that such comments were calculated to excite feelings of hostility towards the prisoners about to be tried. R. v. O'Dogherty, 5 Cox, C. C. 348. The House of Lords, when sitting as a Court of Law, claimed for many years the right to appoint one printer to publish their proceedings, and to order that no other person should presume to publish the same, even after the case was at an end. So, in the case of an impeachment, Lord Erskine, L. C., held, after great hesitation, that such an order must be enforced by injunction; thus apparently admitting that one chamber of the legislature had the power to create a monopoly. Such a decision would not be upheld in the present day. Gurney v. Longman (1807), 13 Vesey, 493-509. And see Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303-2417. Roper v. Streater, Skin. 234; 1 Mod. 217. The Stationers v. Patentees of Rolle's Abridgment, Carter, 89. II. Injunctions granted after Verdict or at the final Hearing. The Superior Courts have also unquestionable power to grant an injunction to restrain any further publication of what a jury has found to be an actionable libel or slander. After such a finding in his favour, the plaintiff may clearly ask for an injunction for his protection in the future in addition to damages for the injury done him in the past. Libel or no libel, malice or no malice, are pre-eminently questions for a jury, but after they have once been decided the judge may grant an injunction, if he is of opinion that any repetition of the libel would be injurious to the plaintiff's property. (Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188.) So when an action is commenced in the Chancery Division (as it now may be), and the defendant does not demand a jury, or applies for one too late, the judge who tries the action may, at the hearing, grant an injunction. (Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, 6 Ch. D. 582; 46 L. J. Ch. 713; 14 Ch. D. 763; 28 W. R. 295; 41 L. T. 542; (C. A.) 14 Ch. D. 781; 28 W. R. 966; 42 L. T. 851; Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 28 W. R. 983; 43 L. T. 91. See also the remarks of Lord Langdale, M. R., in Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 117, 118; and of the late Master of the Rolls in Hinrichs v. Berndes, Weekly Notes for 1878, p. 11.) Illustrations. The plaintiff and the defendant were rival railway signal manufacturers. They both invented practically the same improvement; but defendant was the first to patent it. Plaintiff subsequently petitioned for a patent, but was refused as being too late. Thereupon the defendant published an advertisement announcing that "Saxby's application was cancelled by the Crown on the ground of piracy from Easterbrook." Plaintiff claimed damages £1,000, and an injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing libels against the plaintiff of the like nature and description. The jury awarded forty shillings, and Lord Coleridge, C. J., granted a perpetual injunction. The Divisional Court decided that he had power so to do, as the jury had previously found the matter libellous. [N.B.-This is the only reported case in which any injunction has been granted in the Queen's Bench Division in an action of libel or slander.] Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188. Joseph and Josiah Thorley had equal rights to manufacture "Thorley's Food for Cattle," both possessed the secret of its composition, and manufactured the same article. Yet the executors of Joseph advertised that they "alone possessed the secret for compounding that famous condiment," which they knew to be false. Malins, V.-C., refused to grant an injunction on an interlocutory application; but granted it at the final hearing, and his decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam (interlocutory), 6 Ch. D. 582; 46 L. J. Ch. 713. (Before Malins, V.-C.) 14 Ch. D. 763; 28 W. R. 295; 41 L. T. 542. (C. A.) 14 Ch. D. 781; 28 W. R. 966; 42 L. T. 851. And see James v. James, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; 41 L. J. Ch. 253; 26 L. T. 568. Mr. Gandy owned two patents for manufacturing cotton belting; plaintiffs were formerly his agents. An injunction was granted by Pearson, J., in 1883, to restrain the plaintiffs from selling the belting of other manufacturers as that of Gandy. Subsequently Gandy inserted an advertisement in the British Trade Journal, complaining that unprincipled persons were imitating his belting, and misleading the public, stating that the above injunction had been granted, and that he had reason to believe that plaintiffs still continued to sell a large quantity of other belting as his. North, J., granted an injunction with costs against both Gandy and the publisher of the British Trade Journal, and also ordered Gandy to pay £500 damages. Kerr v. Gandy, 3 Times L. R. 75. Where the plaintiff in a trade-mark case failed on all points but one, and afterwards published a "caution" to the trade, which stated the effect of the judgment so far as it was in his favour, but omitted all allusion to the parts of the judgment in defendant's favour, North, J., held the report unfair, gave the plaintiff £5 damages, and granted an injunction restraining its circulation, with costs. Hayward & Co. v. Hayward & Sons, 34 Ch. D. 198; 56 L. J. Ch. 287; 35 W. R. 392; 55 L. T. 729. III. Injunctions granted on an Interlocutory Application before or without any Verdict. It has now been decided in the Chancery Division (in the face of a long series of decisions to the contrary), that the Court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the publication of a libel upon an interlocutory application at any stage of the action. (Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall (C. A.), 20 Ch. D. 501; 51 L. J. Ch. 874; 30 W. R. 583; 46 L. T. 746.) And also to restrain any slander calculated to injure the plaintiff's business. (Hermann Loog v. Bean (C. A.), 26 Ch. D. 306; 53 L. J. Ch. 1128; 32 W. R. 994; 51 L. T. 442; 48 J. P. 708.) No such injunction has as yet been granted in the Queen's Bench Division, so far as I am aware. But this jurisdiction must be exercised with great caution so far as interlocutory applications are concerned, and especially in cases of slander. Thus, an interlocutory injunction will not be granted restraining any publication. that is prima facie privileged ( Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall (C. A.), 20 Ch. D. 501; 51 L. J. Ch. 874; 30 W. R. 583; 46 L. T. 746), or that may be bonâ fide comment on a matter clearly of public interest. (Armstrong and Others v. Armit and Others, 2 Times L. R. 887.) Nor will an injunction be granted until it is proved that the matters alleged in the document complained of are untrue, so that the further issuing of such documents would not be bond fide. (Halsey v. Brotherhood (C. A.), 19 Ch. D. 386; 51 L. J. Ch. 233; 30 W. R. 279; 45 L. T. 640. See also Anderson v. