municate at once with Dr. Roberts, Vanburgh Castle, Blackheath, S.E." Kay, J., held, that persons reading this advertisement might understand it to refer to the plaintiff company (though that company never had anything to do with the Medical and General Association) and to impute insolvency to the plaintiff company; and he granted an injunction with costs. [It seems to me a harmless advertisement, not libellous, and to have been published honestly in reasonable self-defence.] Briton Life Association (Limited) v. Roberts, 2 Times L. R. 319. A newspaper article, commenting on recent alleged irregularities in the Ordnance Department of the War Office, whereby defective guns, &c. had been supplied to the nation and accepted without sufficient trial, asserted that the plaintiff, a gun manufacturing company, had obtained contracts from government officials by corrupt means. The plaintiff brought an action for damages, and also applied for an injunction to restrain the editor and printer of the paper from further publishing libellous matter of the plaintiffs pending the action. The Court (Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Denman, J.), refused the application, as the subject-matter of the article was clearly one of great public interest, and the comments thereon were not proved to be malâ fide. Armstrong and others v. Armit and others, 2 Times L. R. 887. Restraining the Publication of Private Letters. The unauthorized publication of copyright letters or other M.SS., having value as literary property, will of course be restrained on the application of the writer or of one to whom he has assigned his copyright. Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342; Thompson v. Stanhope, Ambler, 737; Forrester v. Waller, cited 4 Burr. 2331; 2 Brown, P. C. 129; 2 Swanst. 426, n. A young man had received letters from an old lady, written under the influence of a weak attachment for him, which he threatened to publish. He agreed, however, not to publish the letters, but to return them on condition that he was paid a sum of money. This sum was paid him; yet he refused to give the letters up, and again threatened to publish them. An injunction was of course granted to restrain such a breach of contract and violation of good faith "with a purchaser, who, independent of any original copyright, had acquired the undoubted right of preventing that publication." v. Eaton (1813), cited 2 Ves. & B. 23, 28. Where an injunction had been obtained to restrain the publication by the defendant of certain letters written by the plaintiff to Mitford, on the ground that Mitford had handed them to the defendant in breach of confidence, Sir Thomas Plumer, V.-C., dissolved it on proof that there had been no breach of faith or confidence, saying: The plaintiffs have failed to establish either ground for the interference of a Court of Equity, copyright, or confidence. If any case is to be made against the defendant, it cannot be upon these circumstances in a Court of Equity: the plaintiffs must therefore be left to do what they can at law; and this injunction must be dissolved." Lord and Lady Perceval v. Phipps, 2 Ves. & B. 19, 29. The defendant returned to the plaintiff the original letters he had received from the plaintiff, stating that he did not consider himself entitled to retain them. He subsequently advertised publicly that he was about to publish copies of these letters which he had taken before he returned the originals, without the knowledge of the plaintiff. Lord Eldon, after grave doubts as to his power so to do, ultimately granted an injunction to restrain the proposed publication, not on the ground that he had any power to prohibit libels-this he expressly disclaimed-but on the ground that the plaintiff had, under the circumstances, a right of property in the letters. The letters, indeed, do not appear to have been libellous. Gee v. Pritchard and another (1818), 2 Swan. 402. So it has been held in America that a Court of Equity has no jurisdiction to restrain or punish crime, or to enforce the performance of a moral duty, except in so far as it is connected with the rights of property. It cannot, therefore, restrain the publication of private letters which have no value as literary productions, although it may be evident that the publication is proposed with a view of wounding the feelings of others, or of gratifying a perverted public taste. Hoyt v. McKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. Cases (New York), 320. Wedmore v. Scovel, 3 Edw. Ch. R. 515. But in a recent case, where an earl had separated from his wife, and after both were dead the executor of the earl published his "Life and Letters," and thereupon the defendant, the executrix of the countess, proposed to publish some of the earl's letters, which he had written to her and others in his lifetime, and of which the defendant was in possession as such executrix, Bacon, V.