money to be transferred," was held not too wide; for such would be the meaning conveyed to readers by the defendant's insinuation. Turner v. Meryweather, 7 C. B. 251; 18 L. J. C. P. 155; 13 Jur. 683; 19 L. J. C. P. 10. If asterisks be put instead of the name of the party libelled, it is sufficient that those who know the plaintiff should be able to gather from the libel that he is the person meant; it is not necessary that all the world should understand it, so long as the meaning of the paragraph is clear to the plaintiff's acquaintances. Bourke v. Warren, 2 C. & P. 307. Some libellous verses were written about "L--y, the Bum;" the Court was satisfied in spite of the finding of the jury that the words related to the plaintiff, a sheriff's officer. Levi v. Milne, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418. "All the libellers of the kingdom know now that printing initial letters will not serve the turn, for that objection has been long got over." Per Lord Hardwicke in Roach v. Garvan, Re Read and Huggonson (1742), 2 Atk. 470; 2 Dick. 794. "His name was O'B." (meaning thereby the plaintiff). This was held sufficient in O'Brien v. Clement, 16 M. & W. 159; 16 L. J. Ex. 77. To say, "I have seen women steal yarn before" may amount to a charge of larceny against some particular woman now; provided there be proper averments in the pleadings and sufficient evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the trial. Hart v. Coy, 40 Ind. 553. To say, "I believe that will to be a rank forgery" may be a slander on the solicitor who prepared it and attested the signature. Seaman v. Netherclift, 1 C. P. D. 540; 45 L. J. C. P. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878. There appeared in Mist's Weekly Journal an account professedly of certain intrigues, &c. at the Persian Court, really, at the English. The late King George I. was described under the name of " Merewits," George II. appeared as "Esreff," the Queen as "Sultana," while a most engaging portrait was drawn of the Pretender under the name of "Sophi." It was objected on behalf of the prisoner that there was no evidence that the author intended his seemingly harmless tale to be thus interpreted and applied: but the Court held that they must give it the same meaning as the generality of readers would undoubtedly put upon it. R. v. Clerk (1729), 1 Barnard. 304. If the defendant says "A. or B." committed such a felony, both A. and B. or either of them can sue, for both are brought into suspicion. Anon., 1 Roll. Abr. 81. Ingalls v. Allen, 1 Breese, 233. In Falkner v. If a man says "My brother," or "my enemy" is perjured, and hath only one brother or one enemy, such brother or enemy can sue; but if he says, One of my brothers is perjured," and he hath several brothers, no one of them can sue [without special circumstances to show to which one he referred]. Jones v. Davers, Cro. Eliz. 497; 1 Roll. Abr. 74. Wiseman v. Wiseman, Cro. Jac. 107. But where seventeen men were indicted for conspiracy, and A. said, “These defendants are those that helped to murder Henry Farrer," each one of the defendants can bring a separate action as much as if they each had been specially named. Foxcroft v. Lacy, Hobart, 89; 1 Roll. Abr. 75. Defendant wrote and published of plaintiff, a bookseller: "The man at the sign of the Bible is no slouch at swearing to an old story." The sign over plaintiff's shop was a book, lettered "Bible," and he had recently given evidence against defendant in another action. Held, that he could recover. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (New York) 214. A. said to B., "One of us two is perjured," B. answered "It is not I," and A. replied, “I am sure it is not I." B. can sue A. for charging him with perjury. Coe v. Chambers, 1 Roll. Abr. 75; Vin. Abr. c. b. 4. The defendant wrote and published that his hat had been stolen by some of the members of No. 12 Hose Company. This Hose Company was a volunteer fire brigade unincorporated, and the members brought a joint action. Held, that the action could not be maintained, and that the defendant could not be compelled to declare to which individual members he referred. Girand v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith (New York City Common Pleas), 337. So if a man says to the plaintiff's servant, "Thy master Brown hath robbed me," Brown can sue; for it shall not be intended that the person addressed had more than one master of the name of Brown. So if the defendant had said, "Thy master," simpliciter; or to a son, "Thy father; " to a wife, "Thy husband." Per Haughton, J., in Lewes v. Walter (1617), 3 Bulstr. 226. But if the defendant said to a master, "One of thy servants hath robbed me," in the absence of special circumstances no one could sue; for it is not apparent who is the person slandered. James v. Rutlech, 4 Rep. 17. So where a party in a cause said to three men who had just given evidence against him, "One of you three is perjured," no action lies. Sir John Bourn's Case, cited Cro. Eliz. 497. Where the defendant said to his companion B., "He that goeth before thee is perjured," the plaintiff can sue, if he aver and prove that he was the person who was at that moment walking before B. Aish v. Gerish, 1 Roll. Abr. 81. A libel was published on a "diabolical character," who, "like Polyphemus, the man-eater, has but one eye, and is well known to all persons acquainted with the name of a certain noble circumnavigator." The plaintiff had but one eye, and his name was I'Anson; so it was clear that he was the person referred to. I'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; 2 Smith's L. Cas. (6th ed.), 57, [omitted in 7th and 8th eds.]