he be punished by the advice of the council, notwithstanding the said statutes." (12 Rich. II. c. 11.)

Although by these statutes no civil remedy is expressly given, yet the violation of these provisions entitles the great men of the realm to sue for damages, on the well-known principle that if A. does an act expressly prohibited by statute, whereby B. is prejudiced, A. must compensate B. for such private injury. A. will also be liable to imprisonment for contempt on the information of the AttorneyGeneral.

All peers, whether of Great Britain or of Scotland (5 Anne, c. 8, s. 23), are within the statute; including a viscount, though such a title of honour was unknown when the statute was passed. (Viscount Say & Seal v. Stephens, Cro. Car. 135; Ley, 82.) The King himself is within the 3 Edw. I. c. 34 (12 Rep. 133); but not within 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 5, not being "a great man" of his own realm. (Cromp. Author. 19, 35.) A peeress is not within either statute. (Cromp. Author. 34.) A baron of the Exchequer (and now any judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature) is within the statutes. Of course the rank or dignity which entitles the plaintiff to sue in scandalum magnatum must have been attained before the words complained of were published.

Although the words of the statute are "horrible and false lies," yet they have been strained to cover words which in no way affect the life or dignity of the peer, but which are merely uncivil expressions, expressing general disesteem for his lordship. For it is alleged that such expressions, though not likely to result in general discord, and the "quick subversion of the realm," yet impugn and vilify the honour of the nobles, and tend to provoke to a breach of the peace. (But see the remarks of Atkins, J., in 2 Mod. 161-165. Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes.) The words also were supposed to echo through the kingdom, being spoken of a peer of the realm; and the plaintiff therefore had this further privilege, that he could lay the venue where he pleased, and was not bound, like an ordinary plaintiff, to try in the county where the words were spoken.

Illustration.

Words complained of :—“ I value my Lord Marquess of Dorchester no more than I value the dog at my foot." Held, that the action was well laid in scandalum magnatum, the plaintiff being a marquess. But a private person would have had no action for such words without proof of special damage, as they merely show the esteem in which the defendant held him.

Proby v. Marquess of Dorchester (in error), 1 Levinz, 148.

Lord Falkland v. Phipps, 2 Comyns, 439; 1 Vin. Abr. 549.

But the civil proceeding under these statutes is now quite obsolete. This may be, as alleged in Russell on Crimes (5th ed. vol. iii. p. 203, n.), because the nobility prefer "to waive their privileges in any action of slander, and to stand upon the same footing, with respect to civil remedies, as their fellow subjects." Or it may possibly be due to the decision in Lord Peterborough v. Williams, 2 Shower, 506 (or in Butt's ed. p. 650), that in scandalum magnatum no costs are to be given to the plaintiff, though the verdict be for him. I believe no such action has been brought since 1710. (The Duke of Richmond v. Costelow, 11 Mod. 235.)

CHAPTER V.

SLANDER OF TITLE, OR WORDS CONCERNING THINGS.

WORDS cannot be defamatory unless they directly affect some person; either in his individual capacity, or in his office, profession, or trade. Sometimes no doubt an attack on a thing may be an indirect attack upon an individual; and may therefore be actionable, as defamatory of him. Thus where the defendant said of the plaintiff, "He is a cheat; he has nothing but rotten goods in his shop;" this was rightly held a slander on the plaintiff in the way of his trade (Barnet v. Wells (1700), 12 Mod. 420); for the words clearly imputed that the plaintiff was aware of the unsatisfactory condition of his wares, and yet continued to foist them on the public. So to charge a tradesman with wilfully adulterating the goods he sells is clearly an attack on him as well as on his goods, and would therefore be actionable without special damage. (Jesson v. Hayes (1636), Roll. Abr. 63. See also Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 478, and other cases cited ante, pp. 30-32.)