-C., though admitting that such letters were the defendant's property, yet granted an injunction forbidding her to publish or part with any of them, on the ground that he did not consider that their publication was necessary for the vindication of the character of the deceased countess. [Is not this reviving the censorship of the Press?] Earl of Lytton v. Devey and Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 54 L. J. Ch. 293; 52 L. T. 121. Rival Patentees. A patent, so long as it subsists, is prima facie good; but a patentee is not entitled to issue circulars stating his intention to institute legal proceedings, in order to deter persons from purchasing alleged infringements of his patent, if he has no bona fide intention to follow up his threats by taking such proceedings, and the Court will in such case restrain him from any further issue of such circulars. Rollins v. Hinks, L. R. 13 Eq. 355; 41 L. J. Ch. 358; 20 W. R. 287; Axmann v. Lund, L. R. 18 Eq. 330; 43 L. J. Ch. 655; 22 W. R. 789. The holder of a patent, the validity of which is not impeached, will not be restrained by injunction from issuing notices warning the public against purchasing certain articles, on the ground that they are infringements of his patent, and threatening legal proceedings against those who purchase them, until it is proved that his statements are untrue; but as soon as that is proved he will be restrained, as any further issue of them cannot be bona fide. Halsey v. Brotherhood (C. A.), 19 Ch. D. 386; 51 L. J. Ch. 233; 30 W. R. 279; 45 L. T. 640; affirming the decision of Jessel, M. R., 15 Ch. D. 514; 49 L. J. Ch. 786; 29 W. R. 9; 43 L. T. 366. The plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing or circulating statements that the skates about to be introduced by the plaintiffs were an infringement of the defendants' patent. But the ViceChancellor (Chatterton) was of opinion that Rollins v. Hinks and Axmann v. Lund were virtually overruled by The Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott; and held that he had no jurisdiction to restrain a publication, whether libellous or not, merely because it may tend to injure property. Hammersmith Skating Rink Co. v. Dublin Skating Rink Co., 10 The defendant company had issued circulars, declaring that the plaintiff was wrongfully using the defendant's labels upon his jars of extract of meat, and threatening the plaintiff's customers with legal proceedings for buying and reselling his jars bearing those labels; the plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the defendant from issuing such circulars; but the Court refused to grant it, because it was not satisfied that the statements complained of were untrue. (Chitty, J.) Anderson v. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., 45 L. T. 757. Subsequently Anderson issued new wrappers for his meat jars, with a photograph of Baron Liebig and the words, "This is the only Genuine Brand." The meat company, whose brand was at least as genuine as Anderson's, thereupon applied for and obtained an injunction restraining him from using such wrappers, although the company had themselves issued misleading advertisements. (Chitty, J.) Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Limited v. Anderson, 55 L. T. 206. James V. But as to the necessity of an applicant for an injunction coming with clean hands, see Leather Cloth Co., Limited v. American Leather Cloth Co., Limited, 4 Where defendant has issued notices to plaintiff's customers, asserting that plaintiff in selling certain goods is infringing defendant's patent rights, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's statements are false; and if no mala fides is proved, so that no damages could be recovered, the Court will not grant an injunction. If, however, in any judicial proceeding, the statements are proved to be false in fact, an injunction will be granted against continuing them, as all further publication would then be malâ fide. (Kay, J.) Burnett v. Tak, 45 L. T. 743. A motion was made for an injunction to restrain the defendant, the printer and publisher of the Electrician newspaper, from publishing or selling any copies of a particular issue of that paper, which contained a letter alleged to be a libel on the plaintiff's patent in an electric lamp known as the Fyfe Main Lamp. The statements in the letter in question were said to be wholly untrue, and calculated to deter persons from making use of the plaintiff's patent. Day, J., sitting as vacation judge, granted an interim injunction. Fyfe v. Gray, 73 Law Times (newspaper), 309. The Court will not grant an injunction to restrain the bona fide issue of circulars, warning persons that if they buy of the plaintiff they will infringe the defendant's patent and be liable to proceedings, unless a very strong primâ facie case be made out showing that such publication is in violation of an express contract between the parties; however much the balance of convenience may be in favour of granting it. Société Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Tilghman's Patent Sand The plaintiffs were the makers of "Rainbow Water Raisers or