. Fleetwood v. Curl, Cro. Jac. 557; Hob. 268. In a recent case the libel did not name the person alluded to; but described him " as a man of high descent, who has been regarded as a man not only of refined tastes and studious habits, but as an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability." The relator swore that he believed that the libel was intended to refer to himself. The Duke of Sutherland and others of his friends considered that it would be generally understood as applying to him; and a rule was granted. But upon the argument of the rule, the publisher and the author of the libel both swore positively that the relator was not the person referred to, and that they were not in fact aware that he was either a man of refined tastes and studious habits, or an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability. And the rule was therefore discharged. R. V. Barnard, Ex parte Lord R. Gower, 43 J. P. 127. Words defamatory of A. may in some cases be also indirectly defamatory of B. Illustrations. Where a married man was called "cuckold" in the City of London, his wife could sue; for it was tantamount to calling her "whore." Vicars v. Worth, 1 Stra. 471. Hodgkins et ux. v. Corbet et ux., 1 Stra. 545. Slander addressed to plaintiff's wife :-" You are a nuisance to live beside of. You are a bawd; and your house is no better than a bawdy-house." Held, that the plaintiff could maintain the action without joining his wife, and without proving special damage; because if in fact his wife did keep a bawdy-house, the plaintiff could be indicted for it. Huckle v. Reynolds, 7 C. B. N. S. 114. Where the words prima facie apply only to a thing, and not to a person, still if the owner of the thing can show that the words substantially reflect upon him, he may sue, without giving proof of special damage and without proving malice. Illustration. To write and publish that plaintiff's ship is unseaworthy and has been sold to the Jews to carry convicts, is a libel upon the plaintiff in the way of his business, as well as upon his ship. Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; 8 Solomon v. Lawson, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796, and other cases cited ante, pp. 30—32, 81. CHAPTER IV. SCANDALUM MAGNATUM. By virtue of certain ancient statutes, words which would not be actionable, if spoken of an ordinary subject, are actionable, if spoken of a peer of the realm, or of a judge, or of any of the great officers of the Crown, even without proof of any special damage. It has been maintained that this privilege existed at the common law, independently of any statute; and passages are generally cited from Reports in support of this opinion. But in the passages relied on, Lord Coke is, I think, referring to criminal, and not to civil, proceedings. And such a distinction between nobles and commoners appears to me alien to the spirit of our common law. The following are the statutes referred to:-" Forasmuch as there have been oftentimes found in the country devisors of tales, whereby discord or occasion of discord, hath many times arisen between the King and his people, or great men of this realm; for the damage that hath and may thereof ensue; it is commanded, that from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander, may grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm; and he that doth so, shall be taken and kept in prison, until he hath brought him into the Court, which was the first author of the tale." 3 Edw. I. Stat. Westminster I. c. 34.) 66 Item, of devisors of false news, and of horrible and false lyes, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also of the chancellor, treasurer, clerk of the privy seal, steward of the King's house, justices of the one bench or of the other, and of other great officers of the realm, of things which by the said prelates, lords, nobles and officers aforesaid, were never spoken, done, nor thought, in great slander of the said prelates, lords, nobles, and officers, whereby debates and discords might arise betwixt the said lords, or between the lords and the commons, which God forbid, and whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided: It is straitly defended upon grievous pain, for to eschew the said damages and perils, that from henceforth none be so hardy to devise, speak, or to tell any false news, lyes, or such other false things, of prelates, lords, and of other aforesaid, whereof discord or any slander might rise within the same realm; and he that doth the same shall incur and have the pain another time ordained thereof by the Statute of Westminster the First, which will, that he be taken and imprisoned till he have found him of whom the word was moved." (2 Rich. II. st. I. c. 5.) "Item, whereas it is contained, as well in the Statute of Westminster the First, as in the statute made at Gloucester, the second year of the reign of our lord the King that now is, that none be so hardy to invent, to say, or to tell any false news, lies, or such other false things, of the prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also of the chancellor, treasurer, clerk of the privy seal, the steward of the King's house, the justice of the one bench or of the other, and other great officers of the realm, and he that doth so shall be taken and imprisoned, till he hath found him of whom the speech shall be moved: It is accorded and agreed in this Parliament, that when any such is taken and imprisoned, and cannot find him by whom the speech be moved, as before is said, that |