But wholly apart from these cases there is a branch of the law (generally known by the inappropriate but convenient name-Slander of Title) which permits an action to be brought against any one who maliciously decries the plaintiff's goods or some other thing belonging to him, and thereby produces special damage to the plaintiff. This is obviously no part of the law of defamation, for the plaintiff's reputation remains uninjured; it is really an action

on the case for maliciously acting in such a way as to inflict loss upon the plaintiff. All the preceding rules dispensing with proof of malice and special damage are therefore wholly inapplicable to cases of this kind. Here, as in all other actions on the case, there must be et damnum et injuria. The injuria consists in the unlawful words maliciously spoken, and the damnum is the consequent money loss to the plaintiff.

I. Slander of Title proper.

Where the plaintiff possesses an estate or interest in any real or personal property, an action lies against any one who maliciously comes forward and falsely denies or impugns the plaintiff's title thereto, if thereby damage follows to the plaintiff. (Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 869; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370.)

The statement must be false; if there be such a flaw in the title as the defendant asserted, no action lies. And it is for the plaintiff to prove it false, not for the defendant to prove it true. (Burnett v. Tak, 45 L. T. 743). And the statement must be malicious; if it be made in the bona fide assertion of defendant's own right, real or supposed, to the property, no action lies. But whenever a man unnecessarily intermeddles with the affairs of others with which he is wholly unconcerned, such officious interference will be deemed malicious and he will be liable, if damage follow. Lastly, special damage must be proved, and shown to have arisen from defendant's words. And for this it is generally necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was in the act of selling his property either by public auction or private treaty, and that the defendant by his words prevented an intending purchaser from bidding or completing. (Tasburgh v. Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Lowe v. Harewood, Sir W. Jones, 196; Cro. Car. 140.) So proof that plaintiff wished to let his lands and that the defendant prevented

an intending tenant from taking a lease will be sufficient. But a mere apprehension that plaintiff's title might be drawn in question, or that the neighbours placed a lower value on plaintiff's lands in their own minds in consequence, the same not being offered for sale, will not be sufficient evidence of damage. "This action lieth not but by reason of the prejudice in the sale." (Per Fenner, J., in Bold v. Bacon, Cro. Eliz. 346.) The special damage must always be such as naturally or reasonably arises from the use of the words. (Haddon v. Lott, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 49; see post, c. X. p. 325. But see Pawley v. Scratton, 3 Times L. R. 146.)

It makes no difference whether the defendant's words be spoken or written or printed; save as affecting the damages, which should be larger where the publication is more permanent or extensive, as by advertisement. (Malachy v. Soper and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723.)

The property may be either real or personal; and the plaintiff's interest therein may be either in possession or reversion. It need not be even a vested interest, so long as it is anything that is saleable or that has a market value.

Illustrations.

Lands were settled on D. in tail, remainder to the plaintiff in fee. D. being an old man and childless, plaintiff was about to sell his remainder to A., when the defendant interfered and asserted that D. had issue. A. consequently refused to buy. Held, that the action lay.

Bliss v. Stafford, Owen, 37; Moore, 188; Jenk. 247.

The plaintiff's father being tenant-in-tail of certain lands, which he was about to sell, the purchaser offered the plaintiff a sum of money to join in the assurance so as to estop him from attempting to set aside the deed, should he ever succeed to the estate tail; but the defendant told the purchaser that the plaintiff was a bastard, wherefore he refused to give the plaintiff anything for his signature. Held, that the plaintiff had a cause of action, though he was the youngest son of his father, and his chance of succeeding was therefore remote.

Vaughan v. Ellis, Cro. Jac. 213.

Plaintiff succeeded to certain lands as heir-at-law; the defendant asserted that plaintiff was a bastard; plaintiff was in consequence put to great expense to defend his title.

Elborow v. Allen, Cro. Jac. 642.

To call a man a bastard while his father or other ancestor is alive may be actionable on general principles, if special damage ensue, such as the loss of a