marriage, or if he be disinherited in consequence of defendant's words (a very improbable result, as his father must know better than the defendant whether the plaintiff is a bastard or not); but it is not the subject of an action for slander of title; for, even though heir-apparent, plaintiff has no title; but only a mere expectancy. Nelson v. Staff (1618), Cro. Jac. 422. Humphrys v. Stanfeild, vel Stridfield (1638), Cro. Car. 469; Godb. 451; Sir Wm. Jones, 388; 1 Roll. Abr. 38. Turner v. Sterling (1671), 2 Vent. 26; Anon., 1 Roll. Abr. 37. Banister v. Banister (1683), 4 Rep. 17. The defendant falsely represented to the bailiff of a manor that a sheep of the plaintiff was an estray, in consequence of which it was wrongfully seized. Held, that an action on the case lay against him. Newman v. Zachary, Aleyn, 3. The plaintiff was desirous to sell his lands to any one who would buy them, when the defendant said that the plaintiff had mortgaged all his lands for 1007., and that he had no power to sell or let the same. No special damage being shown, judgment was stayed. It was not proved that any one intending to buy plaintiff's lands heard defendant speak the words. Manning v. Avery (1674), 3 Keb. 153; 1 Vin. Abr. 553. The plaintiff was possessed of tithes which he desired to sell; the defendant falsely and maliciously said, "His right and title thereunto is nought, and I have a better title than he." As special damage it was alleged that the plaintiff "was likely to sell, and was injured by the words; and that by reason of the defendant's speaking the words, the plaintiff could not recover his tithes." Held, insufficient. Cane v. Golding (1649), Style, 169, 176. Law v. Harwood (1629), Sir Wm. Jones, 196; Palm. 529; Cro. The plaintiff was the assignee of a beneficial lease, which he expected would realize 1007. But the defendant, the superior landlord, came to the sale, and stated publicly, "The whole of the covenants of this lease are broken, and I have served notice of ejectment; the premises will cost £70 to put them in repair." In consequence of this statement the property fetched only 35 guineas. Rolfe, B., left to the jury only one question-Was the defendant's statement true or false? and they found a verdict for the plaintiff; damages, £40. But the Court of Exchequer granted a new trial on the ground that two other questions ought to have been left to the jury as well :-Was the statement or any part of it made maliciously? and, Did the special damage arise from such malicious statement or from such part of it as was malicious? Brook v. Rawl, 4 Exch. 521; 19 L. J. Ex. 114. And see Smith v. Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246. Watson v. Reynolds, Moo. & Mal. 1. An advertisement was sent to the Wolverhampton Chronicle in the ordinary course of business and published once on January 6th, 1868. It was as follows:-"Important notice. Horsehill Estate. The public are respectfully requested not to buy any property formerly belonging to A., B., and C., without ascertaining that the title deeds of the same are correct; as the heirs are not dead nor abroad, but are still alive." This estate was at that moment adver tised for sale in building lots; but this advertisement revived all previous doubts about plaintiff's title, and rendered the estate practically unsaleable. On January 13th plaintiff wrote and complained of this advertisement, and asked for the name and address of the person who sent it to the paper. This the proprietor of the paper at once furnished; but on January 30th he was served with a writ. On February 10th he inserted an apology. But the jury, under the direction of Keating, J., found for the plaintiff. Ravenhill v. Upcott, 33 J. P. 299. The plaintiff held 160 shares in a silver mine in Cornwall, which he said were worth £100,000. Tollervey and Hayward each filed a bill in Chancery against the plaintiff and others claiming certain shares in the mine, and praying for an account and an injunction, and for the appointment of a receiver. To these bills plaintiff demurred. Before the demurrers came on for hearing, a paragraph appeared in the defendants' newspaper to the effect that the demurrers had been overruled, that an injunction had been granted, that a receiver had been duly appointed, and had actually arrived at the mine; all of which was quite untrue. A verdict having been obtained for the plaintiff, damages £5, the Court of Common Pleas arrested judgment on the ground that there was no sufficient allegation of special damage, and this, although the declaration contained averments to the effect that "the plaintiff is injured in his rights; and the shares so possessed by him, and in which he is interested, have been and are much depreciated and lessened in value; and divers persons have believed and do believe that he has little or no right to the shares, and that the mine cannot be lawfully worked or used for his benefit; and that he hath been hindered and prevented