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Limited, 45 L. T. 757.) Hence on this application, apparently, it lies on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's statements are false. (Burnett v. Tak, 45 L. T. 743.) As soon as this is done an injunction will be granted against continuing them, as all future publications would then be malâ fide. (Hill v. Hart Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798; 51 L. J. Ch. 845; 31 W. R. 22; 47 L. T. 82; Société Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Tilghman's Patent Sand Blast Co. (C. A.), 25 Ch. D. 1; 53 L. J. Ch. 1; 32 W. R. 71; 49 L. T. 451; 48 J. P. 68.) And although an interim or interlocutory injunction cannot as a rule be obtained unless the applicant shows clearly that "irreparable damage" will ensue from the continuance of the acts complained of-damage, that is, for which no amount of damages can adequately compensate him (Mogul Steamship Co. v. M'Gregor, Gow & Co., 15 Q. B. D. 476; 54 L. J. Q. B. 540; 53 L. T. 268; 49 J. P. 646)— yet in this special branch of equity injunctions appear to be freely granted without proof of any actual damage whenever the judge thinks the words are calculated to injure the plaintiff's business; and this, even in the case of slander of title, where special damage is essential to the cause of action at common law. (Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 28 W. R. 983; 43 L. T. 91. But see Dicks v. Brooks (C. A.), 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 29 W. R. 87; 43 L. T. 71.) Illustrations. The Rev. Thomas Scott, at the time of his death, was employed in revising and improving the fourth edition of the Commentaries on the Bible, with the assistance of A. After his death, the plaintiff employed A. to finish this work, and then published it under the title of "The 5th Edition of Scott's Bible, with the Author's last Corrections and Improvements." In January, 1841, the defendants, Fisher & Co., began to publish, in monthly numbers, an illustrated edition of Scott's Bible, and a reprint of the fourth edition, the copyright in which had expired; they advertised it, both in the public papers and on the wrappers of the numbers, as "a new and carefully revised edition of the work," and as intended to "contain the whole unadulterated labours of the author, not as circulars containing inaccurate statements as to the financial condition of the society. Kay, J., on motion, granted an injunction to restrain "the further issuing of this circular, or any other circular or letter containing false or inaccurate representations as to the credit or financial condition of the said society." Hill v. Hart Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798; 51 L. J. Ch. 845; 31 W. R. 22. The plaintiff dismissed one of his managers, the defendant, from his employ, who thereupon went about among the plaintiff's customers, making oral statements reflecting on the solvency of the plaintiff, and advised some of them not to pay the plaintiff for machines which had been supplied through himself. The plaintiff brought an action to restrain the defendant from making statements to the customers or any other person or persons that the plaintiff was about to stop payment, or was in difficulties or insolvent, and from in any manner slandering the plaintiff or injuring his reputation or business. No special damage was proved; but it was held both by Pearson, J., and the Court of Appeal, that the Court has jurisdiction to restrain a person from making slanderous statements calculated to injure the business of another person, and that this jurisdiction extends to oral as well as written statements, though it requires to be exercised with great caution as regards oral statements, and that in the present case an injunction ought to be granted. Hermann Loog v. Bean (C. A.), 26 Ch. D. 306; 53 L. J. Ch. 1128; 32 W. R. 994; 51 L. T. 442; 48 J. P. 708. The coopers of Cork and Limerick, who made butter-firkins by hand, were much annoyed at the plaintiff's starting a manufactory near Limerick for making similar firkins by machinery; and they induced the butter merchants of Limerick to print and widely distribute a "Notice to Farmers" stating that they would not purchase any butter packed in machine-made firkins, as they found them "to be most injurious to the keeping qualities of butter," to the great injury of plaintiff's business. The Irish Queen's Bench Division granted an injunction to restrain the publication of this notice, on the authority of Hermann Loog v. Bean, holding that the Judicature Act had altered the law as laid down in Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott. Punch v. Boyd and others, 16 L. R. Ir. 476. The Briton Life Association, which was not a limited company, amalgamated twenty years ago with another company called the Medical and General Life Association, and the company thus formed took the name of the Briton Medical and General Life Association (Limited). In October, 1875, a new and distinct company, the plaintiff, was registered as the Briton Life Association (Limited). In 1885 a petition was presented for winding-up the Briton Medical and General Life Association (Limited), and in those proceedings a proposal was made for a reconstruction of the company and the reduction of its contracts. There was a reference to chambers to ascertain whether this scheme could be properly carried out with regard to the interests of the various persons concerned in the company. The defendant, who was a policy-holder in the Briton Medical and General Life Association (Limited), was alarmed at this proposal, and issued the following advertisement to his fellow policy-holders:-"Life Policy Dangers. Briton Life Office, which took over the Medical and General, is opposing the winding-up petition by a scheme which seeks to save shareholders' unpaid capital at expense of policy-holders. With a view to organized action, com |