instead of furnishing a defence, will aggravate the case of the defendant." (Per Best, J., in Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 647, 648.) And a defendant will be taken to have acted maliciously, if he eagerly seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastily concludes that a great public scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the Crown. (Robinson v. May, 2 Smith, 3.) Illustrations. A memorial to the Home Secretary or to the Lord Chancellor, complaining of misconduct on the part of a county magistrate, and praying for his removal from the commission of the peace, is privileged. Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25, 99; 1 Jur. N. S. 846; 2 Jur. N. S. 90. So is a petition to the House of Commons charging the plaintiff with oppression and extortion in his office of Vicar-General to the Bishop of Lincoln, although the petition was printed, and copies distributed amongst the members. Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 131; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58. The defendant deemed it his duty as a churchman to write to the Bishop of London informing him that a report was current in the parish of Bethnal Green that a stand-up fight had occurred in the school-room of St. James the Great between the plaintiff, the incumbent, and the school-master, during school hours. The letter was held privileged under the Church Discipline Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, s. 3, although the defendant did not live in the district of which the plaintiff was incumbent, but in an adjoining district of the same parish. James v. Boston, 2 C. & K. 4. A letter written to the Postmaster-General, or to the secretary to the General Post Office, complaining of misconduct in a postmaster, is not a libel, if it was written as a bona fide complaint, to obtain redress for a grievance that the party really believed he had suffered; and particular expressions are not to be too strictly scrutinized, if the intention of the defendant was good. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548. Blake v. Pilfold, 1 Moo. & Rob. 198. The defendant drafted a memorial to the Home Secretary on a matter within his jurisdiction, and read it to M. in the presence of M.'s wife, and asked M. to sign it. M. signed it, and the defendant then sent it to the Home Secretary. Grove, J., held that both the petition and the conversation with M. were primâ facie privileged. Spackman v. Gibney, Bristol Spring Assizes, 1878. The plaintiff was a sanitary inspector under the statute 41 & 42 Vict. c. 74, s. 42, appointed by the local authority, but removable by the Privy Council; the defendant addressed a letter to the Privy Council, charging the plaintiff with corruption and misconduct in his office. Held, that no action lay without proof of malice. Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. D. 112; 55 L. J. Q. B. 150; 53 L. T. 765. But in seeking redress, the defendant must be careful to apply to some person who has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, or power to redress the grievance, or some duty or interest in connection with it. Statements made to some stranger who has nothing to do with the matter cannot be privileged. If the defendant applies to the wrong person, through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various state officials, such slight and unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. (Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250.) But if he recklessly makes statements to some one who is, as he ought to have known, altogether unconcerned with the matter, the privilege is lost. (Hawk. Pl. Cr. I. 544.) And where the informant is himself the person aggrieved, he should be very careful not to be led away by his just indignation into misstating facts, or employing language which is clearly too violent for the occasion. "If, without express malice, I make a defamatory charge which I bonâ fide believe to be true, against one whose conduct in the respect defamed has caused me injury, to one whose duty it is, or whose duty I reasonably believe it to be, to inquire into and redress such injury, the occasion is privileged; because I have an interest in the subjectmatter of my charge, and the person to whom I make the communication has on hearing the communication a duty to discharge in respect of it." (Per Fitzgerald, B., in Waring v. M'Caldin (1873), 7 Ir. Rep. C. L. at p. 288.) Illustrations. "A petition to the King upon matters in which the Crown cannot directly interfere" is privileged. An elector of Frome petitioned the Home Secretary, stating that the plaintiff, a magistrate of the borough, had made speeches inciting to a breach of the peace, and praying for an inquiry, and that the Home Secretary should advise her Majesty to remove the plaintiff from the commission of the peace. Such petition was held to be privileged, although it should more properly have been addressed to the Lord Chancellor. Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25, 99; 1 Jur. N. S. 846; 2 Jur. N. S. 90. Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250, ante, p. 212. The plaintiff was about to be sworn in as a paid constable, by the justices, when the defendant, a parishioner, made a statement against the plaintiff's character in the hearing of several by-standers. Held, that even if such statement ought rather to have been made to the vestry, who drew up the list of constables whom the justices were to swear in, still it was privileged, if made bona fide in furtherance of the ends of justice. Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129. A letter to the Secretary at War, with the intent to prevail on him to exert his authority to compel the plaintiff (an officer in the army) to pay a debt due from him to defendant, was held privileged, although the Secretary at War had no direct power or authority to order the plaintiff to pay his debt. "It was an application," says Best, J., "for the redress of a grievance, made to one of the King's ministers, who, as the defendant honestly thought, had authority to afford him redress." Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642; 1 Chit. 85; 1 D. & R. 252. A timekeeper employed on public works, on behalf of the Board of Works, wrote a letter to the secretary of the Board, imputing fraud to the contractor. Blackburn, J., directed the jury that if they thought the letter was written in good faith and in the discharge of what the defendant considered his duty to his employers, it was privileged, although such a complaint should have been addressed to Mr. Harris, the resident engineer. Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250. Tompson v. Dashwood, 11 Q. B. D. 43; 52 L. J. Q. B. 425; 48 L. T. 943; 48 J. P. 55. The plaintiff was a teacher in a district school; the inhabitants of the district prepared a memorial charging the plaintiff with drunkenness and immorality, which they sent to the local superintendent of schools. It ought strictly to have been sent to the trustees of that particular school in the first instance, and such trustees would then, if they thought fit, in due course forward it to the local superintendent for him to take action upon it. Held, that the publication was still prima facie privileged, although, by a mistake easily made, it had been sent to the wrong quarter in the first instance.. McIntyre v. McBean, 13 Up. Canada Q. B. Rep. 534. But where the defendant wrote a letter to the Home Secretary complaining of the conduct of the plaintiff, a solicitor, as clerk to the borough magistrates, this was held not to be privileged, because Sir James Graham had no power or jurisdiction whatever over the plaintiff. There was moreover evidence of malice. Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 8 L. T. (Old S.) 135; 11 Jur. 101, post, p. 279. An Irish coroner sent to the Chief Secretary of Ireland a report of an inquest he had held on the body of an out-door pauper, and at which the plaintiff, who was the relieving officer, had given evidence. He mentioned in this report that the parish priest, who happened to be in court, stated publicly at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, "This is nothing short of perjury." Held, that this portion of the report at all events was not privileged, as the Chief Secretary could have no interest in hearing Father Callary's opinion of the plaintiff's evidence. Lynam v. Gowing, 6 L. R. Ir. 259. B. COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN SELF-DEFENCE. (iv.) Statements necessary to protect defendant's private interests. Any communication made by the defendant is privileged which a due regard to his own interest renders necessary. He is entitled to protect himself. But in such cases it must clearly appear not merely that some such communication was necessary, but that he was compelled to employ the very words complained of. If he could have done all that his duty or interest demanded without libelling or slandering the plaintiff, the words are not privileged. Thus, it is very seldom necessary in self-defence to impute evil motives to others, or to charge your adversary with dishonesty or fraud. So, too, in cases where some such communication is necessary and proper in the protection of the defendant's interests, the privilege may be lost if the extent of its publication be excessive. I am not entitled to write to the Times because some one has cast a slur on me at a private meeting of the board of guardians; in fact by so doing I take the surest method of disseminating the charge against myself. So with an advertisement inserted in a newspaper, defamatory of the plaintiff; if such advertisement be necessary to protect the defendant's interest, or if advertising was the only way of effecting the defendant's object and such object is a lawful one, then the circumstances excuse the extensive publication. But if it was not necessary to advertise at all, or if the defendant's object could have been equally well effected by an advertisement which did not contain the words defamatory of the plaintiff, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice to go to the jury. (Brown v. Croome, 2 Stark. 297; and Lay v. Lawson, 4 A. & E. 795, overruling, or at least explaining Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 191. And see Stockley v. Clement, 4 Bing. 162; 12 Moore, 376; Head v. Briscoe et ux., 5 C. & P. 485; R. v. Enes (1732), Andr. 229; 4 Bacon's Abr. Libel A. (2), p. 452; and Gassett v. Gilbert and others, 6 Gray (72 Mass.), 94, ante, p. 220.) Illustrations. The plaintiff, a trader, employed an auctioneer to sell off his goods, and otherwise conducted himself in such a way that his creditors reasonably concluded that he had committed an act of bankruptcy. One of them, the defendant, thereupon sent the auctioneer a notice not to pay over the proceeds of the cale to the plaintiff, "he having committed an act of bankruptcy." Held by the majority of the Court of C. P. that this notice was privileged, as being made in the honest defence of defendant's own interests. Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290. So where an agent in temperate language claims a right for his principal, or a solicitor for his client. Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2422. Steward v. Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168. Even without express authority. Watson v. Reynolds, Moo. & Mal. 1. Delivery to a third person for service on the plaintiff of a statutory notice under the Insolvent Act of 1869 (Nova Scotia) is primâ facie privileged, if it be made bona fide with the object of protecting defendant's rights. Bank of British North America v. Strong, 1 App. Cas. 307; 34 L. T. 627. The defendant had dismissed the plaintiff from his service on suspicion of theft, and, upon the plaintiff coming to his counting-house for his wages, called in two other of his servants, and addressing them in the presence of the plaintiff, said, "I have dismissed that man for robbing me: do not speak to him any more, in public or in private, or I shall think you as bad as him." Held a privileged communication, on the ground that it was the duty, and also the |