from selling or disposing of his said shares in the said mine, and from working and using the same in so ample and beneficial a manner as he otherwise would have done." Malachy v. Super and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723; 2 Hodges, 217. And see Hart and another v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373, ante, p. 32. It is not actionable for any man to assert his own rights at any time. And even where the defendant fails to prove such right on investigation, still if at the time he spoke he bona fide supposed such right to exist, no action lies. (Carr v. Duckett, 5 H. & N. 783; 29 L. J. Ex. 468.) Hence, whenever a man claims a right or title in himself, in possession or in remainder, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that he had no such right; he must also give evidence of express malice (Smith v. Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246); that is, he must also attempt to show that the defendant could not honestly have believed in the existence of the right he claimed, or at least that he had no reason able or probable cause for so believing. If there appear no reasonable or probable cause for his claim of title, still the jury are not bound to find malice; the defendant may have acted stupidly, yet from an innocent motive. (Pitt v. Donovan, 1 M. & S. 648; Steward v. Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168; Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694.) But in all cases where it appears that the defendant at the time he spoke knew that what he said was false, the jury should certainly find malice; lies which injure another cannot be told bonâ fide. (Waterer v. Freeman, Hob. 266.) The law is the same where the defendant is an agent or attorney, and claims for his principal or client a title which he honestly believes him to possess. (Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2422; Steward v. Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168.) So where a man bona fide asserts a title in his father or other near relative to whom he or his wife is heir apparent. (Pitt v. Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639; Gutsole v. Mathers, 1 M. & W. 495; 5 Dowl. 69; 2 Gale, 64; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 694.) But where the defendant makes no claim at all for himself or any connection of his, but asserts a title in some one who is a stranger to him, here he clearly is meddling in a matter which does not concern him; and such officious and unnecessary interference will be deemed malicious. (Pennyman v. Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427; 1 Vin. Abr. 551; Mildmay et ux. v. Standish, 1 Rep. 177 b; Cro. Eliz. 34; Moore, 144; Jenkins's Centuries, 247.) "If some portions of the statement which a person makes are bona fide, but others are malâ fide, and occasion injury to another, the injured party cannot recover damages unless he can distinctly trace the damage as resulting from that part which is made malá fide." (Per Parke, B., in Brook v. Rawl, 4 Ex. 524.) So if part be true and part false. (Ib. 523.) Illustrations. Plaintiff had purchased the manor and castle of H. in fee from Lord Audley, and was about to demise them to Ralph Egerton for a term of twenty-two years, when the defendant, a widow, said, "I have a lease of the castle and manor of H. for ninety years;" and she showed him what purported to be a lease from a former Lord Audley to her husband for a term of ninety years. This lease was a forgery; and the defendant knew it. Held, that an action lay for slander of title; though the defendant had claimed a right to the property herself. It would have been otherwise had she not known that the lease was a forgery. Sir G. Gerard v. Dickenson, 4 Rep. 18; Cro. Eliz. 197. And see Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 116 (B. & D.). Lovett v. Weller, 1 Roll. R. 409. If the defendant asserts that plaintiff is a bastard, and that he himself is the next heir, no action lies. Banister v. Banister (1683), 4 Rep. 17. Cane v. Golding (1649), Styles, 169, 176. The plaintiff put up for sale by public auction eight unfinished houses in Agar Town. The defendant, a surveyor of roads appointed under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 84, had previously insisted that these houses were not being built by the plaintiff in conformity with the Act. He now attended the sale and stated publicly, "My object in attending the sale is to inform purchasers, if there are any present, that I shall not allow the houses to be finished until the roads are made good. I have no power to compel the purchasers to complete the roads; but I have power to prevent them from completing the houses until the roads are made good." In consequence only two of the carcasses were sold; and they realized only £35 each, instead of £65. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for £18 12s. But the Court of Common Pleas held that there was no evidence of malice to go to the jury. For malice is not to be inferred from the circumstance of the defendant having acted upon an incorrect view of his duty, founded upon an erroneous construction of the statute. Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 831; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370. Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2422. Plaintiff held lands on lease from Home, which he put up for sale. Defendant, who was Home's attorney, attended and said publicly before the first lot was put up, "There is a suit depending in the Court of Chancery in respect to this property; encroachments have been made; proceedings will be taken against the purchaser; there is no power to sell the premises; a good title cannot be made," &c. Littledale, J., directed the jury that defendant was not liable, if he bona fide, though without authority, raised such objections only as Home, if present, might lawfully have raised. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, one farthing. Watson v. Reynolds, Moo. & Mal. 1. Pawley v. Scratton, 3 Times L. R. 146. The plaintiff was the widow and administratrix of her deceased husband, and advertised a sale of some of his property. Defendant, an old friend of the husband, thereupon put an advertisement in the papers offering a reward for the production of the will of the deceased. The defendant subsequently called on the solicitor of the deceased, and was assured by him there was no will; but, in spite of this, the defendant attended at the sale and made statements which effectually prevented any person present from bidding. After waiting twelve months, the plaintiff again put the same property up for sale, and defendant again stopped the auction. Cockburn, C. J., left it to the jury to say whether, after the interview with the plaintiff's solicitor, defendant could still possess an honest and reasonable belief that the deceased had left a will. The jury found that he had not that belief. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £54 78. Atkins v. Perrin, 3 F. & F. 179. A. died possessed of furniture in a beer-shop. His widow, without taking out administration, continued in possession of the beer-shop for three or four years, and then died, having whilst so in possession conveyed all the furniture by bill of sale to her landlords by way of security for a debt she had contracted with them. After the widow's death, the plaintiff took out letters of administration to the estate of A., and informed the defendant, the landlord's agent, that the bill of sale was invalid, as the widow had no title to the furniture. Subsequently the plaintiff was about to sell the furniture by auction, when the defendant interposed to forbid the sale, and said that he claimed the goods for his principals under a bill of sale. On proof of these facts, in an action for slander of title, the plaintiff was nonsuited. Held, that the mere fact of the defendant's having been told before the sale that the bill of sale was invalid, was no evidence of malice to be left to the jury, and that the plaintiff was therefore properly nonsuited. Steward v. Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168. And see Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290. The defendant wrongfully and maliciously caused certain persons who had agreed to sell goods to the plaintiff to refuse to deliver them, by asserting that he had a lien upon them, and ordering those persons to retain the goods until further orders from him, he well knowing at the time that he had no lien. Held, that the action was maintainable, though the persons who had the goods were under no legal obligation to obey the orders of the defendant, and their refusal was their own spontaneous act. Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 369; 10 Jur. 917. The lessee of an hotel agreed to sell her lease and certain valuable tenant's fixtures to Turner. Defendant, the assignee of the lessor, thereupon gave notice to Turner that he claimed most of the fixtures as landlord's fixtures, and that if Turner bought them, he would have to give them up at the end of the term or pay defendant for them. Held, that no action lay, for there was no evidence of malice, although defendant had no present property in the goods. Baker and others v. Piper, 2 Times L. R. 733. Patents, &c. The defendant had a subsisting patent for the manufacture of spooling machines; so had the plaintiff. The defendant wrote to certain manufacturers, customers of the plaintiff, warning them against using the plaintiff's machine, on the ground that it was an infringement of the defendant's patent. Held, that "the action could not lie unless the plaintiff affirmatively proved that the defendant's claim was not a bona fide claim in support of a right which, with or without cause, he fancied he had, but a malá fide and malicious attempt to injure the plaintiff by asserting a claim of right against his own knowledge |