"thereon "] printed for sale, and published in England or Ireland periodically, or in parts or numbers at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days between the publication of any two such papers, parts, or numbers.

Also any paper printed in order to be dispersed, and made public weekly or oftener, or at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days, containing only or principally advertisements.

The word "occupation" when applied to any person shall mean his trade or following [qu. calling], and if none, then his rank or usual title, as esquire, gentleman.

The phrase "place of residence" shall include the street, square, or place where the person to whom it refers shall reside, and the number (if any) or other designation of the house in which he shall so reside.

The word "proprietor" shall mean and include as well the sole proprietor of any newspaper, as also in the case of a divided proprietorship the persons who, as partners or otherwise, represent and are responsible for any share or interest in the newspaper as between themselves and the persons in like manner representing or responsible for the other shares or interests therein, and no other person.

The above definition of a "newspaper " is taken almost verbatim from Schedule (A.) of the 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, which was repealed by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 99. It was held that a paper or pamphlet, though printed for sale, and containing public news, was not "a newspaper " within the former Act, if published periodically at intervals exceeding twenty-six days. (Att.-Gen. v. Bradbury and Evans (1851), 7 Exch. 97; 21 L. J. Ex. 12; 16 Jur. 130.)

2. Newspaper reports of certain meetings privileged.]-Any report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting shall be privileged, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, and if such report was fair and accurate and published without malice, and if the publication of the matter

complained of was for the public benefit; provided always, that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceeding, if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert in the newspaper in which the report containing the matter complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of such plaintiff or prosecutor.

This section was inserted in consequence of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416; 41 J. P. 789, in which it was decided that a fair and accurate report published in a local newspaper of the proceedings at a meeting of a board of guardians was not privileged. It will, I presume, protect the printer and the reporter, as well as the proprietor and editor of a newspaper; although the concluding proviso seems to contemplate that the defendant will have the power to admit or exclude a letter of explanation at his pleasure.

Prior to this Act no report of any public meeting was privileged, merely on the ground that it was an honest and accurate report of what had really taken place. (Ante, p. 266.) The defendant had to prove either that the words he had reported were true, or that they were bonâ fide comments on a matter of public interest.

I do not think that this section will afford much protection to the newspapers. The privilege conferred is very cautiously guarded. The defendant will have to prove

(a) That the meeting was a public meeting,

(b) Lawfully convened

(c) For a lawful purpose,

(d) And open to the public;

(e) That the report was fair and accurate

(f) And published without malice,

(g) And that the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit;

(h) And, after proving all these facts, the defendant will lose his privilege if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant refused, when asked, to insert a reasonable letter of explanation or contradiction.

I think that at common law, without this section at all, a report which complied with all the above conditions would have been held no libel; for I presume no publication will be held to be "for the

public benefit," unless it relate to some matter of public interest within the rules laid down on pp. 40-52.

(a), (d) Public Meeting.

What is "a public meeting," "open to the public"? There are, as yet, no decisions reported on this point; but I am informed that Lord Coleridge, C. J., expressed an opinion at the Swansea Winter Assizes, 1886, in a case of Hughes v. Gibson, that a meeting of a board of guardians was not such a public meeting, although reporters were admitted. If so, Mr. Sowler would be held liable just as he was before this Act.

It follows that no meeting of a town council or vestry is a public meeting within this section, or any other meeting at which the public are present merely as spectators. It is not enough that any respectable citizen could in fact gain admittance to the room, if when admitted he could neither speak nor vote, nor take any part, legitimately, in the proceedings.

At the same time, it is probably giving too narrow an effect to the section to limit it to meetings which are open to the public by law, and not by the permission of the conveners. There are very few meetings to which the public have a right to insist on admission. So, too, if the meeting is open to the bulk of the community, it would probably be deemed a public meeting, though some few were excluded—e. g., where a meeting is summoned of the electors of a borough, or even of the ratepayers of a particular parish. But I presume that a meeting to which only Liberals or only Conservatives were invited, or a meeting of the members of some religious denomination, would not be within the section. Meetings of creditors, meetings of shareholders in a company, &c., are clearly not "public meetings."

Again, is a meeting "open to the public" when any one may enter, but only on payment of some fixed charge for admission? The legislature, it will be observed, is not content with the phrase, "a public meeting"; it goes on to say, "and open to the public." A lecture or concert, for which seats are reserved long beforehand at high prices, could hardly be called a public meeting. But I incline to think that if the meeting was public in all other respects, the mere fact that a small charge was made for admission will not take the case out of the section. (See Langrish v. Archer, 10 Q. B. D. 44; 52 L. J. M. C. 47; 31 W. R. 183; 47 L. T. 548; 47 J. P. 295; 15 Cox, C. C. 194.)

