the plaintiff himself, and therefore he must be nonsuited. Such was the ruling of Lord Ellenborough in Smith v. Wood, 3 Camp. 323; but this is inconsistent with Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; and in Warr v. Jolly, 6 Car. & P. 497, it was expressly held that a communication purposely procured by the plaintiff was privileged. Illustrations. "If a servant, knowing the character which his master will give of him, procures a letter to be written, not with a fair view of inquiring the character, but to procure an answer upon which to ground an action for a libel, no action can be maintained." Per Lord Alvanley in King v. Waring et ux., 5 Esp. 15. And see Fonville v. Nease, Dudley, S. C. 303, ante, p. 152. The defendant discharged the plaintiff, his servant, and when applied to by another gentleman, gave him a bad character. The plaintiff's brother-in-law, Collier, thereupon repeatedly called on the defendant to inquire why he had dismissed the plaintiff: and at last the defendant wrote to Collier stating his reasons specifically. The plaintiff sued out a writ the same day the letter was written. Held by Lord Mansfield, C. J., and Butler, J., that no action lay on such letter, as the defendant was evidently entrapped into writing it. Weatherston v. Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110. See also Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; Rogers v. Clifton, 3 B. & P. 592. A builder employed two men, the plaintiff and Fosdyke, to repair Barton's house. Defendant on a privileged occasion had stated to the builder, "I saw the man employed by you take from Mr. Barton's house and carry away two long pieces of quartering. I hallooed to the man." Plaintiff thereupon brought Fosdyke to the defendant and said, "Is this the man?" Defendant replied, "No, you are the man." Held, no action lay. Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297. Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470. The defendant was asked by a friend of the plaintiff's to sign a memorial in favour of the plaintiff. He declined. The plaintiff's friend pressed him to sign and asked his reasons for declining. Thereupon defendant stated his reasons, and this statement was held a privileged communication. Cowles v. Potts, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; 11 Jur. N. S. 946; 13 W. R. 858. Murdoch v. Funduklian, 2 Times L. R. 215, 614. A friend of the plaintiff's asked defendant to act as arbitrator between the plaintiff and A. in a dispute about a horse. Defendant declined. The friend wrote again strongly urging defendant to use his influence with A. not to bring the case into court. Defendant again declined, and stated his reasons; and on this letter plaintiff brought an action. Subsequently another friend of the plaintiff's, with his knowledge and consent, wrote to defendant that she was confident he was misinformed about the plaintiff. Defendant replied that he believed A. and his servant, and not the plaintiff. On this plaintiff brought a second action of libel. Held, that both letters were privileged. Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C. B. N. S. 392; 33 L. J. C. P. 89; 10 Jur. A witness (whom we must presume to have been an agent of the plaintiff's, though it is not so stated in the report) heard that the defendant had a copy of a libellous print, went to defendant's house, and asked to see it; the defendant thereupon produced it, and pointed out the figure of the plaintiff and the other persons caricatured. Lord Ellenborough nonsuited the plaintiff, as there was no other publication proved. Smith v. Wood, 3 Camp. 323. The plaintiff had been in partnership with his brother-in-law, Pinhorn, as a linendraper at Southampton; but gave up business and became a dissenting minister. Rumours reached his congregation that he had cheated his brotherin-law in the settlement of the accounts on his retirement from the partnership. The plaintiff challenged inquiry, and invited the malcontents in the congregation to appoint some one to thoroughly sift the matter. The malcontents appointed the defendant, and the plaintiff appointed the Rev. Robert Ainslie. Held, that all communications between the defendant and Ainslie relative to the matter were privileged, as being made with the sanction and concurrence of the plaintiff. Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. Remington v. Congdon and others, 2 Pick. (19 Mass.) 310. Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, 26 Kansas, 384; 40 Amer. R. 316. In answer to plaintiff's inquiry as to a rumour against himself, defendant told him, in the presence of a third party, what some one had said to his (defendant's) wife. There was no proof that the defendant had ever uttered a word on the subject till he was applied to by the plaintiff. Held, that the answer was privileged. Warr v. Jolly, 6 Car. & P. 497, as explained by Lord Denman in And see Richards v. Richards, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557. The plaintiff called at the "Trevor Arms," and asked the landlord, in the presence of witnesses, "What do you mean by saying that I have taken sovereigns over your counter from your barmaid?" Day, J., held defendant's answer privileged. Palmer v. Hummerston (1883), 1 Cababé & Ellis, 36. The plaintiff was a builder, and contracted to build certain school-rooms at Bermondsey. The defendant started a false report, that in the building the plaintiff had used inferior timber; the report reached the plaintiff, who thereupon suspended the work, and demanded an inquiry; and the committee of the school employed defendant to survey the work and report. He reported falsely that inferior timber was used. Lord Lyndhurst directed the jury, that if they believed that the reports which produced the inquiry originated with the defendant, the defendant's report to the committee was not privileged. Verdict for the plaintiff. Smith v. Mathews, 2 Moo. & Rob. 151. The Weekly Dispatch libelled the Duke of Brunswick in 1830. In 1848 the Duke sent to the office of that newspaper for a copy of the number containing the old libel, and obtained one. Held, that he could sue on this publication to his own agent, though all proceedings on the former publication were barred by the Statute of Limitations. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION, AND THE PERSON TO In such a case every communication honestly made in order to protect such common interest is privileged by reason of the occasion. Such common interest is generally a pecuniary one; as that of two customers of the same bank, two directors of the same company, two creditors of the same debtor. But it may also be professional, as in the case of two officers in the same corps, or masters in the same school, anxious to preserve the dignity and reputation of the body to which they both belong. In short, it may be any interest arising from the joint exercise of any legal right or privilege, or from the joint performance of any duty imposed or recognised by the law. Thus two executors of the same will, two trustees of the same settlement, have a interest, though not a pecuniary one, in the management of the trust estate. So the ratepayers of a parish have a common interest in the selection of fit and proper officers to serve in the parish, their salary being paid out of the rates. So relations by blood or marriage have a common interest in their family concerns. But beyond this there is no privilege. The "common interest" must be one which the law recognises and appreciates. No privilege attaches to gossip, however interesting it may be to both speaker and hearers. (Rumsey v. Webb et ux., Car. & M. 104; 11 L. J. C. P. 129.) The law never sanctions mere vulgar curiosity or officious intermeddling in the concerns of others. To be within the privilege, the statement must be such as the occasion warrants and must be made bona fide to protect the private interests both of the speaker and of the person addressed. If in fact the defendant had no other interest any in the matter beyond that which other educated person would naturally feel, interference on his part would be officious and unprivileged. (Botterill and another v. Whytehead, 41 L. T. 588.) Illustrations. The defendant and Messrs. Wright and Co., his bankers, were both interested in a concern, the management of which the bankers had entrusted to the plaintiff, their solicitor. A confidential letter written by the defendant to Messrs. Wright and Co., charging the plaintiff with professional misconduct in the management of such concern was held privileged by Lord Ellenborough. M'Dougall v. Claridge, 1 Camp. 267. A creditor of the plaintiff may comment on the plaintiff's mode of conducting his business to the man who is surety to that creditor for the plaintiff's trade debts. Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Camp. 269, n. Where A. and B. have a joint interest in a matter, a letter, written by A. to induce B. to become a party to a suit relating thereto, is privileged though it may refer to the plaintiff in angry terms. Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680. Klinck v. Colby and others, 1 Sickels (46 N. Y.) 427, ante, p. 224. A creditor was appointed trustee in liquidation of the debtor's estate, the debtor continuing to manage his former business for the benefit of the estate. A letter written by the trustee to another creditor, commenting in very severe terms on the debtor's conduct, is privileged. Spill v. Maule, L. R. 4 Ex. 232; 38 L. J. Ex. 138; 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675. A person interested in the proceeds of a sale may give notice to the auctioneer not to part with them to the plaintiff, who ordered the sale, on the ground that he has committed an act of bankruptcy. Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290. So the son-in-law of a lady has sufficient interest in whom she marries to justify him in warning her not to marry the plaintiff, if he honestly believes him, however erroneously, to be of bad character. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88; 2 M. & Rob. 20. Adams v. Coleridge, 1 Times L. R. 84. So, too, a bishop's charge to his clergy is prima facie privileged, although it contain calumniatory matter. Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor and Man, L. R. 4 P. C. 495; 42 L. J. P. C. 11; 21 W. R. 204; 28 L. T. 377; 9 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 318. So the reports of the directors and auditors of a company printed and circulated among the shareholders are privileged. Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498. A solicitor, acting for some shareholders in a company, printed and sent to the shareholders, but to no one else, a circular reflecting on the promoters and directors and inviting the shareholders to meet and discuss their position and take measures to protect their common interests. Held, that such publication was prima facie privileged. Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall (C. A.), 20 Ch. D. 509; 51 L. J. A caution sent by the committee of a charity to all the subscribers, warning them not to pay their subscriptions in future to the plaintiff, the former collector, who "was found unworthy of confidence, and dismissed," is primâ facie privileged. Gassett v. Gilbert and others, 6 Gray, (72 Mass.) 94. A communication from a firm of brewers to the tenants of their public-houses, refusing to accept any longer in payment cheques drawn on a particular bank, is prima facie privileged. Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons (C. A.), 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851; 43 L. T. 651; (H. L.), 7 App. Cas. 741; 52 L. J. Q. B. 232; 31 W. R. 157; 47 L. T. 662; 47 J. P. 214. Defendant was a life governor of a public school to which the plaintiff supplied butchers' meat; defendant told the steward of the school, whose duty it was to examine the meat, that plaintiff had been known to sell bad meat. privileged communication. Humphreys v. Stillwell, 2 F. & F. 590. And see Crisp v. Gill, 29 L. T. (O. S.) 82. Held a Several fictitious orders for goods had been sent in the defendant's name to a tradesman, who thereupon delivered the goods to the defendant. The defendant returned the goods, and, being shown the letters ordering them, wrote to the tradesman that in his opinion the letters were in the plaintiff's handwriting. Held, that this expression of opinion was privileged, as both defendant and the tradesman were interested in discovering the culprit. Croft v. Stevens, 7 H. & N. 570; 31 L. J. Ex. 143; 10 W. R. 272; 5 L. T. 683. |