Elevators," and they commenced an action for an injunction to restrain the defendants from issuing a circular cautioning the public against the use of such elevators as being direct infringements of certain patents of the defendants. The plaintiffs subsequently gave notice of a motion to restrain the issue of this circular until the trial of the action. The defendants then commenced a cross action, claiming an injunction to restrain the plaintiffs from infringing their patents. Held, by Kay, J., that as there was no evidence of mala fides on the part of the defendants, they ought not to be restrained from issuing the circular until their action had been disposed of, but that they must undertake to prosecute their action without delay. Household and another v. Fairburn and another, 51 L. T. 498. The law on this point has now been settled by express legislation :-"Where any person claiming to be the patentee of an invention, by circulars, advertisements, or otherwise, threatens any other person with any legal proceedings or liability in respect of any alleged manufacture, use, sale, or purchase of the invention, any person or persons aggrieved thereby may bring an action against him, and may obtain an injunction against the continuance of such threats, and may recover such damage (if any) as may have been sustained thereby, if the alleged manufacture, use, sale, or purchase to which the threats related was not in fact an infringement of any legal rights of the person making such threats: Provided that this section shall not apply if the person making such threats with due diligence commences and prosecutes an action for infringement of his patent." 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 32. On any motion for an injunction under this section, the applicant must, as a condition precedent, show that there has been no infringement on his part. And if in opposition to the motion a case of alleged infringement is raised by the respondents' affidavits, an injunction will not be granted, although the respondents decline to take legal proceedings in respect of such alleged infringement. Barney v. United Telephone Co., 28 Ch. D. 394; 33 W. R. 576; 52 A threat by a private letter is within the section; hence, where such a threat was made, but defendants now admit that plaintiffs have not infringed their patents, they will be perpetually restrained from making or continuing threats of legal proceedings. Driffield and East Riding Cake Co. v. Waterloo, &c. Cake Co., 31 Ch. D. 638; 55 L. J. Ch. 391; 34 W. R. 360; 54 L. T. 210. On an application for an injunction under this section, it is not open to the plaintiff to dispute the validity of the defendant's patent. The issue must be confined to the question of infringement. (Chitty, J.) Kurtz v. Spence, 33 Ch. D. 579; 55 L. J. Ch. 919; 35 W. R. 26; 55 L. T. 317. It must be admitted that the law laid down in the above cases is new law; and with all respect to the learned judges who decided them, it may be questioned whether it is good law. In the first edition of this book, published in February, 1881, the rule of law in force at that date was thus stated:-"No injunction can be obtained to prohibit the publication or republication of any libel, or to restrain its sale. (Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 23 W. R. 249; 31 L. T. 866.) The matter must first go before a jury, who are to decide whether the words complained of are libellous or not. The Crown has no authority to restrain the press; and the Courts, whether of law or of equity, cannot, till after verdict, issue any injunction in respect of any libels, save such as are contempts of Court." (Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188.) And I venture to think that this is still the law of the land, and will be upheld as such in the House of Lords, if the question ever comes before that tribunal. There has, no doubt, been a conflict of authority on this point. As long ago as 1742, it was clearly laid down in Roach v. Garvan, Re Read and another, 2 Atk. 469, that Courts of Equity had no jurisdiction over actions of libel and slander, whether public or private, except as contempts of their own Courts. The Courts of Common Law had at that time no power to grant injunctions at all. No doubt in the early days of arbitrary prerogative the Court of Star Chamber occasionally restrained the publication of works alleged to be seditious. But Scroggs, C. J., was impeached for attempting to introduce the practice into the King's Bench, in the case of Henry Carr, 7 Howell's State Trials, 1111. See Article III. 8 Howell's State Trials, at p. 198. It is, however, stated in the note to Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. p. 441, that in 1720 in a case of Burnett v. Chetwood Lord Chancellor Parker granted an injunction to restrain the printing and publishing of a translation into English of a book written in Latin, and which he thought had better remain in Latin; "he looked upon it," he said, "that this Court had a superintendency |