despising, or reviling, or what person or persons shall advisedly in any other wise contemn, despise, or revile the said most blessed Sacrament, shall suffer imprisonment of his or their bodies and make fine and ransom at the king's will and pleasure." (1 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 1.)

"Any vicar or other minister whatsoever that shall preach, declare, or speak anything in the derogation or depraving of the Book of Common Prayer, or anything therein contained, or of any part thereof," shall on conviction for the first offence suffer forfeiture of one year's profit of benefices and six months' imprisonment, and for the second offence, one year's imprisonment and deprivation, and for the third offence, deprivation and imprisonment for life: or, if not beneficed, for the first offence imprisonment for one year, and for the second offence imprisonment for life. (2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 2; 1 Eliz. c. 2, s. 2.)

Any person whatsoever, lay or clerical, who "shall in any interludes, plays, songs, rhymes, or by other open words, declare or speak anything in the derogation, depraving, or despising of the same book, or of anything therein contained, or any part thereof," shall for the first offence forfeit one hundred marks, for the second offence four hundred marks, and for the third offence shall forfeit all his goods and chattels to the Queen and be imprisoned for life. (2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 3; and 1 Eliz. c. 2, s. 3.)

These provisions are applied to our present Book of Common Prayer by the 14 Car. II. c. 4, s. 1.

Every person ecclesiastical, who shall persist in maintaining or affirming any doctrine directly contrary or repugnant to any of the Articles agreed on in the Convocation holden at London in 1562, shall be deprived of his living. (13 Eliz. c. 12, s. 2.)

The statute 3 Jac. I. c. 21, as to players, was repealed in 1843 by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 1.

"If any person, having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, the Christian religion within this realm, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, assert or maintain that there are more Gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of divine authority," he shall, on conviction by the oath of two or more credible witnesses, be deprived of all offices, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, unless he renounce his errors within four months from the date of his conviction; and for a second offence he shall be declared unable to sue in any court of law or equity, to be a guardian, an executor or administrator, to take any legacy, or to hold any office, and shall also suffer imprisonment for three years. But information must be given on oath to a magistrate within four days after such words were spoken, and the prosecution must be within three months after such information. (9 Will. III. c. 35 [c. 32 in the Statutes at Large], as amended by 53 Geo. III. c. 160.)

But this statute does not affect or alter the common law (R. v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161; R. v. Williams, 26 Howell's St. Tr. 656); nor would its repeal. (R. v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26; Att.-Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Mer. at pp. 399, 405, 407.)

This Act appears to be directed rather against apostasy than blasphemy. So far as I am aware, there never has been a single prosecution under it, partly, perhaps, from the difficulty there would be in proving that the person accused had been educated in, or made profession of, the Christian religion; partly, perhaps, because the punishment for a first offence is so slight. "Advised speaking" probably means words spoken deliberately, as opposed to "a casual expression dropped inadvertently." (See Burder v. Heath, 15 Moore, P. C. C. 80; Brodrick & Fremantle, at p. 234.)

By the Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880 (43 & 44