(c) For a Lawful Purpose.

Next, the defendant must show that the meeting "was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose." Seditious or illegal meetings must not be reported, apparently. Seditious meetings are prohibited by 39 Geo. III. c. 79 (repealed in part by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, s. 1), and by 57 Geo. III. c. 19 (repealed in part by 36 & 37 Vict. c. 91, s. 1). Meetings which are convened for the bona fide purpose of reforming our laws by petitioning parliament, or by other lawful means, are not seditious; but whenever persons assemble to bring the constitution into contempt, and to excite discontent, and disaffection against the king's government, it is an illegal meeting. (R. v. Hunt and others,

3 B. & Ald. 566; Redford v. Birley, 3 Stark. at p. 103.)

So, if persons meet for a purpose which, if executed, would make them rioters, but separate without carrying their purpose into effect, this is an unlawful assembly, though they have done nothing. (Rex v. Birt and others, 5 C. & P. 154.) A meeting called "to adopt preparatory measures for holding a national convention" was held an illegal meeting in Rex v. Fursey, 6 C. & P. 81.

Again, the manner of holding the meeting may render it an unlawful meeting. Thus, any assembly is unlawful which meets under circumstances likely to endanger the peace of the neighbourhood; and, in order to decide whether an assembly is or is not unlawful, the jury may take into consideration the tumultuous way in which the meeting assembled, the hour at which it met, the excitement which prevailed at it, the inscriptions and devices on banners and flags displayed, the language used by the persons assembled, and by those who addressed them, and even what the chairman of this meeting said and did at a previous meeting, convened for a purpose avowedly similar. (R. v. Hunt and others, 3 B. & Ald. 566.) But the circumstances must be such as would alarm not foolish or timid persons only, but also persons of reasonable firmness and courage. (Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91, 109.)

A procession with banners is not necessarily unlawful, even though it result in a breach of the peace; and, where the promoters of a meeting assemble with a lawful purpose, and with no intention of carrying out such purpose in any unlawful manner, the fact that they know that their meeting will be opposed, and have good reason to suppose that a breach of the peace will be committed by their opponents, does not make their meeting unlawful. (Beatty and others v. Gillbanks, 9 Q. B. D. 308; 51 L. J. M. C. 117; 31 W. R. 275; 47 L. T. 194; 46 J. P. 789; 15 Cox, C. C. 138. But see O'Kelly v. Harvey, 15 Cox, C. C. 435.)

(b) Lawfully convened.

Not only must the meeting be held "for a lawful purpose," but it must be "lawfully convened." It can hardly be expected that the editor of a newspaper can know exactly how and by whom the meeting was convened. This requirement must, I think, be intended only to meet cases where it is notorious that the meeting is being convened in defiance of the authorities, or in violation of the Acts against. tumultuously petitioning Parliament. (13 Car. II. c. 5; 1 Will. & M. sess. 2, c. 2; and 57 Geo. III. c. 19, s. 23.) Thus, if the Chief Commissioner of Police did not exceed his powers in forbidding any public meeting in Trafalgar Square on November 9th, 1886, a report of any meeting held in spite of his orders would not be privileged. Whether a meeting would be within the section which was summoned for a lawful purpose to meet in Dodd Street, I cannot say; Dodd Street being a public highway, though a cul de sac, and therefore held to be an improper place for any meeting.

(e) The Report must be fair and accurate.

It is not necessary that the report should be verbatim; nor is absolute accuracy essential so long as the report is substantially correct. A few slight accidental errors will not destroy the privilege, provided the whole report, as published, produces materially the same effect on the mind of the reader as an absolutely correct report would have done. "It is not to be expected that in discharging this duty of a public journalist he will always be infallible," says Cockburn, C. J., in Woodgate v. Ridout, 4 F. & F. at p. 217.

(f) Without Malice.

This means 66 without express malice," of course. created by this section is only qualified, not absolute.

The privilege

(g) The Publication of the Matter complained of must be for the Public

Benefit.

This is a most important safeguard. It is not sufficient that a report of the meeting should be for the public benefit; it must be shown that the publication of the very words complained of was for the public benefit. This was clearly pointed out by the Divisional Court in Pankhurst v. Sowler, 3 Times L. R. 193. In that case, a speaker at a public election meeting thought fit to make a personal attack on a gentleman who was standing for another constituency 200 miles